[Peetwo]

C&C II: The Art of (topcover) O&O?? - 

Now that we finally have someone back at the HCA (Hooded Canary Aviary) athorised to make inputs to the accident investigation database, I note that there has been a flurry of activity over the last two days - see: https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/saf...e=Aviation - which includes filling out the basic details of the C130 crash including a summary: 

Collision with terrain involving Lockheed Martin EC-130Q, N134CG, near Peak View, New South Wales, on 23 January 2020

...The ATSB is investigating the collision with terrain of a Lockheed EC-130Q Hercules Large Air Tanker, registration N124CG, near Peak View, New South Wales, on 23 January 2020.

While conducting fire control operations, the aircraft collided with terrain after completing a fire retardant drop. The three flight crew on board were fatally injured, and the aircraft was destroyed.

The ATSB has deployed a team of transport safety investigators with experience in aircraft operations, maintenance and data recovery to the accident site, to begin the evidence collection phase of the investigation, including conducting site mapping and identifying aircraft components for recovery for examination at specialist technical facilities.

As part of the investigation, ATSB investigators will also analyse available recorded data, review weather information, aircraft maintenance and flight crew records, and interview witnesses.

Should any safety critical information be discovered at any time during the investigation, the ATSB will immediately notify operators and regulators so appropriate and timely safety action can be taken.

A final report will be published at the conclusion of the investigation...

All pretty standard -    However one of the most disturbing lines in the notification lies in the 'General Details' where under the sub-heading 'Anticipated completion' it says...

"..3rd Quarter 2021.." - WTD! 

P2 interpretation: In other words that's how long, as a minimum, the Hooded Canary believes it will take for the heat to blow off this extremely high profile accident investigation, where the safety risk has been effectively mitigated for any potential personal, agency and/or ministerial blow back. After all mid to late 2021 and going into 2022 HC may possibly have finished his tenure with ATCB and already received his Golden Gong award for the many loyal un-thwarted years of running a protection racket for both the minister and Govt of the day. And the Nation will be heading into another election with all the 'white noise' that will create for any potential ministerial embarrassment (think Albo and PelAir in June 2013)...

But wait there's more -   

Although inexplicably no longer appearing ( ) on the front page of the ATCB AAI notification/database webpage ( ), on the same day the C130 notification of investigation was put up there was a notable update for occurrence AO-2018-053 which if you'll remember had some disturbing details revealed in the preliminary report:

..The operator’s standard operating procedures for take-off required the PM to announce when the airspeed reached 100 kt and for the PF to cross check this airspeed indication...

...The flight crew recalled that they detected an airspeed anomaly during the take-off roll, including red speed (SPD) flags on both primary flight displays (PFD).

The standard operating procedures stated that the captain held responsibility for the decision to reject the take-off or continue. It stated that rejecting a take-off between 100 kt and V1 was a serious matter, that a captain should be ‘go-minded’, and that very few situations should lead to the decision to reject the take-off. There was no indication on the CVR recording that the captain or the first officer discussed rejecting the take-off...

This was the 'update' released (and originally published on the front page of the ATCB AAI webpage -   ) two days ago (my bold):

Update published 29 January 2020

The ATSB investigation into the airspeed indication failure on take-off involving Airbus A330, 9M‑MTK, at Brisbane Airport, Queensland, on 18 July 2018 is continuing.

The investigation is currently near the end of the evidence collection phase, with the examination and analysis phase in progress.

Since the publication of the investigation’s preliminary report on 30 August 2018, the investigation team has:

• interviewed the flight crew, engineers, ground handling personnel, and air traffic controllers
  
  
• reviewed cockpit voice and flight data recordings from the aircraft
  
  
• reviewed recordings from air traffic control (ATC) and closed-circuit security video
  
  
• obtained and reviewed further information from the aircraft manufacturer, aircraft operator, engineering support provider, and ground handling service provider.
  

The investigation continues to examine the:

• procedures, arrangements and interactions between the operator’s maintenance engineers, flight crews, engineering support provider and ground handling service provider
  
  
• procedures relating to ground and flight crew pre-flight checks, including walk-around procedures
  
  
• training records for flight crew, engineers and ground handling personnel
  
  
• warnings, cautions and other information displayed to the flight crew during the occurrence flight
  
  
• ATC recordings
  
  
• closed-circuit video recordings
  
  
• cockpit voice and flight data recordings.
  

Once the examination and analysis phase is complete, a final report will be drafted and undergo a rigorous internal review to ensure the report findings adequately and accurately reflect the analysis of available evidence. Following the completion of the internal review, a draft of the final report will be sent to all directly involved parties for their comment before the report is finalised and published.

Should any safety issues be identified during any phase of this investigation, the ATSB will immediately notify those affected and seek safety action to address the issue.

