Oh FDS just blame it on the pilot -
Following up his last highly informative post on an individual State's obligations as a signatory to ICAO, JW (aka James Wilson) follows with an excellent explanation on the ICAO USOAP audit system and how Australia dodged a bullet in the ICAO/FAA 2008 audit:
Very much related - from off the UP's current thread on the PelAir v KazCasey appeal - credit where credit is due Slats, I believe, firmly nails together several previously un-associated dots...
However what I found really fascinating and in some ways equally disturbing was the WikiLeaks cable:
"...principally a shortage of properly-trained inspectors and excessive delegation of regulatory functions to carriers..."
'Carriers' in my opinion is a bit too general and should really include all air service operators, including Airservices Australia and aerial ambulance/emergency service operators like PelAir. However, as the VH-NGA ditching proves again and again, that then leaves option A for dodgy air service providers facing possible CASA embuggerance from an accident/incident:
"There is no problem so complex that it cannot simply be blamed on the pilot."
— Dr Earl Weiner (Reminded of quote by Vref+5 off the UP) -
MTF...P2
Following up his last highly informative post on an individual State's obligations as a signatory to ICAO, JW (aka James Wilson) follows with an excellent explanation on the ICAO USOAP audit system and how Australia dodged a bullet in the ICAO/FAA 2008 audit:
Quote:JW (aka James Wilson)
November 19, 2016 at 9:49 pm
Dan,
ICAO does not ‘sanction’ Member States, but it does monitor and audit them for compliance with ICAO standards through its Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program (USOAP). A serious deficiency in a State’s safety oversight capability results in the publication of a Significant Safety Concern (SSC), the details of which are made available to the State concerned to help it fix the problem, and to all ICAO Member States so they might take appropriate action to ensure safety. There are currently SSCs in place for Angola, Djibouti, Eritrea, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan and Thailand.
A USOAP audit in 2008 highlighted a number of areas where Australia was not compliant with ICAO standards. Most of those deficiencies were addressed to ICAO’s satisfaction and certainly didn’t result in an SSC, however, one area that was not addressed related to aircraft accident investigations. ICAO recommended that “Australia should provide sufficient funding to the ATSB to allow the investigation of all aircraft accidents and serious incidents in accordance with Australia’s responsibilities under ICAO Annex 13”.
Australia chose to lodge a difference with ICAO, noting that “Australia considers it impractical to investigate all accidents and serious incidents within resources available. In addition to targeting those accidents and incidents that are likely to yield the greatest safety value in accordance with the guidelines quoted above, Australia normally gives priority to investigations of accidents and serious incidents involving regular public transport aircraft (especially with fare-paying passengers) and accidents involving fatalities other than those involving ultralights and sport aviation.”
ICAO gives Member States an Effective Implementation (EI) percentage that measures their compliance in various areas, including legislation, organisation, licensing, operations, airworthiness, accident investigation, air navigation services, and aerodromes. Australia’s overall EI is currently 85.14, vs 91.36 in the USA, 93.63 in the UK, 95.28 in Canada and 83.72 in New Zealand. Australia certainly has room for improvement, but its EI is well above the global average and is vastly better than countries such as Djibouti, which has an EI of just 4.14. In the area of aircraft accident investigation, Australia’s EI is actually 96.97, which is amongst the world’s best and better than Canada (91.58), Great Britain (84.21), New Zealand (68.75) and the USA (82.47). Draw your own conclusions, but perhaps that’s a reflection of ICAO’s methodology rather than Australia’s investigative performance!
Very much related - from off the UP's current thread on the PelAir v KazCasey appeal - credit where credit is due Slats, I believe, firmly nails together several previously un-associated dots...
Quote:slats11 - I wonder what would happen.....I must admit I never really joined up those particular dots, to be honest I was probably too disturbed by the needless harm being inflicted on the victims of PelAir, in particular KazCasey & DJ -
if an operator passed a routine CASA audit in 2008,
and then in 2009 FAA held concerns about CASA's oversight such as "excessive delegation of regulatory functions to carriers", and the FAA was therefore contemplating recommending a downgrade of Australian aviation to category 2 (which would have enormous ramifications),
and then in November 2009 said operator ditched off Norfolk because the plane ran out of fuel and couldn't reach an alternate airport,
and then the subsequent CASA audit in November - December 2009 found numerous deficiencies with the operator which raised questions about the effectiveness of CASA's oversight (and indeed raised questions about the earlier 2008 audit),
and ...... this all happened right at the very time (30 November - 4 December 2009) the FAA were back in Australia to decide whether to recommend whether Australia should be downgraded to category 2,
then I wonder what CASA would do with the post-accident audit.
