Steam On – Sunday rant follows.
P2 offers the ATSB report into -THIS - ‘incident’ - HERE. The crafty bugger has only published the ‘Hitch’ comment which, for some bizarre reason proffers kudos to the pilot. Bollocks, absolute, total, unmitigated bollocks. This half baked report helps no one; least of the silly young sod involved or the fool who authorised a newly licenced pilot out alone in a low performance aircraft to operate in high performance weather.
No shit Sherlock. Talk about stating the ducking obvious. What about examining why young Spotty was there in the first place and what is significantly wrong with the first potentially suicidal decisions, those made before subsequent actions required the superior skills that superior knowledge would have precluded. In short, the caution instilled in previous years into neophyte pilots. Lets take a look at this incident without the rose coloured glasses.
OK, we can forgive Spotty for being ‘confident’. That false confidence, in all probability, stems from ‘training’ related to ensuring the met report is ‘legal’ for purpose. This has SFA to do with the met report being suitable for ‘operational’ purposes. This is a flight down a valley, surrounded by vertical dirt, notorious for all manner of foul, unpredictable weather, winds, turbulence and rapid mood changes.
Can we forgive the ‘senior’ instructor for supporting Spotty’s enthusiasm to tackle the flight in marginal conditions, in a very little, minimally equipped aircraft? By that I don’t mean GPS and the like, but de-ice and anti-ice gear, sufficient performance to support flight in windy conditions around the high hills and adjacent valleys; or strong enough to withstand the worst of the potential sheer lines, standing waves or CAT that can be, and often are found in that corner of the country, in those forecast conditions? I think not: neither may we continue to condone a system which promotes the ‘legal’ niceties over the operational realities.
No mention of the freezing level; no mention of the ‘mixing’ or potential for freezing rain. No mention made of the penchant for cloud to hang about the hills in layers, or sink into the passes and valleys; reduced visibility, etc. Delaying until the forecast is ‘good’ (as in legal) is no answer for a private, low experience, low performance flight; for commercial IFR operations, it’s a way of life. We have to go; Spotty had options and all of Australia to play around in. So why over the hills, past the valleys and on to Bairnsdale in a half gale Southerly? Not a ‘job’, not RPT, just a training exercise. Lunacy beckons.
To an IFR pilot, the TAF’s are all good news; above alternate requirement, highest IAF 6400 at Latrobe, so ice probable, but visual at minima >1000’ (ish) anywhere. Highest LSALT within 25 nms – 5800@BNS; 6400@ LTV and 3800 NE of ML; so an approach to descend and a good probability of getting visual. That terrain which requires the initiation of an instrument approach to break cloud does not disappear for VFR traffic; still there, hiding in the murk. Did Spotty or Spotty’s mentor consider the possibility of him getting trapped above (or in) cloud, with ice accumulating and needing to divert, over (or through) cloud to any of the destinations for which a TAFOR was issued? All legal, course it was. Operationally sensible? Probably not.
WTF kind of wooly thinking is this? Wind gusting 35 Kts – from where? Cross wind component, quartering, sheering, etc. Why was the wind a problem? If the flight forecast was deemed acceptable, why should the wind suddenly matter so – OK, ‘legal’ again; operationally dodgy, but legally covered. It’s probable Spotty could not make a fist of a gusty, quartering cross wind landing and Bairnsdale can be awkward. So we can glean that Spotty was unafraid of and confident in winning through the tough stuff on the ‘forecast’, but shit scared of a half gale at Bairnsdale. So it's OK to by pass a visual landing because of 'wind'; and heading back out into the murk, to pick your way through to where there is less wind. What are we teaching the kids these days?
Who is this ‘they’; was this report drafted by the tea lady and edited by the milkman? We start the report with a single pilot and midway we have the mysterious ‘they’ on site. More than anything else these two sentences typify the slipshod method of reporting the ATSB have descended to. Syntax errors I can live with, but a final report needs to be edited and checked. Sloppy, silly and detrimental to the already piss poor ATSB reputation.”
Assumption, expectation and folly - can we market that? Seems to be popular these days.
