Like Chalk & Cheese: Homendy vs Popinjay (the latest Can'tberra Village idiot) -
Via the NTSB, Baltimore bridge collision accident:
Compare that to this load of bollocks and self-serving BS...
Plus on the release of the Prelim report, released 35 days past ICAO Annex 13 compliance for release of a AAI Prelim report:
And for the anniversary interim report, this manufactured Popinjay bollocks press release:
Mr Mitchell noted the evidence includes a toxicology report for the fatally injured pilot, showing a positive result for low levels of cocaine metabolites. - “A forensic pharmacologist engaged by the ATSB has stated that the very low concentrations of these metabolites suggest exposure was not likely to have occurred in the 24 hours prior to the accident, and it is unlikely there would have been impairment of the pilot’s psychomotor skills,” This statement led to further defaming of the dead Chief Pilot:
Hmm...don't believe Homendy would be so stupid as to be led down that particular 'blame game' rabbit hole...
MTF...P2
Via the NTSB, Baltimore bridge collision accident:
Quote:31,100 views Streamed live on Mar 27, 2024
NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy briefs the media on the NTSB investigation of a cargo ship striking and subsequent collapse of the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore, Maryland.
Compare that to this load of bollocks and self-serving BS...
Plus on the release of the Prelim report, released 35 days past ICAO Annex 13 compliance for release of a AAI Prelim report:
Quote:“The ATSB has released this preliminary report to detail the circumstances of this tragic accident as we currently understand them, but it is important to stress that we are yet to make findings,” said ATSB Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell.
“Our findings as to the contributing factors to this accident, and the analysis to support those findings, will be detailed in a final report to be released at the conclusion of our investigation.”
Mr Mitchell said the preliminary report details factual information, including the accident’s sequence of events.
“The factual information detailed in this report is derived from interviews with survivors of the accident, including the surviving pilot and passengers, and witnesses; analysis of video footage and images taken by passengers on board both helicopters, onlookers on the ground, and CCTV from nearby buildings; examination of the wreckage of both helicopters; and a review of recorded radio calls and aircraft tracking and radar data.”
The preliminary report details that the helicopters were operating from two separate helipad facilities about 220 metres apart, a pad within the theme park, and a pad to the south at the operator’s own heliport, adjacent to the park. The 5-minute scenic flights were to follow the same counter-clockwise orbit, with the inbound helicopter, registration VH-XH9 (XH9) on approach to land at the heliport to the south and the outbound helicopter, registration VH-XKQ (XKQ) having departed the pad to the north from within the theme park.
The two helicopters collided at an altitude of about 130 feet, 23 seconds into the departing XKQ’s flight.
The main rotor blades of helicopter XKQ entered the forward cabin of XH9. XKQ broke apart in mid-air and impacted shallow water next to a sandbar. The pilot and 3 passengers were fatally injured, and 3 passengers were seriously injured. The helicopter was destroyed.
Helicopter XH9 sustained significant damage to the forward cabin, instrument console, and main rotor blades. The impact turned XH9 to the left, and the pilot continued with the momentum of that movement, completing a 270° descending turn to land on the sandbar below them near to XKQ. The pilot and 2 passengers were seriously injured, and 3 other passengers had minor injuries.
The helicopters were operating in non-controlled airspace where pilots use a common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) to make radio calls to announce their position and intentions, and, as required, to arrange separation with other aircraft.
The report details the radio calls made by the pilot of the returning helicopter XH9, and that as they tracked south over the Broadwater, that the pilot saw passengers boarding XKQ as it was preparing to depart.
The pilot of XH9 recalled that their assessment was that XKQ would pass behind them, and that they did not recall the pilot of XKQ making a standard “taxiing” call announcing their intention to depart.
“This does not necessarily mean that a taxi call was not made, and the ATSB investigation will undertake a detailed analysis of the nature of the radio calls made,” Mr Mitchell noted.
The report also details that the pilot of XH9 did not see XKQ depart from the park helipad.
While video footage taken by passengers in both helicopters on mobile phones contained images of the other helicopter, this does not mean that the other helicopter was visible to either pilot.
“The investigation will look closely at the issues both pilots faced in seeing the other helicopter,” Mr Mitchell said.
“We have already generated a 3D model of the view from the pilot’s seat from an exemplar EC130 helicopter which we will use as part of a detailed visibility study to help the investigation determine the impediments both pilots faced in sighting the other helicopter.”
Mr Mitchell said the investigation will also look more broadly beyond the issues of radio calls and visibility.
