[Peetwo]

Approaching another decade of Iron Ring rule? 

Reference:

Pel-Air: A coverup: a litany of lies? - Version III

Chronology; colour coded to help with making your mind up.

Green - Go head.

Amber - proceed with caution.

Red - Stop and think about it. - Handing over::::-

Pel-Air ATSB/CASA Investigation (AO-2009-072) Chronology from 18/11/2009

– 30/11/2017:

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23 September 1999: Qantas Flight 1 overshoots runway at Bangkok. (ref - #221 & https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/1999/AAIR/aair199904538.aspx )

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11 March 2003: 2nd phase of cooperative Qantas/CASA/University of SA FRMS study.(see links above & https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articl...on-162972/)

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18 November 2009: Ditching 3 NM south-west of Norfolk Island Aerodrome.

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18 November 2009: ATSB notified of accident and ATSB subsequently notify CASA. The
ATSB decide to carry out an investigation and CASA decide to run a parallel
investigation, initiated 19 November.

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19 November 2009: Pel-Air voluntarily suspend Westwind operation.

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20 November 2009: Quote from page 97 of PelAir MKII Final report - "The ATSB asked CAAF for ATS records for the flight and the weather information that was provided to the flight crew of VH-NGA. CAAF forwarded the request to the ATS provider and then obtained the records in December 2009 to pass on to the ATSB. This included copies of the 0630 METAR, 0800 SPECI and 0830 SPECI."

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23 November 2009: Richard White MALIU correspondence to ATSB Director Aviation Safety Investigations, Ian Sangston notifying CASA will be conducting a regulatory investigation into the actions of the flightcrew. Note that there is no reference to 'parallel investigations' under either the 2004 or 2010 MOU (ref link - #122 &  #28).

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23 November 2009: Richard White receives from Airservices Australia  the complete list of Norfolk Island Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts (TAFs) applicable to the occurrence flight timeframe. This included the Nadi non-relayed 0803 AMD TAF, which appears to be underlined (ref link - #122 & #85 )

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25 November 2009: Greg Hood file note email (cc'd Jonathon Aleck, Terry Farquharson, John McCormick.). File note No.4 reference to flight recorder recovery would appear to show, at that point in time, that recovery was inevitable (ref link - #125 )

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26 November 2009: CASA initiate a ‘Special Audit’ conducted between the 26/11/2009-
15/12/2009 at the Pel-Air Bases in Sydney, Adelaide and Nowra.

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30 November 2009: Richard White email to John Barr (cc Roger Chambers) confirming Airservices passed on weather & received flight plan details from PIC Dominic James by phone in Apia. (ref link - #122 )  

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7 December 2009: Audit team meet with Pel-Air management to discuss a number of
deficiencies within the Westwind Operation. This was backed up by correspondence from
CASA on 9/12/2009.

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7 December 2009: FAA/ICAO brief on 'next steps' after poor results/findings in the ICAO USOAP 2008 & FAA Nov 30- Dec 4 2009 Australian audits. (ref links - #53 & WikiLeaks cable PDF: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...ileaks.pdf

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8 December 2009: E-mail from ATSB to CASA raising the possibility of contributing to a
joint fund sharing arrangement to recover the black box and CASA advised they didn’t
have the necessary funds.

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11 December: Advice from the UK Civil Aviation Authority to CASA providing an assessment of the fatigue scores for the accidental flight (ref link - #122 & PDF 881KB )  

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16 December 2009: CASA accept the Pel-Air ‘Management Action Plan’ which consisted
of three phases.

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16 December 2009: Dominic James was 'informally' interviewed by CASA  legal and investigative officers. (ref link - #112 )

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18 December 2009: Pel-Air successfully completed Phase 1 items and were able to
recommence domestic operations.

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21 December 2009: CASA Special Audit of Pel-Air Fatigue Risk Management System ( ref links - #217 & PDF 5428KB )

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23-24 December 2009: CASA overseeing FOI of Pel-Air Eric Demarco issues 14 RCA and
a number of AO. The RCAs needed to be acquitted by 28/01/2010.

