Oh! Look Mum; - “there's an aircraft in my ashtray.”
Not really; but close enough on a few occasions – it happens {mostly) Outside Controlled Airspace (OCTA). The factors are well known. Aircraft are difficult to spot, even when you know where to 'look' – remembering the closing 'speed' equation. 120 Knots = 224 Kph. 150 Knots = 277.8 Kph. 180 Knots= 333.36 Kph. The climb and descent speeds of the two aircraft at Mangalore Beechcraft (Travelair) (AEM) and the PA 44 (Seminole) (JQF) provide a rough idea of the 'closure rate' between the pair (no wind data) [irrelevant} the rate of closure in a time scale matters here. Lets say JQF was climbing at about 100 Knots ~185 Kph. Lets say AEM was descending at 160 Knots ~296 Kph. = +/- 480 Kph. Ten nautical miles is about 18.5 Kilometers. Closing speed 259 knots. Ten miles at 259 knots = 2.3 minutes. Time not really a factor – not with prior knowledge, a plan, or a sighting; provided you know there's an aircraft climbing on your descent path.
ATSB claim (quite rightly) that there were two experienced pilots on board; fair enough – however. One was conducting a check flight the other a training flight. Lets consider that for a moment. Technically and operationally two of the most 'critical' parts of operating under the IFR are the approach and landing phase and the take – off departure phase. When training or examining a candidate pilot; where do you imagine the attention of 'training/check pilot' will be mostly focused? Lots to do, much to watch, it is a 'busy' period where the potential for a serious error 'can' occur. Focus on task is not only demanded; but absolutely essential.
ATSB - “As such, the ATSB concluded that the pilots either failed to identify that a collision risk existed or identified the potential risk but incorrectly assessed that the aircraft were sufficiently separated. In either case, the primary defence of established self separation required in non controlled airspace was absent.”
I beg to differ M'Lud. Start - HERE – with a good analysis by 'Blackburn' over on the UP. It is worthy of consideration – even if just for the questions it raises.
For example – Was the CTAF frequency 'busy'? Normally, on approach, comms are tuned to the CTAF and the area frequency (ATC). On approach/descent a 'silent' cockpit is the general rule; particularly during training to avoid distraction; unless something is turning Pear shaped. But here we have one taxi for departure coming South; one for approach heading North; one to climb, one to descend. It is a reasonable assumption that at least one of the instructing pilots would be waiting and listening for a radio call to 'sort out' the potential conflict. It was, for a long while only a 'potential' conflict. Simple enough - “we'll maintain 5000' until over the aid” the response from the opposition Roger; will maintain 4000' until clear. CTAF busy – OK: call Center and sort it out there. But 'Sort it' the tooter the sweeter. So much for the crew efforts. Blackburn raises the specter of 'No Known Traffic' – twice. At 1120:28 the inbound pilot acknowledges the Center Controller advice of 'traffic'.
UP post - “The report also says that traffic was provided, however when AEM came on the local controller’s frequency, the crew of AEM were told on two occasions, 2 minutes apart (11.17.42 and 11.19.35) that there was NO IFR TRAFFIC. Up till then (2 minutes prior to the collision) JQF had not been provided any traffic info on the opposite direction descending traffic.
Can you spot the holes in the cheese? This report begs more questions than it answers; but, its hard to gainsay the ATSB summary:-
“Analysis conducted for the ATSB by an air traffic services subject matter expert identified a number of potential reasons why updated traffic information would not have been provided. Specifically, the controller: could reasonably expect the occupants of the aircraft were talking to each other and taking action to avoid each other may over-transmit the pilots while they are trying to talk to each other not being fully aware of any coordination between the occupants of the two aircraft, could give advice that created a hazardous situation.
Flatulent, slightly fluffy reasoning; ATC 'could' have made sure that the conflict message was delivered; and received confirmation earlier (much) from both crew. This is a part of this event which will always raise conjecture. Yet sometimes – rarely the planets align and events happen. This should have been preventable; one radio call from any party involved could have avoided it all. IFR particularly in IMC, especially in a known 'high volume' traffic area when the weather, cloud, traffic, comms and terrain is 'suspect'. The area is particularly busy; until there is dedicated ATC service (one consul) the risk remains high; more service or less aircraft seems to be the only 'bullet proof' solution; but even then, at the end of the shift there's only one fellah responsible for the flight. That's why they are paid 'the big bucks'..........
