[Peetwo]

"...the ATSB prefers to encourage relevant organisation(s) to proactively initiate safety action, rather than to issue formal safety recommendations or safety advisory notices..."

Hmm...guess the bureau has a sense of mistrust when it comes to Jabiru aircraft- why??

Here is a summary of the ATSB findings & implications to Jabiru courtesy Hitch:

The Jabiru J230.


ATSB Engine Report zeroes in on Jabiru Failures
09 Mar 2016

  

Queensland firm Jabiru defends record following Australian Transport Safety Bureau report

A Jabiru 2200 engine. (Jabiru)


Jabiru slams ATSB over Engine Failure Report
10 Mar 2016

Further Update: The 'Klan Man' is back..  (Via the Oz today):

Jabiru slams ATSB’s damning engine safety report as ‘biased’

• Anthony Klan
  
• The Australian
  
• March 11, 2016 12:00AM
  

Journalist
Sydney
Anthony Klan is a journalist specialising in corporate malfeasance and business reporting. He has won many awards including a Walkley Award in 2007 for Business Journalism, the 2014 News Corporation Australia Business Journalist of the Year, and the 2015 Citi Journalism Award for Excellence, Personal Finance. Have a tip off? Complete confidentiality assured: klana@theaustralian.com.au


An ATSB study says one in 10 Jabiru engines failed or malfunctioned during flight.


[/url][url=http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/aviation/jabiru-slams-atsbs-damning-engine-safety-report-as-biased/news-story/8e00b4c63c68da43971889388451cb00#]
The nation’s biggest manufacturer and exporter of light aircraft engines has been savaged by the transport safety regulator, which has found that one in 10 Jabiru ­engines failed or malfunctioned during flight.

Dear {fill in industry stakeholder/Senator name} - Up yours!

L&Ks DAS Skidmore


From the released AQON #158 (note the part in bold -  ):

Question no.: 158
Program: n/a
Division/Agency: Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Topic: Shutdown calculations
Proof Hansard Page: 106 (8 February 2016)

Senator O'Sullivan, Barry asked:

Senator O'SULLIVAN: You may have to take this on notice: what data did you rely upon that had you draw the conclusion of the number of shutdowns calculated?
Mr Skidmore: We had data from ATSB, from Recreational Aviation Australia and from our own investigations. We should be able to get the exact data.
Senator O'SULLIVAN: Would you be able to do that?
Mr Skidmore: Yes.

Answer:
The data CASA relied on in determining appropriate action in respect of Jabiru engines was derived from the following sources:

• Jabiru Engine Failure Analysis in relation to Service Difficulties Reports received by CASA from 2007 to 2011;

• Investigation report into Jabiru Reliability and Continuing Airworthiness Support (13 March 2013) which focussed on previously identified through bolt failures relating to continuous airworthiness responsibilities;

• Research into Engine Reliability for Ultralight, Recreational and Light Sports Aircraft (January 2014) relating to the inflight shut down rate between 2012 and 2013, based on Recreational Aviation Australian (RA-Aus) accident, incident and defect reports for that period;

• Consolidated engine occurrence data from 1 January to 30 July 2014 collected from RA-Aus, Airservices Australia and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau; and
• United States Federal Aviation Administration Memorandum ‘Risk Assessment for Reciprocating Engine Airworthiness Directives’ (24 May 1999).

Next 'up yours' was to Senator Canavan:

Question no.: 159
Program: n/a
Division/Agency: Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Topic: FRMS changes
Proof Hansard Page: 109 (8 February 2016)

Senator Canavan, Matthew asked:

Senator CANAVAN: I have some very simple questions about the proposed FRMS changes. I understand it is moving away from industry exemption processes to CAO 48.1. Some in the industry have contacted me about concerns that there has not been a proper transparency about the reasons for this change, particularly the data that is relied on by CASA to justify the change. Have you provided the industry with all of this data?
Mr Skidmore: Yes, we have. Everything we based the 48.1 changes on is on the website.
Senator CANAVAN: When was that done?
Mr Skidmore: I do not know the exact date, but I can find out.

Answer:
A review of the case for change: Scientific support for CAO 48.1 Instrument 2013 was published on the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) website on 24 November 2015. Key aspects of this information were also provided in the Notice of Final Rule Making published in March 2013 and to industry attendees at various industry briefings conducted by CASA representatives prior to and after the commencement of CAO 48.1 Instrument 2013.