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24th December 2009: Dominic James notice of suspension of CPL, ATPL, CIR pursuant
to CAR 265(1)(a). Also given notice to undertake examinations under CAR 5.38.

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24 December 2009: Pel-Air successfully completed Phase 2 items and were able to
recommence international operations.

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8 January 2010: CASA issue 7 more RCAs and several more AO, all of which Roger
Chambers the Audit Coordinator signed on behalf of several SAR team members.

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8 January 2010: Audit Report completed.

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13 January 2010: ATSB issue preliminary report AO-2009-072.

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 1 February 2010: Quote from TSBC report ".. the team leader and the general manager (GM) decided to provide CASA with a briefing on the perceived safety issue. The briefing was held by video conference on 03 February 2010. On 12 February, the primary contact at CASA followed up with a phone call to the IIC asking the ATSB to send a letter describing the safety issue.

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3 February 2010: Video conference meeting between the ATSB and CASA to discuss
critical safety issue.

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4 February 2010: Internal CASA email ATSB identification of a 'critical safety issue' may have ramification for CASA actions in relation to Mr James (ref links - #217 & PDF 913KB )

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9 February 2010: Internal ATSB email regarding the ATSB and CASA's approach to the Pel-Air investigation (ref links - #217 & PDF 1093KB )

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12 February 2010: Mr R White ALIU Manager contacts Mr Michael Watson the ATSB
‘investigator in charge’ to request a supporting letter that described the critical safety
issue.

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15 February 2010: ATSB create a PDF of the Preliminary Report to forward to ICAO ADREP database office. However it would appear that this PDF copy was not forwarded to ICAO until 10 November 2015. (ref link - #149 & ICAO1 ) Ps The original VH-NGA Final Report was never forwarded to ICAO.

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26 February 2010: Mr Sangston Director of Aviation Safety Investigations writes to Mr
White addressing the critical safety issue with the requested supporting documentation.

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19 March 2010: CASA LSD draw up and distribute ‘AT10-23 NORFOLK ISLAND SAFETY
ISSUE LEGAL DRAFT 19 MARCH.doc’.

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20 March 2010: CASA internal e-mail that highlighted a 50:50 split within the CASA
inspectorate on when to divert to an alternate.

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23 March 2010: ‘AT10-23 NORFOLK ISLAND SAFETY ISSUE LEGAL DRAFT 19
MARCH.doc’ approved for Mr White to send by CASA Corporate Relations and Strategy
(i.e. Grima and co).

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23 March 2010: Dominic James licenses cancellation matter (CAR 265(1) (a)) was
originally set down for mention in the AAT.

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26 March 2010: Mr White and CASA initial response to critical safety issue.

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31 March 2010: ATSB e-mail Mr White ALIU Manager requesting information under S32
on Pel-Air’s Air Ambulance classification of Operations and Noumea French regulator
restrictions on Pel-Air Operations. Note: There is no record/copy of this e-mail.

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14 April 2010: Mr White’s replies to ATSB e-mail 31 March 2010. Reference Senate
Inquiry page under ‘Additional information’ item 3.

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22 April 2010: Follow-up meeting between ATSB and CASA (John Grima and co) on the
CSI matter was held in CASA’s Woden, ACT offices. Reference AQON 22/10/12 ATSB
(Hansard, pg 66).

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10 May 2010: 'Special Fatigue Audit: Jetstar' the 'Cook report' was released (ref links - #219 & PDF 5210KB )

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26 May 2010: At a 'regular' meeting between John McCormick (former CASA DAS) and Martin Dolan (former ATSB Chief Commissioner), McCormick advised Dolan that in light of the ongoing PelAir parallel investigation, that CASA would be conducting an internal review of it's audit and surveillance processes.(ref link - #97)  

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27 May 2010: The Hon Anthony Albanese MP and former Minister for Infrastructure, Transport & Regional Development  officially opens the REX Australian Airline Pilot Academy. (ref link - #97)  

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11 June 2010: Correspondence from CASA ALC (assigned legal counsel) Joe Rule to DJ Legal Counsel in reply to questions asked on the DJ FCL suspension in the lead up to a proposed AAT hearing. This 'answering' correspondence would appear to indicate that CASA LSD were also misled in relation to the 0803 AMD TAF. (ref link - #109 & http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2....6.101.pdf )  

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15 June 2010: ATSB receive e-mail from Pel-Air detailing actions done in response to
CASA Special Audit.

