[Peetwo]

Airport public safety risk mitigation - Oz style?

To begin I note some commentary via the relevant UP thread... :
 

Clinton McKenzie

The ATSB investigation details a 2003 email it uncovered, in which an Essendon Airport management officer advised that CASA had agreed verbally to the airport applying a strip width of 180 metres rather than 300 metres.

“This should open up about 36,000 square metres of new land for development,” the email says.

Essendon Airport relied heavily on a letter from a CASA officer confirming that interpretation a month later, but CASA told the ATSB investigation that advice was wrong and had no legal validity.

This is another example of CASA apparently ‘disowning’ responsibility for its own officer’s inconvenient actions.

It appears that the only way in which to have confidence that anything written by any CASA officer is CASA’s position is to write to the CEO and seek confirmation that the CEO acknowledges and accepts that what the CASA officer said is CASA’s position.

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Mach E Avelli

The airport owner (and CASA, if implicated) will argue that the buildings had no influence on the outcome of the King Air crash. In this particular case they would be right, but it was sheer luck that no one was there on the ground to get hurt.

If a heavier bizjet plows into the shopping centre and kills a dozen or two seeking some retail therapy, Essendon Airport will close overnight. It will briefly open for ferry flight take-offs only. CASA will claim to have eliminated the risk.

The developers will circle like sharks, hangars will become trendy apartments, and the runways will make very convenient parking areas for new high rise buildings.

How to destroy valuable aviation infrastructure 101.

Don't forget the other interested parties - Airservices,  the Department (DITRDC&A) and by association Popinjay's cover-up crew??



Not that anyone can challenge it but apparently Popinjay was attributed to saying this bollocks:

“This complex investigation made nine findings pertaining to the acceptance of grandfathering in non-standard circumstances, review of safety cases, limited guidance for some safety standards, and assurance processes between federal agencies for airport planning relating to the Bulla Road Precinct,” said ATSB Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell.

“We note that both CASA and the airport operator have maintained that there is an acceptable level of safety with the current status of the runway strip, obstacle limitation surfaces, and publication of information to pilots. It was not the role of the ATSB to do a separate risk assessment, but we have noted the type of risk information that should be taken into account by aerodrome operators and regulators.”

And then a real Popinjay quote, via the Patrick Hatch Age article: Ref - Finally MSM catch up on Essendon DFO cover-up report??

ATSB chief commissioner Angus Mitchell said the safety authority’s investigation did not find that the DFO was unsafe or should not have been built, but the bureau could not confirm how the airport determined the development was compliant with the rules.

“We can’t say it was in breach, or it was in accordance, because of that uncertainty of what standard applied and what was being used at the time,” Mitchell said.

Ah yes...??

From all the factual evidence, weasel words (above); and indeed the 146 page Popinjay cover-up report itself; it is obvious that all the relevant Federal bureaucratic authorities and agencies are totally prepared to operate the Essendon airport runways in:

a) total non-compliance with the ICAO Annex 14 international standards; and..
b) with the miniscule risk of there ever being "a heavier bizjet" plowing into the DFO shopping complex during peak trading hours!! -    (P2 - Gotta wonder about the insurance companies take on this??)

However back to this observation from Popinjay: "..safety authority’s investigation did not find that the DFO was unsafe or should not have been built.."

Despite the fact that it is not the ATSB's role to provide opinion, or to decide whether a building should or shouldn't have been built, I find it staggering that this so called 'systemic' investigation has been pigeon-holed to 'defined' parameters that seemingly contradict the original intent of the ATSB investigation - quote from the Age January 2019 article: Essendon Airport DFO plans call safety planning into question

It comes as the Australian Transport Safety Bureau is close to completing a major investigation into how Essendon's DFO complex was designed and approved. The probe was launched in the wake of a fatal crash in 2017 when a light aircraft ploughed into the rear of the centre.

“The very fact that it was allowed to be built is a safety concern for our system," said Captain Marcus Diamond, a safety and technical officer at the Australian Federation of Air Pilots (AFAP).

"It means that inappropriate buildings can be built not just at Essendon, but at other airports.

"There’s more risk, and we need to know how that was justified.”

This brings me to the obvious omission to Popinjay's systemic investigation...err...'safety study' report. Why no mention/reference to the DITCRD (the Dept of everything) NASAG's implementation of the NASF (National Airports Safeguarding Framework), in particular:

Guideline B: Managing the Risk of Building Generated Windshear and Turbulence at Airports PDF: 1005 KB DOC: 653 KB

Guideline F: Managing the Risk of Intrusions into the Protected Airspace of Airports PDF: 160 KB DOC: 71 KB

Guideline I: The new National Airport Safeguarding Framework (NASF) Guideline I on Public Safety Areas (PSAs) was agreed by Ministers at the Transport and Infrastructure Council on 9 November 2018.

