Why did they ask the office girl?
The video above is from Senate Estimates; above (Cheers P2). Questions are asked of Spence who, in her defence, would have NFI about the subject examined. Clerical staff are not 'operational' staff; but the questions linger and they do demand (absolutely) definitive answers. There is on Pprune a well writ post which begs answer to many, many questions. Questions which, IMO demand answers and a serious revision of a significant 'safety' matter. To wit; fatalities in multi engine aircraft during 'check & training' (C&T) Why? Well, more have died during this particular element of T&C under discussion than in any other area. The 'engine failure after take off' (EFATO) scenario demands a 'check flight' twice a year, for every type operated in a general aviation (non airline) fleet. Three different types on line; equate to six high risk exercises; one every two months in aged aircraft with no 'guaranteed' performance; aircraft which work very hard for living.
“It is given to us to calculate, to weigh, to measure, to observe, this is natural philosophy; almost all the rest is chimera.”
Consider this; the FAA set the rules for the critical data which brackets an aircraft performance envelope – HERE - . Manufacturers use a factory fresh model to provide the 'performance' data; test pilot skills are 'factored' down to provide an envelope for 'general' piloting ability and maintenance. They do a pretty good job of this; no guarantees of course. But general wear and tear and a range of piloting skills are accounted for. (Give or Take). Many (many) of the airframe engine combinations have aged gracefully, survived all manner of pilots, airstrips, weather, abuse and load for many, many decades and still going strong.
“When you have mastered numbers, you will in fact no longer be reading numbers, any more than you read words when reading books. You will be reading meanings.”
Consider the odds: take the number of take off and landing cycles conducted by the non airline sector (GA) in a year; then count the number of 'dead cut' engine failures events. Rarer than Rocking Horse pooh. Even rarer count the number of fatal events due to engine failure at low level during operations, now we are into Hen's teeth territory. Then count the fatalities due to 'simulated' engine failure in 'check' operations.
“99 percent of all statistics only tell 49 percent of the story.”
Two steps (hobble) from my desk, from number four shelf I drag out a random flight manual for a 'light twin' – A Ted Smith Aerostar 601. From the manual sections it is easy to define several elements, critical to the 'higher risk' elements of the 'take off' component. The Minimum Single engine control speed is set between 80 and 86 knots. The single engine climb speed, is set at about 109 knots (Indicated airspeed). Working the data for an aircraft at max weight, on a 25c day; sealed runway etc. provides a clearly defined (on paper) distance (time too if you work in ground speed) between passing 'minimum control speed' and single engine climb speed. It is, in an accelerating aircraft but a heartbeat or two; BUT remains at the top end of the 'high risk' envelope for 'C&T' exercise for fatality. So why is this 'check' mandated, twice a year? Seriously, what's the point?
“Ah, but my dear sir, the why must never be obvious. That is the whole point.”
In the AS 600 manual; there are 21 separate 'emergency' check lists within the 'Flight Manual' EP section. Each (every) one, has a higher statistical 'fail/problem' ratio than a 'dead cut' of an engine in a 'critical' situation. The maintenance logs will confirm this. These essential, potentially lethal items are not required to be checked twice a year, but they matter. Engine failure between rotate and clean up/ climb away is a drill. A simple drill; and must be as 'automatic' as retracting the undercarriage or closing the door. The 'basics' apply across the spectrum of operations, the 'time' between 'startle' and 'direct action' should be no more than a quick curse, no thought required; there isn't time. The initial training should be, and mostly is, done at altitude, calmly, with the rinse, wash, repeat method. Reaction and the response all carefully set in a stone cold, correct procedure. With an engine failed during a critical phase, (86 – 105 KIAS) 'things' are going to get busy and there's precious little time to be faffing about with shut down/ feather distractions. In a light twin, it should much less time to action than it takes to type it. Mixture, Pitch, Power - Identify, Verify, Feather and get on with the 'real' job. Reducing Drag by securing the engine is only the first stanza in a very dangerous game. Getting the aircraft flying is the real job. That, not the drill is the secret to survival.
Repetition of the same thought or physical action develops into a habit which, repeated frequently enough, becomes an automatic reflex. Amen....
