06-06-2024, 10:22 AM
ZAHARI – The Master Aviator – piloted 9M-MRO to the end – Here is how.
PAIN: For your consideration.
The official ATSB / DSTG interpretation of the 7th Arc 00:19 UTC BFO's, is of an uncontrolled (ghost flight) high ROD spiral dive, into the SIO, very near to the 7th Arc, after fuel exhaustion at cruise altitude. If this interpretation was correct, the aircraft would have been shredded into millions of pieces upon impact with the surface of the ocean, and the resulting fragmented debris field should have been found within the area that was scanned.
No such debris field was found.
This leaves only two possibilities.
(A) Either the search 'missed' the debris field (which the ATSB claim is highly unlikely), or
(B) The existing interpretation of the 7th Arc 00:19 UTC BFO's is not correct.
If the current official ATSB / DSTG interpretation of the 7th Arc 00:19 UTC BFO's is not correct, then by extension, there is no logical reason to continue to assert that the debris field must still be proximate to the 7th arc, indeed, there is no logical reason to continue to believe that the wreck site will comprise a debris field populated by millions of fragmented pieces at all.
There is of course another scenario that can explain the 00:19 UTC BFO's that the 'ghost flight' (which the ‘Ghost Flight’ proponents will not entertain).
For those whose minds are firmly closed and set in reinforced 'ghost flight concrete', it might be best to just take the British Bobby's advice: 'move along now sir - nothing to see here - there's a good chap'.
For those still with an open mind, and willing to entertain a 'pilot controlled to the end' scenario, consider this one, if you will.
PREAMBLE:
I believe that Zahari had METICULOUSLY planned this MISSION long ago. EVERYTHING was dependent on 'the end game'. He fully intended to ALIGHT on the sea surface, around dawn. He knew that he needed to remain 'in the dark' for as long as possible, only becoming visual at low altitude in twilight (to be able to align with the swell so as to be able to 'alight on the surface').
NOTE: I use the word ALIGHT deliberately. I want to EMPHASISE the point, that THIS WAS NOT A DITCHING (as in an emergency landing of a land plane on a body of water), but was instead, a fully planned AND CONTROLLED water landing {like a seaplane / flying boat} at dawn.
(note: Zahari loved flying a large radio controlled scale model of a PBY/Catalina).
PLANNING:
I believe that Zahari's planning was based on the position of the 00:00 UTC SURFACE TERMINATOR at the point at which he had planned to become visual. There are a number of factors that you have to keep in mind with this.
FIRST: Sunrise occurs at cruise altitudes approximately 20 minutes before the point on the surface immediately below you, {the beginning of astronomical and nautical twilight can be up to an hour earlier (depending on latitude, day of year, etc)}.
SECOND: On that day (8th March 2014), deep in the SIO, the advancing terminator was almost perfectly aligned with his southbound cruise true heading, approaching him from the PORT side.
THIRD: The combined effect of these two factors, meant that his TOD (top of descent from cruise) had to begin very late in the flight south, probably around 23:40zulu, descending JUST UNDER THE ADVANCING TERMINATOR, (so as to be able to remain in the dark), until at a very low altitude, (say 4,000 feet AMSL).
EXECUTION:
PHASE 1-A:
Initiate descent. TOD is at 23:40 zulu.
NOTE: It is a damn shame that the second satcom call delayed what should have been the 6th ping at around 23:41 to 00:11 zulu.
Zahari deliberately shut down engine #2 (right engine) at 23:40zulu, and commenced a modified 'single engine drift down' on engine #1 (left engine) only, and whilst doing so, deliberately cross fed all remaining fuel in the right tank to the left tank.
PHASE 1-B:
Zahari modulated power as required to maintain a steady ROD of 2,500 ft/min.
NOTE: HE HAS TO MAINTAIN A MINIMUM ROD of 2,500 ft/min because of the advancing terminator.
Once all remaining fuel has been purged from the right tank, Zahari shuts down the transfer/crossfeed pumps and fully isolates the right A/C buss.
