[Peetwo]

Uh'mm -I’ll have two bob’s worth. Part II - The reply

P2 – “Hmm...no comment required me thinks –“

Certainly non required on the ‘CASA’ input; but I wonder.  Has Fawcett ‘lanced the boil’ so to speak?  At his last committee (above) he informed the ‘treaties’ crew to do their homework and be ready with answers, next time.

P2 - I think you might be spot on Ol'Tom

Now then; if the ‘department’ have been relying too heavily on CASA ‘advice’ and assume that CASA actually know what they are about (ass-u-me) then this bus could be headed for the CASA bus stop. Make no mistake, if the ‘heavy-duty’ professional public servants are made to look foolish, or embarrassed by CASA, there will be no hesitation – under the bus they go – and a good riddance.

P2 - Again I would suggest, given that in 21 months (from March 2014 to November 2015) the Department has reigned in the rapid escalation of differences (still not sure if they were notified to ICAO??) and in fact decreased the total by at least 908, that the Department has come to the realisation that CASA were taking the Mickey Bliss when it came to our obligations to ICAO.    

Fuel policy should be, and mostly is (at the big end of town) a company SOP, the regulation should be ‘flexible’ in that it allows for ‘an alternative means of compliance’ to the mandated minimum fuel on board – at the end of the landing roll.  Provided that fuel meets the ‘flight fuel’ reserves; then CASA should be ‘satisfied’; ask Big Q if you have any doubts.  But when it comes to playing fast and loose with ICAO compliance affecting ‘the simplicity’ of operations  and interfering with high level inter governmental treaties; CASA and Aleck are way out of their weight class.

P2 - Again totally on the same page Ol'Tom and it is somewhat ironic that the ICAO Annex 6 amendment also allows for this:

4.3.4.4 Notwithstanding the provisions in 4.3.4.1, 4.3.4.2 and 4.3.4.3, the State of the Operator may, based on the results of a specific safety risk assessment conducted by the operator which demonstrates how an equivalent level of safety will be maintained, approve operational variations to alternate aerodrome selection criteria. The specific safety risk assessment shall include at least the:

a) capabilities of the operator;

b) overall capability of the aeroplane and its systems;

c) available aerodrome technologies, capabilities and infrastructure;

d) quality and reliability of meteorological information;

e) identified hazards and safety risks associated with each alternate aerodrome variation; and

f) specific mitigation measures.

Note.— Guidance on performing a safety risk assessment and on determining variations, including examples of variations, is contained in the Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976) and the Safety Management Manual (SMM)

(Doc 9859).

Those as audit on behalf of the ICAO know their business, and know it well.  Australia only just kept their status after the last adventure and escaped by the skin on their teeth, solely due to some pretty hefty political intervention.

P2 - Interestingly with 2008 ICAO audit the issue of notified differences was a highlighted bone of contention with the FAA and ultimately led to an NCN being issued.

Reference para 3.2.3 and Appendix 3.1.1 of the 2008 ICAO audit report:  

3.2.3 For the regulatory framework and rulemaking procedures, the Regulatory Development Management (RDM) Manual, dated 20 February 2008, describes the processes and requirements involved in the making of aviation safety regulations, standards and associated advisory materials. Procedures for amending regulations, including identifying and notifying differences to ICAO, are established and documented in the manual. In addition, the manual provides an overview of the requirements established by the Australian Government for conducting consultations on regulatory requirements and following other regulatory “best practices.” However, the procedures described in the new manual for the amendment of regulations and for the identification and notification to ICAO of differences existing between the ICAO SARPs and PANS (Procedures for Air Navigation Services) do not address adopted regulations and have not kept the national regulations in pace with ICAO Annex amendments, in particular for personnel licensing, airworthiness and aircraft operations. In addition, not all differences to ICAO SARPs have been notified to ICAO.

 


I would suggest that since the 2008 ICAO audit there is only one agency that has proactively addressed NCN 1-1-1, can you guess which of the listed agencies this is? (Hint: Think annex 12.. )  

Well, the puss is now flowing from the boil Fawcett lanced. Yes, it is an ugly analogy, but then the situation Australia is in equates to ugly, messy and painful.  Let’s hope the grown ups know how to cure the canker.  By the by – I have it on good authority that voodoo smoke and mirrors prescribed treatments, just don’t work, not worth a tinkers cuss.

P2 - To confirm to myself that Senator Fawcett on a mission to 'lance the boil', I decided to review the SCOT reports after the 139 report (i.e. the Serbia & Vanuatu air services agreement).

I discovered that there was indeed one more air services agreement that
the Joint treaties committee reviewed in the 44th Parliament: Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic Relating to Air Services .

The following was from the recorded Hansard from the brief public hearing:

ACTING CHAIR: During the inquiry into air services agreements between Australia and Serbia and Vanuatu last year, the committee was told that, as well as having an agreement in place, foreign airlines need to satisfy safety standards as assessed by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, CASA. This includes considering how their practices differ from International Civil Aviation Organization standards. In our report, the committee suggested that the DFAT negotiators should consult with CASA as to whether potential agreement parties are meeting the International Civil Aviation Organization standards or whether there are safety concerns. So the question is: did the department consult with CASA about Laos's performance against the International Civil Aviation Organization standards during the negotiations for this agreement?

Mr Smith : There was consultation with CASA for the negotiation of this agreement. Just looking at the time frame of the two agreements that you referred to that were before the committee last time, there was not that specific additional level of consultation that was mentioned with Serbia and Vanuatu. Discussions have taken place with CASA about expanding the level of consultations prior to future negotiations.

