P2 – “Where's the bucket Ol'Tom?”
That – is (I hope) a tongue in cheek understatement. We need a long drop outdoor dunny to deal with the copious amounts of Canary comment induced vomit from just the fatuous remarks department. I never though we’d miss Beaker, with all his faults even He would not say anything as risible as:-
Hood - “aircraft and aircraft systems need to be designed in anticipation of and tolerant to foreseeable inadvertent pilot actions.” (retch).
Seriously? – For Ducks sake. Backtrack the ATR event to weather briefing; fly along until the top of descent and watch as the aircraft is mindlessly configured for a ‘high speed’ descent; no mention of Turbulence penetration speed consideration; just punch the descent into the box and sit back – the turbulence was forecast and; as any pilot who ever flew between Canberra and Sydney will tell you – it can get ‘bumpy’. No ‘wind shear’ warning in any of the weather information – just turbulence and inversion (hint- hint).
"Recommended procedures: A simple rule of thumb would be to split the difference and fly a speed that is approximately half way between Vs1 and Va. However, a slightly faster speed will help improve controllability in very rough conditions. Since airspeed will be varying considerably in turbulence, it is not important that the pilot try to maintain an exact speed, but rather work to maintain near a level attitude and not exceed either the Va or Vs1 limits. The Continental Airlines B-737 Flight Manual offers the following excellent guidance which is also applicable to light aircraft, “The two major concerns when encountering turbulence are minimizing structural loads imposed on the aircraft and avoiding extreme, unrecoverable attitudes.”
So, Ok an experienced crew may not come all the way back to snail speed – but would/should build a ‘buffer’ between two extremes; keeping a few knots off the clock in case the speed picks up toward ‘risky’ and prevent not only ‘over speed’ but potential air-frame damage. Certainly fast enough to keep things ticking over nicely. Not rocket science – Airmanship, professionalism, understanding, due diligence and old fashioned common sense.
So Tweedledee and Tweedledum are bowling along – shock horror – the forecast inversion and the forecast moderate turbulence have caught them out. Too bloody fast mate – over speed approaching. OK – back off the power – ease the nose up - reduce the descent rate and proceed at a reduced speed. No brainer – routine – easiology. Nope, out hero’s elect to not only disregard SOP and manufacturer procedure; but engage in an arm wrestle for control. Can’t remember the number of foot/pounds needed to be deliberately applied to separate the elevator channels - but it is a big one, i.e. you have to mean it. So we have a situation where – at a relatively high speed – one side of the elevator gets an ‘UP’ command – the other a ‘DOWN’ force and, no surprise it breaks. Training error, discipline error, operational error, pilot error – maybe plain old panic and incompetence. Plenty of options there – one option though can easily be ruled out; manufacturer and design error. Hood speaks through his posterior orifice. Disgraceful, deceitful and wrong.
Not content with making a fool of himself in front of aircraft manufacturers and aircrew all over the world – he then tries to ‘piggy-back’ into the Boeing mess to try and give the impression that ‘he’ is a sage, experienced doyen of aircraft systems and their design.
Hood - “Aviation safety regulators and aircraft manufacturers need to address previously unforeseen aircraft design consequences during the operational life of an aircraft type.’
It is good thing he can speak through his posterior orifice – because he is full of it. Clown!
Toot – pass the bucket – toot.
Sotto voce – I ain’t done with this yet – not by a long march.
That – is (I hope) a tongue in cheek understatement. We need a long drop outdoor dunny to deal with the copious amounts of Canary comment induced vomit from just the fatuous remarks department. I never though we’d miss Beaker, with all his faults even He would not say anything as risible as:-
Hood - “aircraft and aircraft systems need to be designed in anticipation of and tolerant to foreseeable inadvertent pilot actions.” (retch).
Seriously? – For Ducks sake. Backtrack the ATR event to weather briefing; fly along until the top of descent and watch as the aircraft is mindlessly configured for a ‘high speed’ descent; no mention of Turbulence penetration speed consideration; just punch the descent into the box and sit back – the turbulence was forecast and; as any pilot who ever flew between Canberra and Sydney will tell you – it can get ‘bumpy’. No ‘wind shear’ warning in any of the weather information – just turbulence and inversion (hint- hint).
"Recommended procedures: A simple rule of thumb would be to split the difference and fly a speed that is approximately half way between Vs1 and Va. However, a slightly faster speed will help improve controllability in very rough conditions. Since airspeed will be varying considerably in turbulence, it is not important that the pilot try to maintain an exact speed, but rather work to maintain near a level attitude and not exceed either the Va or Vs1 limits. The Continental Airlines B-737 Flight Manual offers the following excellent guidance which is also applicable to light aircraft, “The two major concerns when encountering turbulence are minimizing structural loads imposed on the aircraft and avoiding extreme, unrecoverable attitudes.”
So, Ok an experienced crew may not come all the way back to snail speed – but would/should build a ‘buffer’ between two extremes; keeping a few knots off the clock in case the speed picks up toward ‘risky’ and prevent not only ‘over speed’ but potential air-frame damage. Certainly fast enough to keep things ticking over nicely. Not rocket science – Airmanship, professionalism, understanding, due diligence and old fashioned common sense.
So Tweedledee and Tweedledum are bowling along – shock horror – the forecast inversion and the forecast moderate turbulence have caught them out. Too bloody fast mate – over speed approaching. OK – back off the power – ease the nose up - reduce the descent rate and proceed at a reduced speed. No brainer – routine – easiology. Nope, out hero’s elect to not only disregard SOP and manufacturer procedure; but engage in an arm wrestle for control. Can’t remember the number of foot/pounds needed to be deliberately applied to separate the elevator channels - but it is a big one, i.e. you have to mean it. So we have a situation where – at a relatively high speed – one side of the elevator gets an ‘UP’ command – the other a ‘DOWN’ force and, no surprise it breaks. Training error, discipline error, operational error, pilot error – maybe plain old panic and incompetence. Plenty of options there – one option though can easily be ruled out; manufacturer and design error. Hood speaks through his posterior orifice. Disgraceful, deceitful and wrong.
Not content with making a fool of himself in front of aircraft manufacturers and aircrew all over the world – he then tries to ‘piggy-back’ into the Boeing mess to try and give the impression that ‘he’ is a sage, experienced doyen of aircraft systems and their design.
Hood - “Aviation safety regulators and aircraft manufacturers need to address previously unforeseen aircraft design consequences during the operational life of an aircraft type.’
It is good thing he can speak through his posterior orifice – because he is full of it. Clown!
Toot – pass the bucket – toot.
Sotto voce – I ain’t done with this yet – not by a long march.