PSAs are designated areas of land at the end of airport runways within which certain planning restrictions may apply. The new PSA Guideline was developed to mitigate the risk of on-ground fatalities from an aircraft incident, by informing a consistent approach to land use at the end of Australian airport runways.

• Guideline I PDF: 1938 KB DOCX: 2122 KB
  

   
 Interestingly enough in 2019 the Dept of Everything put in place a review of the 'implementation of the NASF'- Google reference: 

 

The Review considered implementation of the NASF across jurisdictions; and sought submissions from all levels of government, industry and community stakeholders. During 2020 the Review was delayed due to temporary reallocation of resources in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

- 

The Review report was eventually released in October 2021: https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/sites/...report.pdf

 

Executive Summary

The National Airports Safeguarding Advisory Group (NASAG) was established in 2010 as a cross jurisdictional advisory body to progress work on developing a national approach to land use planning around airports in Australia. The group is chaired by the Commonwealth Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications, and is comprised of state and territory planning and transport departments, Department of Defence, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), Airservices Australia (Airservices), and the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA).

In 2012, Ministers of the then Standing Council on Transport and Infrastructure endorsed the first iteration of the National Airports Safeguarding Framework (NASF) which included seven overarching Principles and six Guidelines.

Between 2012 and 2018, three additional Guidelines were endorsed by the Ministers and added to the NASF. Current NASF Guidelines consider aviation-related issues such as aircraft noise, building induced windshear and turbulence, wildlife hazard management, wind turbines, pilot lighting distraction, airspace protection, protection of air navigation equipment, protection of strategic helicopter landing sites, and public safety areas near the end of runways. NASF has implications for the general public as well as those working in town planning, residential or commercial development, building, development and aviation related industries.

With a view to ensuring the functionality and currency of the NASF, an external implementation review process was agreed to by NASAG in 2019. This report provides a summary of the NASF Implementation Review process undertaken in 2019, and captures NASAG’s Recommendations for further action on airport safeguarding following consideration of this information. Due to COVID-related resourcing limitations this report has been delayed 18 months. Recognising the amount of time that has elapsed since jurisdictions first provided a status update on implementation of the NASF in 2019 the opportunity to provide a 2021 update on implementation was provided as part of the final drafting process. These jurisdictional updates, provided on a voluntary basis, are included in the Appendices to this report.

Public consultation conducted as part of the review sought comments from NASAG members, the aviation industry, and over 600 local government and community stakeholders regarding the implementation of the NASF to date. The consultation period ran for 12 weeks and 42 submissions were received.

Key matters raised during consultation included:

Awareness of airport protection issues continues to increase, with land use planning decisions increasingly referencing NASF and consideration of its implications.

Each of the states/territories have incorporated some form of planning requirements into their respective planning frameworks relating to at least two of the nine NASF guidelines. However, for local governments, the incomplete introduction of planning mechanisms to address NASF-related issues continues to be a hindrance in the consideration of development applications in the vicinity of airports.

Industry bodies and local governments indicated that a jurisdiction not introducing NASF-related provisions into high level planning policy, or providing clear policy direction on the use of the NASF, is a fundamental obstacle to implementation of the framework.

The lack of understanding within the building/development industry regarding safety implications of development near airports continues to be a challenge.

Across many submissions, it was suggested that industry/planning bodies could benefit from a targeted education program on the NASF guidelines, and the economic benefits that airports bring to communities through economic development and employment.

The establishment of airports as statutory referral authorities would be beneficial in providing supporting technical expertise for planners when assessing potential risks to or from aviation activities.

The review found that increasing awareness of the NASF since 2012 has yielded positive results for communities and airports. Moving forward, there are opportunities to further expand awareness and increase the uptake of the NASF through industry networking, legislative/policy approaches, and education activities for practitioners and industry. These themes have been reflected in the eight Implementation Review Recommendations to be taken forward by NASAG.

 
Hmm...note the timing for consideration of implementation of the NASF is 2027! - WTF??

Since the release of the report in October 2021, all other meaningful progress on the NASF seems to have again stalled...  

Are we surprised?? -   

However, focusing on the submissions to the review, for the Gold Star and Choccy Frog award and possible reasons for downplaying the review final report, here is a link and quotes from the 'nailed it' AusALPA submission 34...   