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21 July 2010: CAIR 09/3 completed.

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28 July 2010:  Quote from TSBC peer review report - "On 28 July 2010, CASA briefed the ATSB on the findings of its regulatory investigation into the ditching, which it had done in parallel with the ATSB investigation.Footnote 12 "The team leader obtained a copy of the CASA investigation report in March 2011."

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1 August 2010: 'Chambers report' created (ref link - #217 ) 18 August 2010: Internal CASA email regarding the discussion with the ATSB over the content of the ATSB report (ref links - #217 & PDF 1193KB )

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11 January 2011: CASA email chain, initiated by Roger Chambers,  on Dominic James CEP (Coordinated Enforcement Process) . Highlights one of the many times the CEP was varied and the senior management ranks that had a vested interest in the PelAir ditching matter. (ref link - #98 )

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18 March 2011: Tabled document received from Senator Xenophon in Canberra. Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) report titled on 'Special Fatigue Audit: Jetstar' (ref links - #219 & PDF 5210KB ) 

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18 March 2011: Pilot Training Inquiry QON asked in the course of public hearing (ref links - #219 & QON 18/03/2011 )

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March 2011: (see 28 July 2010 ref above)

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5 August 2011: With little to no fanfare CASA DAS John McCormick issues a regulatory policy directive ( ref link - #74  & Download das-pn015-2010.pdf)  titled "ATSB Cooperation Policy". Appears to be a threat to any CASA Officers not to talk out of school to the ATSB. 

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11 November 2011: Former Pel-Air Chief Pilot and recently appointed CASA FOI
(February 2011) Mr. Wickham participates (observer) in a CASA approval process for a
Pel-Air Check Pilot. Note: Wickham originally applied for a position with CASA as a Flight
Training Examiner in August 2010.

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26 March 2012: Mr Sangston approves Final Report draft release to the directly involved
parties (DIP) for comment on its factual accuracy. Comments were requested from DIP
by 23 April 2012.

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24 May 2012: Internal ATSB email- reviewer wanting to look more closely at FRMS and re-interview pilots (ref links - #217 & PDF 535KB )

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24 May 2012: Internal ATSB email- reviewer indicating they can't deviate at this point and they have to work with what they have (ref links -  #217 & PDF 360KB )

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27 March 2012: CASA Delegate Greg Hood signs a 'notice of variation' & 'notice of revocation' correspondence to Dominic James . This notice was supported by, a Hood signed, Roger Chambers authored  'Standard Form Recommendation'. (ref link - http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/FOI4.pdf )

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30 March 2012: Roger Chambers correspondence to CASA (cast of thousands) officers involved in DJ CEP, notifying for administrative purposes the Hood signed 27 March 2012 notice. (ref link - #98 & #100 )

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30 June 2012: Roger Chambers correspondence to DJ notifying him that omission of the agreed conditions on his FCL is illegal and those conditions will now have to be published on his FCL. This notice gave DJ seven days to respond. (ref link - #103 )  

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4 July 2012: The ATSB requested a copy of the CASA special audit report under a
section 32 notice. A copy of the report was received on 9 July 2012.

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16 July 2012: Draft 2 issued to DIP.

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18 July 2012: Roger Chambers recommendation to add conditions to DJ FCL. Included a Roger Chambers authored SFR that was not signed by CASA Delegate. (ref link - #103 & http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Dominic-James-documents-released-19-Oct-17-Volume-1.pdf )

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July-Aug 2012: REX Airlines declares political donations of 250K to the ALP; 95.7K to the Nationals; & 40K to the Liberals (ref link - http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-10-24/ae...le/7959394 & #94)

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6 August 2012:  Internal ATSB email regarding the inconsistency in safety knowledge of ATSB staff ( ref links - #217 & PDF 1597KB )

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8 August 2012: Flight Nurse Karen Casey submits an FOI request with CASA FOI Legal
Services Division asking for a copy of the CASA Special Audit Report.

