[Peetwo]

LMH etc..catching up! - 

Reference Senate Estimates:

Senator McDonald Adjournment Speech - 13/06/23: Air Safety Torres Strait

Last night in the Senate...

Air Safety: Torres Strait



Senator McDONALD (Queensland) (19:32): Tonight I rise with a heavy heart, because three weeks ago I raised with CASA the very serious situation of no passenger air services to Darnley and M... (I believe that is meant to read: Mabuiag)  islands as a result of CASA regulation. Despite there being no incidents reported on the airstrips on those islands, CASA closed the strips to commercial flights and withdrew the ability for these community members to affordably travel by air between islands.

Instead, residents were forced into dinghies—dinghies!—on notoriously dangerous waters inhabited by crocodiles and sharks. On 19 April the Torres Strait Islander Regional Council met with CASA and asked them to allow an exemption for the airline to land of these strips—island strips that this company had been landing on for the past 20 years without incident. As usual, CASA gave a bureaucratic response that did not identify what the problem actually was that it was solving. Nor did they offer a solution for the remote community to continue accessing commercial air travel, leaving people to traverse these treacherous waters in boats. No pathway was undertaken for the airline to receive an approval. Instead, they are undertaking landing trials with weights, which CASA may or may not consider.

Underscoring the confusion of CASA's conduct is the fact that the same planes being banned from commercial operations on the islands could still use the strips in a private capacity. Just take a moment to comprehend that. Commercial rules are understandably stricter than private rules, but you can see how industry participants and passengers get frustrated: the same planes and the same airstrips, but different rules.

Three weeks ago, I asked the representing minister, Assistant Minister Anthony Chisholm: do you think that, for the two islands that have no passenger service going into them, this is a good outcome? His response was that the islands could apply for some funding for the airstrips to be upgraded. I asked the CEO of CASA to make sure the minister was briefed on the issue of there being no passenger service for these two islands. I wonder if that has happened, because the very worst news has been advised. Yesterday, after a four-day search for Wendy Richardson, the search was called off. I knew Wendy. The last time we met, we discussed her father, Sir Robert Norman, the acclaimed pioneer of regional aviation in the cape. Sir Robert saw the importance of providing an aerial service in the north for isolated communities at a time when aviation was overseen by the Civil Aviation Authority.

Wendy's loss is the exclamation point on years of conduct by CASA which has my phone running hot with complaints every single week. I grew up in a time when aviation was easily accessible and was a reliable way to conquer the tyranny of distance we experience in this country, especially in northern Australia. I remember local shows and events having not just automobiles in the car park but dozens of light planes. It seemed that everyone in North Queensland flew or knew someone who flew. Now flying is reserved for people who have a lot of money or who have the patience and fortitude to navigate the mountains of regulation imposed on them by CASA—regulations which many participants point out make no improvements to safety but discourage flying and cruelly punish minor indiscretions and which the big players can afford to implement but which force smaller carriers to pay to retrain staff, replace equipment that is functioning perfectly and change work operations they've used for years without incident.

No-one is blaming CASA for Wendy Richardson's death, but I want assurances that air travel will be restored to these islands immediately. In the meantime, flight companies should be provided with exemptions that will allow them to continue operations until more permanent fixtures are in place. I say that because no-one—and I mean no-one—in Australia should be forced to cross open sea in a dinghy because our air safety regulations force them out of the sky and into an open boat.

Via the LMH.. :

CASA under Fire over Torres Strait Airports

14 June 2023





Queensland Nationals Senator Susan McDonald has fired a broadside at CASA over what she says are unnecessary restrictions on RPT operations into some airports in the Torres Strait islands.

CASA has determined that some Cessna C208B operations into short strips have been ignoring runway safety factors required for RPT flights, which effectively removed services from some islands because the operators can't comply when the aircraft are flown at certain weights.

The issue was highlighted last week with the disappearance of speech pathologist Wendy Richardson, who was lost when the boat she was in capsized near Mabuiag Island, one of the islands that has lost its RPT service.

Addressing the senate on Tuesday night, Senator McDonald took aim at CASA and demanded an immediate resumption of the suspended services.

