[Peetwo]

Final Report: Pilot ENDANGERS Crowd at Race

Here's another one for the list, where CASA has gone with the 'nothing to see here - move along'

..or 'nothing to do with us' approach?

(From 06:40 minutes)

Also from this week's DTS Stewie Macleod:

Aerobatic aircraft damaged at Bathurst racetrack operated in no-fly areas



An Extra 300 aerobatic aircraft that was damaged when it struck a barrier while taxiing at the Mount Panorama Circuit then took off and flew through a no‑fly area, an ATSB report details.

The aircraft was being used to deliver the trophy for the annual Bathurst 1000 motor race on 13 October 2024, with a single pilot on board.

The aircraft had taken off from Bathurst Airport, about 10 km to the west, before landing on the Mountain Straight section of Mount Panorama Circuit for the trophy handover.

After landing, the pilot conducted a reversal turn, during which the aircraft struck a barrier, resulting in damage to the tailplane.

“The pilot reported not feeling the impact, but a media helicopter pilot immediately alerted them to the issue, and recommended checking the aircraft’s tail before taking off,” ATSB Director Transport Safety Stuart Macleod said.

After taxiing to deliver the trophy, the pilot conducted a full control check and a visual check of the tail from their cockpit seated position.
With no control problems or damage identified, the pilot taxied the aircraft back uphill along Mountain Straight, before turning around again and taking off in the opposite direction from which they had landed.

“Both the landing and take‑off tracks took the aircraft into a designated ‘no‑fly area’ occupied by spectators, which did not comply with the Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s required spectator safety heights and distances for an air display,” Mr Macleod said.

“Moreover, the pilot did not conduct an external inspection after striking the barrier, and the take off and return flight to Bathurst Airport were conducted with the damaged tailplane.”

The ATSB’s report details previous application processes undertaken by the pilot for air displays at other motor races, where the pilot was regularly advised by CASA staff of the regulations restricting operating over or near spectators, and at times changed plans accordingly.

“However, the pilot’s application for the Bathurst 1000 did not describe how the landing or take off on Mountain Straight would occur,” Mr Macleod noted.

“Due to obstacles at the southern end, the take‑off and landing could only have been conducted from the north, over the no‑fly area, which was clearly marked in the pilot’s submitted diagram, but this was not specified in the application process.”

The ATSB found that CASA approved the pilot’s application despite the limited information provided.

Mr Macleod noted CASA’s advisory circular for air displays acknowledges the level of risk for air displays may be elevated for those onboard the aircraft, such displays must not increase risk for spectators and others on the ground.

“All air display personnel, including the organiser, air and ground coordinators, and pilots, must ensure displays are planned in compliance to the requirements, and conducted within these approved arrangements,” Mr Macleod concluded.

Read the report: Collision with terrain involving Extra EA 300-LT, VH-XKW, about 10 km west-south-west of Bathurst Airport, New South Wales, on 13 October 2024

Publication Date:10/04/2025

"...On 5 September, CASA acknowledged receipt of the pilot’s application by email, and provided the pilot with the contact details of the FOI assigned to assess the request. The FOI reported to the ATSB that on review of the application, they assumed the pilot would comply with the NO FLY AREAs on the display diagram and that they were unaware of the topography of Mountain Straight.

The FOI did not review any of the pilot’s previous applications and therefore was not aware of the requests to conduct landings and take-offs at the Barbagallo and Sandown racetracks. On 6 September, the FOI issued the display approval without any requests for information or clarification from the pilot and without completing the required OPS.25 worksheet..."

Reference "K" - 14/03/2017:  

Without prejudice; (or even a dog in the fight).

P2 – “Interesting that Comardy is sitting in the position of the decision maker?

It is to hoped that the position ‘decision maker’ (Hoods old job) is vacant; if so, it will one of the very best decisions Carmody ever made; if not ‘the’ best.

P2 – “Will this now be SOP for all 'show cause' enforcement actions or has Carmody sacked anyone else who can make such decisions?”

Dunno mate; but for Carmody’s sake, lets hope he is not basing his decisions on the ‘Enforcement manual’; unless of course he has signed it and now owns it as his very own. I wonder how a serious legal challenge would fare against any ‘action’ taken against a person based on that dreadful ‘McConvict’ drafted section. I reckon that would be ‘interesting’.

Seventeen days after the crash, CASA acting chief executive Shane Carmody wrote to Mr Rhoades to say his air operator’s certificate was suspended immediately because, as chief pilot and business owner, he had allowed flying that “contributes to or results in a serious and imminent risk to air safety”.