It must have been a very strange time at CASA - being audited by the FAA at the same time CASA was performing an audit on the Norfolk ditching. Very strange indeed.
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/0...RRA1081_a.html
However what I found really fascinating and in some ways equally disturbing was the WikiLeaks cable:
Quote:B. CANBERRA 1040 Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Edgard Kagan, Reasons 1.4 ( b)(d).One line from the above stood out more than any other because I thought on how much this was still the status quo, if not worse today...
1. (C/NF) Summary: The FAA team concluded their audit (reftels) and gave a brief assessment of preliminary findings. While the team recognized improvements on previous shortcomings and commended many areas, a few problems remain. Australian officials seem committed to overcoming the shortcomings before a second and final FAA visit within the next three months, but the possibility of a category downgrade does exist and is being taken seriously. The team outlined the sequence of events going forward and agreed to work closely with Embassy Canberra. End Summary.
2. (C/NF) The FAA team gave a preliminary assessment of their November 30 - December 4 audit to Australian Civil Aviation and Safety Authority (CASA) officials and separately to DCM Dan Clune. The team explained the significant shortcomings, discussed potential scenarios, outlined the sequence of events going forward and agreed to work closely with Embassy Canberra. Problem: --------
3. (C/NF) While the team recognized improvements on previous shortcomings and commended many areas, there remain a few shortcomings, principally a shortage of properly-trained inspectors and excessive delegation of regulatory functions to carriers. Approximate Timeline: ---------------------
4. (C/NF) Based on our conversations with FAA team members, following is a rough sequence of events going forward: -- Two weeks: Informal letter FAA team to CASA (through State/Embassy Canberra) delineating specific areas from their assessment that need to be addressed. This is meant to aid CASA to swiftly focus efforts on overcoming shortcomings. -- 30 days: Formal State front-channel cable with official report of the week-long assessment, constituting official notification from FAA to CASA under ICAO. According to the FAA team, this cable will most likely state that Australia does not/not comply with ICAO standards and indicate that, if the problems are not remedied, it would be downgraded to Category 2. The cable will also request further consultations, which would include a second visit to Australia within 65 days after the first visit. -- 65-90 days: Second visit to Australia, probably by the end of February 2010, by a smaller team. This would be a shorter verification trip which would determine whether or not to recommend a downgrade to Category 2. -- Mid-March 2010: Approximate timeframe when FAA would publish official notice of a Category 2 downgrade, in the event this were to happen. Preventing Worst-Case Scenario -------------------------------
5. (C/NF) A downgrade to Category 2 would be the worst-case scenario, which would entail measures such as freezing Australia-U.S. flight operations to current levels and terminating code-sharing arrangements, such as the one between Qantas and American Airlines. CASA officials are not taking this possibility lightly and seem committed to resolve the shortcomings in order to avoid a downgrade.
6. (C/NF) Comment: FAA team members were extremely satisfied with CASA officials' openness and eagerness to make constructive improvements based on the assessment. FAA Qmake constructive improvements based on the assessment. FAA and CASA clearly have a good working relationship and we will monitor progress toward maintaining Category 1 status. We will also monitor that CASA's efforts enjoy adequate support at the ministerial level as well as from CANBERRA 00001081 002 OF 002 Australia's commercial airlines. BLEICH
"...principally a shortage of properly-trained inspectors and excessive delegation of regulatory functions to carriers..."
'Carriers' in my opinion is a bit too general and should really include all air service operators, including Airservices Australia and aerial ambulance/emergency service operators like PelAir. However, as the VH-NGA ditching proves again and again, that then leaves option A for dodgy air service providers facing possible CASA embuggerance from an accident/incident:
"There is no problem so complex that it cannot simply be blamed on the pilot."
— Dr Earl Weiner (Reminded of quote by Vref+5 off the UP) -
MTF...P2