[Peetwo]

In the aftermath -

For obvious reasons I thought the following posts - off the Accidents - OS thread - worth regurgitating here... :

Update 05/12/16: The knock on effect of poor NAA oversight.

Update 08/12/16:
Via Fox News Latino:

Bolivia arrests Lamia Airlines chief after lack of fuel caused crash that killed 71 people
Published December 06, 2016

The implications of survival in AAI -

The following is an excellent article by Joseph Wheeler (courtesy the Oz) which considers the implications for survivors and the further psychological trauma they are exposed to post accident/incident:

Colombia air disaster survivors endure hearing crash tapes

• Joseph Wheeler
  
• The Australian
  
• 12:00AM December 9, 2016
  

Imagine surviving a catastrophic airline disaster and then having to listen to the news playing sound recordings of those last moments of terror.

It is something the survivors of last week’s air crash tragedy in Colombia regrettably will have to endure.

The crash will long be remembered for the deeply disturbing tapes that have been released outside the context of an official Annex 13 air accident investigation. The nation of Brazil mourns, the sporting world mourns; and the world of air accident investigation mourns the irretrievable cost of leaks of such sensitive recorded information which, properly decoded in context, will be one of the keys to properly determining just what went wrong.

It is not often that there are survivors to such disasters and their evidence about the aircraft’s final flight will also be important in settling the actual events that led to the accident. But think of the life that awaits them: injured, scarred, and robbed of sleep by the moments of terror and sights imprinted into their minds — sights that no one should ever see.

Their futures may be marred by a single night in November when disaster struck, and publicly available information that should never have been made free for all to hear — particularly those recovering as survivors of the crash itself.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the world many others experienced a similar kind of terror — the shock precipitated by reportedly severe turbulence that injured seven people as they came to land in Sydney on an Air China flight.

Is there anything in common with the two events as markedly separated as they were in location and cause? It turns out that precisely the same international law potentially applies to both incidents to control the liability of the respective air carriers for death, and injury. In some ways it seems anomalous that a charter flight in South America, a simple point-to-point operation should be in the same category as an international airline’s long-haul flight from Asia to Australia — but the law was designed to make it simpler for those involved to access justice.

In both cases those injured or the families of the victims have recourse against the carrier by way of strict liability (meaning negligence does not need to be proven) with compensation payable to them essentially limited only by their proven financial losses.

In both cases, the essential element of the law applying is the fact that a contract of carriage was in place and the carriage was “international”.

There is a major battle in international air law over the specific circumstances when compensation may be paid for psychiatric injury by air carriers for surviving air passengers — and it is happening in Australia.

The case arises out of the 2009 ditching near Norfolk Island of a medevac aircraft operated between Samoa and Melbourne. Nurse Karen Casey is battling for the right to compensation for her mental injuries, particularly post traumatic stress disorder as a species of “bodily injury” rather than “pure” psychiatric injury.

The distinction is an important one and, because of the nature of international air law, the results of the appeal, presently being decided after a hearing in late November, will certainly have implications for claims made by those survivors who suffer PTSD.

If the appeal succeeds, then the prospect of compensation for PTSD following the terror of surviving an air accident will be lost; if the appeal is dismissed, the decision opens the way for those suffering PTSD (whether in Australia, following severe turbulence, or the jungles of South America, following a crash) to hold the air carrier accountable for the very real mental anguish suffered.

Joseph Wheeler is the principal of IALPG, national head of aviation law at Maurice Blackburn Lawyers, and aviation legal counsel to the Australian Federation of Air Pilots.

MTF...P2

Well said Mr. Wheeler.

It is most refreshing to read an accurate, concise summary on air accident aftermath, in particular on the legal ramifications. If – gods forbid – but if Australia looses an aircraft the wise words spoken, warning government, will return to haunt.

The world wide aviation industry tries, very hard, to learn the lessons, writ in blood and fire taught by every accident and incident. Nearly every occurrence bring about ‘change’ – in one form or another – as the reasons for the event become clear. Government seems to avoid taking these essential steps, living in a fools paradise, believing it cannot happen here.

Granted, the percentage chances are low, but we have come awfully close the abyss, several times in the last few years and it is a numbers game. The government rump, like it or not, is well and truly exposed. Simply denying that any government agency could be part of the causal chain will not withstand, nor satisfy close examination. There are enough loose ends in the government's knitting to keep a quarrel of lawyers gainfully employed for many years.

The crash in Brazil for example seems, from information available, simple enough to fathom. The aircraft ran out of fuel; pilot error plain and simple. But – the penalties for carrying insufficient reserve failed to act as a deterrent – however; those for declaring a fuel emergency did not fail. Had the crew ‘declared’ they may, just, have squeaked into an area suitable for a survivable landing. Sure, its debatable, but the reality is stark.  The ‘law’ failed to prevent an accident; twice.  It is this failing which must be addressed; more bad law heaped on existing bad law simply creates anarchy. The intent cannot be prevented by the written word. Never could: well, not before the fact anyway.

Toot toot.

While we are at it for the record (& for those who missed it), Senator Xenophon's Estimates QON for an update to the ATSB PelAir cover-up reinvestigation was actually answered by the due date. However the AQON was just a copy off the ATSB website's latest obfuscated bollocks update:

ATTACHMENT A

The investigation team is now finalising the draft report and has started an internal review process. Once the internal review is completed, the report will be handed to the ATSB Commission for their consideration and approval. The ATSB will then provide the draft report to directly involved parties for their comment and feedback. Given the broad-ranging and complex nature of the investigation, and the size of the report, the draft report is now expected to be released to directly involved parties in early 2017.