PHASE 2-A:
On reaching FL200/20,000 feet, (maximum flap actuation altitude) he reduces power to flight idle and momentarily levels at 20,000 ft to slow down as quickly as possible to configures flaps and slats for alighting.
NOTE: It is necessary to configure the flaps NOW, whilst he still has fuel for engine #1, because the hydraulic fluid required to power the hydraulic flap actuator motors that can only be supplied by the main engine hydraulic pumps.
He sets flaps 1, then flaps 5, and then flaps 15.
NOTE: ONLY FLAP 15 is selected (definitely NOT 20, 25 or 30), because it is necessary to configure 'for the end game', where the 'operating requirement', will be to have the best L/D-IGE (lift over drag ratio in ground effect) with two huge wind milling engines (acting like giant air brakes). Any more than Flap 15 generates far too much drag, so the 'trade-off' for a minimal incremental stall seed reduction is not acceptable. This is BECAUSE, although it is normally desirable to have the lowest stall speed possible, that has to be SUBORDINATE TO, and must be COMMENSURATE WITH, being able to achieve the ABSOLUTE MINIMUM ROD possible for alighting, by 'holding off and bleeding the speed' in the last few seconds before actually ALIGHTING.
NOTE: This requires 'seaplane/flying boat piloting technique' to achieve.
PHASE 2-B:
Very soon after configuring the flaps, he manually deploys the RAT. This is necessary to ENSURE that he will have enough hydraulic power for easy manipulation of the reduced number of flight control surfaces that he will have remaining after the inevitable loss of the hydraulic pumps powered by engine #1 when it eventually flames out.
NOTE: This configuration has never been tried on type in real world test flying, (for obvious reasons) so even training in Level D simulators (which can only be programmed on 'theoretical data' in this configuration), is at best, of 'questionable fidelity'.
So, for these reasons, it is absolutely necessary to 'do a little test flying' as soon as engine #1 eventually quits, so the RAT must be already 'up and running'.
PHASE 3-A:
Shortly thereafter, having satisfied himself that the RAT has deployed and has come on-line, he continues on, again modulating power to reestablish ROD of 2,500 ft/min and accelerate to, and maintain, the flaps extended limit speed of 200 KIAS, to go as far as he can .
PHASE 3-B:
Engine #1 eventually flames out due to fuel exhaustion not long afterwards, probably at a height of between FL200 and FL150. As engine #1 winds down, it's generators and hydraulic pumps go off-line, and he is now a glider, on RAT power alone, with two wind milling engines.
PHASE 4-A:
Zahari's is now focused on exercising pith and roll control inputs to test for, 'to get a feel for the responsiveness and control effectiveness with RAT hydraulics only'.
How would he proceed ?
There are two obvious possibilities.
Possibility #1.
He could have been testing for pitch control responsiveness at 'low Q' (low dynamic pressures), i.e. the 'low speed regime'.
These tests were facilitated by the combination of altitude (mid level) and low KIAS. Was he testing for stick shaker onset - possibly even stick pusher activation, and what would happen if he held it into the incipient stall, what did it feel like, would it 'mush' or 'break' ? How difficult was it to recover ? How long did it take? How much height did it take to recover? This is all crucial information for 'the end game', the final descent into the flare in ground effect, the subsequent 'hold-off' and alighting. He has to know, how slow he can actually go, before he has to, ALIGHT.
Possibility #2.
Similarly, he could have been testing roll control responsiveness at 'low Q'. Was he testing for the fidelity of roll control, roll rate, how sluggish it felt, at what point did incipient loss of roll control occur, particularly, when he would lose the ability to pick up a dropped wing in a timely manner.
This is all crucial information for 'the end game’; since there is an obvious need to perform the final alignment on a suitable wave crest. He has to know, how low, and how slow, can he actually go, before he risks losing effective roll control, and thus effective directional control. At what point, does he have to commit to a particular wave crest, come what may.
But, whilst he is doing this, the APU has automatically restarted.
It takes a little while for the APU to spin up to operating speed, (a little longer in the thin air at mid altitude than in the thick air on the ground) but when it does, it's generator comes back on line (initiating the SDU reboot).