All a bit too ‘subjective’ for my taste. I’d expect most reading here have operated in ‘turbulent’ conditions, most have probably operated passenger flights in aircraft without a cockpit door; done ‘joy flights’ and ‘scenic flights’ or even back in the day, ‘commuter’ flights. How would you like a beer in the fridge for every time you’d heard a passenger ‘scream’ or similar when you hit the bumpy bits; or when you level off and come back to cruise power, or ‘crank it over a bit’ so folk can see what they came to see? It is, IMO perfectly understandable that folk are ‘nervous’ when confronted with a tiny, one engine aircraft, a stranger for a pilot and all ‘crammed’ into the small area allotted. The noises (engine and airflow) all perfectly acceptable to the ‘pilot’ heighten sensitivity, and any ‘abrupt’ change of ‘state’ increases the tension level. It is a fair bet that at least one of three passengers in a C172 just did not want to be there anyway. In defence of this pilot, it would be reasonable to argue that unless one of the passengers was an accredited pilot, capable of ‘judging’ the manner in which the flight was handled; then hearsay evidence from passengers is not only worthless, but prejudicial. If this fellah has been ‘acting the goat’; then by all means, string him up, after proof beyond reasonable is accepted by the court.  

"The flight, including the wail of the stall warning horn, is recorded in a video taken by a passenger and recovered by police."

These Qld CASA chaps do seem to like their ‘video’ evidence; the Quadrio matter is not forgotten and there may be a line of defence in those ‘images’ and recordings of ‘passengers squealing’.

Mr Carmody wrote that the video showed Mr Woodall flying at 150-200 feet; risky, because if something went wrong such as engine failure, “he would have only minimal altitude, and therefore (minimal) time, to safely manage the upset”.

Precautionary search? Seems like a very ‘safe’ precaution to landing ‘on the beach’. I would say that not to do so was certainly a risk. The procedure should be cast in stone in the company operations manual; that would be mandatory. Accepted or ‘approved’ by CASA is academic as CASA approve the Air Operators Certificate and by extension – the operations as writ. Had this fellah not done a PS and had an event on the ‘strip’ then crucifixion would be in order. Again the intent to be unsafe can be discredited, a saving of an additional five or perhaps six minutes operating costs could be avoided by ‘skipping’ the PS. So it comes back to just what is ‘unsafe’ and who is making the judgement.

Mr Carmody criticised what he called “aerobatic manoeuvres”, saying the recording “includes an audible ‘squeal’ from a passenger at the beginning of the abrupt pitch inputs”. The CASA chief said Mr Woodall should have kept up his airspeed after the engine failed, not risked a stall by banking hard, and landed on water if necessary. He alleged the plane’s fuel supply might have been contaminated by debris.

Try to define ‘aerobatic’ in this context. Provided the aircraft was not operated outside of the specified envelope, then a steep turn, or whatever is quite legal. A badly executed ‘manoeuvre’ may demonstrate a lack of skill and/or judgement; but can it be considered ‘dangerous’ without the benefit of a 'G' meter record? It is all very well to say Mr Woodall ‘should’ have done this or that after the event, indeed most pilots who have been involved in any sort of ‘event’ can recount exactly what they ‘should’ have done; and would do, if it ever happens again. I wonder if CASA ever mandated a training requirement, specific to that beach area, dedicated to establishing ‘best practice’ in the event of an engine failure, at low level on the go-around after the precautionary search? If not why not, surely that would be ‘proper’ oversight of the safety of the operations approved by CASA.

Perhaps this was a cowboy operation; perhaps not. But consider all the evidence, before pronouncing a sentence.

When we teach someone to fly – what is the noise heard during the flare and touch down? What is the purpose of that noise? Is it absolutely safe to slow the aircraft down to stall warning speed? What does the pilot have at his ready disposal to maintain the speed at which the warning occurs?

Nope, no quarrel with CASA shutting down a rogue, non at all; provided they have got all the ducks lined up and back ‘em up with proof, beyond reasonable doubt; and, perhaps adjust their thinking toward ‘prevention’ rather than prosecution.

My two bob for its worth.

Toot toot.

Plus from the ATSB FR:

..The ATSB recently noted limitations with CASA’s surveillance processes of charter operators during the period up to 2009 in its AO-2009-072 (reopened) investigation report (released in November 2017). It concluded there was a safety issue at that time with the procedures and guidance for conducting surveillance events not formally including the nature of the operator’s activities, the inherent threats or hazards associated with those activities, and the risk controls that were important for managing those threats or hazards. With the introduction of the CASA Surveillance Manual in 2012, there appeared to be no additional guidance procedures or guidance that addressed this issue. A review of the available evidence associated with the surveillance of Wyndham Aviation suggests that this safety issue still existed in practice during the period up to 2017...

MTF...P2