[Kharon]

For the sake of friendly discussion.

V – It’s not a bad theory as far as it goes and the possibility of incorrect waypoint selection is there; but, IMO only as an incidental factor.  To fully support the Smithson argument one needs to ignore several very real, important ‘operational’ factors; or, at very least, provide a credible explanation for the holes in the construct.

“V” – “Assume that there was some emergency between IGARI and BITOD.”

OK – lets sit in the flight deck jump seat for a while – top of climb, ATC hand over, all routine – time for a coffee; then the warnings or flames (take your pick) start.  Wide range of choices there – from both engines quitting to a toilet roll fire in the aft dunny.  So, lets say there is a problem, one of sufficient magnitude to require a return; or even one severe enough to demand landing at the nearest acceptable airport.

“V” – “For the sake of argument, assume that due to the emergency, Z takes back the aircraft as pilot flying,  

There are some potential flaws in that statement – depending on the nature of the ‘problem’ it may well be that ‘Z’ elected to let the AP do the flying while he and ‘H’ attempted to deal with whatever was occurring.  Lets take the view that it was a serious event – serious enough to warrant an immediate return to the nearest suitable aerodrome – even to the nearest emergency landing area – one of the first things that would be done is communication with ATC.  The aircraft needs a course reversal, perhaps a change of level, perhaps a block clearance to operate in, an emergency descent, direct clearance to a straight in, fire and ambulance services – but no one knows WTF was occurring.  

Not one single indication of any form of ‘emergency’ was broadcast.  If the aircraft was in that much trouble, cockpit aflame, engines dead, covered in ice and headed for the ocean – someone would have got on the radio, had they been able. The other side of that coin is had this been a severe enough problem and the crew were ‘overcome’; the wreckage would be pretty much in the area where the ‘event’ occurred.  But it ain’t; it’s supposed to be a further seven hours of flight time away from the ‘scene of the event’.  So we are at the junction where we must discern what, if anything, ‘killed’ a crew but allowed the aircraft to fly on for several more hours.

The latest event in the Mediterranean demonstrates that anything severe enough to ‘kill’ the aircraft, takes the crew with it.  I find it hard to accept that the crew were ‘lost’, without any form of communication with ATC, but the aircraft survived several hours.  

‘V” – “[and] H reverts to being PM. Z commences the turn, and during the troubleshooting the aircraft gets to a point at or near waypoint IPRIX.

A stretch of the ‘operational mind’ could accept this – but it’s unlikely.  The situation above would, perhaps, be acceptable in a ‘routine’ emergency. But the statement implies the crew were ‘functioning’, running check lists and deciding to return.  Habit, training and experience would have provided a clear, routine line of communication with ATC.  We have a problem, we are returning; we are turning back etc.  Even then the Skipper would be calling the tunes, the FO playing the piano; these situations are rehearsed often and beaten into the wooden heads of professional aircrew until they become ‘reflex’, taking the crew from reaction to action in a heartbeat.

I can live with the notion that an incorrect waypoint entry could be made; but cannot come to agree with the notion that ATC would not have picked up the track deviation and questioned the intentions of an off track aircraft, returning to base, with a problem – had they known there was, indeed, a problem.  Aviate, navigate, communicate.  M’tas all.

Someone, somewhere knows exactly what happened; find that person, you find your aircraft.  Anything else is a bit like doing the crossword puzzle; it’s interesting but utterly pointless.

Toot toot