Now, the question arises, what was Zahari actually doing with his 'test flying', his actual manipulation of the controls, right at the very moment when the SDU came back on line, and the APU air driven hydraulic pumps came on line as well ?
Zahari was pitching down (with considerable forward stick due to only one elevator powered on RAT hydraulics alone), already in a rapid descent (say 5,000 ft/min) having just begun recovery from a stick shaker onset (or a stick pusher onset) at the very moment that those APU air driven pumps suddenly and unexpectedly kicked in, suddenly repowering the other elevator, thus producing a sudden and unexpectedly violent additional pitch down.
(This immediately generates a very high and unanticipated ROD, which momentarily startles him).
Within mere seconds, his ROD has tripled from 5,000 ft/min to 15,000 ft/min. Although startled, he checks the descent with back stick, and begins recovery to maintain his necessary ROD of 2,500 ft/min.
BUT CRUCIALLY, it only takes a few more seconds for Zahari to realizes that the cause of this unanticipated aggressive pitch down upset was the APU bleed air powered hydraulic pumps coming back on-line, and powering ALL primary flight control surfaces (the confirmatory que to him being that pitch control is now 'almost like normal feel' again) so, since he definitely does not want those bloody APU air driven hydraulic pumps messing things up again,
Zahari deliberately and immediately reaches up to the overhead panel, and cycles the APU switch.
ON - then - OFF, to kill the APU, and thus kill those damn pneumatically driven hydraulic pumps.
HOWEVER - unbeknown to him, the SDU had been transmitting during that 'upset', thus generating those 7th Arc 'high ROD BFO's' that we all now know.
This 'timely, deliberate, active pilot action, of manually shutting down the APU' (unbeknown to the world) also kills the APU generator, which also removes electrical power from the SDU, which dies, as chance would have it, just an instant before 'the expected IFE log on attempt'.
NOTE: This all happened probably in the height band between FL150 and FL100, perhaps a bit lower. In any case, the 7th arc BTO arc is definitely NOT at cruise altitude, and should be replotted for a much lower altitude; I would recommend FL100 instead of the existing FL350.
PHASE 4-B:
Proceed with the 'end game'.
Regards,
Ventus45
PAIN: For your consideration.
The official ATSB / DSTG interpretation of the 7th Arc 00:19 UTC BFO's, is of an uncontrolled (ghost flight) high ROD spiral dive, into the SIO, very near to the 7th Arc, after fuel exhaustion at cruise altitude. If this interpretation was correct, the aircraft would have been shredded into millions of pieces upon impact with the surface of the ocean, and the resulting fragmented debris field should have been found within the area that was scanned.
No such debris field was found.
This leaves only two possibilities.
(A) Either the search 'missed' the debris field (which the ATSB claim is highly unlikely), or
(B) The existing interpretation of the 7th Arc 00:19 UTC BFO's is not correct.
If the current official ATSB / DSTG interpretation of the 7th Arc 00:19 UTC BFO's is not correct, then by extension, there is no logical reason to continue to assert that the debris field must still be proximate to the 7th arc, indeed, there is no logical reason to continue to believe that the wreck site will comprise a debris field populated by millions of fragmented pieces at all.
There is of course another scenario that can explain the 00:19 UTC BFO's that the 'ghost flight' (which the ‘Ghost Flight’ proponents will not entertain).
For those whose minds are firmly closed and set in reinforced 'ghost flight concrete', it might be best to just take the British Bobby's advice: 'move along now sir - nothing to see here - there's a good chap'.
For those still with an open mind, and willing to entertain a 'pilot controlled to the end' scenario, consider this one, if you will.
PREAMBLE:
I believe that Zahari had METICULOUSLY planned this MISSION long ago. EVERYTHING was dependent on 'the end game'. He fully intended to ALIGHT on the sea surface, around dawn. He knew that he needed to remain 'in the dark' for as long as possible, only becoming visual at low altitude in twilight (to be able to align with the swell so as to be able to 'alight on the surface').
NOTE: I use the word ALIGHT deliberately. I want to EMPHASISE the point, that THIS WAS NOT A DITCHING (as in an emergency landing of a land plane on a body of water), but was instead, a fully planned AND CONTROLLED water landing {like a seaplane / flying boat} at dawn.
