Part II: Operations - Airline/Operator AOC Flight Operations & NAA oversight.
Yes a reminder that Murky and his minions manipulated a near perfect (3.03% off 100% compliance implementation) for the ICAO audit AI critical element - one word BOLLOCKS!
However "K" that does not mean it is time to knock off, we still have 7 more critical elements to appraise and I think we should now go to your pet subject - 'Operations.'
Now although 'operations' is above the global average (Aus 71.07% vs 67.01 ICAO GA), I find it passing strange that of all the critical elements this would be the one CE that you would want to manipulate/doctor to appear much better than the global average. The reason being that 'operations' is the one real showstopper that can draw an ICAO red flag and, when combined with other negative findings can ultimately lead to a subsequent downgrade to ICAO category two.
Example: This is what Nepal is currently dealing with, reference Nepal v Aus v ICAO GA:
So "K" when you get back from your Wednesday ramble let us begin to examine the area of 'operations'. Maybe we could start by examining some of the more happy, crappy ATSB 'topcover' incident/accident reports and current investigations that seemingly ignore or sideline obvious operational 'safety issues' in their rush to ping the flight crew and/or smaller operators.
Now I know we have a plethora of obfuscated high profile occurrences to choose from that fit the bill (Mildura Fog duck-up, Norfolk Island ditching, ATR bird strike accident, Rex & Coal loaders, B717 and marginal fuel etc..etc.) but for recency and topical relevance, I thought this just released ATSB 'short investigation bulletin' report could be extremely topical...
Back to you Dear Ferryman, Dear Ferryman..
MTF...P2
Quote:Kharon - Aye, P2 was bang on the money, non of the accident/incident reports eventually presented withstand a close examination. Which leaves us still wondering how the ATSB can attain such a high ICAO score after the Canley Vale and Norfolk debacles, and Mildura, and the ATR and a whole list of ‘other’ matters which have been delayed, deferred or degraded to ‘minor’ or insignificant. Manipulated to tick an ICAO box and ensure ministerial comfort.
Yes a reminder that Murky and his minions manipulated a near perfect (3.03% off 100% compliance implementation) for the ICAO audit AI critical element - one word BOLLOCKS!
However "K" that does not mean it is time to knock off, we still have 7 more critical elements to appraise and I think we should now go to your pet subject - 'Operations.'
Now although 'operations' is above the global average (Aus 71.07% vs 67.01 ICAO GA), I find it passing strange that of all the critical elements this would be the one CE that you would want to manipulate/doctor to appear much better than the global average. The reason being that 'operations' is the one real showstopper that can draw an ICAO red flag and, when combined with other negative findings can ultimately lead to a subsequent downgrade to ICAO category two.
Example: This is what Nepal is currently dealing with, reference Nepal v Aus v ICAO GA:
So "K" when you get back from your Wednesday ramble let us begin to examine the area of 'operations'. Maybe we could start by examining some of the more happy, crappy ATSB 'topcover' incident/accident reports and current investigations that seemingly ignore or sideline obvious operational 'safety issues' in their rush to ping the flight crew and/or smaller operators.
Now I know we have a plethora of obfuscated high profile occurrences to choose from that fit the bill (Mildura Fog duck-up, Norfolk Island ditching, ATR bird strike accident, Rex & Coal loaders, B717 and marginal fuel etc..etc.) but for recency and topical relevance, I thought this just released ATSB 'short investigation bulletin' report could be extremely topical...
Quote:kharon Wrote: ATSB on the 717 incident - HERE.
From the ASIB report:
Quote: Wrote:Safety message
Inaccurate take-off reference data has potentially serious consequences. ATSB Aviation Research and Analysis Report AR-2009-052 (Take-off performance calculation and entry errors: A global perspective) documents a number of accidents and incidents where take-off performance data was inaccurate. The report analyses those accidents and incidents, and concludes:
… it is imperative that the aviation industry continues to explore solutions to firstly minimise the opportunities for take-off performance parameter errors from occurring and secondly, maximise the chance that any errors that do occur are detected and/or do not lead to negative consequences.
The ATSB SafetyWatch highlights the broad safety concerns that come out of our investigation findings and from the occurrence data reported to us by industry. One of the safety concerns relates to data input errors.
Reference ATSB desktop ASIB report - Issue 52
Update: Binger in the Oz today...
Quote: Wrote:QantasLink flight ‘used incorrect weight and temperature data’
- Mitchell Bingemann
- The Australian
- 12:00AM October 4, 2016
Reporter
Sydney
@Mitch_Hell
A QantasLink plane avoided a potentially serious incident after it completed a trip from Canberra to Sydney using incorrect data about the plane’s weight and temperature.
An investigation by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau into the June 20 incident has found that a tired crew and last-minute changes to the aeroplane’s passenger numbers meant the wrong takeoff data was used for the flight.
The incident involved a Cobham-operated Boeing 717-200 that was flying to Sydney with 91 passengers and five crew on board. The captain had prepared for a “flex” takeoff based on an assumed outside temperature of 39C. Flex allows pilots to use reduced thrust to take off, which reduces the wear and tear on plane engines.
However, that flex temperature was revised down to 34C when 22 additional passengers were loaded on to the plane after the cockpit checklist had been completed. While the captain recorded the new temperature, it was scribbled over the initial 39C figure, which was then used to calculate the engine’s required thrust.
Despite the error, the flight continued to Sydney and landed without incident.
In its investigation into the incident, the ATSB found that both members of the flight crew assessed that tiredness because of their early morning start may have contributed to the flex temperature error, but that they were fit to continue to operate for the rest of the day’s duty.
“The flight crew commented that a combination of distraction by cabin crew and ground personnel while re-entering data, a reduced state of arousal following a high workload instrument approach, and possibly tiredness from an early start may have contributed to their omitting to enter the correct flex temperature,” the ATSB said. In its official report into the incident, the bureau said the use of inaccurate takeoff reference data could have potentially serious consequences.
In a 2011 report, the ATSB highlighted the consequences of failing to use correct data for flight calculations, saying that tail strikes, runway overruns and degraded handling qualities could all occur.
“It is imperative that the aviation industry continues to explore solutions to, firstly, minimise the opportunities for takeoff performance parameter errors from occurring and, secondly, maximise the chance that any errors that do occur are detected and/or do not lead to negative consequences,” it said.
Cobham Aviation Services, which hires the crew, said they would ensure their pilots used a new takeoff and landing data collection card if new information needed to be added or updated.
Back to you Dear Ferryman, Dear Ferryman..
MTF...P2