 

Legislative Implementation of the NASF

In the absence of a clear safeguarding endpoint, legislative implementation is doomed to be fragmented and potentially inconsistent, if not counter-productive.

AusALPA does not believe that the hopeful adoption of the Guidelines in State or Territory legislation, regulated individually by those jurisdictions in the absence of umbrella Commonwealth legislation is a viable model. The absence of any vestige of enforcement by DITCRD at the leased Commonwealth airports hardly sets an appropriate example for other levels of government. Unfortunately, a range of effective ownership and control issues mean that a simple single solution is not practicable.

While noting the much narrower focus of this review, AusALPA considers Australia’s airports as strategic national assets in the first instance, with their economic benefits following close behind. Notwithstanding that recent events at Essendon indicate little effective Commonwealth control over leased assets, the privatisation of all but the 22 leased Commonwealth airports has complicated the strategic management by governments of all our airports. Considering both Defence and Disaster Management implications means that strategic outcomes will necessarily remain a multi-jurisdictional issue. On the other hand, economic outcomes should remain with the relevant jurisdiction within which the airport is situated or which retains legal control.

However, in order to achieve our goal of a standardised national approach to airport safeguarding that applies to all airports in all jurisdictions, AusALPA believes that there needs to be a single authority that is ceded all necessary powers by each of the jurisdictions to enforce the intended safety outcomes. With the exception of Guideline A Measures for Managing Impacts of Aircraft Noise, AusALPA considers the remaining Guidelines to be all safety-related and amenable to the application and enforcement by one agency.

SCOTI/TIC has undertaken a number of such exercises previously: on 19 August 2011, the Council of Australian Governments signed Intergovernmental Agreements to establish the national maritime regulator, the national rail safety regulator and investigation system and the national heavy vehicle regulator. While AusALPA surmises that the compromises and concessions required in those spaces were relatively simple compared to the complexity of airport safeguarding, as far as we are aware there are no Constitutional challenges from the States and Territories to the current position that the Commonwealth covers the field in regard to aviation safety matters. Despite our reservations, CASA emerges as the least worst option as the choice of a single agency that all jurisdictions accept as the standard setter for most safety outcomes at airports.

While CASA has proven to be particularly weak in airspace protection, the reality is that they are weak regulators in all of the safety-related Guideline areas. More often than not, CASA hides behind a lack of legislated authority - but even where they do provide advice, as best as we can tell, it rarely if ever reflects any philosophical strength.

AusALPA considers this weakness to be primarily a function of the constraints placed on CASA by DITCRD, which clings to the legacy of the encroachment on safety matters of the Airports Act 1996 as well as to an apparent over-sensitivity to Constitutional matters related to land use planning despite the aviation safety consequences. Although ICAO does not provide standards for the safety-related Guideline topics, that absence is no impediment to Australia imposing its own standards.

We believe that CASR Part 139 is the natural home for these standards.

Nonetheless, the protection of prescribed airspace needs a complete overhaul. At the moment, the only protection of prescribed airspace is empowered by Part 12 of the Airports Act 1996 and the Airports (Protection of Airspace) Regulations 1996, of which paradoxically Guideline F at paragraph 23 outlines a workaround. That legislation only affects the 22 leased Commonwealth airports and is regulated by DITCRD, not CASA – at all other airports, CASA imposes a duty on the airport operator to prescribe and protect the OLS and PANS-OPS surfaces notwithstanding the lack of authority and power of the airport operator to protect that airspace.

AusALPA has no visibility of the extent to which State, Territory or local governments provide protection of that airspace from encroachment, if at all.

The Opacity of Implementation and Decision-making

AusALPA’s greatest difficulty is that, as the primary users most exposed to the safety risks, we continually need to force our way into the various debates and consultations.

Our greatest disappointment is that DITCRD, CASA and airport operators all actively frustrate scrutiny of compliance with the NASF – a complete failure to act in the public interest and to accept public accountability for actions, decisions and outcomes.

With very few exceptions, airports exist to serve the Australian public and the safetyrelated standards and processes exist so that we can make their travel as uneventful as possible. None of the safety-related standards and processes exist for the benefit of officers of DITCRD, CASA or the airport operators – AusALPA strongly believes that a total change of mindset is required.

Currently, the only visibility of the application of the NASF that we get is through the MDP process at the leased Commonwealth airports. Only Canberra and Sydney proactively engage with us, otherwise we have to hope that our very limited resources detect the notification of a pdMDP on individual airport websites within the relevant consultation window. We do not believe that such a hit-or-miss system for those major airports is the best that can be done in the interests of aviation safety.