For me, the paragraph above defines the entire problem; from CASA through to ATSB and on to training standards. Read the bold bit, again and again until you see the blindingly obvious.
“After logging the diversion time on the flight plan, the pilot initiated a turn to the left.” WRONG –
Straight - nay - 'instantly' into cloud. Bollocks, this happens on night approaches, in lousy weather when visual can ‘instantly’ become not visual; quite often, on a dark night you can't see a low patch or layer; now that’s 'instant' loss of VMC.
Aviate; first last and always. Situational awareness always, and for ever. Does our kudos covered hero think “Oh crap, best get out of Dodge and head for the ranch”. Nope, first it’s head down, thumb in arse, mind into neutral, do the paperwork, look up; and, suddenly - Oh, surprise cloud everywhere. Bollocks , lethal, stupid, amateurish, badly trained Bollocks. Flogging about in marginal VMC you should be able to see the stuff, be aware of it and always, always leave the back open. Did young Spotty have this beaten into his little wooden head, as often as required, until it was an instinct. Clearly not.
Why? Can someone tell me, why a PPL cannot execute a 180˚ turn on the clocks to reverse course out of the murk, back into the visual conditions which he was enjoying, just a few ‘instants’ ago. Spotty had just finished training, so he should have the IF lessons fresh in his wooden head; Shirley. Or at least he had been taught to do a simple, basic rate 1 turn and confirm the attitude and timing on instruments. Rate 1, for 1 minute to a reciprocal heading to be in the clear – unless he was situationally unaware of the circumstances. But I forget, the paper work must be done first. Die young man; but die all legal, but leave the paperwork tidy.
So what? The ducking aircraft was in bloody cloud, not lost in space. WTF – he was navigating brilliantly in marginal VMC before ‘instantly’ being trapped in a malevolent cloud from nowhere. A 180 should have put him back from whence he came. The VOR (which is ground based station and unlikely to be fitted in a PA 28) or Omni Bearing Selector (OBS) and Course deviation Indicator (CDI) is irrelevant to the loss of external reference; the primary cause of this dreadful report.
Finally, we arrive back at the point where there may; or may not have been two in the lost aircraft, “keeping them calm” implies, yet again that there was."
Wish I’d never read the bloody report; but, I did. Please, please can we have our ATSB back; I don’t get paid enough for doing their job and my own. FCODL. Well done ATC, well done the Cirrus pilot. Spotty and his ‘senior instructor’ need their heads banged together and the drafting ATSB clown needs a new profession, being the tea lady needs a modicum of brain power; so that’s out.
Toot – weary – toot ends Sunday rant. Aye; (sigh) - turn it off GD; we’re done here.
Quote:Truly superior pilots are those who use their superior judgment to avoid those situations where they might have to use their superior skills.
P2 offers the ATSB report into -THIS - ‘incident’ - HERE. The crafty bugger has only published the ‘Hitch’ comment which, for some bizarre reason proffers kudos to the pilot. Bollocks, absolute, total, unmitigated bollocks. This half baked report helps no one; least of the silly young sod involved or the fool who authorised a newly licenced pilot out alone in a low performance aircraft to operate in high performance weather.
Quote:[as] soon as a pilot is in difficulty, or preferably before they reach that point, cannot be overstated.
No shit Sherlock. Talk about stating the ducking obvious. What about examining why young Spotty was there in the first place and what is significantly wrong with the first potentially suicidal decisions, those made before subsequent actions required the superior skills that superior knowledge would have precluded. In short, the caution instilled in previous years into neophyte pilots. Lets take a look at this incident without the rose coloured glasses.
Quote:ATSB - “Confident that the flight could be safely conducted under the VFR, etc.”
OK, we can forgive Spotty for being ‘confident’. That false confidence, in all probability, stems from ‘training’ related to ensuring the met report is ‘legal’ for purpose. This has SFA to do with the met report being suitable for ‘operational’ purposes. This is a flight down a valley, surrounded by vertical dirt, notorious for all manner of foul, unpredictable weather, winds, turbulence and rapid mood changes.
