[Peetwo]

DSB v ATSB POC - A cluster of Duck-ups

#Post255

Helicopter strays into jets’ airspace in Melbourne

#Post262-265 (previous page)

Passenger video gives inside view of ATC screw up at Melbourne Airport

NX Quotes:

[b]“Airservices Australia agreed this was a serious incident, but it took more probing and letters from me before night time LAHSO operations were suspended at Melbourne Airport from 10th November 2015 — over four months after the incident,” he said.

“When it comes to safety there must be no scrimping of staff, and we should be adopting world’s best practice,” he said.
[/b]
Senator Xenophon said the double go-around was described in risk assessment modelling as a one-in-175-year event, but that two such events had occurred in the last five years.

“It seems there is something seriously wrong with this so-called risk assessment modelling when it comes to aircraft hurtling along at 800km per hour,” Senator Xenophon said.

Be forewarned & be prepared -
Hoodlum appears to have embraced the NX & RRAT Committee forewarnings prior to last Estimates, from ASA Hansard:

Senator XENOPHON: It is good to hear that. Can I just go to the issue of the question I put on notice about the incident that took place in Melbourne, in Essendon Airport, on 12 November 2013, which you are familiar with?


Mr Harfield : Correct.

Senator XENOPHON: You indicated in an answer that Airservices had reviewed coordination procedures and in July 2014 implemented a number of actions, which I will not have to repeat—although my understanding is that those questions were due in December and we did not get them until February. Is that right?

Mr Harfield : We provided the questions on notice in return in accordance with the time lines.

Senator XENOPHON: So, if we did not get them, that might have something to do with the department.

Mr Mrdak : I explained earlier there was some delay in having some of the questions completed but then also cleared by the minister.

Senator XENOPHON: So the minister did not clear them within the time required by the Senate. So you guys complied within the time frame. If it said by 4 December, for instance, you would have provided it to the department, to the minister's office, by 4 December, or whatever the time line was? I am satisfied with that. That is relevant in the following context. You answered that you implemented a number of actions about Melbourne Tower, keeping them informed in terms of the status of Essendon. Melbourne Tower was advised of aircraft conducting instrument approaches to runway 26 at Essendon. Melbourne Tower's was given increased awareness of potential conflicts which are operating on runway 16 for departures. In addition, an interim system enhancement has been implemented which involves a visual prompt. So all these safeguards were put in place. What I am trying to understand is—and I wrote to your chair, Sir Angus Houston, recently—you are aware of what happened at Melbourne and Essendon airports on Australia Day this year?

Mr Harfield : That is correct.

Senator XENOPHON: Can you just run us through that very briefly, because it concerns me that it has happened again, despite these processes that have been put in place.

Mr Harfield : It may be easier to run through a document I can table which actually has both the incident of 12 November 2013—the original incident—

CHAIR: Do you want to table that?

Mr Harfield : Yes. I have got that one to be tabled. It has got the actions taken but also the event of 26 January and the details associated with that.

Senator XENOPHON: Maybe we could get some copies through the secretariat.

Mr Harfield : I have got some copies here as well.

Senator XENOPHON: I move that it be tabled.

CHAIR: Yes; we—

Senator XENOPHON: I am trying to get through it, Chair. So you understand my concern in this regard? I obviously have not had an opportunity to look at this. You understand my concern that—

Mr Harfield : I very much understand your concern that there are two incidents that are very similar. As you will see from the document that we have provided and tabled, there are some extra circumstances that occurred differently from the first one that created the same event, and that is what we are investigating, to put in extra mitigation to ensure that it does not happen again.

Senator XENOPHON: It is a pity I did not see this beforehand, because I obviously will not be able to ask you questions about it. I may have to put some questions on notice or ask them at the following estimates or another committee hearing...

  
Okay so there were 2 ASA tabled documents & they are now publicly available:

2.) Document titled 'Information Brief: Melbourne Basin Coordination Incidents'. Tabled by Airservices Australia on 8 February 2016.


(PDF 1653KB)

3.) Document titled 'Information Brief: LAHSO at Melbourne Airport'. Tabled by Airservices Australia on 9 February 2016.

(PDF 4836KB) 

  
No 2) above was the one that Harfwit refers in Hansard:


The second briefing -  on the LAHSO & related double go round incident - by Hoody was equally as good & provides another concise timeline that doesn't paint CASA in a particularly - shall we say - proactive light...  

It is encouraging to see that Hoody is getting on with the job of proactively tackling some of these recently identified significant safety issues to do with ATC in YMML...

However the cluster of serious incidents recorded for in & around YMML (Tullamarine International Airport) and the associated airspace should be of particular concern for the ATSB.  Yet I don't believe (I could stand to be corrected ) that the supposedly independent air safety investigator, has initiated any research investigations into the rising list of serious occurrences in and around Melbourne airport - Why not?

In a fascinating comparison it just so happens that the Dutch Safety Board has just initiated an investigation into Amsterdam Airport Schiphol:

Investigation

• 
  Nieuws2 Mar 2016
  
  Investigation into air traffic safety at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol
  The Dutch Safety Board has started a thematic investigation into air traffic safety at and around Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. Over the past few years, the Dutch Safety Board has investigated multiple incidents at the airport. With a view to further improving safety at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, the Board now wishes to investigate whether these incidents may be due to multiple root problems, such as the design, location and use of the airport. Not only is this important for the current handling of air traffic, but also given the generally expected growth in the numbers of flights at Schiphol in the decades ahead.
  
  Among other things, the investigation will determine whether the parties involved followed up the Board's previous recommendations. The Board also wishes to gather information on how the parties involved have been fulfilling their responsibilities with respect to the various safety aspects of air traffic. Indeed, the Board wants to examine how the safety of local residents features in decisions on Schiphol and how the interests of safety, economy and the environment are balanced.
   
  The events and incidents investigated previously by the Board included aircraft taking off from a runway not cleared for use, runway incursions (i.e. vehicles crossing or driving on a runway in use for air traffic) and technical problems.
  

        
From that brief investigation summary it doesn't appear (unlike our ATSB) to be beholden or PC'd in regards to any DIPs (Airport owners, ATC or regulator) and they certainly aren't going to shirk their responsibilities as the ICAO State approved AAI..
MTF...P2