Airframe ignorant – Operationally savvy.
My vast working knowledge of Airbus could be transcribed onto the back of a matchbox – with room left over for the Magna Carta. However, the Air Asia X ‘incident’ and the ATSB’s eventual report– HERE – from an operational POV is worth a thought or two.
The report itself is framed in a very ‘authoritarian’ manner no if’s considered and no but’s at all. Taken as read, the report goes to some length to reinforce the ‘by the book’ gospel of black letter compliance. Supporting the CASA doctrine of removing big picture thought and command prerogative from the equation. No doubt there were errors made – a warning which calls for an engine shut down is only ignored at your own peril – that’s a given no brainer. Not too much in the way of tea and biscuits at the management meeting. No sympathy whatsoever regarding the attempted re-lights. No idea what a replacement engine is worth, but compared to the cost of an oil pump shaft – righteous fury well warranted.
Some of the points raised by ATSB are valid in relation to the engine management procedures; there is a need for clarity and detailed information – which; time permitting – as it was in this case – could have prevented the mishandling and subsequent damage bill. But that aside was the flight actually ever ‘at risk’?
There is a post on the UP – HERE – by SWH which, IMO, supports the diversion to Melbourne. What is not mentioned within the ATSB report is ‘company advice’ and communications. ATSB also fail to discuss ‘operational logic’. Adelaide, Alice or Melbourne were on the cards for non threatening (not emergency) situation – Melbourne would be the most convenient for the company. Was there any company influence involved in the command decision process?
SWH – “My biggest criticism of the report is the apparent lack of understanding of the aircraft weight, fuel system (no fuel dump), and drift down profile of the A330. It will take around 90 minutes for a single engine drift down from FL380 at green dot. At the end of the drift down they would be TOD for MEL”.
SWH – “An immediate diversion to ASP would result in an unplanned overweight landing onto a shorter runway at night at higher density altitude with reduced flap setting at an airport they never operate into.
SWH – “Amber LAND ASAP means CONSIDER landing at the nearest suitable, it does not mean land at the nearest. The report clearly indicates the crew did consider ASP, and then chose not to go there which is entirely their operational decision to make.
I only grabbed the post because to my Airbus uneducated mind, the points made seem operationally logical, company practical and within the realms of command decision making. Sure bang some heads for the bloody awful engine handling, demand clear SOP and etc. But I think – in those circumstances – I may well have gone to MEL. But I was not there, neither were the ATSB, only the flight crew were.
Not only is the report unpardonably late (again). This is, (once again) not a ‘balanced’ report from the ATSB. As usual they choose to pontificate and take the high ‘safety ground’ – across the board, slanting reports to favour the dictates of their masters, rather than presenting a balanced, calm, even handed, factual, operationally sound report which may assist future aircrew thinking in an abnormal – i.e. not an ‘emergency’ situation…
Toot - toot
My vast working knowledge of Airbus could be transcribed onto the back of a matchbox – with room left over for the Magna Carta. However, the Air Asia X ‘incident’ and the ATSB’s eventual report– HERE – from an operational POV is worth a thought or two.
The report itself is framed in a very ‘authoritarian’ manner no if’s considered and no but’s at all. Taken as read, the report goes to some length to reinforce the ‘by the book’ gospel of black letter compliance. Supporting the CASA doctrine of removing big picture thought and command prerogative from the equation. No doubt there were errors made – a warning which calls for an engine shut down is only ignored at your own peril – that’s a given no brainer. Not too much in the way of tea and biscuits at the management meeting. No sympathy whatsoever regarding the attempted re-lights. No idea what a replacement engine is worth, but compared to the cost of an oil pump shaft – righteous fury well warranted.
Some of the points raised by ATSB are valid in relation to the engine management procedures; there is a need for clarity and detailed information – which; time permitting – as it was in this case – could have prevented the mishandling and subsequent damage bill. But that aside was the flight actually ever ‘at risk’?
There is a post on the UP – HERE – by SWH which, IMO, supports the diversion to Melbourne. What is not mentioned within the ATSB report is ‘company advice’ and communications. ATSB also fail to discuss ‘operational logic’. Adelaide, Alice or Melbourne were on the cards for non threatening (not emergency) situation – Melbourne would be the most convenient for the company. Was there any company influence involved in the command decision process?
SWH – “My biggest criticism of the report is the apparent lack of understanding of the aircraft weight, fuel system (no fuel dump), and drift down profile of the A330. It will take around 90 minutes for a single engine drift down from FL380 at green dot. At the end of the drift down they would be TOD for MEL”.
SWH – “An immediate diversion to ASP would result in an unplanned overweight landing onto a shorter runway at night at higher density altitude with reduced flap setting at an airport they never operate into.
SWH – “Amber LAND ASAP means CONSIDER landing at the nearest suitable, it does not mean land at the nearest. The report clearly indicates the crew did consider ASP, and then chose not to go there which is entirely their operational decision to make.
I only grabbed the post because to my Airbus uneducated mind, the points made seem operationally logical, company practical and within the realms of command decision making. Sure bang some heads for the bloody awful engine handling, demand clear SOP and etc. But I think – in those circumstances – I may well have gone to MEL. But I was not there, neither were the ATSB, only the flight crew were.
Not only is the report unpardonably late (again). This is, (once again) not a ‘balanced’ report from the ATSB. As usual they choose to pontificate and take the high ‘safety ground’ – across the board, slanting reports to favour the dictates of their masters, rather than presenting a balanced, calm, even handed, factual, operationally sound report which may assist future aircrew thinking in an abnormal – i.e. not an ‘emergency’ situation…
Toot - toot