Senator FAWCETT: Clearly before you came to this committee you had the previous reports. I accept the fact that this was negotiated a year ago, but you have had the report since then. Have you gone back to CASA to ask them, for example, what the latest IATA, ICAO or FAA audits were on Laos?

Mr Smith : In September 2015, ICAO published its report on the most recent audit evaluation, undertaken in April 2015, of the Lao PDR. The audit was a targeted review of the 224 unsatisfactory findings made by ICAO during an earlier full audit undertaken in 2010 and it intended to find an update of the assessed safety oversight of the status of Laos. No significant safety concerns were identified during the audit. ICAO uses the 'effective implementation' terminology as a measure of a state's safety oversight capability, and a higher 'effective implementation' indicates that a state's safety oversight system has a greater degree of compliance with ICAO provisions. In 2010, Lao PDR was assessed as having an EI of 65.31 per cent and, following the April 2015 audit, the Lao PDR has improved its score to 73.03.

Senator FAWCETT: I hear that, and that has been in the media recently. Laos are very proud of that—and so they should be—but you did not answer my question. Having had that gap between the issue of our last report and this appearance, have you gone back to CASA to ask them for their opinion? For example, Laos is not registered with IATA. They do not have the IOSA audit, which is kind of the benchmark for international airlines. Generally speaking, the perception is that if you have not had an IOSA audit then perhaps you do not think you are ready for it. It is kind of the gold standard for international airlines. The majority of airlines are; Laos is not. Have you gone back and asked CASA their opinion on what may be lacking that has caused Laos to not actually pursue the IATA accreditation?

Mr Smith : CASA were consulted on the text before it was finalised, but we did not specifically ask the sorts of questions that you have outlined. Part of the rationale surrounds the likelihood of Lao Airlines serving the Australian market with their own aircraft. The agreement was settled to provide both for own-operated services and, primarily, for code-share services. In the event that the operation into Australia of Lao carriers with Lao-registered aircraft becomes more likely, I think that issue would become more topical and would certainly interest and exercise CASA's attention. Certainly, the air services agreement we are discussing today includes the standard safety clause that is included in our air services agreements, which provides CASA with the scope and ability to enforce the minimum ICAO standards, as well as applying the domestic standards that they would apply before issuing FAAOCs and the like.

Senator FAWCETT: I still just make the note that, having issued a report recommending a particular course of action, I am a little disappointed that that has not been followed through prior to this hearing so that we have an assurance. Taking on board what you are saying—that, at this stage, you do not anticipate a Lao-registered aircraft to operate here—and noting also the recent ICAO evaluation, I still think that is a loop that should be closed before the committee actually considers the report.

This led to these critical comments in the final committee report...

Consultations with CASA

2.54 In 2014, the Committee reviewed air services agreements between Australia and Serbia and Vanuatu.64

2.55 In Report 139, the Committee stated:

Article 38 of the Chicago Convention requires a Party to notify the ICAO when it finds it impractical to comply in all respects with international standards and practices, and when it is unable to change its standards and practices to comply with standards and practices revised by the ICAO.65

2.56 The Committee found that both Serbia and Vanuatu had lodged notices of difference with the ICAO.66

2.57 At the time, the Department advised the Committee that relevant notices to the ICAO were not considered as part of the process of negotiating air services agreements because air services agreements were essentially economic agreements.67

Air services arrangements provide an economic framework in which airlines can consider serving a market. Differences lodged by States, among other more pertinent kinds of safety-related information, may be taken into account by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority [CASA] in the assessment of applications for the operation of foreign aircraft into and out of Australia.68

2.58 The Committee’s conclusion was that:

… it would be imprudent if the Department’s negotiators did not at least make themselves aware of the differences notified to the ICAO by States with which they are negotiating. The Committee suggests that, as part of the negotiation process of future Air Services Agreements, the Department’s negotiators consult with CASA in order to determine if any of the differences notified by the State with which they are negotiating may pose a safety risk for Australian travellers.69

2.59 Bearing in mind that the proposed Agreement was negotiated in 2012, before the Committee’s views on the matter were made clear in Report 139, the Committee asked the Department’s representative whether the Department had attempted to consult with CASA and other relevant agencies regarding the proposed Agreement since the tabling of Report 139 in May 2014. The Department responded that:

Since the Committee’s hearing on 12 October 2015, CASA was again consulted, and was asked whether Laos is meeting the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards or whether there are any concerns.

CASA noted that Lao-registered aircraft do not currently operate to Australia, and that before a Foreign Aircraft Air Operator’s Certificate (FAAOC) is issued to a foreign airline operator, and as part of CASA’s ongoing oversight of the holder, CASA assesses the application against ICAO Annex 6 criteria, as well as the relevant provisions of the Australian civil aviation legislation.

CASA advised that, in the absence of an application for an FAAOC or a similar permission, it would not actively monitor a foreign operator or the regulatory authority responsible for the safety oversight of the prospective operator. CASA confirmed that the safety article in the proposed agreement with Laos provides it with the regulatory authority it requires to deal with any future applications from Lao-registered aircraft operators.70

Conclusion

2.60 The Committee reiterates its view that consultation between CASA and the Department should be taking place on safety issues pertaining to a country with which Australia is negotiating an air services agreement.

2.61 Where such agreements have already been negotiated, the Committee considers that it would be prudent for the Department to ensure that such consultation takes place before the relevant treaty is tabled in Parliament.

2.62 Nevertheless, the Committee supports the proposed Agreement and recommends that binding treaty action be taken. 

 

Hmm...again err...no comment -

MTF...P2