[Peetwo]

The Airservices Australia conundrum??  

From the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee (Senate-Friday, 28 November 2014):

...Mr Clark : We employ around 4,300 people. We are a billion dollar company. We are nationally distributed, with over 30 to 40 individual locations, with a distributed staff base. Over the last three years we have had four issues of credit card misuse, for which the misuse totalled $14,000. Of that $14,000, we have recouped $6,500. On two of those occasions we have not been able to recoup, for a variety of reasons...

...Mr Clark : I do not think I could have assisted in answering the question. I think, between the people sitting at the table answering the question, including Ms Staib, there was a degree of confusion vis-a-vis the lack of detail around what was the matter being discussed.

Senator STERLE: No, that is disingenuous.

CHAIR: That is a workshopped answer.

Senator STERLE: Someone only had to say, 'Yes, we have had an issue.' Then someone at the table—Ms Staib or one of her lieutenants, who are so loyal—could have come out and said, 'We can provide you with the details, we would prefer to talk about it later,' or whatever, and not try and fob us off. That is what happened, and none of you ran to her defence, unless you were under instruction not to.

CHAIR: No, hold. Mr Clark, that might be a workshopped answer. It was very clear what we were on about and, I have to say, my impression from this side—and not from the back of the room—is that maybe there are certain things that the old Greg Russell club that exists in Airservices does not want Ms Staib to know about and on some matters she may be kept in the dark. I am just wondering whether you are part of that. Surely, you knew what Senator Sterle was on about. Do not pretend there was some confusion. It was black and white...

"K" and I vividly remember that session as the last time that arrogant twat Clark would appear before the Senate committee - good riddance to trough dwelling fat cat trash...

In regards to the highly visible disdain that the former CFO, & other members of Airservices Australia executive, held for our elected representatives in their attempts to hold them to account on various non-transparent, possibly fraudulent executive financial practices; one has to ask how did it get to that point because apparently it was not always so??
        
The following perhaps provides a clue to a point in time when there was a distinct paradigm shift in the perceived power base in the air safety bureaucracy.

Minutes of the Aviation Safety Forum 16th meeting:

Item 16.9 – National Airspace System

Mike Smith, Executive Director of the National Airspace System

Implementation Group, attended the meeting for this item.

Mike Smith gave a presentation on the implementation status of the National
Airspace System(NAS). Implementation is being managed by the NAS
Implementation Group, which comprises staff drawn from Airservices
Australia, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), Defence, DOTARS and
other appropriate organisations. The Implementation Group is overseen by
the Aviation Reform Group.

The ASF noted that CASA’s involvement in NAS comprises: requisite
regulatory change; safety case assessment; and helping with education.

Phase 2

Mike Smith told the ASF that the NAS communication strategy was developed
in consultation with a considerable number of industry members. Emphasis
was given to making sure, before it was sent out, that the information was
cogent and relevant and would not be misused. This care had been repaid
with many complimentary responses from pilots on the quality and
comprehensiveness of the material.

Mr Smith advised that the distribution of NAS material was timed to coincide
with the normal Airservices Australia distribution cycle, so that pilots would
receive new charts and AIP Supplements around the same time they received
the information explaining the NAS changes. The information being provided
is virtually a location-by-location account of what happens to the airspace.
The Implementation Group ensured that interested parties not on the
Airservices chart list also received the information. In the case of sport
aviation, special material was produced for the sport aviation organisations to
send out in their journals.

Implementation of Phase 2 is on track for 27 November, in terms of the
involvement of the relevant government agencies, including Defence. Mr
Smith noted that the Implementation Group has worked closely with Qantas,
particularly the regional airlines, and that they have all signed off on their
internal safety cases. In that respect, John Raby expressed his concern that
Virgin Blue was not consulted, given that it has significant relevant operations
and will have to change some of its standard operating procedures. Mr Smith
apologised for what was an administrative oversight.

John Raby also expressed concern about the risk of high-capacity RPT
aircraft operating in E airspace with ‘rogue’ VFR pilots who do not have their
transponders switched on. Mike Smith advised that there are additional
transponder requirements and that he was writing to pilots that day to caution
them about the importance of being particularly alert and vigilant while
everyone becomes accustomed to the new system, and reporting all incidents
to inform post-implementation evaluation.

