[Peetwo]

SSP ignores Airport and ATC safety issues?? - 

References: Dots-n-dashes on ICAO GRSAP, the SSP and the CASA O&O of the NRSG?? 

The GRSAP recommended actions and initiatives was adopted in principle by the Australian Aviation Safety bureaucracy and subsequently embedded and became a theoretical function of our latest version of our tick-a-box Annex 19 SSP (refer pg 37 NRSG).

The NRSG is oversighted and administered by CASA: Ref - https://www.casa.gov.au/about-us/who-we-...#1.Purpose

1. Purpose

The National Runway Safety Group (NRSG) is a State Safety Programme (SSP) hazard-specific working group and has been established to facilitate State-level visibility and continuous improvement in safety performance, specific to runway safety in Australia.

&.. Of Skeletons and closets.....

..There are several worthy of the time taken to consider; the Chicago Convention for one. A binding agreement, made in good faith with the very best of intentions at its core; all happily manipulated to a fare-thee-well with the tacit, twice removed approval of successive governments, happy to be rid of any and all direct responsibility. Another large pile comes from the august aviation pinnacle body, ICAO. Spirit, intent and obligations all reside within that mouldering pile; yet treated with same disrespect, disdain and blatant manipulation to suit purpose. But, these things are now more matters for history than resurrection: Alas...There is however a more modern document gracing those shelves; another that began it's life full of promise, hope and good intentions; this too is being mauled in the same suffocating damp, stagnant, turgid atmosphere; I refer of course to the SSP.

Freely available _ HERE_. “Australia's fifth edition of its Aviation State Safety Program (SSP) and the inaugural National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP), have been finalised following stakeholder consultation.”

The indefatigable P2 (legend) has for a long while now monitored the 'use', application and results of the SSP tenets and principals in relation to 'real life' events. One could expect that a high profile, important, expensive 'program' – with some real teeth – would be well supported and active; alas. Take for example the sterling (gold star) work done by Aus ALPA in one narrow, but essential to 'safety' area of air operations; - HERE – and again – HERE - . Serious commentary, completed by professionals based against a wide range of 'experience', exposure and current operational knowledge. Then (for a Choc frog) find the SSP response and actions either promised or delivered. Anyway; it is P2's hobby horse, and there is much MTF. Suffice to say that once again; good advice is consigned to the basement; the expense and spin remains, once again, unchecked; and, not only does the nation pay for this glossy top cover – but has little of intrinsic or practical value to show for the investment (once again)....

&.. The rooted cause:  

Mr. Approach 

Note, there is no mention of "aviation safety performance". So what is that and did Airservices maintain it? This also begs the question, "is Mr. Harfield in possession of a document from Ms. Spence that allows him not to provide commensurate services"? In a way he is because CASA also has approved Airservices contingency procedures, but prolonged lack of staff is not the reason ICAO allows for such procedures to exist.

To return to the question, clearly, if Airservices was not providing an air traffic service in otherwise controlled airspace (Classes A, C, D and E in Australia) then they were also not maintaining "aviation safety performance" in that airspace. The latter, which presumably means nobody died, was, in fact, being maintained by the pilots in the now uncontrolled airspace.

As for "transparency and accountability", these are qualities that every public servant claims for their work. It seems that the only way the public ever sees this accountability is when the politicians see the need to appoint a Royal Commission. If there ever is one into the debacle that Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts, it's seven ministers, CASA and Airservices has become then Robodebt will look like an amateur production...

---

Kharon

Put aside the eternal need to keep the incumbent minister and the DoIT out of the morass, ignore the many academic and scientific methods available and the expensive folks who 'can do' the research and draft the 'paper'. Let's get down to 'brass tacks'.

That the entire ATC system is a world class cluster of ducks is a given. Ironically, those who created the mess and should no longer be there to create even more mess; are the ones anointed to 'fix it'. Think about it – can you imagine the upheaval should the government admitted to an expensive, flawed, toxic, second world air traffic system, being run on the fumes left behind after the executive level had finished ensuring their well being; or that financial brain farts had ensured the inevitable (forecast) result we see today. Can you contemplate the ramifications if the public ever discovered that there was much more concern with fine line 'legal' abrogation than to ensuring an efficient, first world system to prevent the unthinkable possibility of two loaded aircraft colliding?

That however is not the resident evil, scratch off the glossy top cover and study where the real liability resides; the parts that elegantly and eloquently remove minister, department and management from any and all responsibility. Oh, its there. No long bow drawn. The blame will be sheeted home to the ATCO and flight crew. No expense will be spared to prove, beyond reasonable doubt (and insurance pay-out) that the government, ASA management and the system was in no way at fault.

In follow up to both Mr Approach and Kharon's excellent OBS about what has become a normalised deviance to our air traffic control system (as managed by the ASA executive management and it's Board), I noted the following CASA answer to Senator McKenzie's written QON in regards to the 'close prox' incident that occurred at YSSY on 29th April: 267. CASA - Stakeholder Satisfaction Survery.pdf

7. Regarding the close call of two Qantas 737's in Sydney on April 29, did you work with Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) and Airservices Australia (ASA) on this matter to determine the cause of the matter?

