[Peetwo]

B-17 prelim report released??

"..Hmm...it will be interesting to watch the NTSB investigation unfold and what recommendations they eventually come out with. However, unlike the ATSB with the Angel Flight Mount Gambier accident report, I strongly suspect they won't be pulling any punches, or providing topcover for the FAA, while laying all blame at the feet of the Collings Foundation..."

 

Been a bit busy so I am a little bit late in getting this out but less than 2 weeks after the tragic crash of the B-17 at Bradley International Airport Connecticut. the NTSB have released their prelim report...

..On October 2, 2019, at 0953 eastern daylight time, a Boeing B-17G, N93012, owned and
operated by the Collings Foundation, was destroyed during a precautionary landing and
subsequent runway excursion at Bradley International Airport (BDL), Windsor Locks,
Connecticut. The commercial pilot, airline transport pilot, and five passengers were fatally
injured. The flight mechanic/loadmaster and four passengers were seriously injured, while one
passenger and one person on the ground incurred minor injuries. The local commercial
sightseeing flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations
Part 91, in accordance with a Living History Flight Experience exemption granted by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area
and no flight plan was filed for the flight, which departed BDL at 0947.

On the morning of the accident flight, an airport lineman at BDL assisted the loadmaster as he
added 160 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel to the accident airplane. The lineman stated that the
accident airplane was the first to be fueled with 100LL fuel that day.

According to preliminary air traffic control (ATC) data provided by the FAA, shortly after
takeoff, at 0950, one of the pilots reported to ATC that he wanted to return to the airport. At
that time, the airplane was about 500 ft above ground level (agl) on the right crosswind leg of
the airport traffic pattern for runway 6. The approach controller verified the request and asked
if the pilot required any assistance, to which he replied no. The controller then asked for the
reason for the return to the airport, and the pilot replied that the airplane had a "rough mag"
on the No. 4 engine. The controller then instructed the pilot to fly a right downwind leg for
runway 6 and confirmed that the flight needed an immediate landing. He subsequently
cancelled the approach of another airplane and advised the pilot to proceed however necessary
to runway 6. The approach controller instructed the pilot to contact the tower controller, which
he did.

The tower controller reported that the wind was calm and cleared the flight to land on runway
6. The pilot acknowledged the landing clearance; at that time, the airplane was about 300 ft agl
on a midfield right downwind leg for runway 6. The tower controller asked about the airplane's
progress to the runway and the pilot replied that they were "getting there" and on the right
downwind leg. No further communications were received from the accident airplane. Witness
statements and airport surveillance video confirmed that the airplane struck approach lights
about 1,000 ft prior to the runway, then contacted the ground about 500 ft prior to the runway
before reaching runway 6. It then veered right off the runway before colliding with vehicles and
a deicing fluid tank about 1,100 ft right of the center of the runway threshold.

The wreckage came to rest upright and the majority of the cabin, cockpit, and right wing were
consumed by postimpact fire. The landing gear was extended and measurement of the left and
right wing flap jackscrews corresponded to a flaps retracted setting. The flap remained
attached to the right wing and the aileron was consumed by fire. The flap and aileron remained
attached to the left wing and a section of flap was consumed by fire. The empennage, elevator,
and rudder remained intact. Control continuity was confirmed from the elevator, rudder,
elevator trim, and rudder trim from each respective control surface to the area in the cabin
consumed by fire, and then forward to the cockpit controls. Elevator trim and rudder trim
cables were pulled during impact and their preimpact position on their respective drum at the
control surfaces could not be determined. The left wing aileron trim tab remained intact and its
pushrod was connected but bent. The left aileron bellcrank separated from the wing, but the
aileron cables remained attached to it and the aileron cable remained attached in cockpit.

The Nos. 1 and 2 engines remained partially attached to the left wing and all three propeller
blades remained attached to each engine. One propeller blade attached to engine No. 1
exhibited an 8-inch tip separation; the separated section traveled about 700 ft before coming to
rest near an airport building. Another propeller blade on the No. 1 engine exhibited chordwise
scratching and leading edge gouging. The third propeller blade was bent aft. The No. 2 engine
propeller blades exhibited leading edge gouges and chordwise scratches.

The No. 3 engine was recovered from the top of the deicing tank. One blade was impact
damaged and near the feather position. The other two blades appeared in a position between
low pitch and feather. One propeller blade exhibited a 5-inch tip separation and the separated
tip sections were recovered from 100 ft and 700 ft from the main wreckage. The No. 4 engine
was recovered from the deice building. All three propeller blades on the No. 4 engine appeared
in the feather position.

The wreckage was retained for further examination.

A fuel sample was able to be recovered from one of the No 3. engine's two fuel tanks. The
recovered sample had a visual appearance and smell consistent with 100LL aviation fuel and
was absent of debris or water contamination. Following the accident, the fuel truck used to
service the airplane was quarantined and subsequent testing revealed no anomalies of the
truck's equipment or fuel supply. Additionally, none of the airplanes serviced with fuel from
the truck before or after the accident airplane, including another airplane operated by the
Collings Foundation, reported any anomalies.

The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land,
airplane multiengine land, instrument airplane, and held a type rating for the B-17. In addition,
he held a mechanic certificate with airframe and powerplant ratings. His most recent FAA
second-class medical certificate was issued on January 9, 2019. At that time, he reported a total
flight experience of 14,500 hours.

The co-pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine
land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane, with type ratings for B-737, B-757,
B-767, DC-10, and LR-Jet. In addition, he held a flight engineer certificate as well as a flight
instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine and instrument airplane. His most
recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on January 8, 2019. At that time, he
reported a total flight experience of 22,000 hours.

The airplane was manufactured in 1944, issued a limited airworthiness certificate in 1994, and
equipped with passenger seats in 1995. It was powered by four Wright R-1820-97, 1,200-
horsepower engines, each equipped with a three-blade, constant-speed Hamilton Standard
propeller. The airplane was maintained under an airworthiness inspection program, which
incorporated an annual inspection, and 25-hour, 50-hour, 75-hour, and 100-hour progressive
inspections. Review of maintenance records revealed that the airplane's most recent annual
inspection was completed on January 16, 2019. At that time, the airframe had accumulated
about 11,120 total hours of operation. Engine Nos. 1, 2, and 3 had 0 hours since major overhaul
at that time. Engine No. 4 had 838.2 hours since major overhaul at that time. The airplane's
most recent progressive inspection, which was the 100-hour inspection, was completed on
September 23, 2019. At that time, the airplane had been operated about 268 hours since the
annual inspection.

The recorded weather at BDL at 0951 included calm wind; 10 statute miles visibility; few
clouds at 11,000 ft; few clouds at 14,000 ft; broken clouds at 18,000 ft; temperature 23°C; dew
point 19°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.81 inches of mercury.

Hmm...not a hint of topcover or political correctness inside of any of that bare bones summary.

Here is a link for the Mount Gambier accident - see https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/inv...-2017-069/ and click on prelim report - note that at that point of the investigation the ATSB was already 2+ weeks behind and they hadn't even gathered the pilot's details or the wx information etc..etc?? But they had already established a possible causal link and bias with the charity Angel Flight's charter/purpose for being:

Several components and documentation were removed from the accident site for further examination by the ATSB.

The investigation is continuing and will include examination of the following:

- recovered components and available electronic data
- aircraft maintenance documentation
- weather conditions
- pilot qualifications and experience
- coordination and planning of the charity flight
- the use of private flights for the transfer of passengers for non-emergency medical reasons
- similar occurrences.

BRB verdict: Round 1 overwhelmingly to the NTSB...

MTF...P2