Toot toot..
Not really; but close enough on a few occasions – it happens {mostly) Outside Controlled Airspace (OCTA). The factors are well known. Aircraft are difficult to spot, even when you know where to 'look' – remembering the closing 'speed' equation. 120 Knots = 224 Kph. 150 Knots = 277.8 Kph. 180 Knots= 333.36 Kph. The climb and descent speeds of the two aircraft at Mangalore Beechcraft (Travelair) (AEM) and the PA 44 (Seminole) (JQF) provide a rough idea of the 'closure rate' between the pair (no wind data) [irrelevant} the rate of closure in a time scale matters here. Lets say JQF was climbing at about 100 Knots ~185 Kph. Lets say AEM was descending at 160 Knots ~296 Kph. = +/- 480 Kph. Ten nautical miles is about 18.5 Kilometers. Closing speed 259 knots. Ten miles at 259 knots = 2.3 minutes. Time not really a factor – not with prior knowledge, a plan, or a sighting; provided you know there's an aircraft climbing on your descent path.
ATSB claim (quite rightly) that there were two experienced pilots on board; fair enough – however. One was conducting a check flight the other a training flight. Lets consider that for a moment. Technically and operationally two of the most 'critical' parts of operating under the IFR are the approach and landing phase and the take – off departure phase. When training or examining a candidate pilot; where do you imagine the attention of 'training/check pilot' will be mostly focused? Lots to do, much to watch, it is a 'busy' period where the potential for a serious error 'can' occur. Focus on task is not only demanded; but absolutely essential.
ATSB - “As such, the ATSB concluded that the pilots either failed to identify that a collision risk existed or identified the potential risk but incorrectly assessed that the aircraft were sufficiently separated. In either case, the primary defence of established self separation required in non controlled airspace was absent.”
I beg to differ M'Lud. Start - HERE – with a good analysis by 'Blackburn' over on the UP. It is worthy of consideration – even if just for the questions it raises.
For example – Was the CTAF frequency 'busy'? Normally, on approach, comms are tuned to the CTAF and the area frequency (ATC). On approach/descent a 'silent' cockpit is the general rule; particularly during training to avoid distraction; unless something is turning Pear shaped. But here we have one taxi for departure coming South; one for approach heading North; one to climb, one to descend. It is a reasonable assumption that at least one of the instructing pilots would be waiting and listening for a radio call to 'sort out' the potential conflict. It was, for a long while only a 'potential' conflict. Simple enough - “we'll maintain 5000' until over the aid” the response from the opposition Roger; will maintain 4000' until clear. CTAF busy – OK: call Center and sort it out there. But 'Sort it' the tooter the sweeter. So much for the crew efforts. Blackburn raises the specter of 'No Known Traffic' – twice. At 1120:28 the inbound pilot acknowledges the Center Controller advice of 'traffic'.
UP post - “The report also says that traffic was provided, however when AEM came on the local controller’s frequency, the crew of AEM were told on two occasions, 2 minutes apart (11.17.42 and 11.19.35) that there was NO IFR TRAFFIC. Up till then (2 minutes prior to the collision) JQF had not been provided any traffic info on the opposite direction descending traffic.
Can you spot the holes in the cheese? This report begs more questions than it answers; but, its hard to gainsay the ATSB summary:-
“Analysis conducted for the ATSB by an air traffic services subject matter expert identified a number of potential reasons why updated traffic information would not have been provided. Specifically, the controller: could reasonably expect the occupants of the aircraft were talking to each other and taking action to avoid each other may over-transmit the pilots while they are trying to talk to each other not being fully aware of any coordination between the occupants of the two aircraft, could give advice that created a hazardous situation.
Flatulent, slightly fluffy reasoning; ATC 'could' have made sure that the conflict message was delivered; and received confirmation earlier (much) from both crew. This is a part of this event which will always raise conjecture. Yet sometimes – rarely the planets align and events happen. This should have been preventable; one radio call from any party involved could have avoided it all. IFR particularly in IMC, especially in a known 'high volume' traffic area when the weather, cloud, traffic, comms and terrain is 'suspect'. The area is particularly busy; until there is dedicated ATC service (one consul) the risk remains high; more service or less aircraft seems to be the only 'bullet proof' solution; but even then, at the end of the shift there's only one fellah responsible for the flight. That's why they are paid 'the big bucks'..........
Toot toot..