Over on Jeff Wise net, a contributor who goes by the title "S25" has conducted his own analysis of the ISAT BTO/BFO data.
He has proposed an interesting explanation of how it ties in to the Acoustic Signals recorded by the Curtin University Hydrophones, and defines a new search location, which is slightly north-east of the existing ATSB search area.
His post is as follows:
S25
Posted September 12, 2016 at 9:29 PM
To All:
There has been much speculation pertaining to routes which satisfy the BTO/BFO data that may exist East of the current search area. The answer is yes they do exist and do satisfy the BTO/BFO data better than any routes to the current search area. There are at least two routes, which I have identified as the East and West Routes, which have zero BTO error and with average BFO errors of minus 0.11 Hz and minus 0.23 Hz respectively. The basic corridors for these routes were first presented to the ATSB in August 2014. The updated routes were presented to the ATSB in March 2015. The refined routes were presented to the ATSB in March 2016 with all the route timing points, BTO and BFO calculations using two different computation techniques, an Excel spreadsheet showing fuel use minute by minute, an Excel spreadsheet correlating Indicated Airspeed (KIAS); Calibrated Airspeed (KCAS); True Airspeed (KTAS); and Mach Number for zero to 41000 feet altitude with standard and non-standard true-air-temperatures, along with the images of the route segments drawn in Google Earth from takeoff to the Virtual Waypoint locations.
I can only present a very abbreviated impression of the two routes since the full data package has about 60 documents involving computations, tabular data, images and explanatory discussions. The two proposed routes are common from the 17:07:19 position (5.413N, 102.867E) through to the ISBIX waypoint at 0.366N, 93.671E. The West Route crossing time at the ISBIX position is approximately 20:11:00 while the East Route crossing time is approximately 20:12:00. The East Route uses two airspeeds of Mach 0.84/484 KTAS and Mach 0.80/461 KTAS. The West Route uses two airspeeds also, however, they are Mach 0.84/484 KTAS and Mach 0.81/467 KTAS. The two proposed routes follow their individual great circle routes after crossing ISBIX and diverge from each other about 37 nautical miles at the 7th Arc. Google Earth detailed images effectively display the interesting circuitous route that the aircraft was most likely directed to fly between the 18:25 position and the 19:41 BTO/BFO position south of BEDAX. These routes have probably been discounted by the ATSB because they require seven inputs into the flight management system/autopilot thereby negating any “Ghost Flight” scenario.
In early August Richard Godfrey presented a document on the Duncan Steel website entitled ‘Hydrophone Data and MH370’ (See Duncan Steel website at /archives/date/2016/08/08). The sound data identified as Signal Group A had been captured over a 21 second period at the Cape Leeuwin Hydrophone array located at 34.892°S, 114.153°E and described in Richard Godfrey’s presentation.
It was an independent data source which needed to be integrated with potential MH370 route data. Correlating the data sets was quite interesting since the East and West Route impact points correlated in both position and timing with Richard Godfrey’s discussion impact items #3 and #1 respectively. My analysis and correlation results were presented to the ATSB in early August 2016.
The potential East Route Impact at 00:21:07 UTC at -31.47S, 96.93E correlated with the impact data #3 at 1649km/278.5º from the Cape Leeuwin hydrophone array as addressed in the Discussion portion of Richard Geoffrey’s presentation.
The potential West Route Impact at 00:20:50 UTC at -31.96S, 96.47E correlated with impact data #1 at 1674km/276.25º from the Cape Leeuwin hydrophone array as addressed in the Discussion portion of Richard Godfrey’s presentation. According to Richard from the time delays between the sound arriving at each element of the array (3 elements) it is possible to roughly determine the direction of arrival of the signal to within about 0.75°. The West Route impact data at 276.25º is within the 1.5º nominal cone of reception for impact data #1 observed at the hydrophone array while the East Route impact data at 278.5º is 2.25º outside the cone of reception. This may give extra weight to the West Route impact area if the precision of the cone of reception is held to 1.5º.
The East Route is on a great circle route from the ISBIX Waypoint to Virtual Waypoint S50, E100 or to a secondary Virtual Waypoint S32, E097. These two great circle routes do not deviate more than 1500 feet from each other. The S50, E100 waypoint would most likely have been the waypoint entered in the Flight Management System if the East Route was flown. They are identified as Virtual Waypoints because they are not reachable with the onboard fuel.
