[ventus45]

Is Paul Smithson correct ?

I posted Paul's theory in post #130.
http://auntypru.com/forum/-MH370-time-to...24#pid3424

Paul's theory in essence
After an in-flight emergency at 17:21 UTC Captain Zaharie and his crew were trying to get the plane home.
Webpage: http://www.findmh370.com/
Download a PDF of Paul Smithson's full MH370 report (70 pages, 16Mb file).
http://www.findmh370.com/Head_for_Home_2_Feb_2016.pdf

Was MH370 really "HEADING FOR HOME" ?

IT PROBABLY WAS !

Is it possible, that the MH-370 disaster may have been a tragic re-run of the American Airlines Flight 965 Cali Disaster of the 20th December 1995 ?

I think there is a possibility that it may be, for the same reason, "WAYPOINT CONFUSION".

In the case of AA965, it was the erronius selection of ROMEO instead of ROZO.

In the case of MH370, it may have been the erronious selection of UPROB instead of UPRON.

Is MH370 a tragic case of The Cali Disaster Revisited - perhaps ?

First, a REFRESHER on the Cali Disaster.

(Edited from Wiki)

Cali's approach uses several radio beacons to guide pilots around the mountains and canyons that surround the city.
The airplane's flight management system already had these beacons programmed in, and should have, in theory, told the pilots exactly where to turn, climb, and descend, all the way from Miami to the terminal in Cali.

Since the wind was calm, Cali's controllers asked the pilots whether they wanted to fly a straight-in approach to runway 19 rather than coming around to runway 01. The pilots agreed, hoping to make up some time.
The pilots then erroneously cleared the approach waypoints from their navigation computer.
When the controller asked the pilots to check back in over Tuluá, north of Cali, it was no longer programmed into the computer, and so they had to pull out their maps to find it.
In the meantime, they extended the aircraft's speed brakes to slow it down and expedite its descent.
By the time the pilots found Tuluá's coordinates, they had already passed over it.
In response to this, they attempted to program the navigation computer for the next approach waypoint, Rozo.
However, the Rozo NDB was identified as R on their charts.
Colombia had duplicated the identifier for the Romeo NDB near Bogotá, and the computer's list of stored waypoints did not include the Rozo NDB as "R", but only under its full name "ROZO".
In cases where a country allowed duplicate identifiers, it often listed them with the largest city first.
By picking the first "R" from the list, the captain caused the autopilot to start flying a course to Bogotá, resulting in the airplane turning east in a wide semicircle.
By the time the error was detected, the aircraft was in a valley running roughly north-south parallel to the one they should have been in.
The pilots had put the aircraft on a collision course with a 3,000-meter (9,800 feet) mountain. (3°50′45.2″N 76°06′17.1″W)
Twelve seconds before the plane hit the mountain, named El Diluvio (The Deluge), the Ground Proximity Warning System activated, announcing an imminent terrain collision and sounding an alarm.
Within a second of this warning the first officer disengaged the autopilot, and the captain attempted to climb clear of the mountain.
However, neither pilot had remembered to disengage the previously deployed speed brakes, which reduced the rate of climb.
At 9:41:28 pm Eastern Standard Time it struck trees at about 8,900 feet MSL on the east side of the mountain.
The crash was six miles south of Tuluá VOR and 28 miles north of the approach end of runway 19 at Alfonso Bonilla Aragon International Airport.


Now, let us return our attention to MH370.

Assume that there was some emergency between IGARI and BITOD.
Assume that they got to, or very close to, BITOD before deciding to RETURN to KL.
From that position, their best bet would be to turn right to intercept Airway R208 for a direct return to KL.
For the sake of argument, assume that due to the emergency, Z takes back the aircraft as pilot flying, and H reverts to being PM.
Z commences the turn, and during the troubleshooting the aircraft gets to a point at or near waypoint IPRIX.
Z orders H to program return to KL via R208.
As a "first step", to intercept R208, H decides to select waypoint UPRON.
This makes perfect sense, since it puts them on Airway R208, with two very good options.
(1) If the emergency is critical, and landing as soon as possible is required, they are heading direct for Kuala Trengganu Airport.
(2) If the emergency is less severe, they can OVERFLY Kuala Trengganu Airport and continue on for the return to Kuala Lumpur.

But it all goes wrong !

In his haste to enter UPRON, he (H) types "UPRO and immediately "inadvertantly" selects the first waypoint that comes up on the FMS - UPROB !!!

Whatever the emergency was, the aircraft now turns a few degrees more than planned.
iNSTEAD OF TURNING TO 223 degrees true to track from around IPRIX to UPRON (69 nautical miles), it turnes ONLY AN ADDITIONAL 15 DEGREES, to 238 degrees true, to track from around IPRIX to UPROB (677 nautical miles).

Since the crew never detected this mistake, it must be assumed that they became incapacitated soon after selecting UPROB, since, their intended waypoint UPRON was only about 8 or 9 minutes flying time away from that moment.

The aircraft was then a ghost flight, and proceed to UPROB (which also happens to be directly over MEDAN).

Now we need:
(A) ALL Indonesian primary radar data for that night, specifically Medan radar (both civil and military), and Sibolga military radar data.
(B) to examine all possible ghost flight scenarios from the last waypoint, UPROB.



The INTENDED RETURN







The ERROR - and TRAGIC RESULT ?