Just thinking 'out loud' here.
There is a claim made the by ATSB into the Essendon DFO event which states the aircraft was 240 Kilos overweight (there or thereabouts). There is an additional claim that the 'take off roll' was longer than it should have been.
ATSB have been very coy in defining the 'base load' data used to reach these assumptions. This effectively prevents external confirmation of their data set and nullifies any counter argument to their claim of investigative probity. Problem is, some of it is simply hand woven distraction, just shy of outright obfuscation. For example:-
The 'ground roll' calculations; all this horse pooh relating to Raytheon and tailwind factor and etc. is plain, flat out guess work. Let me explain; there are three options available to a King Air pilot; One:: steadily set take off power (or close to) before releasing the brakes for a 'short filed' take off. Two, normal steady increase to maximum grunt within the confines of runway length, surface conditions etc. Three: Bang 'em up to the stops and await the bollocking from both engineering and the CP on return. Turbines need a little time to spool up, it ain't instant, best to lead gently to full song, and listen and watch as they get there. In the routine situation; most pilots will not be messing about getting the power on; but between the two extremes, on a normal operation, the time taken varies between pilots; some quicker, some slower. This will effect the length of ground roll, BUT it has sweet sod all to do with why 'this' crash into a building occurred; absolutely nothing.
This is the part where, to professional pilots, experienced on type 'suspicion' begins to creep in. If a thing like the 'factory test pilot' length of the take off roll (+/- 50 metres) can be woven into a yarn, then the rest automatically becomes suspect. Then the external, independent, expert investigations begin in earnest.
For another example (one of several) – ATSB claim a 240 Kg overload: really? Well boys, grab a pencil and get out the books. I did. Flight planning 101. How far is there to go? Can I carry return fuel given the weather and the load and ATC requirements. Yes; then upload the fuel required (plus a bit for Mum and the Kids) but do not exceed a take off weight which will, given the conditions and the chance of needing to operate with one engine inoperative while avoiding obstacles ahead, 'difficult' in a FAR 23 aircraft. Max Ramp weight (Be 200) 5710 Kg:: Max Take off weight – 5670 Kg; that boys and girls allows a 50 Kg margin for taxi (-10 for each start up + run up and checks – say another 10. 20 kg) and holding point aggravation uncertain.. Uhm, how long was the accident aircraft on taxi and holding point before line up? How much fuel was burnt two starts, checks, two taxi legs; all fuel out of tanks. Not calculated or even mentioned is it.
So what of the flight fuel requirements? ATSB have not provided data which would allow an evaluation of the 'actual' requirements; ATC and weather considerations etc. But, even so; when I add 100 Kg to the 'executive' configuration weight I have on file (it was a heavy one); and plan the flight manually, on book figures; and allow for the minimum uplift (if required) at King Island prices; it is 'difficult' to parlay that into an assumed 240 Kg overload. Mind you, I did plan it at F200; 1700 PRPM, best economical (no rush for 160 nautical mile flight); working the plan to a 12 minute climb (150 lb of fuel and 38 ground miles) - (no wind data) a 14 minute descent (62 ground miles and 140 lb of fuel) which gave me 26 ground miles to cover at (say) 260 knots. Allow for an approach (say 12 minutes at holding rate, allow 5 minutes for a circuit – and – on book figures, nil wind – and allowing for a twenty minute (delay' ATC diversion) on return to Melbourne. I am still at worst at MTOW at the beginning of the flight. That is after allowing 100 kg per passenger; 4 x 20 kg each (bag of concrete) for golf clubs and 10 Kg a piece for accessories (lap tops, cameras, etc) I cannot find much more than the difference between Max ramp weight and MTOW; which, even without subtracting the first start up, engine checks, taxi to pick up point, second start and taxi and line up, the fuel load at start up just does not add up to a 240 kg over weight take off, no where near it. Not when the aircraft only loaded 1485 kg of fuel.
Non of this means anything to aviators – it's just the usual ATSB spin, working to fool some of the people, most of the time. But glaring misdirection, exposed by switched on legal counsel will tear it to shreds; for it is wide open. This further discredits the ATSB and interferes with a 'righteous' outcome. We all want to know the how and the why of this accident; just can't quite see it clearly, through the unnecessary smoke and mirrors.
Not anywhere near good enough by world standards and even for the ATSB after multiple 'butchered' reports, it is a new low.
