[Peetwo]

Feely – Touchy? Tin Hat?

CG – “I want to know why it is acceptable to "practice" EFATO at 400 feet in Australia when the UK and USA insist on 3000 feet.”


Good question. Some aircraft; of which I have a little more than a nodding acquaintance, are grossly misrepresented in the ‘Grand-Fathered’ simulator approvals. In fact, recently I have flown three individual simulators which, IMO, are so far removed from ‘reality’ that apart from ‘systems’ and procedural training, they are as far as it is possible to get from ‘the aircraft’.  Taxi and Tin Hat about now......But I'll stand by it.- FWTW.

As said; they are great for sorting multi crew operations into a routine and a thinking pattern; fantastic for analysing a series of lights and warnings; very good at demonstrating how one failure can lead to another etc & etc. No quarrel with any of that, indeed I would support the notion that ‘Sim’ training is cost effective and valuable. But, it is not the end of the Rainbow. Not by a long march.

Much depends on the Sim operator. There are some who will ‘tick-a-box’ and, provided the client company is happy with this outcome, then all is well. No come-back in the event of an accident. Then, you have operations in the class of Flight Safety; these guys are good. Their simulators and their tech support is fantastic; their Sims as close as possible to ‘reality’ and they can talk to the FAA about what’s best and fairest. If the world followed the FS ethic and philosophy, I would not be banging on here. Alas…

The ‘quality’ is not in the ‘movement’ or the ‘visuals’.  The quality is based on the amount of expense the provider is prepared to go to in order to achieve a realistic flight envelope. The ‘low end’ provider will take the data from one test flight envelope as use that as the ‘base’ for the software. Folk like FS will take (pay for) all the flight envelope data they can get and spend as much time and money as they can on getting the aircraft simulator ‘right’. Small things. like synchronising the visuals with movement is incredibly time and money consuming.

Many don’t care about the accuracy of simulation. They want pilots in and out in the shortest time acceptable at minimum cost. The oldest and most hoary of faery tales is “just get it done in the Sim” we’ll teach you fly the aircraft later. Qualified – Oh yes. Safe? Well that would depend on reliability and Lady Luck.

There is defined ‘gap’ between be legally qualified and operationally competent in some ‘training’ programmes.

There exists a confusion within official minds that the Sim can make for a ‘safer’ pilot. This notion will only be tested when pilots begin to say the magic word “No”. Or in my case “No Way” to some of the outlandish demands of CASA FOI who expect an aircraft to behave in exactly the same fashion as the Sim.

Back in the day – even Qantas required that any qualifying check was conducted ‘in the aircraft’. Not so much today – but Sim’s have improved, particularly at airline level so this, in a controlled environment is acceptable. Down stream, from top class airlines – things are not so cut and dried. Therein lays the quandary.

For example – the Conquest Negative Torque System (NTS). If the engine is not sensing ‘negative torque’ then the system will not (Categorically) work – it cannot. Therefore, simply simulating an engine failure will produce a ‘worst case’ scenario i.e. a propeller at full flight fine pitch – as in a barn door on one side. The rate of speed wash off is well documented in the certification data, along with the ‘sloppy’ low speed aileron/ elevator effectiveness. Cool in the Sim;-but in real life? Seriously? Once again CASA’s legal arse end covered – the bodies are of no significance. Lord - have Mercy…

Toot – toot.

Addendum: It would appear that once again we are going down the (very scary) MOAS black hole...  Therefore for the benefit of CG, plus those curious in the aviation safety embuggerance timewarp in this country, could i suggest a simple search word be placed into the AP search function - ie Brasilia : https://auntypru.com/forum/search.php?ac...order=desc

Now scroll to the bottom of the page and slowly work your way up...

The following quotes, from the 1st couple of links provided, highlights the disconnection between industry expectations of the ATSB as the so called 'aviation safety watchdog' and the reality of what the agency has become - i.e a neutered and muzzled. mangy mutt...   

..Finally the following quote from AIPA's ASRR submission perhaps highlights the view of many of Qantas pilot's (at least) in regards to having & maintaining a fully independent State AAI:

AIPA’s submission specifically questioned whether CASA’s role in the aviation system was being adequately scrutinised, but the harsh reality is that the same question could be asked in relation to any of the agencies directly or indirectly influencing aviation safety. 

Current knowledge, post the Senate Inquiry, suggests not.