Quote:ATSB - “[the] pilot then discussed the planned route, and associated weather forecasts with a senior instructor at the flying school.”
Can we forgive the ‘senior’ instructor for supporting Spotty’s enthusiasm to tackle the flight in marginal conditions, in a very little, minimally equipped aircraft? By that I don’t mean GPS and the like, but de-ice and anti-ice gear, sufficient performance to support flight in windy conditions around the high hills and adjacent valleys; or strong enough to withstand the worst of the potential sheer lines, standing waves or CAT that can be, and often are found in that corner of the country, in those forecast conditions? I think not: neither may we continue to condone a system which promotes the ‘legal’ niceties over the operational realities.
Quote:ATSB - “The Area 30 Forecast (ARFOR) overview, issued at 0805 Eastern Standard Time (EST), which covered the time of the flight, predicted isolated scattered showers, and snowfalls above 4,000 ft. Low cloud with precipitation particularly on the windward slopes was also forecast. It was expected that this low cloud would contract to the north-east section of Area 30 by 1200, and clear by 1400. The wind below 5,000 ft was forecast as south-westerly and between 20 and 25 kt. A note stated that winds up to 5,000 ft were forecast to be 10-20 kt stronger in the east (including the Bairnsdale region).”
No mention of the freezing level; no mention of the ‘mixing’ or potential for freezing rain. No mention made of the penchant for cloud to hang about the hills in layers, or sink into the passes and valleys; reduced visibility, etc. Delaying until the forecast is ‘good’ (as in legal) is no answer for a private, low experience, low performance flight; for commercial IFR operations, it’s a way of life. We have to go; Spotty had options and all of Australia to play around in. So why over the hills, past the valleys and on to Bairnsdale in a half gale Southerly? Not a ‘job’, not RPT, just a training exercise. Lunacy beckons.
Quote:Moorabbin: Issued at 0907: Scattered cloud at 3,000-4,000 ft, with deteriorating conditions from 1800.
Bairnsdale: Issued at 1027: Wind from 250°T at 14 kt; 10 km visibility; light rain showers and scattered cloud at 3,000 ft, with broken cloud at 4,000 ft.
Latrobe Valley: Issued at 1030: 10 km visibility, light rain showers. Cloud few at 2,500 ft and scattered at 3,500 ft
To an IFR pilot, the TAF’s are all good news; above alternate requirement, highest IAF 6400 at Latrobe, so ice probable, but visual at minima >1000’ (ish) anywhere. Highest LSALT within 25 nms – 5800@BNS; 6400@ LTV and 3800 NE of ML; so an approach to descend and a good probability of getting visual. That terrain which requires the initiation of an instrument approach to break cloud does not disappear for VFR traffic; still there, hiding in the murk. Did Spotty or Spotty’s mentor consider the possibility of him getting trapped above (or in) cloud, with ice accumulating and needing to divert, over (or through) cloud to any of the destinations for which a TAFOR was issued? All legal, course it was. Operationally sensible? Probably not.
Quote:ATSB - "During this discussion, the pilot and instructor decided that due to the METAR at Bairnsdale Airport indicating strong winds of up to 35 kt, the pilot should make an assessment upon arrival there. If the pilot did not assess the wind as suitable/safe for landing, the brief was to overfly the airport and commence the return l
e.g. to Latrobe Valley."
WTF kind of wooly thinking is this? Wind gusting 35 Kts – from where? Cross wind component, quartering, sheering, etc. Why was the wind a problem? If the flight forecast was deemed acceptable, why should the wind suddenly matter so – OK, ‘legal’ again; operationally dodgy, but legally covered. It’s probable Spotty could not make a fist of a gusty, quartering cross wind landing and Bairnsdale can be awkward. So we can glean that Spotty was unafraid of and confident in winning through the tough stuff on the ‘forecast’, but shit scared of a half gale at Bairnsdale. So it's OK to by pass a visual landing because of 'wind'; and heading back out into the murk, to pick your way through to where there is less wind. What are we teaching the kids these days?
Quote:ATSB “They visually confirmed the aircraft’s location, noting this on the flight plan.”
