[Peetwo]

Su_Spence monthly WOFTAM waffle; & miniscule (Albo Govt) non-response to GA Inquiry??

CASA briefing March: https://updates.communication.casa.gov.a...887f6d058c

(Warning bucket may be required  -   )

Via Supp Estimates:

CHAIR: I'm loath to ask this as you're walking out the door, Ms Spence, but this committee did do a GA inquiry, so there are a lot of questions coming to the secretariat on how far the government is from a response. You don't have to tell me here; it's alright.

Ms Spence : You might want to ask the department.

(From 47:20 minute mark)

Curious on that smug interchange between the Chair and Su_Spence, I made some enquiries to the RRAT secretariat on the now lapsed GA inquiry. Apparently it is correct that CASA has responded to the 2nd interim report of the GA inquiry. Despite being lapsed, the Albanese Govt is still obliged to respond and the RRAT Committee has effectively been awaiting for that response since the change of Govt. As the inquiry was self-referred the committee doesn't have to refer to the Senate in order to continue with the inquiry. Therefore the Govt response will inform the Committee on whether to continue and complete the GA inquiry. (Thank you Gerry -  ) 

So what's the hold up miniscule?? -   

Going forward and in order to get some oxygen back into this issue, I am going to refer to sections of the 2nd interim report, which IMO highlight perfectly the many diabolical regulatory road blocks industry faces when dealing with our 19th century Big R-regulator, beginning with:     

GA risk profile

2.7 There are varying views about the risk profile of GA. For example, according to Mr Peter Cromarty, a former Executive Manager at CASA, the ATSB’s figures show that:

[T]he total accident rate, per hours flown, for GA operations are nine times as likely to have an accident compared to commercial air transport operations… Recreational Aviation operations are twice as likely to have an accident as GA... The fatality rate, per hours flown, indicates general aviation operation are around fifteen times more likely to experience a fatal accident than commercial air transport operations. Again, Recreational Aviation is double GA.7

2.8 Conversely, according to a report by Anjum Naweed and Kyriakos Kourousis, the GA sector has a lower risk profile, as measured by the impact of an accident, compared to the commercial sector:

…[if] risk is a combination of the likelihood of the hazard and the risk consequences of an ensuring accident, then, although the probability of having [an] air accident in GA is higher than in commercial aviation, the lower severity of such accidents results in a lower risk profile.8

2.9 Professionals Australia observed the challenges for CASA administering two sections of aviation with different risk profiles:

While commercial aviation is the area where the consequences of critical failures are significant, the likelihood of such failures occurring are lower due to the resources of operators to maintain operational safety and the high level of public scrutiny. In general aviation, the consequences of critical safety failures are lower than with commercial airlines, however the likelihood and frequency of these failures are high, particularly when payment has been received by the operator for the carriage of passengers…9

2.10 Mr Mark Newton, a pilot and aircraft owner, submitted, ‘it is undeniable that private pilots have greater control over their risk appetite than commercial pilots’.10 Mr Newton explained that his risk awareness, and that of his passengers was distinct from charter and airline customers and that everyone ‘involved has opted in following a detailed briefing’.11 Mr Newton continued:

No amount of oversight from a safety regulator can prevent me from making decisions about running out of fuel or crashing into a mountain or running off the side of a runway or operating an airplane with a faulty engine, or from setting up any of the preconditions that make those things happen … A safety regulator is only worthwhile to the extent that it promotes and supports my safety culture.12

2.11 Aerial Application Association of Australia Ltd (AAAA), drew attention to the lack of safety data, suggesting that this was indicative of CASA’s lack of engagement with those who operate the aircraft:
… the lack of focus on safety/accident data to inform the current regulatory development process is in stark contrast to the development of Sector Risk Profiles where CASA engages with industry to learn more about risks and controls from highly experienced operators and pilots.13

2.12 According to Mr Phillip Hurst, CEO, AAAA, their members are extremely safety conscious, for obvious reasons:

We're very keen on safety as well, especially with my members being at the pointy end of any accident. We take safety very seriously, which is why we do a lot of offline training that’s not required by law. We do well above what the minimum legal requirement is.14

2.13 AAAA recommend CASA work cooperatively with industry to develop Sector Risk Profiles (SRP), relevant safety KPIs and other useful metrics to focus on safety outcomes rather than regulatory process.15 The AAAA went on to explain that:

Critically, the SRP process must be based on data – accident trends based on ATSB and BITRE data, identified opportunities for improvement – and very differently to other CASA approaches – recognition that industry can play a leading role in improving safety through various programs.16

2.14 Several issues were raised by submitters about Approved Self-administering Aviation Organisations (ASAO) and the potential for ‘blind spots’ in regulations as well as what is an acceptable risk for ASAOs.

2.15 For example, Mrs Susan Woods from Jabiru Aircraft commented that there is ‘no consideration of the cost of safety or differentiation between acceptable risk of commercial airline travel and acceptable risk of sport aviation’.17 According to Jabiru Aircraft, their customers must sign an acknowledgement of the risks of flying in aircrafts with their engines due to CASA’s concern about the risk of litigation concerning past approvals.18

2.16 Professionals Australia was concerned about CASA’s responsibility being subcontracted to non-government organisations operating as ASAO and believed that it was necessary for CASA to have ‘the skills and resources to oversight these organisations, otherwise blind spots in the regulation of general aviation could emerge’.19

Plus relevant video segments from the inquiry:

MTF...P2