(note: Zahari loved flying a large radio controlled scale model of a PBY/Catalina).
PLANNING:
I believe that Zahari's planning was based on the position of the 00:00 UTC SURFACE TERMINATOR at the point at which he had planned to become visual. There are a number of factors that you have to keep in mind with this.
FIRST: Sunrise occurs at cruise altitudes approximately 20 minutes before the point on the surface immediately below you, {the beginning of astronomical and nautical twilight can be up to an hour earlier (depending on latitude, day of year, etc)}.
SECOND: On that day (8th March 2014), deep in the SIO, the advancing terminator was almost perfectly aligned with his southbound cruise true heading, approaching him from the PORT side.
THIRD: The combined effect of these two factors, meant that his TOD (top of descent from cruise) had to begin very late in the flight south, probably around 23:40zulu, descending JUST UNDER THE ADVANCING TERMINATOR, (so as to be able to remain in the dark), until at a very low altitude, (say 4,000 feet AMSL).
EXECUTION:
PHASE 1-A:
Initiate descent. TOD is at 23:40 zulu.
NOTE: It is a damn shame that the second satcom call delayed what should have been the 6th ping at around 23:41 to 00:11 zulu.
Zahari deliberately shut down engine #2 (right engine) at 23:40zulu, and commenced a modified 'single engine drift down' on engine #1 (left engine) only, and whilst doing so, deliberately cross fed all remaining fuel in the right tank to the left tank.
PHASE 1-B:
Zahari modulated power as required to maintain a steady ROD of 2,500 ft/min.
NOTE: HE HAS TO MAINTAIN A MINIMUM ROD of 2,500 ft/min because of the advancing terminator.
Once all remaining fuel has been purged from the right tank, Zahari shuts down the transfer/crossfeed pumps and fully isolates the right A/C buss.
PHASE 2-A:
On reaching FL200/20,000 feet, (maximum flap actuation altitude) he reduces power to flight idle and momentarily levels at 20,000 ft to slow down as quickly as possible to configures flaps and slats for alighting.
NOTE: It is necessary to configure the flaps NOW, whilst he still has fuel for engine #1, because the hydraulic fluid required to power the hydraulic flap actuator motors that can only be supplied by the main engine hydraulic pumps.
He sets flaps 1, then flaps 5, and then flaps 15.
NOTE: ONLY FLAP 15 is selected (definitely NOT 20, 25 or 30), because it is necessary to configure 'for the end game', where the 'operating requirement', will be to have the best L/D-IGE (lift over drag ratio in ground effect) with two huge wind milling engines (acting like giant air brakes). Any more than Flap 15 generates far too much drag, so the 'trade-off' for a minimal incremental stall seed reduction is not acceptable. This is BECAUSE, although it is normally desirable to have the lowest stall speed possible, that has to be SUBORDINATE TO, and must be COMMENSURATE WITH, being able to achieve the ABSOLUTE MINIMUM ROD possible for alighting, by 'holding off and bleeding the speed' in the last few seconds before actually ALIGHTING.
NOTE: This requires 'seaplane/flying boat piloting technique' to achieve.
PHASE 2-B:
Very soon after configuring the flaps, he manually deploys the RAT. This is necessary to ENSURE that he will have enough hydraulic power for easy manipulation of the reduced number of flight control surfaces that he will have remaining after the inevitable loss of the hydraulic pumps powered by engine #1 when it eventually flames out.
NOTE: This configuration has never been tried on type in real world test flying, (for obvious reasons) so even training in Level D simulators (which can only be programmed on 'theoretical data' in this configuration), is at best, of 'questionable fidelity'.
So, for these reasons, it is absolutely necessary to 'do a little test flying' as soon as engine #1 eventually quits, so the RAT must be already 'up and running'.
PHASE 3-A:
Shortly thereafter, having satisfied himself that the RAT has deployed and has come on-line, he continues on, again modulating power to reestablish ROD of 2,500 ft/min and accelerate to, and maintain, the flaps extended limit speed of 200 KIAS, to go as far as he can .