"Tonight I rise with a heavy heart, because three weeks ago I raised with CASA the very serious situation of no passenger air services to Darnley and Mabuiag islands as a result of CASA regulation," McDonald told the senators.

"Despite there being no incidents reported on the airstrips on those islands, CASA closed the strips to commercial flights and withdrew the ability for these community members to affordably travel by air between islands.

"Instead, residents were forced into dinghies—dinghies!—on notoriously dangerous waters inhabited by crocodiles and sharks."

McDonald also pointed out that private operations were still permitted into the impacted runways using the same aircraft that RPT operators have been prevented from using.

"Just take a moment to comprehend that," she said. "Commercial rules are understandably stricter than private rules, but you can see how industry participants and passengers get frustrated: the same planes and the same airstrips, but different rules."

According to the CASA website, the rules surrounding runway safety factors have not changed.

"Runway safety buffers provides a margin of error to account for issues like unexpected weather conditions, poor runway surfaces, aircraft performance or pilot skill," CASA states.

"Safety buffers are determined by adjusting the actual runway distance by using a ‘factoring’ multiplier. This factoring increases the minimum runway length required based on the type of operation and the aircraft.

"There has been no change to the rules for factoring and runways which increases the runway length required."

A CASA spokesperson told Australian Flying that the regulator was working to resolve the issue with RPT operator Skytrans.

"Torres Strait aerodromes and runways remain open for all aircraft that can land on short runways," the spokesperson said. "Every CASA decision is made with the safety of passengers in mind.

"Over the last six months, we have been working with Skytrans and providing progressive approvals to enable them to continue operating safely.

"We will continue to work with Skytrans to support the return of services where safe."

Sources close to the issue have said that the crux of the problems is that if runway safety buffers are applied, operators of Cessna Caravans can't comply unless they fly at weights that make the aircraft economically unviable.

Other aircraft such as the Britten-Norman Islander are believed to have no issue on those runways, but don't have the capacity of the Caravans.

Senator McDonald on Wednesday called on Minister for Transport and Infrastructure Catherine King to fast-track planned upgrades for Torres Strait airstrips.

“CASA made a questionable decision to close these strips and offered no alternatives for people needing to travel and they are forced to use boats,” she said. 

“CASA must provide an exemption to allow air travel to restart to and from these islands before there is another tragedy.
“I am distressed that we are seeing CASA make decisions without sufficient evidence that, instead of offering tangible safety benefits, in fact put people in high-risk situations.

“Minister King must review the closures, order the fast-tracking of airstrip upgrades and ensure the Civil Aviation Safety Authority is addressing issues in a timely, logical and effective manner before another life is lost.”

Runway safety factors allows for things like aborted take-offs, poor weather, slower braking and human error.
Operators can fly into runways that don’t meet the requirements, but only with permission from CASA.

Plus via the UP: Hansard Today……

megle2

This casa madness just goes on and on, I wonder what the actual airstrip deficiencies are

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SOPS

An empty sky is a safe sky.

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megan

No-one is blaming CASA for Wendy Richardson's death

I would, decisions you make have consequences, however tenuous they may be, the good old Swiss cheese model.

CASA gave a bureaucratic response that did not identify what the problem actually was that it was solving. Nor did they offer a solution for the remote community to continue accessing commercial air travel

I'm from the Government and I'm here to help you.

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PiperCameron

Three weeks ago, I asked the representing minister, Assistant Minister Anthony Chisholm: do you think that, for the two islands that have no passenger service going into them, this is a good outcome? His response was that the islands could apply for some funding for the airstrips to be upgraded. I asked the CEO of CASA to make sure the minister was briefed on the issue of there being no passenger service for these two islands. I wonder if that has happened..

Crikey! So.. if the government doesn't control CASA, who does?!?

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Clinton McKenzie

The government doesn't control CASA. That's an intended outcome.

The Parliament controls CASA in principle - through the legislation it makes or does not disallow - but in general leaves CASA to do what it will as a matter of practicality.

In any event, it's not CASA job to brief anyone on what places do and do not have a passenger service.

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Mach E Avelli

Bring back something along the lines of the old PNG Developmental Air Services regulations. For years, under Aussie regulation we put DC 3s onto marginal strips, with decent loads, and yet had a good safety record.

