Centaurus (legend) & Alea lacta est.
If you Google this famous quote, AI will provide a short blurb, explaining Caesar, the Rubicon and a civil war. The phrase crossing the Rubicon marks a 'PNR' (point of no return).
The Centaurus post on PP – HERE -: neatly targets a problem, a few decades old problem. A matter every pilot, since Pontius, has been obliged to 'manage'. Some system in the aircraft has decided to play at silly buggers. Without even referring to a log; a dozen or more memory items spring to mind. Murphy strikes again. Now Murphy don't give a fig for what you have strapped to your posterior; the location, the weather or any other damn thing. But Murphy always leaves open the options; “Are ya feeling lucky Punk: well, are ya?”
And that is the only question worth considering, sometimes. It is always your Rubicon to cross and therein lays the nub of the matter. There is not a driver (air-frame) on the planet who has not been faced with the 'options'. These are not the 'cut and dried' options like #2 donkey has decided to give up its ghost; or the main wheel tyres (tyre) has ripped etc; these are tales for the pub; it is the 'other' things which create the uncertainty phase. Go – don't go? Land at nearest suitable or plug on; etc. These are the decisions made on the regular by flight crew.
At home base with engineering available, apart from a delay while broken things are sorted, there is no problem for the flight crew. Airborne, with an MEL in support and a proper recording system, most of Murphy's work can be undone. Breakdown away from home with no engineering support and no MEL 'workaround' is where the dice get rolled. Yet we've all done it, at one time or another. Take a simple 'for instance' – go back as many decades as memory allows and remember the first 'heater' that ever packed in. The old fuel heaters never, not ever quit on a fine sunny day; middle of the night was a favorite. What to do? Apart from near freezing to death, if the weather was kind; you would plug on, probably fly it back to base and politely ask the engineer to sort the bloody thing out, emphasising the peril your future offspring were in. But what if the weather was awful, ice a distinct possibility with clear air only below the LSALT and more sectors to fly. Then what? Much depends on what comes next.
What comes next depends, very much, on both pilot and operator. It is in fact the 'nub' of GA commercial operations. Primarily, this has little to do with the operator; it is a matter for the Chief Pilot or 'fleet manager' not the MD, the owner or even the operations manager; they may hold an 'opinion' but may not dictate solutions, they hold no remit to do so. So, lets say our PA31. C310. C402 with a busted heater pushes on to the destination, lands, rings Ops and is told to standby. Ops checks the contacts for an engineering outfit – no luck. Next call should be to schedule a crew and ship to get out early and complete the task; arrange accommodation etc. etc. Perfect. Anywhere near 'reality'? Well – that depends, don't it. There's a few questions left unanswered there.
Let us begin with 'the heater' – and the aircraft's MR, log books and maintenance history. All good = Tick. Then lets chat with some of the aircrew regarding the heater; about now, anyone with airline or decent operator experience will have guessed. Charlie had problems with it eight months ago; Fred eventually got it going six months ago but it nearly cooked him; Peter mentioned it failed on him a month ago. Ops knew about this – but nothing on the MR reflects this knowledge. “Oh, we need a part and will fix it at the next 100 hourly” big smile – all good. BOLLOCKS it is......
The most vulnerable item in a GA charter outfit is the junior pilot, flying singles in hope of a twin; putting up with 'the way things are' to keep the log book filling up; praying for enough time to apply for a 'proper' job. Easily intimidated, silenced and dependent on gaining a 'good name' and reference for the next gig. Of all people these kids need, indeed must have, first class machinery to operate. I don't mean brand new with all the toys; but serviceable toys, to avoid the situation where their 'superior judgment and skill set' has not been developed or fostered enough to save 'em. Sending 'em off to fight a bear with a lolly-pop stick is just plain wrong. That first job and the lessons learned will form their approach to a real command, where they play for keeps, with more than a mere nine POB.
There is no need to 'coddle' 'em; they need an 'apprenticeship' and there is no better way to become a journeyman than through learning their trade, with guidance, through a season 'out-back' in the wet. It can be a tough school; but the experience will teach them the most powerful word a 'command' pilot can use – its easy to remember – “NO”. Or, for the more articulate “NO DUCKING WAY” but politely. That's what the big bucks are for; can't do that without learning when to say it; can't learn that being bullied into flying dodgy aircraft and not even CASA to complain to. They have ticked all their boxes; up to you to stay or go; they will not assist. Take a look at the 695 fatal event for a classic example. I could go on – older well maintained aircraft – fine. Solid reporting of defects, traceable fixes, great. Operational limitations due to lack of parts/maintenance; acceptable; Chief pilot guidance and advice priceless. Anything else brings Murphy into the game and he plays with loaded dice. So, mind how you go...