Mr Smith pointed out that ‘rogue’ pilots are a considerable risk under the
present system, with evidence of over 1,000 unauthorised entries into
controlled airspace a year. He also noted a recent survey by the
Implementation Group in which 47% of the 1500 pilots responding had said
they were not confident that proper MBZ calls are being made. There will be
an analysis of the survey results by types of licence to identify how
widespread the problem is.

Bill Whitney sought assurance that there is a failure plan in place in the event
of mid-air collision. Mike Smith advised that contingency plans exist at a
number of levels, within and across agencies for such events. These plans
will be applied in the same way as they are now.

Phase 3

The third phase of NAS is scheduled for implementation on 10 June 2004.
This will involve the application of North American CTAF procedures at all
aerodromes in Class G airspace. (This includes MBZs reclassified as CTAFs).
Mr Smith advised that Australian CTAFs are different from those in the United
States. Accordingly, the Implementation Group is reworking the Australian
Risk Model (ARM) to populate it with the United States elements. The ARM
will provide the basis for a comparative assessment with MBZs.

Mr Smith acknowledged that the issue is a very contentious one. He argued
that in practice, however, pilots will be able to choose, to a large extent,
whether they fly in E or other airspace. Traffic information will continue to be
provided in the terminal area.

David Cooke raised the issue that non-pressurised aircraft may need to cruise
lower in winter and, in practice, will be forced into Class G airspace. Mike
Smith advised that it is intended to introduce corridors or blankets of lower
level Class E airspace on busy routes and on other routes where users are
prepared to pay for it.

Mr Smith argued that the concern among some members of the industry
about the replacement of mandatory requirements with recommendations is
misplaced. He believes the experience in a range of industries shows that
recommendations will deliver higher standards and better safety outcomes,
due to the transfer of the onus of care and responsibility to individual pilots.
Mr Smith noted that the current system has generated complacency.

In response to ASF queries about the evidence supporting improved pilot
attitudes, Mr Smith advised that in the United States there is a very high level
of compliance with procedures at entry to the circuit and while on the circuit.
US pilots are generally more diligent in the terminal and more vigilant in
looking out of the window. Collision rates in the United States are just as good
or better than those in Australia, though in both countries the rate is so low as
to make valid statistical comparison impossible. He agreed with David Earley,
however, that a significant cultural change is required of Australia’s pilots.

The ASF also raised the issue of comparative radar coverage. Mr Smith
responded that while the United States has about 85% radar coverage, the
15% not covered represents an area larger than Victoria. He noted that
Australia also has high radar coverage where we have high traffic levels, but
that overall we have fewer than 200 IFRs in the air at any given time
compared with the 4,500 to 9,000 in the United States.

David Cooke pointed out that there is no United States equivalent of
Australia’s GAAPs. Mr Smith advised that in practice the United States Class
D towers work similarly to our GAAPS. He believes that Australia’s Class D
towers will evolve to work in a similar way to GAAP airports.

Mr Smith told the ASF that training very close to complete for CTAFs as an
earlier introduction had been planned originally. Information material is well
advanced and a video will be available in February or March. He indicated
that he should be able to provide CTAF material to the ASF’s February
meeting.

Subsequent NAS changes

NAS should be fully implemented by around 2006. Arrangements for
managing the implementation process over the whole of that period are yet to
be determined.

Mike Smith noted that ADSB technology is moving along within a similar
timeframe. He pointed out that while there is no tie between NAS and ADSB,
the two are complementary.

&.. off the SMH Beaker thread: 

..However with Beaker what really piqued my interest was his involvement with the implementation of the NAS (2B), remembering that he was the Muppet that commissioned Jeff Griffith to review the possible ramifications of modifying (to Australian unique conditions) Class E over D in the NAS(2B) program:  https://infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/p...report.pdf

The following is a link to Hansard from 26 May 2004 Senate Estimates: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/sear...632%2F0002

From the Hansard link there is a lengthy but excellent passage of Q&A & general debate by the RRAT committee Senator's of Mike Smith (the former Executive Director of the National Airspace System) that is worth taking the time to read, example:

Senator O'BRIEN —If you want to be so churlish, then so be it. You can deal with the consequences. The minute suggests there was some opposition to the need for a design safety case, especially by Mr Dick Smith. Is it true that the design safety case conducted by the National Airspace System Implementation Group was for only the 10 characteristics that were considered to be different in the Australian National Airspace stage 2b from the US NAS?

