[Peetwo]

Parallel Hemispheres: A 'how to' on proper AAI by NTSB with B-17 crash final report. - 

Historical reference:

Parallel hemispheres: Connecticut B17 crash? 

I have been watching and reading with much interest the unfolding tragic story of the B-17 crash at Bradley International Airport in Connecticut: 

WWII-era plane crashes in Connecticut

By Mike Hayes, Zoe Sottile, Meg Wagner and Veronica Rocha, CNN
Updated 0111 GMT (0911 HKT) October 3, 2019

 
Reference post from Alphabets:  

A matter of concern.

TOM called the meeting to order; the crew settled down. Item one is a matter of great concern. The needless head butting and hair pulling going on between RAA and AOPA. It is seen as counterproductive, destructive, divisive, irresponsible  and “bloody childish” (not my words). A solution is needed..

So, what to do? History and believe it or not, John Sharp (as Minister) provide the answer. Back in the day, when Sharp was in the hot seat and CASA still had some honourable, intelligent men working for them; a plan was made to accommodate all Part 149 outfits with a set of ‘standards’ which CASA generated and the Alphabet groups could administer. It was a fair and equitable solution; so much so that both Canada and the EASA adopted it, put in a level playing field, and have never been troubled again.

Perhaps it is time the Australian plan was adopted in Australia.

I need to do a bit of digging around and talk to some folk; to be sure the plan can work. If it all pans out, it will be up to the members of the individual groups to sit their ‘management’ down and tell ‘em to get behind it, unite and make it happen. I understand there is a letter to the minister on it’s way, outlining the plan. Ministerial credibility could be partially restored on his nod.

Let’s hope good sense prevails. More to follow as matters progress. Fingers crossed.

Toot – toot.

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Mike Borgelt  Sandy Reith • 3 days ago

Bravo Sandy! I'm pleased that someone else gets it.

Of course there should be no split. The concept of these self administering organisations was pioneered by the failed organisational model of the GFA with its long declining and geriatric membership.

All Australian aircraft should be VH registered and all pilots be required to hold at minimum a Recreational Pilot's Licence, not some mickey mouse "certificate" from some private organisation which has "trained" pilots with instructors who may have as few as 100 hours total aeronautical experience...

...Instead we have CASA's Part 149 abomination which requires people to pay private monopolies even if the person already holds a RPL or higher qualification and appropriate ratings, tailwheel, glider etc. resulting in much higher costs and multiple periodic flight reviews. Part 149 has consumed many thousands of man hours at CASA and the private bodies and many of these people are not paid for their efforts.

Long bow perhaps but? 

The tragic last flight of the B-17 was part of a Collings Foundation Wings for Freedom tour:

"..The Collings Foundation is a private non-profit educational foundation located in Stow, Massachusetts, founded in 1979 by Robert F. Collings and Caroline Collings with a mission dedicated to the preservation and public display of transportation-related history, namely automobile and aviation history..."

Not that there should be any inference/comparison with our Australian Warbirds Association but IMO there are some passing strange parallels when you consider the ongoing Angel Flight imbroglio, the RAAus v AOPA bunfight and the CASA Iron Ring creation of Part 149...  

In the States there is no requirement for a Part 149, apparently the regulatory side of things is incorporated (as MB suggests above) into the normal pilot licensing and aircraft registration rule set. These types of operations fall under either FAR Part 91 or Part 135 - end of.

However that doesn't mean that this tragic occurrence will not lead to an inevitable review/scrutiny of the safety risk mitigation deployed by these types of not for profit operations, highlighted perhaps by the following Christine Negroni article/blog:

   

Warbird Operators Worry After B-17 Crash As Senator Calls for Closer Scrutiny

October 3, 2019 



Having survived combat and oftentimes years of neglect, flying warbirds in America and their owners may be headed into a new battle. Triggered by Wednesday’s fatal crash of the Collings Foundation B-17 Nine-O-Nine at Bradley International Airport, Connecticut Senator Richard Blumenthal says more scrutiny is needed for passenger flights on historic aircraft...

Via Christine Negroni's blog 'Flying Lessons': https://christinenegroni.com/beyond-the-...-17-crash/

Beyond the Headlines, More Than Pilot Error in Fatal B-17 Crash

April 14, 2021 



The list of failures leading up to the crash of a World War 2-era B-17 in October of 2019 is lengthy, highlighting not just individual lapses but systemic ones, the National Transportation Safety Board has found.

Seven people died and five others were seriously injured when the 4-engine aircraft dubbed [i]Nine O Nine,[/i] struck approach lights short of the runway at Bradley International Airport in Connecticut then veered across the threshold slamming into vehicles and a deicing tank off the right side of the runway.  The pilot, Ernest “Mac” McCauley, 75, and co-pilot Michael Foster, 71, were killed along with five of the passengers who were on board to enjoy what is called a living history flight, as I reported for The New York Times.