The West Route is on a great circle route from the ISBIX Waypoint to Virtual Waypoint S50, E099 or to a secondary Virtual Waypoint S37, E097. These two great circle routes do not deviate more than 3 nautical miles from each other at their furthest excursion. The S50, E099 waypoint would most likely have been the waypoint entered in the Flight Management System if the West Route was flown.
Only one set or neither set of the hydrophone data may be valid. Also, only one or neither of the two routes were flown even though each route fits the given data very well. However, since these are the only two sources of independent data that we have to correlate, consequently, we need to accept the data as being valid, until proven otherwise.
There is another interesting aspect to this potential solution. In March 2016 Duncan Steel presented on his website two related articles entitled ‘Some Comments on the Missing (or Missed) Floating Debris Field from MH370’ (See Duncan Steel website at /archives/date/2016/03/15) and ‘RNZAF photographs of the sea surface in the MH370 search area in the southern Indian Ocean’ (See Duncan Steel website at /archives/2261).
A series of photos depicting debris had been taken from RNZAF aircrafts on 28 and 29 march 2014. These photos were taken in the area of -32.5S and 97.8E which happens to be about 140 kilometers southeast of the two proposed impact points on the East and West Routes. This is another aspect of attempting to integrate two types of independent data to establish potential timing and spatial correlations for the two events. Hopefully, someone has the wind and current data for the 8 March to 29 March 2014 time period to verify if these may be valid event correlations and associations.
This discussion may motivate other investigators to search for new data integration/fusion opportunities. It should provide a new dimension to be considered in the drift analysis and newly acquired barnacle enigma. Extensive analyses during the past two years have lead me to the conclusion that the Inmarsat data is of the best quality that could be collected and provided. We need to use it well.
PostScript: There is no way that MH370 could have flown either of these routes if there had been any kind of fire on board.
The full details of his theory are contained in 6 files (4 PDF and 2 Excel Spreadsheets), which are available for download from:
https://www.mediafire.com/folder/w5h5xpz6rt5e8/S25
Below are half size renditions of the last 5 (of thirty) images from the main file, of the new "S25" search area.
![[Image: attachment.php?aid=197]](http://auntypru.com/forum/attachment.php?aid=197)
![[Image: attachment.php?aid=198]](http://auntypru.com/forum/attachment.php?aid=198)
![[Image: attachment.php?aid=199]](http://auntypru.com/forum/attachment.php?aid=199)
![[Image: attachment.php?aid=200]](http://auntypru.com/forum/attachment.php?aid=200)
![[Image: attachment.php?aid=201]](http://auntypru.com/forum/attachment.php?aid=201)
He has proposed an interesting explanation of how it ties in to the Acoustic Signals recorded by the Curtin University Hydrophones, and defines a new search location, which is slightly north-east of the existing ATSB search area.
His post is as follows:
S25
Posted September 12, 2016 at 9:29 PM
To All:
There has been much speculation pertaining to routes which satisfy the BTO/BFO data that may exist East of the current search area. The answer is yes they do exist and do satisfy the BTO/BFO data better than any routes to the current search area. There are at least two routes, which I have identified as the East and West Routes, which have zero BTO error and with average BFO errors of minus 0.11 Hz and minus 0.23 Hz respectively. The basic corridors for these routes were first presented to the ATSB in August 2014. The updated routes were presented to the ATSB in March 2015. The refined routes were presented to the ATSB in March 2016 with all the route timing points, BTO and BFO calculations using two different computation techniques, an Excel spreadsheet showing fuel use minute by minute, an Excel spreadsheet correlating Indicated Airspeed (KIAS); Calibrated Airspeed (KCAS); True Airspeed (KTAS); and Mach Number for zero to 41000 feet altitude with standard and non-standard true-air-temperatures, along with the images of the route segments drawn in Google Earth from takeoff to the Virtual Waypoint locations.
I can only present a very abbreviated impression of the two routes since the full data package has about 60 documents involving computations, tabular data, images and explanatory discussions. The two proposed routes are common from the 17:07:19 position (5.413N, 102.867E) through to the ISBIX waypoint at 0.366N, 93.671E. The West Route crossing time at the ISBIX position is approximately 20:11:00 while the East Route crossing time is approximately 20:12:00. The East Route uses two airspeeds of Mach 0.84/484 KTAS and Mach 0.80/461 KTAS. The West Route uses two airspeeds also, however, they are Mach 0.84/484 KTAS and Mach 0.81/467 KTAS. The two proposed routes follow their individual great circle routes after crossing ISBIX and diverge from each other about 37 nautical miles at the 7th Arc. Google Earth detailed images effectively display the interesting circuitous route that the aircraft was most likely directed to fly between the 18:25 position and the 19:41 BTO/BFO position south of BEDAX. These routes have probably been discounted by the ATSB because they require seven inputs into the flight management system/autopilot thereby negating any “Ghost Flight” scenario.
