Missed it by that much?? - Part III
Previous thread post:
Hallelujah! There is a light at end of the OTSI bureaucratic TSI irrelevance tunnel and perhaps a win for the proper transport safety investigation tin kickers...
Why? Well it would appear, that despite not initiating an investigation into the serious 'close quarters' occurrence (above), OTSI has seen the error of it's ways and allowed their transport investigative team to compose and publish an excellent 'Safety Advisory' that carries the weight of past findings and safety recommendations from their previous 'systemic investigation': "Ferry Safety Investigation - Systemic investigation into ferry close quarter incidents - Sydney Harbour - 2010-2016".
Well done OTSI! - Finally some sanity prevails...
MTF...P2
Previous thread post:
(06-12-2023, 09:51 AM)Peetwo Wrote:
I note that OTSI have still not indicated whether they will be investigating either the near miss or the Barangaroo allision?? Very much related to the 'close quarters' I note that in 2016 OTSI conducted a systemic investigation into Sydney Harbour ferry close quarter incidents between 2010-2016:
The following were 5 recommendations issued to Transport NSW:
Quote:Transport for NSW
5.1 Support the introduction of robust management of the wharf booking system to reduce the congestion around high usage wharf areas and water taxi operations.
5.2 Designate wharf usage according to geographic destination where practicable in order to minimise ferries crossing paths in congested areas.
5.3 Ensure ferry timetables avoid same time departures.
5.4 Amend ferry timetables to reduce congestion around Wharf 6.
5.5 Support establishing an independent common control centre that has dedicated responsibility for the management of traffic in Sydney Cove.
And to RMS:
Quote:Roads and Maritime Services
5.10 Increase monitoring of the wharf booking system to ensure that congestion issues are minimised.
5.11 Assess and control the risk associated with the practice of double stack berthing in Sydney Cove.
5.12 Introduce robust management of the wharf booking system to reduce the congestion around high usage wharf areas and water taxi operations.
Plus to the NSW Port authority:
Quote:Port Authority of NSW
5.17 Ensure that effective communication by ship operators occurs when thrusters are in use by ships in Sydney Cove.
5.18 Establish an independent common control centre with dedicated responsibility for the management of traffic in Sydney Cove.
5.19 Allocate a working VHF radio channel and require masters to not only monitor but transmit through this channel when in Sydney Cove.
5.20 Irrespective of vessel length, all masters to have local knowledge for operating in Sydney Cove.
Hmm...wonder if any of those safety recommendations have been properly implemented??
Hallelujah! There is a light at end of the OTSI bureaucratic TSI irrelevance tunnel and perhaps a win for the proper transport safety investigation tin kickers...
Why? Well it would appear, that despite not initiating an investigation into the serious 'close quarters' occurrence (above), OTSI has seen the error of it's ways and allowed their transport investigative team to compose and publish an excellent 'Safety Advisory' that carries the weight of past findings and safety recommendations from their previous 'systemic investigation': "Ferry Safety Investigation - Systemic investigation into ferry close quarter incidents - Sydney Harbour - 2010-2016".
Quote:Safety Advisory SA05/23
Close quarters situations in the Sydney Harbour area Safety message Sydney Harbour is an extremely busy waterway, used by recreational and commercial vessels, from big ships and high-speed ferries to small powerboats, yachts and kayaks. It has busy navigational channels. The normal collision regulations apply to navigation, with additional local rules to assist in the management of marine traffic.
A recent close quarters situation1 in Sydney Harbour involving two passenger ferries2 highlights the importance for all operators to understand and apply the rules, monitor the appropriate radio frequencies, and maintain a proper lookout. This applies particularly in congested areas, such as Sydney Cove and the Sydney Harbour Bridge Transit Zone.
The incident
On the afternoon of Sunday 4 June 2023, there was a close quarters situation involving MV Collaroy, which was conducting a timetabled ferry service, and a charter vessel, MV Sydney 2000. MV Collaroy was tracking from the west to enter Sydney Cove and MV Sydney 2000 was departing Sydney Cove for a route to the east.
As the vessels approached each other, both Masters performed avoidance manoeuvres, with the vessels coming into close proximity. As the two Masters manoeuvred to avoid collision, a third vessel, a small recreational craft, narrowly avoided colliding with MV Sydney 2000. There were no reported injuries or damage to any vessel.
At the time of the close quarters situation, a cruise ship and fuel barge were berthed at the International Passenger Terminal. The presence of these vessels resulted in a significantly reduced channel for vessels operating to Circular Quay ferry wharves.
OTSI review
Following notification of the incident, the Office of Transport Safety Investigations (OTSI) requested and reviewed information about the occurrence from the involved operators and the Port Authority of NSW. This review identified that there was a misalignment between the involved Masters’ plans, and their expectations of the other vessels’ tracking intentions.
The Master of MV
Sydney 2000 reported that they planned to pass MV Collaroy starboard3 to starboard, as they expected Collaroy would be tracking to berth at Wharf 3 Circular Quay.
The Master of MV Collaroy, which was heading to berth at Wharf 3, reported that they planned to pass the other vessel portside to portside4 as they had observed MV Sydney 2000 alter course to starboard to head east.
With differing plans and expectations between the two Masters, the distance and proximity between the vessels reduced. When it became apparent to each Master that the other was not tracking as expected, both Masters manoeuvred to avoid a collision.
Figure 1: Close quarters situation near Sydney Cove, 4 June 2023
Source: WebcamSydney. Image annotated by OTSI.
Following the incident, the Master of MV Collaroy reportedly tried to call the Master of MV Sydney 2000 on ‘VHF 13’, the radio communication channel for that area of Sydney Harbour, but was unable to raise them. Vessel Traffic Services and the Master of MV Sydney 2000 later reported that the radio call from MV Collaroy was unreadable.5 The two Masters subsequently communicated via radio regarding the occurrence.
Key points for operators Schedule 6 ‘Requirements relating to Sydney Cove’ of the Marine Safety Regulation 2016 (NSW), 6 documents key rules and requirements for operating in Sydney Cove. Sydney Cove is defined as the portion of Sydney Harbour that lies south of an imaginary line drawn from the position of the northernmost fixed red beacon on Dawes Point to the position of the fixed red beacon on Bennelong Point. A supporting map for Sydney Cove navigation rules is published by Transport for NSW (Figure 2).7
Transport for NSW has published the ‘Rules for boating on Sydney Harbour’8 which includes information about operating in the Sydney Harbour Bridge Transit Zone, give-way rules and ferry operations.
OTSI identified increased traffic in Sydney Harbour and ineffective communication between vessels as key contributory factors in close quarter incidents through a systemic investigation into incidents between 2010 and 2016.
The investigation was launched in response to a significant increase in the number of reported close quarters incidents, giving rise to concerns of systemic safety issues associated with ferry operations in Sydney Harbour. OTSI noted that congestion in Sydney Cove increased when cruise ships and servicing vessels, such as fuel barges, were present.
OTSI’s objective was to determine the extent of these incidents, identify any commonality, identify the contributory factors, and provide recommendations to prevent or minimise a recurrence.
In addition to communications and congestion, the investigation also identified scheduling and timetabling of ferry services, and ferry design as contributory factors to close quarters incidents.
Through the investigation, OTSI made recommendations to Transport for NSW, the former Roads and Maritime Services (now part of Transport for NSW), Australian Maritime Safety Authority, Port Authority of NSW and ferry operators.
For details on the findings and recommendations, you can read the full investigation report on the OTSI website.
Figure 2: Sydney Cove Navigation Map
Well done OTSI! - Finally some sanity prevails...
MTF...P2