Complicating the MDP issue a little further, the recent Airports Amendment Act 2018 increased the monetary threshold for MDP treatment to $25M, fortunately somewhat less than the $35M proposed. Our view is that environmental and operational risk consequences are not well correlated with project size and complexity and that increasing the threshold only hides more projects from public scrutiny.

AusALPA recently engaged with the Airport Building Controller (ABC) at Essendon in regard to a building that was under construction in close proximity to the runway and which appeared to penetrate the published OLS within even the inappropriately truncated Guideline B assessment area. The development was not subject to an MDP and consequently there was no public consultation.

It took considerable effort to gain any information from the ABC, whose first step was to consult with DITCRD. Although the next step was to suggest that the legislation prevented the release of any information to us, we eventually gained a response to some questions on notice. One of those questions was about a Guideline B turbulence and windshear analysis – the ABC advised us that no such study had been conducted.

Subsequently, in separate correspondence, CASA advised us that a study had been conducted. It was never volunteered which agency had requested the study or who had conducted it, but it was most apparent that such a request was neither a standard requirement by the ABC nor the supervising section within DITCRD. In the end, we were left to surmise that there was nothing untoward in this assessment in CASA’s possession – we were unable to confirm the technical details for ourselves and the building is now complete and occupied. While the solution to the OLS penetration issue was for the airport operator to artificially shrink the OLS, there is no such “smoke and mirrors” solution to mitigating the likelihood of building induced turbulence in the vicinity of the threshold of runway 08. There was absolutely no transparency of the building approval process and AusALPA has no evidence available to us that suggests that either CASA or DITCRD has the technical capability or interest in verifying the Guideline B analysis.

The only documented process for safety-related development analysis of which we are aware relates to the 22 leased Commonwealth airports. If we then consider the effective absence of any public scrutiny of the remaining airports in Australia, the combined outcome frustrates the public interest and is totally unacceptable.

Impediments to Full Implementation

Notwithstanding our continuing concerns about the content of some of the Guidelines, in the absence of evidence AusALPA has little or no faith that the Guidelines are being properly applied, even at all of the airports subject to the Airports Act 1996. Given that the Essendon ABC is a company providing the same services at a number of airports, it seems reasonable to conclude that their corporate knowledge and procedures do not extend to applying some (or any) of the Guidelines to minor developments, regardless of the potential hazards.

If, as it appears to us, the DITCRD system doesn’t work, then what models are the other levels of government intending to apply to what types of developments and with whom do they intend to consult in the process?

Recently, we heard that DITCRD is embarking on what anecdotally is their first enforcement action in airspace protection, despite many historical non-compliances, some of which were apparently egregious in their disregard for the existing legislative framework. In our experience, a track record of appeasement has never improved compliance. One story had it that, in order to avoid both embarrassment and the need for enforcement action, DITCRD attempted to retrospectively approve a serious OLS penetration but failed to complete the process before the crane was removed after many months of illegal operation.

If true, what enforcement models can we expect the other levels of government to apply given the Commonwealth’s example?

Further to the likelihood of different enforcement models being applied according to the politics of State and Territory economic development, there is also the likelihood of significantly different pathways for administrative and judicial review or other forms of dispute resolution. The NASF is silent in this regard.

A Way Forward

To be clear, AusALPA recognises that the economic decisions surrounding airports, i.e. determining the balance between the economic benefits of developments and the detriments to the accessibility, efficiency and capacity of an airport, rest entirely with the relevant jurisdiction within which the airport is situated or which retains legal control. The issues of enforceability and dispute resolution of development approvals would remain consistent with those jurisdictional norms.

However, contrary to current practice, we are proposing that the assessment, mitigation and enforcement of the safety consequences of all relevant developments be ceded by those jurisdictions to CASA as an independent decision-maker.

Consequently, CASA needs to change its model of how airport standards are applied and enforced so as to obviate the gaming of the system so exemplified by the Essendon experience or by the uncontrolled expansion of the thousands of airspace penetrations at Sydney. As a further consequence, DITCRD should seek major amendments to the Airports Act 1996 that change the current subservient and excessively constrained role attributed to CASA and that also clarify the safety considerations that ABCs must undertake in regard to minor developments.

Furthermore, we are proposing that the visibility of developments affecting the safety outcomes at airports is vastly improved in all jurisdictions.