CASA being CASA would want to cook up extra pilot training, just to ‘manage’ the risk. No harm in that if it’s relevant to the task.

Via Su_Spence HQ yesterday...

Aviation safety in the Torres Strait

TypeStating the facts
Date 15 June 2023

We understand how frustrating it is for communities in the Torres Strait that don't currently have regular air services.



But we don't cut corners when it comes to passenger safety.

Mabuiag and Darnley Islands have short runways that don't meet safety standards for commercial passenger flights in the types of aircraft Skytrans operate.

The aircraft meet the minimums required by the manufacturer, but Australia's safety rules for commercial air transport require longer runways to account for unexpected conditions or pilot skills.

We acknowledge that Skytrans have had a strong safety record over many years. But they have been operating to manufacturer minimums, and not to Australia's airline safety standards.

We are working with Skytrans to see if flights can resume by ensuring safety requirements are met in a different way.

We are determined to find a practical solution, but we need to be sure that we aren't putting passengers at risk.

We have been working with Skytrans over the past 8 months and providing progressive approvals to enable them to continue operating safely to some islands and in some conditions.

This has included Skytrans putting in place additional safety controls like special pilot training and runway markings.

Today they provided us with preliminary data from demonstration flights conducted at Mabuiag. We expect them to conclude test flights and provide their final data in the coming week.

This will give us detailed information on whether they can reliability operate safely on these runways with these new controls in place.

We'll work with them on the safety analysis, comparing real-life data with manufacturer data and safety standards, and we will do the same when data for other islands is available.

If we can be satisfied that the operations are safe, we will approve a departure from the normal rules.

But if we can't be sure it's safe, we may require that different aircraft are used in the absence of access to a longer runway.

What we won't do is compromise passenger safety.

Hmm...Su_Spence trying to reinvent the wheel - 

A blast from the past from the Uzu timeline of embuggerance... : (reference Phearless Phelan article: http://proaviation.com.au/2013/04/28/a-s...d-stuffup/)

Jan 16 99:            Uzu Air’s Britten Norman Islander was involved in a fatal accident at Coconut Island.

Jan 17 99:            An “Immediate safety report” signed by CASA Assistant Director Laurie Foley on the advice of a Cairns FOI who had not visited the site or communicated with the operator, outlined the few known circumstances of the accident, and stated under recommended action: “DFOM (District Flying Operations Manager) to now recommend 28 day suspension of AOC.” The report, faxed to Canberra at 10.55 am, on that day (a Sunday), did not state any reason for the recommendation.

Jan 19 99:            BASI, insurer and operator representatives flew to the accident site. In a faxed message, CASA suspended Uzu Air’s AOC for 28 days, with effect from 2359 that night.

Jan 20 99:            Uzu filed a notice of application for review of the CASA decision to suspend its AOC, claiming that the Authority had acted ultra vires (outside its legislated authority); breached rules of procedural fairness and natural justice; failed to provide adequate reasons for the decision; misapplied administrative principles, and “failed to correctly interpret and apply the law.”

Jan 21 99:            Uzu lodged a detailed 127-page response to CASA’s notice to show cause. The response was never acknowledged. At the same time, the operator attended the first hearing on the matter in the AAT seeking a stay of its AOC suspension. CASA succeeded in having the stay denied. CASA’s use in such stay proceedings of Section 9 of the Civil Aviation Act, appeared to question the ability of any operator to gain a stay. The operator believed the AAT’s effectiveness in reviewing administrative processes may be neutered by this tactic. Uzu would have to wait for the 28 day suspension to expire, before being able to proceed to a substantive hearing. Uzu sought an order for the release of CASA documents related to its decision. CASA said it would take up to 30 days to produce the documents. AAT directed CASA to provide Uzu with all relevant documentation within seven days. (The documents were made available about 10 days later. The 13 letters seeking clarification of RPT/charter status were not included in the documents.)

Jan 22 99:            BASI investigators recovered the engines from the Islander and returned to Cairns. BASI held a meeting at CASA Cairns with CASA AWI. BASI advised CASA the left engine did not appear to be developing power at impact and the fuel mixture control rod was found to be broken at the accident site, but advised the component would require metallurgical examination to determine cause and time of breakage.