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16 August 2012: ATSB Commission approve s25 release of Final Report AO-2009-072
and officially reclassify the ‘safety issue’ to minor.

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30 August 2012: ATSB Final Report AO-2009-072 released.

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31 August 2012: Final Report amended and re-issued.

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3 September 2012: 4 Corners ‘Crash Landing’ program goes to air 8:30pm.

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12 September 2012: E-mail chain (Carmody and Dolan) discussing Senator Xenophon’s
proposal for a possible Senate Inquiry into the ATSB Final report AO-2009-072 (the
tendentious bloggers e-mail).

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13 September 2012: Senate referred the Aviation Accident Investigations (Pel-Air) to
the Senate Standing Committees on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport for inquiry
and report.

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26 September 2012: CASA FOI and Finance officer (LSD) Jennifer Smith-Roberts
releases a redacted version of the CASA SAR to Karen Casey.

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26 September 2012: RRAT committee request ATSB for documents to assist the
committee with its inquiry.

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3 October 2012: Reply from ATSB (Dolan) to committee correspondence requesting
documentation.

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10 October 2012: Ten documents, including the infamous Chambers Report, were received (presumably sent anonymously) by the RRAT Committee Secretariat in relation to the Senate AAI Inquiry. However these documents were not formally tabled till the day before the extraordinary 15 February 2013 public hearing. (ref link - #24 )    

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19 October 2012: ATSB send RRAT Committee correspondence and attachment in
response to submissions from Aherne, Quinn and Currall, which had been approved by
the committee to be publicly available.

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22 October 2012: First Public Hearing for Senate ‘Aviation Accident Investigations’
Inquiry.

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6 March 2014: Senator Xenophon's CAO 48.1 disallowance motion gets voted down in the Senate (ref Hansard: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genp...tion%2Fpdf & http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/sear...%2F0120%22 )

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10 November 2015: PDF copy of 2010 AO-2009-072 Preliminary report ( Aus_Isreal_VH-NGA_18Nov2009_prelim.pdf) is bizarrely modified and added (2126 days after it was created) to the ICAO iSTAR/ADREP database by the ATSB REPCON Manager Elaine Hargreaves. (ref links - 15 February 2010 entry & #56 + https://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking.../17/52003/) 

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24 October 2017: The CASA Board has directed that an independent review of the fatigue rules for operators and pilots contained in Civil Aviation Order (CAO) 48.1 Instrument 2013 will be undertaken in 2017 as a result of feedback received from various sections of the aviation industry.

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30 November 2017: Quote from CASA FOI Officer David Gobbitt correspondence email to Dominic James - "I have not been able to locate a signed copy of the SFR...However, as stated by Adam Anastasi in his email to you dated 27 October 2017, even if the delegate had not signed the SFR, the fact of the delegate sending the decision letter to you on 24 December 2009 would clearly have signified that the delegate accepted the recommendations in the SFR..." (ref - #126 & #331.)

Earlier in the week the following email was sent to a number of IOS and BRB members:

Subject: FAA's view of CASA

Safety fears came close to freezing air route
Dylan Welch September 1, 2011

THE United States was so concerned about the state of Australia's air safety system in 2009 that it considered freezing flights from Australia to the US, a downgrade that normally only affects countries from the developing world.

The revelation, in a US State Department cable released this week by WikiLeaks, discussed a recent safety inspection by the US's Federal Aviation Authority, which audits countries whose carriers fly to the United States to ensure they meet appropriate safety standards.

In the cable, from December 2009, it is revealed the FAA told Australia's Civil Aviation Safety Authority that Australia could face a downgrade to ''Category 2'' due to a shortage of properly trained safety inspectors and too much delegation of CASA's regulatory function to carriers.
Advertisement: Story continues below

A Category 2 rating suggests the FAA believed the country's safety regime does not meet international standards. It is a category mainly used for countries in the developing world.

''A downgrade to Category 2 would be the worst-case scenario, which would entail measures such as freezing Australia-US flight operations to current levels and terminating code-sharing arrangements, such as the one between Qantas and American Airlines,'' the cable stated.