Mr M. Smith —My recollection is that we applied the Airservices process in determining whether elements of the NAS stage 2b required design safety case work. Where it was identified that those elements did require that work, then that work was conducted by my group in conjunction with Airservices. So for the elements that the SCARD process identified required design work, then that work was in fact done. I cannot recall what they all were, but for instance Mr Matthews indicated that some of them were relatively minor. I can recall one that said that a particular set of procedures, which is part of the US NAS, would be introduced but we would not include the part of the US rules that says, `This procedure should not be used on presidential aircraft,' simply because we do not have presidential aircraft in this country. Nonetheless, that was required to be addressed as part of design. Another related to application of a particular set of procedures 10,000 feet above sea level but within 2,500 feet of the terrain. Again, we do not have a circumstance that matches that requirement in Australia, given that Kosciusko is somewhat less than 7,500 feet tall. That is the sort of design issue that the SCARD process came up with. But wherever there was a difference, including those, then design safety case work was conducted.

Senator O'BRIEN —So the answer to the question is yes, but you are giving me additional information. Is that how I should understand it?

Mr M. Smith —That is true.

And if you then go to the previous page of Hansard for Airservices Australia you will witness a completely different, almost subservient, ASA executive not arguing the toss with the Senators but informing them of where their contribution to the NAS 2B implementation program was at, example:

CHAIR —Welcome. My understanding is that you have an opening statement. Is that correct?

Mr B. Smith —Yes, Senator. Should I proceed with that?

CHAIR —Yes.

Mr B. Smith —We would like to put the following information on the record for this committee in order to update progress and clarify issues relating to the National Airspace System. Since I last appeared before this committee on 17 February 2004 considerable safety analysis has been undertaken. On Monday 24 May the board issued a progress report on this work. Airservices Australia board confirmed that some changes will need to be made to part 2b of the National Airspace System—known as the NAS—reforms that were introduced on 27 November 2003. Our conclusion to date is that it is unlikely that reclassification of en route class E airspace to class C airspace will be required. Qualitative assessments associated with this work do, however, point to the need for enlarged class C steps around class C aerodromes as a minimum requirement.

In the light of further data and analysis regarding the benefits and risks associated with the current NAS 2b airspace arrangements, the board has decided to focus future work on two options to enhance the airspace in parallel, both of which are expected to involve minimal change to class E en route airspace. One option involves the use of special E airspace above and around class D or regional towers; the other involves class C airspace above class D towers and some changes to en route class E, for airspace design reasons, in the Sydney-Melbourne corridor. Airservices Australia is directing resources to further investigate these two options, including safety analysis, cost benefit assessments, risk hazard assessments and mitigation identification, and to further consult with industry on these options.

Airservices Australia board also announced further interim enhancements to complement actions already undertaken. These enhancements or risk mitigators were identified as a result of the extensive data collection and analysis conducted to date. They include additional controller training on operational responsibilities and duty of care, working with the Civil Aviation Safety Authority on improved definitions of traffic information and safety alerts, additional pilot education material, working with CASA on educational material to reduce violations of controlled airspace, better coordination with airlines regarding the serviceability of traffic alert and collision avoidance systems—or TACAS—with all operations in relation to transponder failures or noncompliance, and workshopping the feasibility of depicting key instrument flight routes on visual charts.

Overall the board is encouraged by the work under way to narrow the scope of the changes in airspace required. Airservices Australia is on track to complete consideration of the issues in time for any changes to be incorporated into the 25 November 2004 Aeronautical Information Regulation and Control—or AIRAC—distribution deadline. That completes my statement.

    
The stark comparison between the ASA, CASA & Department interaction with the Senate & industry back then, compared to the arrogant tossers from the ASA executive team in the youtube video at the top of the post IMO is simply staggering - when did this paradigm shift in the power base from Department to ASA occur & why?
MTF..P2