Jan 26 99:            Uzu Air lodged a 40-page response to CASA’s proposed AOC suspension.

Jan 27 99:            BASI advised Uzu and CASA that laboratory analysis verified the fuel mixture control rod failed “…due to overload as a result on impact forces.”

Feb 2 99:              BASI stripped down the left engine at Archerfield. On the following day, BASI advised all interested parties of the outcome of the engine strip down.

Feb 4 99:              CASA served a Notice to Show Cause on Uzu Air’s associated company, Tamco Engineering, asserting that BASI investigations “resulted in a finding of a disconnected mixture control rod on the left engine, which was not delivering power prior to time of aircraft impact, and was considered by these BASI Investigators to be a contributing factor to the loss of control of the aircraft prior to that impact. The subject mixture control was found to have suffered failure which exhibited severe corrosion of the mixture control ball end connection.”

The BASI Investigator verbally denied the assertions were ever made and advised Uzu that BASI was lodging a protest with CASA regarding the allegations.

Feb 8 99:              Uzu Air held an informal conference in Cairns with the CASA regional manager, the acting DFOM, and the assigned FOI. Uzu made a proposal that it implement check and training and Class A aircraft maintenance, immediately upon reinstatement of the AOC. The company believed this met with CASA approval.

Feb 12 99:            BASI Deputy Director Alan Stray faxed BASI’s Preliminary Report to Uzu Air. The preliminary report was also faxed to General Manager, Aviation Safety Branch, CASA, Canberra; and CASA Canberra was telephoned to confirm CASA’s receipt of the report. The report stated inter alia: “Examination of the left engine, while still in the wreckage at the accident site, revealed the linkage between the mixture control cable on the carburettor had failed. Subsequent metallurgical examination of these components confirmed that failure was due to overload as a result of impact forces, and that it had not contributed to the accident.” (our emphasis)

Feb 15 99:            CASA suspended Uzu Air’s AOC for a further 28 days and asserted inter alia: “The Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI) has been investigating the crash but has not published a preliminary or final report on its causes.”

Feb 17 99:            The Cairns Post newspaper published an article headed “Crash report rocks CASA,” (by this writer) detailing the contrasts between CASA’s allegations and those of the preliminary BASI report. A faxed letter was received on the same morning from Laurie Foley, saying: “I have now been made aware of the content of a preliminary report of the accident by BASI. Please note that neither the crash itself, nor the possible causes of the crash, were a decisive consideration in my decision to suspend your AOC. I would have suspended your AOC even if I had been aware of the content of the BASI preliminary report.” Assistant Director Foley did not reveal his reasons for this damning assertion.

Feb 18 99:            An AAT-directed teleconference was scheduled for 1700, between Uzu counsel, the AAT registrar, and CASA’s office of legal counsel, to determine the process of an AAT hearing on the second suspension, and to enable Uzu’s counsel to advise CASA of the witnesses Uzu required to examine. Uzu counsel and the AAT were connected. CASA’s phone rang out without answering.

Feb 19 99:            Uzu counsel telephoned CASA Office of Legal Counsel, who advised they had forgotten the teleconference set for the previous day. CASA advised the further “T” documents (documents which CASA relied on to make its decision to suspend the AOC further and which Uzu required under the AAT court order) would now be made available to Uzu. Uzu’s counsel advised that he had the AAT booked in Sydney for Wednesday Feb 24. CASA advised they would be unavailable on that day but Thursday Feb 25 would be acceptable.

On the same day Uzu Air provided CASA with a detailed 50-page response to the proposed further 28 day suspension of its AOC, detailing the foregoing events and again raising the question of RPT versus charter.

Feb 23 99        Uzu’s lawyers requested the AAT issue three subpoenas to involved CASA staff members:

Assistant Director of Aviation Safety Compliance Laurie Foley; District Flying Operations Manager Robert Collins, and;
The case FOI Neale Crawford to be present at the hearing. AAT declined due to inadequate time. “We later learned that CASA did not want them questioned under oath,” said Bob Fulton. The Deputy Commissioner of the AAT gave CASA until 5.30 pm to agree to return the AOC or she would list a substantive hearing on the following Monday and issue writs for the witnesses.