The 'secret' of surviving an engine failure (dead cut) is neither mystical nor magic; but it demands skill and understanding. The aircraft has just lost power, a lot of it. The pilot's job is to get it flying again; reduce the drag, trim for balance, sort out a 'plan' and act (now – now would be good) The first task is demanding; for much depends on it. The aircraft 'must' be 'balanced' and 'drag' reduced; airspeed must be gained, if height is to achieved; it takes skill, patience and understanding to achieve this. Banging about in a circuit, on a fine day at minimum load is of neither practical nor intrinsic value. A partial failure can present a whole raft of 'different problems, particularly with 'systems failure thrown in for fun. In short: the whole CASA demanded, simulated box tick exercise is not only a a waste of time and money, counter productive but has cost more lives than the 'real thing'. Nuts and demanded twice a year???
The majority of multi engine aircraft, below 5700 Kg are, in essence, all the same, give or take. Fly one probably make a fist of flying the rest. A much better notion – for 'safeties' sake, for a newly minted junior twin engine pilots would be en-route check, twice a year, and a once a year 'Base' check. A real work out, in any multi engine aircraft available on the day; soup to nuts – paper work, trim sheet, loading, flight planning, weather assessment; alternate route and 'planning'. The during cruise, in say the Aerostar, systems failure drills; all 21 of them. Debriefing; honest and, importantly, providing guidance toward better performance in the 'rough' areas noted. How else are the 'Kids' to learn their trade?
“I never teach my pupils, I only attempt to provide the conditions in which they can learn.”
Aye well, IMO there is much 'wrong' with the CASA mandated 'check' system. It promotes fiscal and operational resistance and 'work-around' box ticking while enforcing an unrealistic 'legal' tenant of no practical benefit to the 'junior' pilot. Furthermore; the statistics demonstrate, very starkly, a death toll far in excess of deaths in the normal course of operational flying. The ratio of actual engine failure related deaths to the ratio of those killed 'in training' is off the charts. But renders the 'philosophy' nugatory when compared to number of 'real' engine failure events during the small phase of flight between a take off speed and a 'safe' speed for single engine operations. Do the math, I have, acceleration : between 86 KIAS and 109 KIAS = in seconds. I'll wait for Spence to come back with that puzzle solved. P.S. the 'smoke' comes out the back in the real world. Bunch of numpties. Maybe her Bag man with the mouth and 'all the answers' could assist. No bets taken.
Toot – 6 sleeps to freedom-- toot.
The video above is from Senate Estimates; above (Cheers P2). Questions are asked of Spence who, in her defence, would have NFI about the subject examined. Clerical staff are not 'operational' staff; but the questions linger and they do demand (absolutely) definitive answers. There is on Pprune a well writ post which begs answer to many, many questions. Questions which, IMO demand answers and a serious revision of a significant 'safety' matter. To wit; fatalities in multi engine aircraft during 'check & training' (C&T) Why? Well, more have died during this particular element of T&C under discussion than in any other area. The 'engine failure after take off' (EFATO) scenario demands a 'check flight' twice a year, for every type operated in a general aviation (non airline) fleet. Three different types on line; equate to six high risk exercises; one every two months in aged aircraft with no 'guaranteed' performance; aircraft which work very hard for living.
“It is given to us to calculate, to weigh, to measure, to observe, this is natural philosophy; almost all the rest is chimera.”
Consider this; the FAA set the rules for the critical data which brackets an aircraft performance envelope – HERE - . Manufacturers use a factory fresh model to provide the 'performance' data; test pilot skills are 'factored' down to provide an envelope for 'general' piloting ability and maintenance. They do a pretty good job of this; no guarantees of course. But general wear and tear and a range of piloting skills are accounted for. (Give or Take). Many (many) of the airframe engine combinations have aged gracefully, survived all manner of pilots, airstrips, weather, abuse and load for many, many decades and still going strong.
“When you have mastered numbers, you will in fact no longer be reading numbers, any more than you read words when reading books. You will be reading meanings.”
Consider the odds: take the number of take off and landing cycles conducted by the non airline sector (GA) in a year; then count the number of 'dead cut' engine failures events. Rarer than Rocking Horse pooh. Even rarer count the number of fatal events due to engine failure at low level during operations, now we are into Hen's teeth territory. Then count the fatalities due to 'simulated' engine failure in 'check' operations.
“99 percent of all statistics only tell 49 percent of the story.”
