"There is no third option".
Conversational - .Title from a Pprune post - HERE - which P2 parlayed into the post preceding this effort. Not to gainsay these two fine gentlemen; both make perfect sense,-But:-There is IMO a fourth, very powerful option, freely available. A 'Sector Risk Profile'. The 'crop dusting' fraternity under the leadership of Phil Hurst, championed the 'notion' of sector risk analysis being done by those at the coal face. The whole 'thing' is a story for another day; but the fundamental principal applies to 'one-off' types of operation; such harvesting Crocodile eggs. Not too many playing in that game.
But, lets take a hand and dabble. I'll set the odds - there are two 'Totes' active. One for the chances of gaining CASA approval; the other on 'operational' risk.
#1 - Operational risk, radical cause of incident examples:-
Cause - Mechanical failure.
Properly serviced aircraft - 1:1000 - CASA tick.
Poorly serviced aircraft - 1:100 - Trouble.
Cause - Fuel exhaustion.
Properly planned, sensible reserves, promulgated 'time on task' maximums set; distance modified fuel stops. 1000:1 CASA tick.
Poorly considered fuel management (she'll be right minimums) No brainer.
Cause - Pilot error.
Fresh, wanting to build hours, sober, clean, risk aware, procedures and regulation aware, prepared to withstand peer pressure. 1000: 1 CASA tick. V Hung over, hungry, dehydrated, peer pressure, bravado, rule immune. Well!
There is a longer list - but you do see how the 'risk' matrix continues to build the longer the 'risk' remains unmitigated. There exists a 'pressure' to join in and be one of the 'boys'; there is management pressure too. The most damning element is the lack of 'support' for recourse through the operations manuals, or CASA assist.
There are IMO other high risk elements which would (or should) trouble CASA. Firearms (permits and safety training) for one; fuel in Jerry cans another; hot re-fuelling another; sling operations at 60 Kts. A noted lack of stated procedure/ limitations for the actual egg collection part of the operation. The 'bush walking' element, safety gear, first aid, cranky mother croc unafraid of men.
Understandable, but inexcusable is the 'operator' attitude towards risk analysis. But, worst of all and probably the most lethal is the CASA ignorance of the 'external' operational risk factors. Was there ever a 'proving' flight, to observe the operation ; 'at work'. 'Proving' flights were not conducted. CASA simply made sure the legal boxes were ticked. What about a 'check and training' regime for pilots tasked? This is not a task where a juniour can be just sent out to learn on the job. Add up the associated 'unacknowledged risk' areas; winch failiure; cable snagged; 'hook' failiure; engine failiure; communications and support. Egg collector injured; that stand alone must demand a proceedure in the Ops manual.
"Got a SMS?" - "Oh yeah, sure, - Ahh, here it is." Bottom shelf neading a dust off. Proforma, box ticking exercise - unmodified since purchase.
Auto Tick. But where is the briefing on say bitten by a croc? Where is the procedure for engine fail with a 'dope on a rope' at 50 feet? There is a long list of 'stuff' not specifically covered by the 'regulations' BUT, those should (indeed must) have been covered in the Operations and SMS manuals. Real risk; in real time mitigated as best it could be given the nature of the tasks. Oh, and the mandated Drug and Alcohol testing record was found - where?
Sure, CASA dropped a bollock with a clang; multiple times. But the Chief pilot should have raised the oversight issues and pointed to those amendments in the Company Operations Manual suite which addressed the awkward corners of the construct.
Just saying - specialised aerial work operations demand specific knowledge and experience, training and highlighted 'awareness' of the risk matrix. These duly noted and enforced through company SOP, training and mandated protocols. CASA only have one job, to make sure all is executed, legal, tidy and approved. Plenty of blame to share on this debacle, which ended one life and seriously damaged another two. Not good enough, nowhere bloody well near enough from all involved.
Toot - toot.
Conversational - .Title from a Pprune post - HERE - which P2 parlayed into the post preceding this effort. Not to gainsay these two fine gentlemen; both make perfect sense,-But:-There is IMO a fourth, very powerful option, freely available. A 'Sector Risk Profile'. The 'crop dusting' fraternity under the leadership of Phil Hurst, championed the 'notion' of sector risk analysis being done by those at the coal face. The whole 'thing' is a story for another day; but the fundamental principal applies to 'one-off' types of operation; such harvesting Crocodile eggs. Not too many playing in that game.
But, lets take a hand and dabble. I'll set the odds - there are two 'Totes' active. One for the chances of gaining CASA approval; the other on 'operational' risk.
#1 - Operational risk, radical cause of incident examples:-
Cause - Mechanical failure.
Properly serviced aircraft - 1:1000 - CASA tick.
Poorly serviced aircraft - 1:100 - Trouble.
Cause - Fuel exhaustion.
Properly planned, sensible reserves, promulgated 'time on task' maximums set; distance modified fuel stops. 1000:1 CASA tick.
Poorly considered fuel management (she'll be right minimums) No brainer.
Cause - Pilot error.
Fresh, wanting to build hours, sober, clean, risk aware, procedures and regulation aware, prepared to withstand peer pressure. 1000: 1 CASA tick. V Hung over, hungry, dehydrated, peer pressure, bravado, rule immune. Well!
There is a longer list - but you do see how the 'risk' matrix continues to build the longer the 'risk' remains unmitigated. There exists a 'pressure' to join in and be one of the 'boys'; there is management pressure too. The most damning element is the lack of 'support' for recourse through the operations manuals, or CASA assist.
There are IMO other high risk elements which would (or should) trouble CASA. Firearms (permits and safety training) for one; fuel in Jerry cans another; hot re-fuelling another; sling operations at 60 Kts. A noted lack of stated procedure/ limitations for the actual egg collection part of the operation. The 'bush walking' element, safety gear, first aid, cranky mother croc unafraid of men.
Understandable, but inexcusable is the 'operator' attitude towards risk analysis. But, worst of all and probably the most lethal is the CASA ignorance of the 'external' operational risk factors. Was there ever a 'proving' flight, to observe the operation ; 'at work'. 'Proving' flights were not conducted. CASA simply made sure the legal boxes were ticked. What about a 'check and training' regime for pilots tasked? This is not a task where a juniour can be just sent out to learn on the job. Add up the associated 'unacknowledged risk' areas; winch failiure; cable snagged; 'hook' failiure; engine failiure; communications and support. Egg collector injured; that stand alone must demand a proceedure in the Ops manual.
"Got a SMS?" - "Oh yeah, sure, - Ahh, here it is." Bottom shelf neading a dust off. Proforma, box ticking exercise - unmodified since purchase.
Auto Tick. But where is the briefing on say bitten by a croc? Where is the procedure for engine fail with a 'dope on a rope' at 50 feet? There is a long list of 'stuff' not specifically covered by the 'regulations' BUT, those should (indeed must) have been covered in the Operations and SMS manuals. Real risk; in real time mitigated as best it could be given the nature of the tasks. Oh, and the mandated Drug and Alcohol testing record was found - where?
Sure, CASA dropped a bollock with a clang; multiple times. But the Chief pilot should have raised the oversight issues and pointed to those amendments in the Company Operations Manual suite which addressed the awkward corners of the construct.
Just saying - specialised aerial work operations demand specific knowledge and experience, training and highlighted 'awareness' of the risk matrix. These duly noted and enforced through company SOP, training and mandated protocols. CASA only have one job, to make sure all is executed, legal, tidy and approved. Plenty of blame to share on this debacle, which ended one life and seriously damaged another two. Not good enough, nowhere bloody well near enough from all involved.
Toot - toot.