[Peetwo]

Cowper (Legend) Chinese Junk update; & where the hell is OTSI/AMSA?

Courtesy Cowper, via Facebook:

Chris Cowper

Just a little update on our NSW Taxpayer owned, but French operated, Manly Ferry Service and the good ship “Clontarf”.

The Chinese built Gen II Emerald “Clontarf” returned to service a little over 2 weeks after her catastrophic Port Engine failure on 6th February.

Her Port Engine had only been operating for 5,600 hours when she blew up.

Did Transdev replace her totally destroyed Japanese built Yanmar Diesel with a new one?

No way.

“Clontarf” was fitted with an Engine from a Gen I Emerald with 10,000 hours on her.

The blame game is in full swing.

It turns out “Clontarf’s” Port engine was more than 600 hours overdue for a service.

A Lubricating Oil (L.O.) sample had been taken and sent away for testing last year.

For a reason, or reasons, known only to Transdev’s Management, the results of this test had not reached Transdev’s excellent Maintenance Fitters at BSY before she failed.

Former Workmates tell me the L.O. test results have now surfaced.

And are pretty sad.

Below is a paragraph I posted on StMF on 9th February this year.

“Transdev’s Chinese built Gen II Emeralds have 3 ventilation fans in each engine room.

After the port engine detonated, as a precaution, the Engineer on board “Clontarf” attempted to manually close the port engine room vent flaps.

These flaps are designed to starve an engine room fire of oxygen.

Each flap is fastened to the vessel by 2 hinges.

On board “Clontarf” one flap operated as designed.

The second flap also operated as designed, although it had 1 broken hinge.

The 3rd flap had 2 broken hinges and fell into the forward engine room fan.

The large aluminium flap dropping into the fan sheared fan’s blades off.

What this meant, was, if there had been an engine room fire, the Engineer would not have been able to seal the engine room.

He wouldn’t have been able to starve the fire of oxygen.

His fire suppression system would not have been effective.

The port engine fuel filter had been pierced by hot metal, blown out from the disintegrating engine, and was pouring fuel into the bilge.

In January, a “Clontarf” Engineer had reported this faulty Fire Flap to Transdev’s Maintenance department.”

I have seen a photo of the damaged and disconnected Port engine room vent flap, or dampener, lying uselessly where it had dropped down on top of the fan.

This is potentially one of the most dangerous things I have seen in my over 40 years working in our Maritime industry.

The word on the street is, some Management are denying it happened.

Apparently “Balmoral’s” On Board Engineer noticed L.O. in one of her M/E’s coolant and reported it on 14th February.

Last I heard, nothing had been done.

Are our Taxpayer funded regulatory authorities AMSA and OTSI still sitting on their hands?

Do the bureaucrats at Transport for NSW even care what is happening on their watch?

---

Comments in reply:

Jennifer GJ

Is safety being closely monitored? I can see the inconvenience of often needing to take the ferries off the route, but engineers and maintenance crew must not be intimidated into downplaying faults and issues. If they are not being listened to, then this should be offered to someone in the media so proper scrutiny is applied.

Richard Dunn

Thanks Chris, this latest shocking news also adds to the deserved embarrassment for those who claimed that my earlier comment about the near catastrophe was an exaggeration, like a Hollywood movie.

Cowper QON: "..Are our Taxpayer funded regulatory authorities AMSA and OTSI still sitting on their hands?.."

Fair question, a quick perusal of the relevant OTSI and AMSA webpages would seem to indicate that at this point in time there is no activity or even recognition in regards to the Clontarf catastrophic engine failure??

Ref: https://www.otsi.nsw.gov.au/investigatio...stigations & https://www.amsa.gov.au/vessels-operator...nt-reports 

Now very much related when you consider the Cowper post (above), there still hasn't been an update to the ongoing investigation into the..."Safety and assurance systems for defect management (critical steering controls) in the Emerald Class Generation II Fleet - September 2022..":

Extract from IFS:

"..Since 1 December 2021 – 26 September 2022, OTSI received nineteen (19) notifiable
occurrence reports regarding the Generation II ferry class. Ten (10) of these related
to steering defects with no known root cause. The remaining notifiable incidents
related to other general passenger, engineering, operational or assurance incidents
arising from regular passenger ferry services onboard the Generation II vessels.

Scope of the investigation

Based on findings from OTSI’s preliminary enquiries, the Chief Investigator
determined that the matter warranted investigation in accordance with Section 46 of
the Passenger Transport Act 1990 (NSW).

The scope of the investigation includes, but is not limited to:

 Defect management systems and associated assurance processes for critical
steering failures at introduction into service and throughout the service life of
the vessels;
 The effectiveness of the SMS in managing risks to service operations while
critical steering defects are identified and repaired; and
 Engineering resource and competence to support defect management and
associated assurance processes across the fleet

The Chief Investigator has required the Investigator in Charge (IIC) to:

 Identify the factors, both primary and contributory related to critical steering
failure defect management at introduction into service and throughout service
life
 Examine the effectiveness of controls in place to manage the related risks
 Advise on any matters arising from the investigation that would enhance the
safety of ferry operations

The IIC will consult with all Directly Involved Parties (DIPs) throughout the
investigation..."

 
Hmm...here's a thought, since the investigation is still continuing, why doesn't the OTSI Chief Investigator simply expand the scope of the investigation to include the Clontarf catastrophic engine failure and the many Transdev SMS deficiencies highlighted in the Cowper post above? 

I also think it would be worth someone putting in a FOI/GIPA request for the AMSA return to service paperwork after grounding the Gen IIs in October last year and the return to service of the Clontarf after it's catastrophic engine failure on the 6th of February...

MTF...P2