ATSB “[they] were confident that they could ‘push on’.
Who is this ‘they’; was this report drafted by the tea lady and edited by the milkman? We start the report with a single pilot and midway we have the mysterious ‘they’ on site. More than anything else these two sentences typify the slipshod method of reporting the ATSB have descended to. Syntax errors I can live with, but a final report needs to be edited and checked. Sloppy, silly and detrimental to the already piss poor ATSB reputation.”
Quote:ATSB – “ In hindsight, the pilot reported an unawareness of how thick and widespread the cloud ahead really was, and how it was different to what had been expected. After manoeuvring around several patches of cloud, the pilot made a decision to conduct a 180° turn onto the reciprocal track, and return to Moorabbin.
Assumption, expectation and folly - can we market that? Seems to be popular these days.
Quote:“After logging the diversion time on the flight plan, the pilot initiated a turn to the left.”
For me, the paragraph above defines the entire problem; from CASA through to ATSB and on to training standards. Read the bold bit, again and again until you see the blindingly obvious.
“After logging the diversion time on the flight plan, the pilot initiated a turn to the left.” WRONG –
Quote:ATSB – “Almost instantly, the pilot realised that the aircraft was now completely engulfed in cloud, and had entered instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).”
Straight - nay - 'instantly' into cloud. Bollocks, this happens on night approaches, in lousy weather when visual can ‘instantly’ become not visual; quite often, on a dark night you can't see a low patch or layer; now that’s 'instant' loss of VMC.
Aviate; first last and always. Situational awareness always, and for ever. Does our kudos covered hero think “Oh crap, best get out of Dodge and head for the ranch”. Nope, first it’s head down, thumb in arse, mind into neutral, do the paperwork, look up; and, suddenly - Oh, surprise cloud everywhere. Bollocks , lethal, stupid, amateurish, badly trained Bollocks. Flogging about in marginal VMC you should be able to see the stuff, be aware of it and always, always leave the back open. Did young Spotty have this beaten into his little wooden head, as often as required, until it was an instinct. Clearly not.
Quote:ATSB - "The pilot was not instrument rated, nor was the aircraft approved for flight in IMC."
Why? Can someone tell me, why a PPL cannot execute a 180˚ turn on the clocks to reverse course out of the murk, back into the visual conditions which he was enjoying, just a few ‘instants’ ago. Spotty had just finished training, so he should have the IF lessons fresh in his wooden head; Shirley. Or at least he had been taught to do a simple, basic rate 1 turn and confirm the attitude and timing on instruments. Rate 1, for 1 minute to a reciprocal heading to be in the clear – unless he was situationally unaware of the circumstances. But I forget, the paper work must be done first. Die young man; but die all legal, but leave the paperwork tidy.
Quote:ATSB "The aircraft was equipped with a Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range (VOR), but the pilot had not been trained to operate this navigational aid."
So what? The ducking aircraft was in bloody cloud, not lost in space. WTF – he was navigating brilliantly in marginal VMC before ‘instantly’ being trapped in a malevolent cloud from nowhere. A 180 should have put him back from whence he came. The VOR (which is ground based station and unlikely to be fitted in a PA 28) or Omni Bearing Selector (OBS) and Course deviation Indicator (CDI) is irrelevant to the loss of external reference; the primary cause of this dreadful report.
Quote:ATSB - "The instructor in QQT was able to work methodically with the pilot in TAU, focusing on reducing the pilot’s workload and keeping them calm.
Finally, we arrive back at the point where there may; or may not have been two in the lost aircraft, “keeping them calm” implies, yet again that there was."
Wish I’d never read the bloody report; but, I did. Please, please can we have our ATSB back; I don’t get paid enough for doing their job and my own. FCODL. Well done ATC, well done the Cirrus pilot. Spotty and his ‘senior instructor’ need their heads banged together and the drafting ATSB clown needs a new profession, being the tea lady needs a modicum of brain power; so that’s out.
Toot – weary – toot ends Sunday rant. Aye; (sigh) - turn it off GD; we’re done here.