P7’ s Opinion – delivered; as requested.
“Given the size and scope of the RA Oz ‘incident and accident’ list; reading through the responses made to those events; we thought it may germane to take a closer look. ‘K’ is still fuming over the following, too cranky to be impartial. “Can you do it?” Well I’m as appalled as he, however; I’ll take a shot. Lets see”.
..."Inadvertent flight into IMC:
Call pony-pooh right there. “Inadvertent” is a gross misnomer. At night, in Instrument conditions it is possible to ‘inadvertently’ re-enter IMC. The published approach is conducted – the field in sight – then it disappears – why? You have just inadvertently entered cloud )or rain). Anything else is ‘deliberate’. Particularly flying during daylight hours under visual flight rules. Pilots can and rightfully do take a ‘look’, the smart ones always leave the back door open. Nuff said.
The aircraft departed Narromine into significant smoke haze.
Why – the forecast was pretty accurate.
At 500' the pilot could see objects out to about 10NM but could not see the horizon.
Fair enough – a visual reference to the horizontal was available.
At cruise altitude of 4,500' visibility became worse.
Cue drum roll – it is bad visibility, forecast to get worse – at 4500 the effect of ‘slant visibility’ kicks in. Often, when an aerodrome is shrouded in fog – from overhead you can see the runways and stuff; but from three miles out on final approach you are looking through a lot more fog and no surprise – you cannot see the runway. So why go to cruise height where visibility – horizontally is likely to be worse?
The visual cues indicating the aircraft's attitude became degraded.
No shit Sherlock;
The pilot could judge pitch and roll only by looking at the paddocks and roads within a 45 degree cone beneath the aircraft.
Uhmm: that would be to the side only – the nose would preclude full vision forward and the other window would be virtually useless. Essentially – there was zero forward visibility in a text book perfect situation for spatial disorientation.
When they were head-down looking up the latest weather details for their next stop at Griffith
Funny time to be checking the forecast. Most do it pre flight and take note of the details – it’s called pre flight planning.
the pilot glanced sideways at the ground to see if they were still wings-level and all seemed OK until they saw the artificial horizon on the EFIS which indicated that they were in a 15 degree bank.
Aye, an oldie, but a goodie. The hand will follow the eye; head down distracted trying to see what the forecast says – when every eye should have been outside, concentrating on avoiding the perils of disorientation.
The pilot knew then what IMC was
Did you ever read a more fatuous, puerile statement. And it’s bollocks to boot.
"they then engaged the autopilot so the next time they were head-down in the cockpit they weren’t going to give themselves another fright.
That simply beggars belief. They should have been afraid, from the get go. Too poorly trained to realise that they were at real risk – head down, head up, and shake it all about. What a great way to bring on disorientation. Why not use the AP to take a belated look at whatever it was they were concerned about; settle down and think their way home?
The smoke progressively thinned out towards Griffith and visibility entering the circuit was satisfactory until initiating their turn to base.
As previously mentioned – slant viz.
The pilot seemed to have descended into a lens of smoke which totally blocked their view of the runway,
There exists a well tried and tested true manoeuvre called a ‘Go-Around’. Traditionally executed when one cannot see the duckling runway. And WTD is a ‘lens’ of smoke?
but views crosswind and downwind were relatively clear.
No kidding – Wow! a Eureka moment indeed.
The pilot estimated where the extended centreline of the runway was
Top marks for safe thinking? Let’s get this straight – the aircraft is low, slow and on final approach – then the runway vanishes. Had the aircraft been lined up correctly in the first place – why (if you were silly enough to persist) would you start changing ‘heading’. A steady hand and a cool head would sit still and wait until the ‘lens’ (WTD) was flown through – doglegs and estimates are OK with wriggle room – but on final? No mate, not the best idea you ever had. Why not take the crosswind runway if ‘tuther was ‘smoky’ – you can do a crosswind landing can’t you?
and turned final only to find, when exiting the smoke lens, that they had turned too soon, requiring a dog-leg correction to get back on the centreline...
Careful study – pre departure of wind and temperature may just have indicated an ‘inversion’; not mentioned, more training required? In my office the debrief over tea a biscuits would have been ‘interesting’. Not too bad for the crew – mild bollocking would suffice – but for those who trained these clowns; an entirely different matter.
But the real villainy is in the blasé report; there are some serious safety matters on display. The caviller manner in which this report has been drafted is a danger in itself. The complete absence of any safety briefing is deplorable; to the extent that it almost promotes a gung-ho acceptance of ‘derring-do’. The team operating were at risk before they turned a wheel; that risk escalated with every passing moment. They should have known better, they most certainly should have been trained better and they bloody well should have known better; through native common sense.
There – nearly as cranky as ‘K’ by the time I got done with that inexorable failure of system.