''CASA officials are not taking this possibility lightly and seem committed to resolve the shortcomings in order to avoid a downgrade.''

The findings resulted from a five-day safety audit by the FAA in late 2009, which found ''significant shortcomings'' in CASA's maintenance of the Australian aviation regulatory system.

CASA has been criticised for delegating too much of its regulatory obligations to the flight carriers in the past and the FAA audit may have been the last straw.

In the 2010 budget, the government announced a large funding increase for CASA.

The FAA audit may also help explain why CASA was so severe when cracking down on Tiger earlier this year.

Trying to understand the significance of this archived media article I suddenly realised that we are approaching the 10th Anniversary of the infamous, obfuscated and potentially (at the time) embarrassing FAA audit...  

This prompted me to reply to the email and to put out on social media the following...  

Interesting:

Dylan Welch
Dylan Welch is a reporter for ABC Investigations. A former Afghanistan correspondent for Reuters and a national security and crime reporter for the Sydney Morning Herald and Melbourne's The Age, he was co-nominated for a Walkley Award for investigative reporting in 2011 for stories about the secretive NSW Crime Commission. You can contact him at welch.dylan@abc.net.au, Twitter @dylanwelch, and Signal at +61 481 728 943 (messages only). For secure communication please read this: https://pastebin.com/raw/rA9XumZ2
Contact Dylan Welch

I wonder if Dylan Welch would like an update on the current state of affairs within the Australian aviation safety system? i.e. nothing has changed

For his reference:
 

US fears about Australian airlines' safety revealed http://www.traveller.com.au/us-fears-abo...aled-1jlkt via @TravellerAU

US fears about Australian airlines' safety revealed
Dylan Welch




[img=0x0]http://www.traveller.com.au/content/dam/images/1/j/l/n/f/image.related.articleLeadwide.620x349.1jlkt.png/1314774111850.jpg[/img]Safety concern ... Wikileaks reveals the US Federal Aviation Authority found 'significant shortcomings' with Australian airline safety. Photo: James Alcock
[size=undefined]The US was so concerned about the state of Australia's air safety system in 2009 that it considered downgrading Australian airlines flying to the US.

The revelation, in a US State Department cable released this week by WikiLeaks, discussed a safety inspection by the US's Federal Aviation Authority, which audits countries whose carriers fly to the United States to ensure they meet appropriate safety standards.[/size]
[size=undefined]
In the cable, written in December 2009, it is revealed the FAA told Australia's Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) that Australia could face a downgrade to "Category 2" due to a shortage of properly trained safety inspectors and too much delegation of CASA's regulatory function to carriers.

A Category 2 rating suggests that FAA believes the country's safety regime does not meet international standards. It is a category mainly used for countries in the developing world.

"A downgrade to Category 2 would be the worst-case scenario, which would entail measures such as freezing Australia-US flight operations to current levels and terminating code-sharing arrangements, such as the one between Qantas and American Airlines," the cable stated.
[/size]

A downgrade to Category 2 would be the worst-case scenario, which would entail measures such as freezing Australia-US flight operations to current levels and terminating code-sharing arrangements.

[size=undefined]
"CASA officials are not taking this possibility lightly and seem committed to resolve the shortcomings in order to avoid a downgrade."[/size]

Read more: http://www.traveller.com.au/us-fears-about-australian-airlines-safety-revealed-1jlkt#ixzz5rXGidhsn 
Follow us: @TravellerAU on Twitter | TravellerAU on Facebook

How things have changed - NOT! @dylanwelch RT: Dear Lachie I & II https://auntypru.com/forum/showthread.ph...74#pid8374 & http://www.auntypru.com/forum/showthread...73#pid8873 + https://auntypru.com/forum/showthread.ph...82#pid8182
Plus: https://auntypru.com/?s=essendon+dfo+accident

Rgds P2.

   
In the lead up to this historical but almost totally obfuscated event; AP will do a series of exposé posts and endeavour to join some more dots and fill in a few more of the gaps on the TOE (timeline of embuggerance) chronology (above)...  


MTF...P2