Bored and ignorant.
Wombat - "The AG also weighs in on how the Board will satisfy itself that CASA's surveillance is working as it should, in other words, the risk that CASA may be failing its surveillance duties but the Board won't know."
That little nutshell is worthy of the BRB - in fact the subject was discussed in some detail recently. It is a 'broad' subject and worthy of serious consideration. There are several 'good' systems' of audit, some of the best are 'adaptable' - tailor made to suit a particular operation; which, IMO is an essential element. What may be used to analyse Qantas for example simply fails when used to measure a two man joy flight operation - or Angel Flight. So, what is needed? That question in the real world should be answered by the Board; under advisement of independent experts. But, the real, fundamental question (IMO) is- does the audit/surveillance focus on identified 'risk' mitigation and provide salient, practical advice on risk management and reduction; or on prosecution, supported by strict liability?
Identifying 'real life' risk in any class of operation demands real experience of that operation as well as generally accepted, industry developed 'best practice'. These are not separate but integrated measures aimed squarely at risk management. For example - the fire extinguishers at the browser; all up to date - the fuel company will have a system for maintaining them - guaranteed. Meanwhile, the one at the back of the hanger may well have been overlooked - an audit system should pick this up and a clear system to prevent an 'oversight' established; without a penalty attached (omission corrected - no intent proven) : yes, simple stuff used as an example. So, where and when are the 'real' risks identified, by those who take them and how are they to be mitigated? Well, perhaps the call for 'sector risk analysis' could be a solution.
Take private VFR operations into IMC as a sample - the risks and results have been and continue to be clearly identified - the question that stands alone is how to reduce the body count. Take heli mustering as an example - or long line sling loads; or Aerial applications; or rig operations; or SAR work: or charter operations; or corporate jet operations: - all with different 'risk areas', both high and low - all individually quantifiable and definable. Will one size fit all - don't think so, apart from 'book keeping' systems that is.
The question that stands alone is never answered - despite the money spent by CASA and the posturing as 'expert'. Take every 'fatal' accident over the last five years and place the CASA answer to mitigating or preventing a recurrence next to it (dismal).. Then, in a 12 month - compare the results of those measures against the body count. Nothing CASA has achieved through the money invested or their rule making has prevented those accidents; there are no solutions offered, nor can they be held accountable for their abject failure to have any impact on accident prevention. It could be argued that the reverse is true - fear of rule breaking has created a picture of paper compliance, increased cunning and a wall of silence. Pilots afraid to 'confess' - operators spending more time arse covering and paying lip service - spending on administration not maintenance, training and education.
The word 'Safety' should be removed from the CASA title - it has little to do with operational safety. The rule of law demands that 'intent' be proven beyond a reasonable doubt - in a court - with a defence available.
Toot - toot...
Wombat - "The AG also weighs in on how the Board will satisfy itself that CASA's surveillance is working as it should, in other words, the risk that CASA may be failing its surveillance duties but the Board won't know."
That little nutshell is worthy of the BRB - in fact the subject was discussed in some detail recently. It is a 'broad' subject and worthy of serious consideration. There are several 'good' systems' of audit, some of the best are 'adaptable' - tailor made to suit a particular operation; which, IMO is an essential element. What may be used to analyse Qantas for example simply fails when used to measure a two man joy flight operation - or Angel Flight. So, what is needed? That question in the real world should be answered by the Board; under advisement of independent experts. But, the real, fundamental question (IMO) is- does the audit/surveillance focus on identified 'risk' mitigation and provide salient, practical advice on risk management and reduction; or on prosecution, supported by strict liability?
Identifying 'real life' risk in any class of operation demands real experience of that operation as well as generally accepted, industry developed 'best practice'. These are not separate but integrated measures aimed squarely at risk management. For example - the fire extinguishers at the browser; all up to date - the fuel company will have a system for maintaining them - guaranteed. Meanwhile, the one at the back of the hanger may well have been overlooked - an audit system should pick this up and a clear system to prevent an 'oversight' established; without a penalty attached (omission corrected - no intent proven) : yes, simple stuff used as an example. So, where and when are the 'real' risks identified, by those who take them and how are they to be mitigated? Well, perhaps the call for 'sector risk analysis' could be a solution.
Take private VFR operations into IMC as a sample - the risks and results have been and continue to be clearly identified - the question that stands alone is how to reduce the body count. Take heli mustering as an example - or long line sling loads; or Aerial applications; or rig operations; or SAR work: or charter operations; or corporate jet operations: - all with different 'risk areas', both high and low - all individually quantifiable and definable. Will one size fit all - don't think so, apart from 'book keeping' systems that is.
The question that stands alone is never answered - despite the money spent by CASA and the posturing as 'expert'. Take every 'fatal' accident over the last five years and place the CASA answer to mitigating or preventing a recurrence next to it (dismal).. Then, in a 12 month - compare the results of those measures against the body count. Nothing CASA has achieved through the money invested or their rule making has prevented those accidents; there are no solutions offered, nor can they be held accountable for their abject failure to have any impact on accident prevention. It could be argued that the reverse is true - fear of rule breaking has created a picture of paper compliance, increased cunning and a wall of silence. Pilots afraid to 'confess' - operators spending more time arse covering and paying lip service - spending on administration not maintenance, training and education.
The word 'Safety' should be removed from the CASA title - it has little to do with operational safety. The rule of law demands that 'intent' be proven beyond a reasonable doubt - in a court - with a defence available.
Toot - toot...