PHASE 3-B:
Engine #1 eventually flames out due to fuel exhaustion not long afterwards, probably at a height of between FL200 and FL150. As engine #1 winds down, it's generators and hydraulic pumps go off-line, and he is now a glider, on RAT power alone, with two wind milling engines.
PHASE 4-A:
Zahari's is now focused on exercising pith and roll control inputs to test for, 'to get a feel for the responsiveness and control effectiveness with RAT hydraulics only'.
How would he proceed ?
There are two obvious possibilities.
Possibility #1.
He could have been testing for pitch control responsiveness at 'low Q' (low dynamic pressures), i.e. the 'low speed regime'.
These tests were facilitated by the combination of altitude (mid level) and low KIAS. Was he testing for stick shaker onset - possibly even stick pusher activation, and what would happen if he held it into the incipient stall, what did it feel like, would it 'mush' or 'break' ? How difficult was it to recover ? How long did it take? How much height did it take to recover? This is all crucial information for 'the end game', the final descent into the flare in ground effect, the subsequent 'hold-off' and alighting. He has to know, how slow he can actually go, before he has to, ALIGHT.
Possibility #2.
Similarly, he could have been testing roll control responsiveness at 'low Q'. Was he testing for the fidelity of roll control, roll rate, how sluggish it felt, at what point did incipient loss of roll control occur, particularly, when he would lose the ability to pick up a dropped wing in a timely manner.
This is all crucial information for 'the end game’; since there is an obvious need to perform the final alignment on a suitable wave crest. He has to know, how low, and how slow, can he actually go, before he risks losing effective roll control, and thus effective directional control. At what point, does he have to commit to a particular wave crest, come what may.
But, whilst he is doing this, the APU has automatically restarted.
It takes a little while for the APU to spin up to operating speed, (a little longer in the thin air at mid altitude than in the thick air on the ground) but when it does, it's generator comes back on line (initiating the SDU reboot).
Now, the question arises, what was Zahari actually doing with his 'test flying', his actual manipulation of the controls, right at the very moment when the SDU came back on line, and the APU air driven hydraulic pumps came on line as well ?
Zahari was pitching down (with considerable forward stick due to only one elevator powered on RAT hydraulics alone), already in a rapid descent (say 5,000 ft/min) having just begun recovery from a stick shaker onset (or a stick pusher onset) at the very moment that those APU air driven pumps suddenly and unexpectedly kicked in, suddenly repowering the other elevator, thus producing a sudden and unexpectedly violent additional pitch down.
(This immediately generates a very high and unanticipated ROD, which momentarily startles him).
Within mere seconds, his ROD has tripled from 5,000 ft/min to 15,000 ft/min. Although startled, he checks the descent with back stick, and begins recovery to maintain his necessary ROD of 2,500 ft/min.
BUT CRUCIALLY, it only takes a few more seconds for Zahari to realizes that the cause of this unanticipated aggressive pitch down upset was the APU bleed air powered hydraulic pumps coming back on-line, and powering ALL primary flight control surfaces (the confirmatory que to him being that pitch control is now 'almost like normal feel' again) so, since he definitely does not want those bloody APU air driven hydraulic pumps messing things up again,
Zahari deliberately and immediately reaches up to the overhead panel, and cycles the APU switch.
ON - then - OFF, to kill the APU, and thus kill those damn pneumatically driven hydraulic pumps.
HOWEVER - unbeknown to him, the SDU had been transmitting during that 'upset', thus generating those 7th Arc 'high ROD BFO's' that we all now know.
This 'timely, deliberate, active pilot action, of manually shutting down the APU' (unbeknown to the world) also kills the APU generator, which also removes electrical power from the SDU, which dies, as chance would have it, just an instant before 'the expected IFE log on attempt'.
NOTE: This all happened probably in the height band between FL150 and FL100, perhaps a bit lower. In any case, the 7th arc BTO arc is definitely NOT at cruise altitude, and should be replotted for a much lower altitude; I would recommend FL100 instead of the existing FL350.
PHASE 4-B:
Proceed with the 'end game'.
Regards,
Ventus45