8. What course of action has been taken to ensure this does not happen in the future?

9. Was human error or staff fatigue a factor in the incident?

10. Were staff shortages in air traffic control a factor in the incident?

11. In the view of CASA what was the cause of the incident?

Answer:

7. CASA has been advised that Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) is investigating this incident and is available to support ATSB if needed.

8. Pending the outcome of a formal investigation, CASA is satisfied that Airservices is initiating actions to minimise the risk of a similar occurrence.

9. CASA awaits the outcome of the formal investigation to understand possible contributing factors to this incident.

10. CASA awaits the outcome of the formal investigation to understand possible contributing factors to this incident.

11. It would be inappropriate for CASA to speculate on the causes of this incident and will await the outcome of the formal investigation by ATSB.

  
Hmm...no surprises there I guess with the way that was answered?? -   

However to this statement: "CASA is satisfied that Airservices is initiating actions to minimise the risk of a similar occurrence..."

On what are they basing this assessment? Is it based on the findings of a parallel investigation; or a co-operative initiative instigated through the ATSB/CASA MoU and their published responsibilities to the ICAO Annex 19 SSP? Ref pg2: https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/default/fi...ch2015.pdf

3 STATE SAFETY PROGRAMME

3.1 ATSB and CASA are committed to ensure the effective implementation of the State Aviation Safety Programme, as published by the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development. Cooperative priorities for improving implementation of the Programme during the period of this MOU include, but are not limited to:

(a) Improving information collection and sharing processes, having regard to the standards and recommended practices in Annexes 13 and 19 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, done at Chicago 7 December 1944
(b) Cooperative research and analysis to review safety trends and identify areas for safety improvement
© Public communication and education on aviation safety matters.

On the matter of the 'close prox' at YSSY and the other growing list of TIBA near misses, mid-air collisions, MAYDAY fuel diversions and ATCO REPCONs, I cannot understand why these obvious safety risk issues haven't been escalated to an urgent meeting of both the SSP Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program Continuous Monitoring Approach (USOAP CMA) Working Group 

The USOAP CMA Working Group is a working level cross-agency team with representative of all agencies with ICAO Annex responsibilities. The objective of the USOAP CMA Working Group is to promote civil aviation safety by ensuring Australia adheres to ICAO’s safety oversight standards.

; or perhaps the Joint Agency Aviation Safety Analysis Coordination Group (JAASACG):    

To facilitate the exchange of safety-related data and analyses between agencies, for the sole purpose of maintaining and improving aviation safety; and to identify joint safety analysis projects that utilise the combined capabilities of agencies to produce outputs of aviation safety benefit.

Instead we get the 'nothing to see here' response from CASA (above), where they are quite happy to wait on the final report from the ATSB , who you will remember were reluctant to even investigate this incident: Ref - TICK TOCK goes Harfwit's Oz Aviation DOOMSDAY CLOCK??

A couple of OBS here: 1/ This incident occurred over 2 weeks ago, how is it that it has taken over 2 weeks for Popinjay to decide to investigate? 2/ Given this incident involves our national carrier Qantas, why hasn't there been any media briefing about this investigation from Popinjay; or one of his many Director's of Transport Safety??

  
Of passing strange coincidence, have just visited the investigation page for the April 29th 'close prox' at YSSY and it actually had an unnotified update, on the 2 June, to the 'Summary' that bizarrely reads more like a prelim/interim report??

UPDATED 2 June 2023: The ATSB is investigating a close proximity event involving 2 Boeing 737 aircraft, registered VH-VZM and VH-VZW, at Sydney Airport, New South Wales on 29 April 2023. Both aircraft were using runway 16L: VH-VZM departing and VH-VZW arriving.

It was reported that at 1747 local time, after a preceding flight had vacated runway 16L, the controller issued VH-VZM with a take-off clearance, and there was a close proximity event with VH-VZW on approach. The controller reportedly instructed the flight crew of VH-VZW to conduct a missed approach and then vectored the aircraft onto a diverging track.

The ATSB has commenced the examination and analysis of the initial evidence collected.

To date, the ATSB investigation has included:

• interviewing the flight crew and air traffic controllers
  
• analysis of air traffic control recordings
  
• analysis of flight recorder and air traffic surveillance data.
  

The continuing investigation will include further analysis of:

• operational documentation
  
• training practices
  
• flight recorder and air traffic surveillance data
  
• related occurrences.
  

A final report will be released at the conclusion of the investigation. Should a critical safety issue be identified during the course of the investigation, the ATSB will immediately notify relevant parties, so that appropriate safety action can be taken.

  
Couple of OBS here, this investigation is still listed as "Short", therefore due to a 'notified difference' to ICAO Annex 13 - para 7.2: https://www.airservicesaustralia.com/aip...AY2023.pdf

Detail of Differences: Australia will comply with the standard for the more complex accidents. However, for some less complex investigations Australia does not prepare a Preliminary Report.

(PS: I note with the recent update to the NDs that there is no longer a difference to para 7.4 IE the 30 day rule. Yet the ATSB continue to be non-compliant with that rule - WTF?)

I would argue that given the 'close prox' incident, the other ASA incidents, the REPCONs etc..etc that there is a strong argument for the ATSB to be tasked by the SSP to open up a combined 'systemic' investigation into the administration and oversight of the ANSP Airservices Australia. Yet what have we got?? 

     

MTF...P2