In early August Richard Godfrey presented a document on the Duncan Steel website entitled ‘Hydrophone Data and MH370’ (See Duncan Steel website at /archives/date/2016/08/08). The sound data identified as Signal Group A had been captured over a 21 second period at the Cape Leeuwin Hydrophone array located at 34.892°S, 114.153°E and described in Richard Godfrey’s presentation.
It was an independent data source which needed to be integrated with potential MH370 route data. Correlating the data sets was quite interesting since the East and West Route impact points correlated in both position and timing with Richard Godfrey’s discussion impact items #3 and #1 respectively. My analysis and correlation results were presented to the ATSB in early August 2016.
The potential East Route Impact at 00:21:07 UTC at -31.47S, 96.93E correlated with the impact data #3 at 1649km/278.5º from the Cape Leeuwin hydrophone array as addressed in the Discussion portion of Richard Geoffrey’s presentation.
The potential West Route Impact at 00:20:50 UTC at -31.96S, 96.47E correlated with impact data #1 at 1674km/276.25º from the Cape Leeuwin hydrophone array as addressed in the Discussion portion of Richard Godfrey’s presentation. According to Richard from the time delays between the sound arriving at each element of the array (3 elements) it is possible to roughly determine the direction of arrival of the signal to within about 0.75°. The West Route impact data at 276.25º is within the 1.5º nominal cone of reception for impact data #1 observed at the hydrophone array while the East Route impact data at 278.5º is 2.25º outside the cone of reception. This may give extra weight to the West Route impact area if the precision of the cone of reception is held to 1.5º.
The East Route is on a great circle route from the ISBIX Waypoint to Virtual Waypoint S50, E100 or to a secondary Virtual Waypoint S32, E097. These two great circle routes do not deviate more than 1500 feet from each other. The S50, E100 waypoint would most likely have been the waypoint entered in the Flight Management System if the East Route was flown. They are identified as Virtual Waypoints because they are not reachable with the onboard fuel.
The West Route is on a great circle route from the ISBIX Waypoint to Virtual Waypoint S50, E099 or to a secondary Virtual Waypoint S37, E097. These two great circle routes do not deviate more than 3 nautical miles from each other at their furthest excursion. The S50, E099 waypoint would most likely have been the waypoint entered in the Flight Management System if the West Route was flown.
Only one set or neither set of the hydrophone data may be valid. Also, only one or neither of the two routes were flown even though each route fits the given data very well. However, since these are the only two sources of independent data that we have to correlate, consequently, we need to accept the data as being valid, until proven otherwise.
There is another interesting aspect to this potential solution. In March 2016 Duncan Steel presented on his website two related articles entitled ‘Some Comments on the Missing (or Missed) Floating Debris Field from MH370’ (See Duncan Steel website at /archives/date/2016/03/15) and ‘RNZAF photographs of the sea surface in the MH370 search area in the southern Indian Ocean’ (See Duncan Steel website at /archives/2261).
A series of photos depicting debris had been taken from RNZAF aircrafts on 28 and 29 march 2014. These photos were taken in the area of -32.5S and 97.8E which happens to be about 140 kilometers southeast of the two proposed impact points on the East and West Routes. This is another aspect of attempting to integrate two types of independent data to establish potential timing and spatial correlations for the two events. Hopefully, someone has the wind and current data for the 8 March to 29 March 2014 time period to verify if these may be valid event correlations and associations.
This discussion may motivate other investigators to search for new data integration/fusion opportunities. It should provide a new dimension to be considered in the drift analysis and newly acquired barnacle enigma. Extensive analyses during the past two years have lead me to the conclusion that the Inmarsat data is of the best quality that could be collected and provided. We need to use it well.
PostScript: There is no way that MH370 could have flown either of these routes if there had been any kind of fire on board.
The full details of his theory are contained in 6 files (4 PDF and 2 Excel Spreadsheets), which are available for download from:
https://www.mediafire.com/folder/w5h5xpz6rt5e8/S25
Below are half size renditions of the last 5 (of thirty) images from the main file, of the new "S25" search area.
