A nod, to the Gods (and Murphy).
Whilst it may be 'easy' for some to offer their little, but artfully pointed barbs, slick jibes from a privileged, (kissed on the arse by the Gods) position; there are some who learned the 'real' lessons of operational flying in the Alma Marta school of 'hard knocks'. Going through 'the hoops' of VFR to CPL and first multi engine (PA 30) was a breeze; thanks to the good and (historically) exceptional training gifted and, in 'suitable' weather the young 'K' could afford the occasional 'attaboy' for a job done to 'standard'. Of course VFR was OK; but to earn ones keep, an instrument rating was 'de rigueur'. So, the Penny's were found and 'training' began. Luck; pure blind good fortune placed me in the hands of a man who 'knew' what IFR really was. Never was he one for 'forms' or 'systematic' clap-trap; he simply, borderline brutally, ensured that almost any maneuver could be performed; no matter what was occurring, be performed, without hesitation; damage to engine or airframe and to the unfortunates 'in-the-back'. It was 'tough love' and I have thanked the Gods many times over for his 'attention' to my many failing; and, importantly, for the 'gift' of being able to 'understand' the messages delivered from engine, airframe and instruments as a holistic picture. For example; three engines chocked with ice, inside 30 seconds +3” of clear ice, 1000 below LSALT @ Wee Jasper; or, a cylinder through the windscreen 'surveying' a monster thunderstorm at 20 odd thousand and an OEI approach to 'minima' to follow. There are more examples; double engine fail at F170 @ 0100 alongside the Diamndtina – SY to DN. The list goes on; the point is. that despite 'the stuff' which 'ticks-the-boxes' one simply does not know what one does not know. Experience teaches the rest (Murphy assisted).
This report – HERE – takes me back a ways to this report – HERE. The latter report caught the interest of a TV show producer. Nothing else would do but I was called out (from leave) to operate a Merlin on the exact track to the impact point. The GPS was our 'suspect'. Our GPS took us 'eerily' to the exact smoke darkened place. Yet, this was an experienced, fully qualified professional in command of the accident flight, 'in weather'. But there was evidence of tragedy, as stark and clear as if it happened 'yesterday'. Aye; a CFIT: - another one.!
“This isn't just 'the way things are.' This is the way you made them. This is the result of your choices, your actions. Yours.”
How many more I wonder? IF (big one) a competent, highly qualified, current, fit professional can be deceived by weather, mission and instrumentation, then what chance a new chum, on a VFR ticket surviving? My bets book would love to take your bet. This current 'laissez-faire' - 'no responsibility' approach from CASA is creating a false sense of 'security' (for wont of better) within the ranks of the 'private' operational set. Or; the blind leading the blind, if you prefer. I see this – developing across this planet; clever, experienced, highly qualified pilots have been brought to grief due to nature, terrain and bloody awful weather. Why? Oh, please tell me why a Mutt with minimum training and experience can believe that 'they' will win through; every time they declare war on Murphy, the Gods of weather and those who's sage advice is consigned to 'history' and deemed 'not applicable' to them? It simply beggars belief. The most consistent event which claims lives (many) is simply left to the discretion of those with NFI and with zero accountability/ responsibility for the 'happening'. Always the 'blame' resides with the deceived. Oh! BOLLOCKS (in Spades, redoubled).
Aye well; there's line up at the doors; shop floor is clean, beasts fed and watered; the wild wood awaits our nocturnal visit; best shut up and crack on I suppose. But the shame of the weather related CFIT deaths must, sooner or later must be accounted for – (IMO). By the regulator – perhaps??
Selah.
Whilst it may be 'easy' for some to offer their little, but artfully pointed barbs, slick jibes from a privileged, (kissed on the arse by the Gods) position; there are some who learned the 'real' lessons of operational flying in the Alma Marta school of 'hard knocks'. Going through 'the hoops' of VFR to CPL and first multi engine (PA 30) was a breeze; thanks to the good and (historically) exceptional training gifted and, in 'suitable' weather the young 'K' could afford the occasional 'attaboy' for a job done to 'standard'. Of course VFR was OK; but to earn ones keep, an instrument rating was 'de rigueur'. So, the Penny's were found and 'training' began. Luck; pure blind good fortune placed me in the hands of a man who 'knew' what IFR really was. Never was he one for 'forms' or 'systematic' clap-trap; he simply, borderline brutally, ensured that almost any maneuver could be performed; no matter what was occurring, be performed, without hesitation; damage to engine or airframe and to the unfortunates 'in-the-back'. It was 'tough love' and I have thanked the Gods many times over for his 'attention' to my many failing; and, importantly, for the 'gift' of being able to 'understand' the messages delivered from engine, airframe and instruments as a holistic picture. For example; three engines chocked with ice, inside 30 seconds +3” of clear ice, 1000 below LSALT @ Wee Jasper; or, a cylinder through the windscreen 'surveying' a monster thunderstorm at 20 odd thousand and an OEI approach to 'minima' to follow. There are more examples; double engine fail at F170 @ 0100 alongside the Diamndtina – SY to DN. The list goes on; the point is. that despite 'the stuff' which 'ticks-the-boxes' one simply does not know what one does not know. Experience teaches the rest (Murphy assisted).
This report – HERE – takes me back a ways to this report – HERE. The latter report caught the interest of a TV show producer. Nothing else would do but I was called out (from leave) to operate a Merlin on the exact track to the impact point. The GPS was our 'suspect'. Our GPS took us 'eerily' to the exact smoke darkened place. Yet, this was an experienced, fully qualified professional in command of the accident flight, 'in weather'. But there was evidence of tragedy, as stark and clear as if it happened 'yesterday'. Aye; a CFIT: - another one.!
“This isn't just 'the way things are.' This is the way you made them. This is the result of your choices, your actions. Yours.”
How many more I wonder? IF (big one) a competent, highly qualified, current, fit professional can be deceived by weather, mission and instrumentation, then what chance a new chum, on a VFR ticket surviving? My bets book would love to take your bet. This current 'laissez-faire' - 'no responsibility' approach from CASA is creating a false sense of 'security' (for wont of better) within the ranks of the 'private' operational set. Or; the blind leading the blind, if you prefer. I see this – developing across this planet; clever, experienced, highly qualified pilots have been brought to grief due to nature, terrain and bloody awful weather. Why? Oh, please tell me why a Mutt with minimum training and experience can believe that 'they' will win through; every time they declare war on Murphy, the Gods of weather and those who's sage advice is consigned to 'history' and deemed 'not applicable' to them? It simply beggars belief. The most consistent event which claims lives (many) is simply left to the discretion of those with NFI and with zero accountability/ responsibility for the 'happening'. Always the 'blame' resides with the deceived. Oh! BOLLOCKS (in Spades, redoubled).
Aye well; there's line up at the doors; shop floor is clean, beasts fed and watered; the wild wood awaits our nocturnal visit; best shut up and crack on I suppose. But the shame of the weather related CFIT deaths must, sooner or later must be accounted for – (IMO). By the regulator – perhaps??
Selah.