“The ATSB will also consider the operator’s procedures and practices for operating scenic flights in the Sea World area and the process for implementing the recently-acquired EC130 helicopters into operation, and will review the regulatory surveillance of the operator and similar operators.”
The investigation would also look at the use of traffic collision avoidance systems (TCAS). There was no requirement for the helicopters to be equipped with a collision avoidance system, and while both accident helicopters were fitted with TCAS, those systems had not been fully integrated in the accident helicopters (as they had with the operator’s other helicopters), and according to the operator’s pilots were of limited benefit when operating near and on the helipads.
“This will be a complex and comprehensive investigation.
“However, if at any time during the course of the investigation the ATSB identifies a critical safety issue, we will immediately share that information with relevant parties so they can take appropriate safety action.”
And for the anniversary interim report, this manufactured Popinjay bollocks press release:
Quote:Interim transport safety report one year on from Gold Coast helicopter collision
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau has released an interim report detailing contextual information established as part of its ongoing investigation into the mid-air collision between two helicopters on the Gold Coast one year ago.
The report is intended to update the industry and public on the progress of the ATSB’s independent ‘no blame’ investigation, which is conducted with the goal of improving transport safety.
“To date, the ATSB has undertaken extensive work to understand and recreate the events of the day in order to identify and examine the context and risk controls that existed at the time,” Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell said.
“The ATSB analysis framework looks at a hierarchy of factors arranged in their relative proximity to an event, and this investigation has so far concentrated on elements closest to the event: individual actions, vehicle/equipment performance, local conditions, and risk controls.”
This work has included interviews with key personnel and witnesses, the examination of both helicopters, maintenance logs, and postmortem information, a review of industry understanding of seat belt fitment, and analysis of ADS-B and radar flight tracking information, CTAF recordings, and video imagery.
“A large amount of the evidence gathered through this work is detailed in today’s interim report, and investigation into and analysis of many of these areas is ongoing,” Mr Mitchell said.
Mr Mitchell noted the evidence includes a toxicology report for the fatally injured pilot, showing a positive result for low levels of cocaine metabolites.
“A forensic pharmacologist engaged by the ATSB has stated that the very low concentrations of these metabolites suggest exposure was not likely to have occurred in the 24 hours prior to the accident, and it is unlikely there would have been impairment of the pilot’s psychomotor skills,” he said.
“It is important to note while this is a substantive and comprehensive interim report, the ATSB is yet to make formal findings as to the contributing factors that led to this accident as we are continuing our analysis of that evidence.”
Moving forward, Mr Mitchell said the investigation would consider whether any systemic factors contributed to, or increased risk in the accident.
“This will include consideration of the design of the operating environment and operating procedures, the onboarding and implementation of aircraft, change management, and the regulatory environment and input,” he explained.
The ATSB’s final report, which will include analysis, findings, and any recommended safety actions, is on track for an anticipated completion in the third quarter of 2024.
“This was a tragic accident, and it is our responsibility to make findings and drive safety actions, which reduce the likelihood of a similar occurrence in the future,” Mr Mitchell said.
The interim report notes several steps which have already been taken in response to the accident.
After reviewing its processes and procedures, Sea World Helicopters has implemented a new ‘pad boss’ traffic advisory role, added air traffic systems to each of its helicopters’ avionic systems, increased communication protocols, and taken steps to make its helicopters more visible.
Separately, the ATSB issued a Safety Advisory Notice in September, targeting aircraft lifejacket manufacturers and national aviation certification authorities.
“During this investigation, our investigators identified a potentially common lack of understanding in the broader helicopter tourism community about how constant wear lifejackets should be worn in conjunction with seatbelts,” Mr Mitchell explained.
“This correlated with a discovery that some passengers’ seatbelts were not fitted correctly in this accident, in part due to interference from their lifejackets – although we have not attributed this to the tragic outcomes in this case.”
Read the interim report: Mid-air collision involving Eurocopter EC130B4, VH-XH9, and Eurocopter EC130B4, VH-XKQ, Main Beach, Gold Coast, Queensland, on 2 January 2023
Mr Mitchell noted the evidence includes a toxicology report for the fatally injured pilot, showing a positive result for low levels of cocaine metabolites. - “A forensic pharmacologist engaged by the ATSB has stated that the very low concentrations of these metabolites suggest exposure was not likely to have occurred in the 24 hours prior to the accident, and it is unlikely there would have been impairment of the pilot’s psychomotor skills,” This statement led to further defaming of the dead Chief Pilot:
Hmm...don't believe Homendy would be so stupid as to be led down that particular 'blame game' rabbit hole...
MTF...P2