“Given the size and scope of the RA Oz ‘incident and accident’ list; reading through the responses made to those events; we thought it may germane to take a closer look. ‘K’ is still fuming over the following, too cranky to be impartial. “Can you do it?” Well I’m as appalled as he, however; I’ll take a shot. Lets see”.
..."Inadvertent flight into IMC:
Call pony-pooh right there. “Inadvertent” is a gross misnomer. At night, in Instrument conditions it is possible to ‘inadvertently’ re-enter IMC. The published approach is conducted – the field in sight – then it disappears – why? You have just inadvertently entered cloud )or rain). Anything else is ‘deliberate’. Particularly flying during daylight hours under visual flight rules. Pilots can and rightfully do take a ‘look’, the smart ones always leave the back door open. Nuff said.
The aircraft departed Narromine into significant smoke haze.
Why – the forecast was pretty accurate.
At 500' the pilot could see objects out to about 10NM but could not see the horizon.
Fair enough – a visual reference to the horizontal was available.
At cruise altitude of 4,500' visibility became worse.
Cue drum roll – it is bad visibility, forecast to get worse – at 4500 the effect of ‘slant visibility’ kicks in. Often, when an aerodrome is shrouded in fog – from overhead you can see the runways and stuff; but from three miles out on final approach you are looking through a lot more fog and no surprise – you cannot see the runway. So why go to cruise height where visibility – horizontally is likely to be worse?
The visual cues indicating the aircraft's attitude became degraded.
No shit Sherlock;
The pilot could judge pitch and roll only by looking at the paddocks and roads within a 45 degree cone beneath the aircraft.
Uhmm: that would be to the side only – the nose would preclude full vision forward and the other window would be virtually useless. Essentially – there was zero forward visibility in a text book perfect situation for spatial disorientation.
When they were head-down looking up the latest weather details for their next stop at Griffith
Funny time to be checking the forecast. Most do it pre flight and take note of the details – it’s called pre flight planning.
the pilot glanced sideways at the ground to see if they were still wings-level and all seemed OK until they saw the artificial horizon on the EFIS which indicated that they were in a 15 degree bank.
Aye, an oldie, but a goodie. The hand will follow the eye; head down distracted trying to see what the forecast says – when every eye should have been outside, concentrating on avoiding the perils of disorientation.
The pilot knew then what IMC was
Did you ever read a more fatuous, puerile statement. And it’s bollocks to boot.
"they then engaged the autopilot so the next time they were head-down in the cockpit they weren’t going to give themselves another fright.
That simply beggars belief. They should have been afraid, from the get go. Too poorly trained to realise that they were at real risk – head down, head up, and shake it all about. What a great way to bring on disorientation. Why not use the AP to take a belated look at whatever it was they were concerned about; settle down and think their way home?
The smoke progressively thinned out towards Griffith and visibility entering the circuit was satisfactory until initiating their turn to base.
As previously mentioned – slant viz.
The pilot seemed to have descended into a lens of smoke which totally blocked their view of the runway,
There exists a well tried and tested true manoeuvre called a ‘Go-Around’. Traditionally executed when one cannot see the duckling runway. And WTD is a ‘lens’ of smoke?
but views crosswind and downwind were relatively clear.
No kidding – Wow! a Eureka moment indeed.
The pilot estimated where the extended centreline of the runway was
Top marks for safe thinking? Let’s get this straight – the aircraft is low, slow and on final approach – then the runway vanishes. Had the aircraft been lined up correctly in the first place – why (if you were silly enough to persist) would you start changing ‘heading’. A steady hand and a cool head would sit still and wait until the ‘lens’ (WTD) was flown through – doglegs and estimates are OK with wriggle room – but on final? No mate, not the best idea you ever had. Why not take the crosswind runway if ‘tuther was ‘smoky’ – you can do a crosswind landing can’t you?
and turned final only to find, when exiting the smoke lens, that they had turned too soon, requiring a dog-leg correction to get back on the centreline...
Careful study – pre departure of wind and temperature may just have indicated an ‘inversion’; not mentioned, more training required? In my office the debrief over tea a biscuits would have been ‘interesting’. Not too bad for the crew – mild bollocking would suffice – but for those who trained these clowns; an entirely different matter.
But the real villainy is in the blasé report; there are some serious safety matters on display. The caviller manner in which this report has been drafted is a danger in itself. The complete absence of any safety briefing is deplorable; to the extent that it almost promotes a gung-ho acceptance of ‘derring-do’. The team operating were at risk before they turned a wheel; that risk escalated with every passing moment. They should have known better, they most certainly should have been trained better and they bloody well should have known better; through native common sense.
There – nearly as cranky as ‘K’ by the time I got done with that inexorable failure of system.