Toot toot..
If you Google this famous quote, AI will provide a short blurb, explaining Caesar, the Rubicon and a civil war. The phrase crossing the Rubicon marks a 'PNR' (point of no return).
The Centaurus post on PP – HERE -: neatly targets a problem, a few decades old problem. A matter every pilot, since Pontius, has been obliged to 'manage'. Some system in the aircraft has decided to play at silly buggers. Without even referring to a log; a dozen or more memory items spring to mind. Murphy strikes again. Now Murphy don't give a fig for what you have strapped to your posterior; the location, the weather or any other damn thing. But Murphy always leaves open the options; “Are ya feeling lucky Punk: well, are ya?”
And that is the only question worth considering, sometimes. It is always your Rubicon to cross and therein lays the nub of the matter. There is not a driver (air-frame) on the planet who has not been faced with the 'options'. These are not the 'cut and dried' options like #2 donkey has decided to give up its ghost; or the main wheel tyres (tyre) has ripped etc; these are tales for the pub; it is the 'other' things which create the uncertainty phase. Go – don't go? Land at nearest suitable or plug on; etc. These are the decisions made on the regular by flight crew.
At home base with engineering available, apart from a delay while broken things are sorted, there is no problem for the flight crew. Airborne, with an MEL in support and a proper recording system, most of Murphy's work can be undone. Breakdown away from home with no engineering support and no MEL 'workaround' is where the dice get rolled. Yet we've all done it, at one time or another. Take a simple 'for instance' – go back as many decades as memory allows and remember the first 'heater' that ever packed in. The old fuel heaters never, not ever quit on a fine sunny day; middle of the night was a favorite. What to do? Apart from near freezing to death, if the weather was kind; you would plug on, probably fly it back to base and politely ask the engineer to sort the bloody thing out, emphasising the peril your future offspring were in. But what if the weather was awful, ice a distinct possibility with clear air only below the LSALT and more sectors to fly. Then what? Much depends on what comes next.
What comes next depends, very much, on both pilot and operator. It is in fact the 'nub' of GA commercial operations. Primarily, this has little to do with the operator; it is a matter for the Chief Pilot or 'fleet manager' not the MD, the owner or even the operations manager; they may hold an 'opinion' but may not dictate solutions, they hold no remit to do so. So, lets say our PA31. C310. C402 with a busted heater pushes on to the destination, lands, rings Ops and is told to standby. Ops checks the contacts for an engineering outfit – no luck. Next call should be to schedule a crew and ship to get out early and complete the task; arrange accommodation etc. etc. Perfect. Anywhere near 'reality'? Well – that depends, don't it. There's a few questions left unanswered there.
Let us begin with 'the heater' – and the aircraft's MR, log books and maintenance history. All good = Tick. Then lets chat with some of the aircrew regarding the heater; about now, anyone with airline or decent operator experience will have guessed. Charlie had problems with it eight months ago; Fred eventually got it going six months ago but it nearly cooked him; Peter mentioned it failed on him a month ago. Ops knew about this – but nothing on the MR reflects this knowledge. “Oh, we need a part and will fix it at the next 100 hourly” big smile – all good. BOLLOCKS it is......
The most vulnerable item in a GA charter outfit is the junior pilot, flying singles in hope of a twin; putting up with 'the way things are' to keep the log book filling up; praying for enough time to apply for a 'proper' job. Easily intimidated, silenced and dependent on gaining a 'good name' and reference for the next gig. Of all people these kids need, indeed must have, first class machinery to operate. I don't mean brand new with all the toys; but serviceable toys, to avoid the situation where their 'superior judgment and skill set' has not been developed or fostered enough to save 'em. Sending 'em off to fight a bear with a lolly-pop stick is just plain wrong. That first job and the lessons learned will form their approach to a real command, where they play for keeps, with more than a mere nine POB.
There is no need to 'coddle' 'em; they need an 'apprenticeship' and there is no better way to become a journeyman than through learning their trade, with guidance, through a season 'out-back' in the wet. It can be a tough school; but the experience will teach them the most powerful word a 'command' pilot can use – its easy to remember – “NO”. Or, for the more articulate “NO DUCKING WAY” but politely. That's what the big bucks are for; can't do that without learning when to say it; can't learn that being bullied into flying dodgy aircraft and not even CASA to complain to. They have ticked all their boxes; up to you to stay or go; they will not assist. Take a look at the 695 fatal event for a classic example. I could go on – older well maintained aircraft – fine. Solid reporting of defects, traceable fixes, great. Operational limitations due to lack of parts/maintenance; acceptable; Chief pilot guidance and advice priceless. Anything else brings Murphy into the game and he plays with loaded dice. So, mind how you go...
Toot toot..