The public interest is best served by accepting that the potential hazard created by a development is on or near an airport not a function of cost but rather the amalgam of the issues set out in the Guidelines. Each jurisdiction should commit to a public register of development proposals that may present a potential hazard to safe airport operations, enhanced by a published list of stakeholders who are alerted to each new relevant development submitted to the jurisdiction for approval.

Yours sincerely,

Hmm...next on PSAs (Public safety zones) and NASF guideline I - quote from Californian Transport Department 'Airport Land Use Planning':  https://dot.ca.gov/programs/aeronautics/...e-planning

Responsible Land Use Planning

When making land use decisions, it is important that the type and density of land use and its cumulative impacts are given careful consideration so that appropriate decisions are made for the airport, its context, and its environment. Acknowledging this need, in 1967 the California State Legislature authorized the creation of Airport Land Use Commissions (ALUC), to protect the “public health, safety, and welfare by encouraging orderly expansion of airports and the adoption of land use measures that minimizes exposure to excessive noise and safety hazards within areas around public airports to the extent that these areas are not already devoted to incompatible uses.” Generally speaking, ALUCPs look at an area two-miles around an airport.

The law requires each county’s ALUC type to prepare an Airport Land Use Compatibility Plan (ALUCP) with a twenty-year planning horizon. Ideally, the ALUCP should be updated every 5-10 years to ensure consistency with General Plans, Specific Plans, etc. The primary focus of an ALUCP is on broadly defined noise and safety impacts. In addition, ALUCs make compatibility determinations for compliance of all proposed development around an airport. A local government body may override an ALUC compatibility determination for any proposed incompatible land use by a two-thirds majority vote; however, they must notify the Division of Aeronautics and the ALUC of this intent 45 days prior to approving the override. The Division would then respond within 30-days to the local agency’s overrule comments.

Ground and Airspace Safety

A fundamental concern in achieving airport land use compatibility involves safety in the air and within the vicinity of the airport. Aircraft accidents happen infrequently, but the consequences can be severe. The concept of risk is central to the assessment of safety compatibility. The overall objective of safety compatibility is to minimize risks associated with potential aircraft accidents. There are two components to this strategy - safety of people and property on the ground and the protection of navigable airspace from hazardous obstructions to ensure the safety of aircraft occupants. The primary ground strategy is to limit the intensity of use by minimizing residential and non-residential densities and activities that attract people in locations most susceptible to an off-airport aircraft accident. Certain risk-sensitive uses, such as schools and hospitals, and aboveground storage of flammable or hazardous materials, should be avoided regardless of the number of people involved.

For additional information on federal regulations regarding airspace safety, refer to: Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 77 and the California Public Utilities Code Sections 21658 and 21659.

 
In summary, the US State of California has had in place for 56 years an effective legislated airport safeguard framework that has subsequently been successfully duplicated by a majority of US States ever since: Ref - https://dot.ca.gov/-/media/dot-media/pro...k-a11y.pdf

Yet here we are in Oz still trying to subvert and obfuscate the international standards and decades of airport safety risk mitigation techniques and knowledge of the world's most prolific first world aviation nation the USA - UFB!   

MTF...P2 

PS: On Guideline I FAQ note the following reference to the SSP:

Q: What other measures are in place to minimise the risk to public safety near airport runways?

A: Safety at aerodromes is enhanced in a variety of ways and is governed by Australia's Aviation State Safety Programme (SSP), as required by the International Civil Aviation Organization. The SSP sets out Australia’s arrangements for maintaining and improving aviation safety. Under the umbrella of the SSP, Australia's aviation agencies and the aviation industry have significant roles to play in delivering quality safety outcomes. For example, runway safety is enhanced by airport operators through investment in infrastructure such as longer, wider landing strips; Runway End Safety Areas; dual taxi lanes on aprons; installation of runway stop bars; and upgraded approach lighting.

Australia’s Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) also plays a key role in aviation safety through regulatory oversight of such functions as pilot licencing, aircraft operations and maintenance, and through safety education and training while Airservices Australia contributes to the safety of aircraft operations at and near airports through the provision of a range of air traffic management and advisory services. It is also important to note that airports around Australia already take into consideration aircraft crash risks and general public safety through their airport master planning processes.

Much like the non-involvement of the so called SSP in the current Airservices critical shortage of properly qualified ATCOs, the safeguarding of Airports in the areas of building windshear, OLS ICAO and PAN-OPS non-compliance and indeed the obfuscation of Public Safety Area risk mitigation around airports apparently, unlike the statement above,  does not rate a mention within our supposedly full functioning and ICAO compliant SSP? AIOS strikes again:


Ref: AIOS - & the 21st Century??