[Peetwo]

Popinjay's search 4 IP a hazy mirage?? -  

Via Popinjay cover-up HQ:

ATSB recommends improving inspection requirements after failure of 737 flap inboard programming roller cartridge



Key points

• Pilot of Boeing 737 noticed aircraft tended to roll to right after take-off from Sydney;
  
• Post-flight inspection found several components in left outboard aft flap actuation system had failed;
  
• ATSB recommends improving inspection specifications to capture potential fatigue cracking in key parts of flap mechanism.
  

An Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigation found multiple occurrences involving fatigue cracks and failures on 737 wing flaps in a location not included in the detailed flap actuation system inspection.

The investigation stemmed from an incident involving a passenger flight from Queensland’s Gold Coast Airport to Sydney, NSW, operated on 27 April 2022 by a Virgin Australia 737-800, registered VH-YFZ.

“Immediately after take-off the pilot noticed the aircraft tended to roll to the right, and so trimmed the rudder to keep wings level,” ATSB Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell said.

The aircraft no longer required trim when the flaps were retracted for cruise, but the issue returned when the flaps were extended for landing into Sydney.

“A walk-around inspection after the flight found the outboard aft flap on the left wing had not completely retracted, and a subsequent inspection found several components in the aft flap actuation system had failed,” Mr Mitchell said.

The ATSB determined that a pre-existing fatigue crack progressed through the aft flap’s inboard programming roller cartridge, resulting in component failure.

“The last general visual inspection had been carried out on VH-YFZ’s left outboard flap, according to Boeing’s specifications, in October 2020, and no defects were found,” Mr Mitchell said.

“While it could not be determined whether the fatigue crack was present at that inspection, 10 other instances of cracking and/or failure of the programming roller were reported to Boeing between 2017 and 2022, and at least six of these were old enough to have been inspected several times prior to failure.

“Significantly, the area in which the fatigue cracks developed was not included in the detailed inspection that Boeing specified for the flap actuation system.”

Boeing has advised the ATSB that it does not agree that this issue warrants safety action – noting that a review of prior failures showed that aeroplane-level effects were correctly mitigated by flight crews, and the affected aircraft landed without further incident.

“While the ATSB acknowledges that Boeing’s risk management program does not classify this as a safety issue, the ATSB believes the reduction in safety margins involving a passenger-carrying aeroplane, and the frequency of occurrence – particularly in the past five years – warrants safety improvement in the detection of fatigue cracking prior to failure,” Mr Mitchell said.

“A detailed inspection of the flap actuation system already exists, and while it includes the aft flap rollers, it does not include the cartridges that house them. Inclusion of the cartridges in the detailed inspection would provide the greatest opportunity for fatigue cracks to be identified prior to failure.”

Read the report: AO-2020-029: Flight control systems occurrence involving Boeing 737-800, VH-YFZ Gold Coast Airport, Queensland, on 27 April 2022

Publication Date 19/12/2022

First point to note is the typo on the AO (occurrence) number above in red?? Maybe in his haste for self-aggrandisement, plus to possibly put up a smokescreen on the now over 4 year Essendon DFO cover-up inquiry - see HERE - Popinjay forgot to proof read his own presser?? 

However, despite the apparent absence of a prelim report published within 30 days of the occurrence, 7 months and 3 weeks must be close to a record for the ATSB completion of an AAI (defined desktop) investigation??  Probably because large sections of the brief final report are just a copy and paste from VA's internal SMS investigation and Boeing's DIP submission.

On DIP submissions I note that of the DIPs listed only Boeing and VA felt the need to make submissions -   

A draft of this report was provided to the following directly involved parties:

• the flight crew
  
• Virgin Australia Airways
  
• The Boeing Company
  
• the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
  
• the United States National Transportation Safety Board.
  

Submissions were received from:

• Virgin Australia Airways
  
• The Boeing Company.
  

The submissions were reviewed and, where considered appropriate, the text of the report was amended accordingly.

       
Which brings me to Popinjay's identified Safety Issue:

“While the ATSB acknowledges that Boeing’s risk management program does not classify this as a safety issue, the ATSB believes the reduction in safety margins involving a passenger-carrying aeroplane, and the frequency of occurrence – particularly in the past five years – warrants safety improvement in the detection of fatigue cracking prior to failure,” Mr Mitchell said.

Which just goes to show that Popinjay has examined the brief and taken note of the ATSB published 'safety issue':

AO-2022-029-SI-01

Response by The Boeing Company

On 15 November 2022, The Boeing Company provided the following response:

Boeing does not concur that this event represents a safety issue, when analyzed within our FAA‑approved risk management program. A review of prior failures shows that airplane-level effects were correctly mitigated by flight crews and the affected aircraft landed without further incident. Boeing’s review indicates that the event does not represent a significant reduction in airplane safety margins, and that the current inspection program is adequate.

ATSB comment in response

The ATSB acknowledges that, based on consideration of the consequence of the component failure, Boeing’s risk management program does not classify this as a safety issue. However, the ATSB also believes that the reduction in safety margins involving a passenger‑carrying aeroplane and the frequency of occurrence—particularly in the past 5 years— warrants safety improvement in the detection of fatigue cracking prior to failure.

The ATSB also notes that a detailed inspection of the flap actuation system already exists, and while it includes the aft flap rollers, it does not include the cartridges that house them. Inclusion of the cartridges in the detailed inspection would provide the greatest opportunity for fatigue cracks to be identified prior to failure.

Hmm...love to have been a fly on the wall in the halls of Boeing, the FAA and the NTSB when Popinjay issued this Safety Recommendation to Boeing...   

Action description

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that The Boeing Company takes safety action to increase the detection of fatigue cracks in the roller cartridges of 737‑800 aircraft prior to failure.

 

MTF...P2