The investigation process has required a cycle of continuing review of the evidence and the acquisition of new evidence as knowledge gaps and new lines of enquiry have been identified. Further, the ATSB has not sought to confine the scope of the reopened Norfolk Island investigation in the way that it normally would to manage its overall investigation outputs recognising the interests of all parties involved, as well as the Senate Inquiry and the Canadian Transportation Safety Board review of the original ATSB investigation.

A significant amount of detail is required to explain the findings, which are based on a rigorous application of the ATSB’s analysis methodology. To date, the investigation team has acquired and analysed an extensive range of evidence as part of the new investigation. This includes:

• reviewing evidence from the ATSB’s original investigation, and obtaining and reviewing evidence from CASA’s investigation of the accident, CASA’s special audit conducted soon after the accident

• recovering and analysing data from the aircraft’s flight recorders

• re-interviewing the flight crew and medical crew from the accident flight, and conducting over 30 additional interviews, including with 14 Pel-Air Westwind pilots, eight other Pel-Air personnel and six CASA personnel

• obtaining and analysing wind and temperature data, and integrating this information with Flight Data Recorder data, Cockpit Voice Recorder data, Air Traffic Control data, flight crew interviews and refuelling records to provide the best estimate of the aircraft’s fuel status during the accident flight

• obtaining and analysing 8 years of Westwind flight records from the operator’s fleet to examine fuel management aspects for different types of flights, particularly flights to remote aerodromes and air ambulance flights. This also involved obtaining and analysing meteorological information and other information for several flights

• obtaining and reviewing a substantial amount of documentation from the operator, including documentation from the operator’s safety management group meetings, selected samples of incident/hazard/fatigue reports, audit reports, flight crew training records for 18 Westwind pilots, and duty periods for all Westwind pilots for the 6 months prior to the accident

• obtaining and reviewing 10 years of CASA documentation associated with the operator’s Air Operator Certificates

• reviewing documentation from the air traffic services’ providers in Fiji and New Zealand about their policies and procedures for the provision of flight information, and how these were applied during the accident flight. Information was also obtained and analysed regarding how operations in Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum airspace were conducted.

The re-opened investigation has also involved many other activities, some of which have been outlined in the ATSB’s progress web updates.

The ATSB recognises the importance of being able to demonstrate that the reopened investigation addresses identified areas for improvement with the original investigation. Given the size of the report and the complexity of many of the issues, it is difficult to predict how long the draft review and final report processes will take, although it is likely to extend beyond those typical of more routine investigations/reports. After the draft report review process is complete, the ATSB should have a better understanding of a more specific likely timing for the release of the final report.

    
Which was dutifully rehashed by the slightly less invisible Manning at the extra Supp Estimates hearing:

Senator McCARTHY: Thank you. On Pel-Air, where is the Pel-Air reinvestigation report?

Mr Hood: Thank you for the question. In my opening remarks, which I have tabled—

Senator McCARTHY: I have them here.

Mr Hood: The accident occurred when I was involved in regulatory oversight with the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. Prior to my appointment as the chief commissioner of the ATSB, I declared to the minister and to the ATSB commission a potential or perceived conflict of interest in relation to my involvement and approval in that report. With that in mind, the proposal I put forward to the minister and to the commission is that Captain Chris Manning would be the commissioner who would be responsible for the ongoing approval of and release of that report. As a result of this committee and the ASRR, the Aviation Safety Regulation Review, which recommended the appointment of an aviation commissioner, Captain Manning is the first aviation commissioner of the ATSB. He is a former chief pilot at Qantas and the former president of the Australian and International Pilots Association. So he is very well-qualified in this area. With respect to my conflict of interest—or perceived or potential—Captain Chris Manning and the other aspect are being cared for by Pat Hornby, who is the manager of our legal services, so for any questions I will defer to those two.

Senator McCARTHY: Where is the reinvestigation report is at?

Capt. Manning: An investigation update was put on the ATSB website yesterday. That goes into a time line and to what is being done. It is a significant update. It says that the draft report, which is the first iteration, should be ready, and I expect will be ready, early in January. The three commissioners then look at it. That normally takes a week but this report is in excess of 300 pages. Assuming that the report passes that step, it then goes to the directly involved parties, who are people and companies directly affected by the report. They normally get 28 days reply, but it is not unusual to ask for an extension, especially given it is in the January/February area and the length of this report. It would not surprise me if they had an extension. Depending upon their replies—whether they are issues of fact or comment—then the final report is written.

Mr Hornby: If I may, we have a copy of the investigation update that went onto our website. I can table that.

Senator McCARTHY: Thank you, Mr Hornby. Given that that information went up yesterday and, obviously, with over 300 pages to read there is quite a significant amount to read there, what steps might have been taken on the 26 recommendations from the Senate inquiry arising from the incident? Or are you saying that that—

Capt. Manning: All of the inquiries and all of the comments have been taken into consideration. That is one reason why, obviously, the report is extremely detailed—because the ATSB fully acknowledges that they have to be all answered.

 
MTF...P2