Toot toot.
There is a claim made the by ATSB into the Essendon DFO event which states the aircraft was 240 Kilos overweight (there or thereabouts). There is an additional claim that the 'take off roll' was longer than it should have been.
ATSB have been very coy in defining the 'base load' data used to reach these assumptions. This effectively prevents external confirmation of their data set and nullifies any counter argument to their claim of investigative probity. Problem is, some of it is simply hand woven distraction, just shy of outright obfuscation. For example:-
The 'ground roll' calculations; all this horse pooh relating to Raytheon and tailwind factor and etc. is plain, flat out guess work. Let me explain; there are three options available to a King Air pilot; One:: steadily set take off power (or close to) before releasing the brakes for a 'short filed' take off. Two, normal steady increase to maximum grunt within the confines of runway length, surface conditions etc. Three: Bang 'em up to the stops and await the bollocking from both engineering and the CP on return. Turbines need a little time to spool up, it ain't instant, best to lead gently to full song, and listen and watch as they get there. In the routine situation; most pilots will not be messing about getting the power on; but between the two extremes, on a normal operation, the time taken varies between pilots; some quicker, some slower. This will effect the length of ground roll, BUT it has sweet sod all to do with why 'this' crash into a building occurred; absolutely nothing.
This is the part where, to professional pilots, experienced on type 'suspicion' begins to creep in. If a thing like the 'factory test pilot' length of the take off roll (+/- 50 metres) can be woven into a yarn, then the rest automatically becomes suspect. Then the external, independent, expert investigations begin in earnest.
For another example (one of several) – ATSB claim a 240 Kg overload: really? Well boys, grab a pencil and get out the books. I did. Flight planning 101. How far is there to go? Can I carry return fuel given the weather and the load and ATC requirements. Yes; then upload the fuel required (plus a bit for Mum and the Kids) but do not exceed a take off weight which will, given the conditions and the chance of needing to operate with one engine inoperative while avoiding obstacles ahead, 'difficult' in a FAR 23 aircraft. Max Ramp weight (Be 200) 5710 Kg:: Max Take off weight – 5670 Kg; that boys and girls allows a 50 Kg margin for taxi (-10 for each start up + run up and checks – say another 10. 20 kg) and holding point aggravation uncertain.. Uhm, how long was the accident aircraft on taxi and holding point before line up? How much fuel was burnt two starts, checks, two taxi legs; all fuel out of tanks. Not calculated or even mentioned is it.
So what of the flight fuel requirements? ATSB have not provided data which would allow an evaluation of the 'actual' requirements; ATC and weather considerations etc. But, even so; when I add 100 Kg to the 'executive' configuration weight I have on file (it was a heavy one); and plan the flight manually, on book figures; and allow for the minimum uplift (if required) at King Island prices; it is 'difficult' to parlay that into an assumed 240 Kg overload. Mind you, I did plan it at F200; 1700 PRPM, best economical (no rush for 160 nautical mile flight); working the plan to a 12 minute climb (150 lb of fuel and 38 ground miles) - (no wind data) a 14 minute descent (62 ground miles and 140 lb of fuel) which gave me 26 ground miles to cover at (say) 260 knots. Allow for an approach (say 12 minutes at holding rate, allow 5 minutes for a circuit – and – on book figures, nil wind – and allowing for a twenty minute (delay' ATC diversion) on return to Melbourne. I am still at worst at MTOW at the beginning of the flight. That is after allowing 100 kg per passenger; 4 x 20 kg each (bag of concrete) for golf clubs and 10 Kg a piece for accessories (lap tops, cameras, etc) I cannot find much more than the difference between Max ramp weight and MTOW; which, even without subtracting the first start up, engine checks, taxi to pick up point, second start and taxi and line up, the fuel load at start up just does not add up to a 240 kg over weight take off, no where near it. Not when the aircraft only loaded 1485 kg of fuel.
Non of this means anything to aviators – it's just the usual ATSB spin, working to fool some of the people, most of the time. But glaring misdirection, exposed by switched on legal counsel will tear it to shreds; for it is wide open. This further discredits the ATSB and interferes with a 'righteous' outcome. We all want to know the how and the why of this accident; just can't quite see it clearly, through the unnecessary smoke and mirrors.
Not anywhere near good enough by world standards and even for the ATSB after multiple 'butchered' reports, it is a new low.
Toot toot.