As the stomach churns.
Much obliged P2, as time slips away it is important to remember the size, scope and implications of the Pel-Air investigational aberration. The accident itself never really had ‘star status’ and, had the investigation been remotely ‘Kosher’ then it would have served as a grim reminder, the tombstone bearing the legend only dragged out for training purposes.
But that investigation has been proven to not only be flawed, but tainted with the stench of something which, IMO, resembles the outright corruption of all regulatory and investigative tenets. The Senate inquiry committee certainly got a whiff of it; the good Rev Forsyth almost gagged on it; and yet the party continues, unabated to this day.
The Pel-Air ‘fuel policy’ is but one example of a total failure of the safety net system. The failure begins within the company operations manual and ends with the ATSB being satisfied that ‘suitable’ corrections had been made and that it was ‘safe’ for continued operational use. BOLLOCKS.
This 'policy' is typical of normalized deviance, writ by the company, approved by CASA, supported by ATSB. For starters, whoever wrote version one should be pilloried, it is barely compliant with the regulation and of no value whatsoever to an operating aircrew. That this ‘policy was accepted by CASA as part of the approval for the issue of an Air Operators Certificate, stand alone, is grounds for serious examination of the FOI responsible and questions the approval of the chief pilot who either wrote it – or; accepted the policy as being suitable for the proposed operations. Version 1 may, just, have been acceptable as a primer for private pilot navigation training, if supported by extensive briefing; but as a working tool, for long range operations in jet aircraft -. Very few professional airmen would be prepared to work under such a thing.
The second iteration, Version 2 is a simple rehash of V1 and equally dangerous, operationally and legally as the first. This version was deemed, by the CASA, supported by ATSB to be righteous. BOLLOCKS.
Once you realize that the fatally flawed fuel policy is only a very small, but easily understood part of the whole failure of both CASA and ATSB to ‘do their job’, it follows that any further investigation by either agency will be equally as flawed as the first.
If the ATSB ever get around to releasing the report it will reflect this as fact, in each of what is expected to be a 300 (+/- 50) page epistle, which will do little except dilute and obfuscate the radical problem. If you take a simple thing like a fuel policy and examine the system which allowed it to effectively become ‘law’ the depth and breadth of the abject failure of the Australian ‘safety net’, one of the world most expensive, becomes abundantly clear. No one; not the chief pilot, the CASA or the ATSB gives a monkey’s about preventing a crew for running short of fuel, for wont of guidance and clarity. No, but the useless policy 'satisfied' regulatory requirements just fine.
MTF is a very safe bet; the tales from the West-wind factory alone will provide a year’s worth of pure entertainment; I know they are still laughing.
Aye well; I’ve just finished knitting my party hat, I used acceptable, suitable and departure alternates as a base, added a little cross checking, some PNR, a dash of operational control and some rather pretty little warning bells – just for show.
For an example of what to expect from the ATSB – see here.
Toot toot.
Much obliged P2, as time slips away it is important to remember the size, scope and implications of the Pel-Air investigational aberration. The accident itself never really had ‘star status’ and, had the investigation been remotely ‘Kosher’ then it would have served as a grim reminder, the tombstone bearing the legend only dragged out for training purposes.
But that investigation has been proven to not only be flawed, but tainted with the stench of something which, IMO, resembles the outright corruption of all regulatory and investigative tenets. The Senate inquiry committee certainly got a whiff of it; the good Rev Forsyth almost gagged on it; and yet the party continues, unabated to this day.
The Pel-Air ‘fuel policy’ is but one example of a total failure of the safety net system. The failure begins within the company operations manual and ends with the ATSB being satisfied that ‘suitable’ corrections had been made and that it was ‘safe’ for continued operational use. BOLLOCKS.
This 'policy' is typical of normalized deviance, writ by the company, approved by CASA, supported by ATSB. For starters, whoever wrote version one should be pilloried, it is barely compliant with the regulation and of no value whatsoever to an operating aircrew. That this ‘policy was accepted by CASA as part of the approval for the issue of an Air Operators Certificate, stand alone, is grounds for serious examination of the FOI responsible and questions the approval of the chief pilot who either wrote it – or; accepted the policy as being suitable for the proposed operations. Version 1 may, just, have been acceptable as a primer for private pilot navigation training, if supported by extensive briefing; but as a working tool, for long range operations in jet aircraft -. Very few professional airmen would be prepared to work under such a thing.
The second iteration, Version 2 is a simple rehash of V1 and equally dangerous, operationally and legally as the first. This version was deemed, by the CASA, supported by ATSB to be righteous. BOLLOCKS.
Once you realize that the fatally flawed fuel policy is only a very small, but easily understood part of the whole failure of both CASA and ATSB to ‘do their job’, it follows that any further investigation by either agency will be equally as flawed as the first.
If the ATSB ever get around to releasing the report it will reflect this as fact, in each of what is expected to be a 300 (+/- 50) page epistle, which will do little except dilute and obfuscate the radical problem. If you take a simple thing like a fuel policy and examine the system which allowed it to effectively become ‘law’ the depth and breadth of the abject failure of the Australian ‘safety net’, one of the world most expensive, becomes abundantly clear. No one; not the chief pilot, the CASA or the ATSB gives a monkey’s about preventing a crew for running short of fuel, for wont of guidance and clarity. No, but the useless policy 'satisfied' regulatory requirements just fine.
MTF is a very safe bet; the tales from the West-wind factory alone will provide a year’s worth of pure entertainment; I know they are still laughing.
Aye well; I’ve just finished knitting my party hat, I used acceptable, suitable and departure alternates as a base, added a little cross checking, some PNR, a dash of operational control and some rather pretty little warning bells – just for show.
For an example of what to expect from the ATSB – see here.
Toot toot.