 
Then like the C130 notification it says in the 'General details'...

"..3rd Quarter 2020.."  ..yeah right and MH370 will fly again - 

This brings me to another 'furphy/load of bollocks' on what has become a standard statement at the bottom of all ATCB investigation notifications: 

..Should any safety issues be identified during any phase of this investigation, the ATSB will immediately notify those affected and seek safety action to address the issue...

Or fm the C130 notification:

..Should any safety critical information be discovered at any time during the investigation, the ATSB will immediately notify operators and regulators so appropriate and timely safety action can be taken...

However as we have seen and documented numerous times these statements from the Hooded Canary led ATCB are just a tick-a-box routine and merely paying lipservice compliance to the ICAO Annex 13 SARPs?? (eg Hooded Canary's search 4 IP in 2019? )

Now compare that discredited statement to this recent NTSB safety recommendation(s) announcement in relation to a 6 November 2019 occurrence involving a EMB-175 on takeoff out of Atlanta City:

Ref: https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/nr20200129b.aspx

1/29/2020
Based on preliminary findings from its ongoing investigation of an incident involving an Embraer-175 airplane, the NTSB issued 10 safety recommendations Wednesday to address safety issues identified in the investigation.

The NTSB issued six safety recommendations to the National Civil Aviation Agency of Brazil (ANAC) and four to the Federal Aviation Administration. The recommendations are designed to address areas of concern including wire chafing, application of Embraer service bulletins relating to the pitch trim switch, and potential limitations in checklist memory items for pilots to address unintended operation of the pitch trim system.

The investigation and recommendations stem from a Nov. 6, 2019, incident involving Republic Airways flight 4439, an Embraer EMB-175. The flight crew declared an emergency shortly after takeoff from Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, Atlanta, reporting a pitch trim-related flight control issue and difficulty controlling the airplane. There were six passengers on board the airplane. The crew returned to the airport and safely landed the plane about 15 minutes after declaring the emergency.

Although the cause of the incident remains under investigation, post-incident examination of the airplane revealed chafed insulation around wires connecting the horizontal stabilizer actuator control electronics to the captain’s pitch trim switch and autopilot/trim disconnect button. The chafing was caused by contact with the incorrectly untucked pigtail of the forward mechanical stop bolt safety wire.



(Wire chafing to the insulation around wires connecting the horizontal stabilizer actuator control electronics to the captain’s pitch trim switch in an Embraer-175 (left) and an incorrectly untucked pigtail (right) that caused the chafing, are seen in these photos taken Nov. 9, 2019. Photo courtesy of Republic Airways.)

When the captain’s pitch trim switch was removed from the yoke, marks were observed that indicated at some point before the incident flight, the pitch trim switch had been installed in an inverted position. Embraer previously issued three service bulletins related to pitch trim switch installation error following reports from flight crews in 2015 about flight control system difficulties. However, neither the FAA nor the ANAC required incorporation of the service bulletins. While it is not yet known if inverted switch installation was a factor in the incident, the NTSB is concerned the condition could lead to flight crew confusion, delaying appropriate recognition of and response to increased control forces.

Preliminary information from the NTSB’s investigation also suggests that unintended pitch trim operation may be masked and go undetected during certain phases of flight, such as during takeoff. Further, limitations in the checklist memory items may delay pilots in properly responding to and regaining control of the Embraer EMB-170/175/190/195 and Lineage 1000 series airplanes. The NTSB is concerned the crew’s application of the memory item(s) on the EMB-175 Pitch Trim Runaway checklist may not comprehensively address circumstances of the trim system operation in a timely manner.

Based on these preliminary findings from the ongoing investigation, the NTSB issued the 10 safety recommendations to address these safety issues.

“Issuing these 10 safety recommendations early in the investigation demonstrates the NTSB’s commitment to take action as soon as we’ve identified and verified a safety issue that needs to be addressed,” said NTSB Chairman Robert Sumwalt. “We don’t need to wait for an investigation to be completed before issuing safety recommendations. We have the responsibility to issue recommendations that when implemented by recipients, can correct safety deficiencies, prevent accidents, and save lives,” said Sumwalt.

Aviation Safety Recommendation Report 20-01 is available online.

The NTSB’s investigation of the Nov. 6, 2019, incident is ongoing and as such, no conclusions about probable cause should be drawn from the information provided in the safety recommendation report.

###

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents, promoting transportation safety, and assisting victims of transportation accidents and their families.

No further comment - for now?? 


MTF...P2 

ps This: "..The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents, promoting transportation safety, and assisting victims of transportation accidents and their families..."

Just thought I'd throw the challenge out there for a re-write of that statement for our very own HC led ATCB...