“CASA agreed to return the AOC but included a string of ludicrous conditions including that our Cessna 206 be maintained under an approved Class A system of maintenance, which was absurd and in fact, illegal.”

Feb 25 99            At a cost of about $6,000, Uzu attends AAT Sydney at 0915. At 0930, AAT Vice President’s associates advised that CASA would not be attending due to commitments in Brisbane, but CASA would not object to a telephone hearing. However CASA objected to any evidence being tendered or any witnesses being called, as it is ‘not practical to cross examine by telephone.’ Uzu, which had now not earned any revenue for 36 days, was therefore again denied an opportunity to confront its accusers, some of whom were on “stress leave,” a luxury unavailable to Uzu General Manager Bob Fulton or his staff, some of whom had been stood down. CASA however successfully objected to the lifting of the suspension on the grounds of “Air Safety,” relying on Section 9 of the Civil Aviation Act.

Mar 2 99:              A meeting in Canberra was attended by Uzu’s chief pilot, an Uzu consultant, a CASA lawyer, and CASA’s public affairs manager. Uzu was told that CASA wouldn’t extend the suspension, but would either lift it, or let it run its course until March 16. The company was also told that CASA would not renew the suspension or cancel the AOC. No explanation was offered as to why, having made that decision, CASA would not lift the suspension immediately.

It was agreed that draft checking and training and maintenance procedures were required and had been submitted, and that checking and training and progressive maintenance would be progressively incorporated.

Mar 5 99:              An AAT teleconference between CASA office of legal counsel and Uzu confirmed all required documents had been submitted and that the AOC would not be cancelled, no further suspension would be imposed, and the suspension would be lifted between March 10 and 12.

Mar 8 99:              CASA acting DFOM Cairns advised he was satisfied with the draft manuals and would be making “unspecified recommendations” to CASA Canberra. Uzu’s optimism was heightened.

Mar 9 99:              CASA published an amended CAO 82.3 and three blanket exemptions, authorising air charter operators in the Torres Straits to operate RPT until June 9 without meeting the aerodrome, maintenance, or training and checking requirements for RPT.

The principal expertise of the three CASA officers preparing the new rules lay in the respective areas of airworthiness, legal and navigation. Uzu was again told its AOC would be restored by the end of that week.

Mar 10 99:            AM – CASA shifted the goalposts again. While its competitors, who had been operating for the two months Uzu has been grounded, were still in the air and had 90 days to comply with RPT rules, Uzu was told it must comply BEFORE its AOC was restored.

PM -Uzu’s solicitor contacted CASA office of legal counsel and was told the manuals the company had submitted were only DRAFT and that Uzu had not nominated a maintenance controller or check and training captain.

This writer faxed a draft of this chronology to CASA with an invitation to review it for accuracy.

Mar 11 99:            CASA phoned and indicated that a response, detailing some “errors and omissions” would be faxed “tomorrow.” I admitted that because of space limitations I had omitted considerable material, much of it damaging to CASA. (Information provided in CASA’s response is incorporated in this narrative.)

Mar 12 99:            The CASA response did not arrive. Or maybe, obliquely, it did. A faxed message from CASA to Uzu suspended the AOC for a third period, “pending an investigation by CASA into your company’s operations, and the risk to the safety of air navigation in allowing the AOC to continue in force……… The reasons for this decision and the facts and circumstances on which I rely are set out below.” The letter detailed thirty-eight points as “facts and circumstances,”

Mar 15 99:            A fax to the Hon. Warren Entsch, Member for Leichhardt, in response to a phone call to CASA from Mr. Entsch, said that for Uzu to have its AOC reinstated, it must comply with three requirements – training and checking, Class A maintenance, and an approved maintenance controller, which Uzu had already addressed.

Then this...

..In recognition of the need for scheduled air services in remote areas of Australia, CASA implemented a low capacity AOC to regulate scheduled air services into air strips which did not meet the regulatory requirements for normal scheduled air services. CASA stationed FOI Rod Bencke on Horn Island, who recognised the need for these essential services. Working with Rod, Uzu Air rapidly qualified for the issue of a low capacity RPT AOC enabling conduct of scheduled air services to the islands of the Torres Strait...

 

UDB?? 24 years and yet here we are doing the 'Timewarp Again" - 

MTF...P2