Today you’ll read articles that tout the “cause” of the [i]Nine O Nine [/i]accident as pilot error and indeed investigators outline several decisions that exacerbated an already bad situation when McCauley noted rough handling on one of the right (number 4) engines and a failure to climb shortly after takeoff. At the same time, though, the final report, released on Tuesday includes the Collings Foundation, the aircraft owner, the Federal Aviation Administration and a practice of allowing revenue flights on aircraft that do not and cannot equal the safety standards travelers take for granted.



I’ve reported in the past on the improvements in aircraft cabin design and materials that have made it far more likely that passengers will survive an air accident. And while many people may think that surviving a crash is an anomaly, most accidents do not involve fatalities. The reduction in the loss of life in accidents shows how effective the improvements in airplane seats and cabin materials have been.



The push to make airplanes more protective began in the 1980s, after several accidents in which passengers were unable to escape the plane because of fire, smoke or debilitating injuries. But, pause here for a moment and take a gander at the cabin of the [i]Nine O Nine[/i] and ask yourself if any of the criteria below – gospel on an airliner – was met and the answer is obviously, “no”.

• Does the seat protect a passenger’s head, spine and limbs
  
  
• Does the belt confine the traveler within a protective space
  
  
• Can the seat remain in its position
  
  
• Do fabrics and cabin materials resist burning and smoke
  

Replacing authentic interiors with 21st Century airline seats contradicts the mission of organizations that preserve and share historic aircraft with the public. This is why modern advancements in safety [i]that can be instituted[/i] without undermining that noble cause ought to take high priority.

Safety Management Systems, a nearly 2-decade old concept that makes safety a top-down priority and deputizes as a guardian of safety every department and employee in an aviation company, is required for all airlines operating in the United States as well as being an international standard. But SMS is not required for operators like the Collings Foundation. Nevertheless, Collings did have an SMS program but it applied it only sporadically and in some cases ineffectively, according to the accident report.

The SMS did not lead the operator to detect that “the engine run-up checklist was inconsistent with the B-17 engine ground test checklist,” a failure the report suggests could have led the pilots to understand the engine problem before taking off.

Despite the fact that the five passengers killed on the [i]Nine O Nine[/i] paid $450 to be on the flight, they, like many others who participate in similar flights, “are likely unaware that these operations have less stringent requirements than other commercial aviation operations,” the NTSB notes. Changing that is one of the NTSB’s most wanted transportation safety improvements.

The entire report on the tragic and irreplaceable loss of seven people and a historic warbird can be found on the NTSB website. There you’ll read about the lapses of the pilot who was also the director of maintenance at Collings, the shortcomings of Collings and areas where the F.A.A. failed to assure that its regulations were being followed. As always there’s an unbroken chain of events leading to the fiery crash at Bradley Airport.
So see the [i]Nine O Nine[/i]‘s demise as just the consequence of one man’s mistake is not only wrong, it defeats the purpose of the investigation and it reduces the imperative of the board’s safety recommendation.

Via the NTSB: 

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Acci...r2103.aspx

Probable Cause

Analysis
Various revenue passenger-carrying operations are conducted under the operating rules of Part 91; as a result, these operations are not subject to the stricter safety requirements and surveillance that apply to other commercial aviation operations. The NTSB recognizes that it might not be practical or feasible for some Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying operations, due to their mission, to be conducted under other established commercial operating rules (such as Part 135). However, operationally specific regulations are needed for commercial operations currently conducted under Part 91 to increase safety for members of the public who pay to participate in these activities.

The FAA had previously stated that passengers who are transported under Parts 121 and 135 "exercise no control over and bear no responsibility for the airworthiness or operation of the aircraft aboard which they are flown" and that, as a result, the "appropriate level of public safety is provided by…very stringent regulations and oversight under part 121 and part 135." However, even though passengers exercise no control over, and bear no responsibility for, revenue passenger-carrying flights conducted under Part 91, the FAA continues to allow these flights to be conducted under less stringent regulations and with little to no oversight. Further, some Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying operations have the capacity to carry more passengers than Part 135 commercial air taxi and air tour operations and some Part 121 air carrier operations, all of which require operating certificates and operations specifications under Part 119.

The NTSB also recognizes that the types of Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying operations are diverse. Nevertheless, the need for greater safety requirements and more comprehensive oversight applies to all of these operations, as discussed in the report.

As expected no BS, no pulling punches just a clear, concise report with safety recommendations based just on the facts and findings - 

MTF...P2