Two steps (hobble) from my desk, from number four shelf I drag out a random flight manual for a 'light twin' – A Ted Smith Aerostar 601. From the manual sections it is easy to define several elements, critical to the 'higher risk' elements of the 'take off' component. The Minimum Single engine control speed is set between 80 and 86 knots. The single engine climb speed, is set at about 109 knots (Indicated airspeed). Working the data for an aircraft at max weight, on a 25c day; sealed runway etc. provides a clearly defined (on paper) distance (time too if you work in ground speed) between passing 'minimum control speed' and single engine climb speed. It is, in an accelerating aircraft but a heartbeat or two; BUT remains at the top end of the 'high risk' envelope for 'C&T' exercise for fatality. So why is this 'check' mandated, twice a year? Seriously, what's the point?
“Ah, but my dear sir, the why must never be obvious. That is the whole point.”
In the AS 600 manual; there are 21 separate 'emergency' check lists within the 'Flight Manual' EP section. Each (every) one, has a higher statistical 'fail/problem' ratio than a 'dead cut' of an engine in a 'critical' situation. The maintenance logs will confirm this. These essential, potentially lethal items are not required to be checked twice a year, but they matter. Engine failure between rotate and clean up/ climb away is a drill. A simple drill; and must be as 'automatic' as retracting the undercarriage or closing the door. The 'basics' apply across the spectrum of operations, the 'time' between 'startle' and 'direct action' should be no more than a quick curse, no thought required; there isn't time. The initial training should be, and mostly is, done at altitude, calmly, with the rinse, wash, repeat method. Reaction and the response all carefully set in a stone cold, correct procedure. With an engine failed during a critical phase, (86 – 105 KIAS) 'things' are going to get busy and there's precious little time to be faffing about with shut down/ feather distractions. In a light twin, it should much less time to action than it takes to type it. Mixture, Pitch, Power - Identify, Verify, Feather and get on with the 'real' job. Reducing Drag by securing the engine is only the first stanza in a very dangerous game. Getting the aircraft flying is the real job. That, not the drill is the secret to survival.
Repetition of the same thought or physical action develops into a habit which, repeated frequently enough, becomes an automatic reflex. Amen....
The 'secret' of surviving an engine failure (dead cut) is neither mystical nor magic; but it demands skill and understanding. The aircraft has just lost power, a lot of it. The pilot's job is to get it flying again; reduce the drag, trim for balance, sort out a 'plan' and act (now – now would be good) The first task is demanding; for much depends on it. The aircraft 'must' be 'balanced' and 'drag' reduced; airspeed must be gained, if height is to achieved; it takes skill, patience and understanding to achieve this. Banging about in a circuit, on a fine day at minimum load is of neither practical nor intrinsic value. A partial failure can present a whole raft of 'different problems, particularly with 'systems failure thrown in for fun. In short: the whole CASA demanded, simulated box tick exercise is not only a a waste of time and money, counter productive but has cost more lives than the 'real thing'. Nuts and demanded twice a year???
The majority of multi engine aircraft, below 5700 Kg are, in essence, all the same, give or take. Fly one probably make a fist of flying the rest. A much better notion – for 'safeties' sake, for a newly minted junior twin engine pilots would be en-route check, twice a year, and a once a year 'Base' check. A real work out, in any multi engine aircraft available on the day; soup to nuts – paper work, trim sheet, loading, flight planning, weather assessment; alternate route and 'planning'. The during cruise, in say the Aerostar, systems failure drills; all 21 of them. Debriefing; honest and, importantly, providing guidance toward better performance in the 'rough' areas noted. How else are the 'Kids' to learn their trade?
“I never teach my pupils, I only attempt to provide the conditions in which they can learn.”
Aye well, IMO there is much 'wrong' with the CASA mandated 'check' system. It promotes fiscal and operational resistance and 'work-around' box ticking while enforcing an unrealistic 'legal' tenant of no practical benefit to the 'junior' pilot. Furthermore; the statistics demonstrate, very starkly, a death toll far in excess of deaths in the normal course of operational flying. The ratio of actual engine failure related deaths to the ratio of those killed 'in training' is off the charts. But renders the 'philosophy' nugatory when compared to number of 'real' engine failure events during the small phase of flight between a take off speed and a 'safe' speed for single engine operations. Do the math, I have, acceleration : between 86 KIAS and 109 KIAS = in seconds. I'll wait for Spence to come back with that puzzle solved. P.S. the 'smoke' comes out the back in the real world. Bunch of numpties. Maybe her Bag man with the mouth and 'all the answers' could assist. No bets taken.
Toot – 6 sleeps to freedom-- toot.