The issue of FRMS & the CAO 48.1 instrument was also touched on by NX in relation to Qantas OPs at QON 167 & 168. The first AQON was pretty straight forward:

Mr Skidmore: I do not have the exact details at the tip of my fingers but, yes, it is a rough—
Senator XENOPHON: I am happy for you to take it on notice. I understand there are circumstances where it may be necessary for a pilot to exceed the eight-hour flying limit to nine hours, and the 11-hour tour of duty limit to 12 hours if they are in flight and, say, an unexpected weather condition pops up.
Mr Skidmore: That is my understanding, yes.
…
Answer:
Under the rule-set for managing fatigue - Civil Aviation Order (CAO) Part 48 and exemptions - there are various time limits, two of which are a maximum tour of duty of 11 hours and maximum of 8 hours flight time in any tour of duty. However there are also provisions within the Order to allow these limits to be extended to 12 hours for maximum tour of duty and 9 hours for maximum flight time.

It is broadly correct that no flight should commence take-off unless the pilot in command can be reasonably certain that the flight will be completed within the regulatory flight and duty limitations.

The second AQON for some bizarre reason suffered much conflation..

Senator XENOPHON: Yes, for flight planning. But the TEMPO or INTER or alternative airports do not appear to be mandatory considerations with respect to fatigue. Can you see my point that you cannot divorce the two because there is a strict requirement as to how much fuel you must carry, which by implication relates to the amount of time that a pilot is likely to be on duty? But it seems from this Qantas directive to its application of flight time limitations—and it is signed off by the chief pilot—that it is not a mandatory requirement.
Mr Skidmore: I am happy to take it on notice and have a look at it and then we can have a discussion if you like.

Answer:

For the purposes of flight planning, scheduling and crew rostering all flights are planned to be conducted within the prescribed regulatory flight and duty limitations (RFDL). On the day of operations, the crew shall not depart on a flight unless the flight can be completed within the RFDL. This provision is reflected in Qantas’ Flight Standing Order 084/15. In the en-route phase of a flight, the crew must make tactical decisions, taking into account a wide range of factors, including available RFDL and fatigue. The responsibility for making operational decisions in flight rests with the crew, and ultimately the Pilot in Command, because of the dynamic nature of flight operations. This is reflected in the Qantas Flight Standing Order 084/15 provisions for air traffic control holding requirements or forecast weather conditions that are TEMPO (temporary) or INTER (intermittent).

The actual quantity of fuel carried on board is a strategic planning decision. The decision is made in collaboration between flight crew and the airline’s flight planning section, so that regulatory requirements are met and operational efficiencies are maintained. The carriage of fuel is a parallel consideration to other factors, such as available flight and duty periods. The operational regulations set limits associated with minimum fuel carried for each flight, specifying a minimum amount of fuel based on the planned flight as well as additional fuel to cover periods when weather is forecast to be below specified minimum conditions for the destination airport and when air traffic control potentially require additional holding time in case of traffic congestion. There are also limits associated with when the captain must have a plan to divert to an alternate airport and when there must be sufficient fuel on board to fly to that alternate airport and land.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) provides operators with the discretion to consider the particular circumstances of the flight which includes any weather holding, air traffic holding and alternate airport requirements as well as the likelihood of any of these requirements materialising and to determine whether the flight can be contained within the original flight and duty limits (or the extended limits if the pilot considers themselves sufficiently fit for the proposed flight and the operator agrees with this assessment). The extension limit is available if the pilot and the operator consider that the pilot is fit for the extension, given the particular circumstances of the flight to be undertaken. When a duty period is extended, the subsequent crew rest period is augmented to take into consideration the preceding working period. Unlike running out of fuel, a pilot’s alertness does not end abruptly but is impacted by a complex set of factors, one very important one being the length of the tour of duty and the amount of flight time they have accrued.

Treating flight and duty limits in the same way as the minimum fuel requirements would involve ensuring that any weather related or air traffic control related holding period be contained entirely within the maximum flight and duty limits in order to undertake the flight. There may be, however, many reasons why a crew would modify their expectation of a straightforward approach and landing at the destination, and weather is only one such reason. Rather than be overly prescriptive CASA is aware that pilots are trained to make these kinds of operational decisions and the rules should support such decisions rather than hinder them. Qantas has an approved safety management system and this system is required to consider all foreseeable hazards and manage the risk associated with these hazards to an acceptable level.

P1 once told me that when the bureaucrats (i.e. CASA Iron Ring) start to lengthen their answers it is a sure sign that 'they' have something to hide. I am not sure if that is the case here but that AQON certainly seems a little OTT??


MTF...P2