AIPA believes that the ATSB has a very clear duty under the TSIA to independently and holistically examine the aviation safety system. Pandering to the ego or behaviour of any stakeholder is anathema to the principles under which the ATSB was established and AIPA strongly believes that the safety message should never be lost in the telling. We strongly support the notion of the ATSB as the watchdog of agency influence on aviation safety.

[b]Recommendation 3[/b]

AIPA recommends that the Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development issue a directive to the ATSB clarifying that paragraphs 12AA(1)(b) and © of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 require holistic examination of the aviation safety system, including the regulatory framework, and that cooperation and consultation with stakeholders must not be permitted to compromise the independence of the ATSB or the making of safety recommendations.

Nonetheless, AIPA recognises two important factors: first, the current generation of senior ATSB managers may find it difficult to step out of Miller’s shadow; and second, the ATSB is not and never should be a routine auditor of the aviation safety system. AIPA believes that the latter function requires a Machinery of Government change to redress a number of aviation safety governance issues. We will elaborate on that proposal later in this submission.

Addendum - DAS'd hopes.

The following is a link for the PAIN research & opinion piece - Opinion :-ATSB since 2003. In the course of the Senate AAI Inquiry this paper was submitted to the RRAT References Committee for their review.

The part to which AIPA reference in their submission 8 to the Committee is on pages 4 & 5.

From page 5 of PAIN report:

Opinion: This data clearly shows the demise of the Safety Recommendation in Australia but it does not mirror the ‘tremendous’ savings made by not having to administer such an essential database. Which seems to be Mr Dolan’s primary focus.

What the data also clearly shows is that the leading transport investigation authority the NTSB do not share the ATSB philosophy on the issuing of safety recommendations. The
NTSB know that safety recommendations are indeed the cornerstone of their existence and the safety information contained within recommendations will be disseminated across the aviation industry, the travelling public and indeed around the world.

The following is an excerpt of the generic ‘Safety Action’ statement issued with nearly all
ATSB Final Reports within the last two years:

SAFETY ACTION.
Whether or not the ATSB identify safety issues in the course of an investigation, relevant organisations may proactively initiate safety action in order to reduce their safety risk. The ATSB has been advised of the following proactive safety action in response to this occurrence

Opinion: Translated this means is that unless an interested party actually reads the report the safety action information contained within the report is effectively ‘invisible’ and will not be disseminated across worldwide industry stakeholders.

Generating Safety Recommendations ensures that the safety action information is totally
transparent.

PAIN has several substantial volumes of information that show the demise of the ‘Safety
Recommendation’ in Australia, such is our concern on this issue.

We have also examined the final reports on the Pel Air ditching event off Norfolk Island
and the fatal Sydney 'Canley Vale' and Darwin Brasilia fatal accidents; we believe they
provide further examples of compromised ATSB Final Reports.

Also relevant to the discussion is PAIN supplementary submission (click on title) - NGA_Senate_Supplement.pdf - to which Chapter 7 is of particular relevance...

---

&..

...CASA and ATSB; an unholy union?

It really is a hellish tangle. Layer upon layer of obfuscation, work-shopped denial, artful justification and more hyperbole than you could shake a stick at.  I am of course referring to the ATSB confection of investigation; the sweet delights found in the Beyond all Sensible Reason approach. I can’t, not with the best will in the world, do the research and reading for you. Neither can I tell you  how to ‘read’ the material. It is as stultifying, mind numbing, tedious and eye glazing, as it is intended to be.  Practical folk, like pilots (particularly) don’t read the published works of ICAO or the glossy, lengthy dribble published by the ‘agencies’; not in the way a lawyer or a judge would and certainly not in the way ICAO would. These documents are writ in different language, the language of the bureaucrat, the diplomat and the policy maker. So, one needs to dig deep and do some head scratching to translate the offerings.  Not many practical folk will– I flatly refuse to, unless there is a need. The Pel-Air report provides that need, the concerns of the Senate Standing Committee (SSC) drive that need and, IMO the industry, the minister and the travelling public need to be made aware of the dreadful state not just the ATSB is in; but the whole sorry saga of the Australian aviation oversight system, despite the ‘feel good’ rhetoric.  Shall we begin by taking a brief look at history, (the exit? - second on the left)...

    
And on the subject of simulators and CASA's causal history of blue line fever training accidents please refer here: 4D - DOT,DOT,DOT-DASH,DASH,DASH-DOT,DOT,DOT

..History then shows a clear shift in the approach of the ATSB to a ‘softly softly’ approach where organizational issues are brushed aside. A classic is the Air North Brasilia fatal where a whole string of ‘organizational’ matters of great import were written out of the script.  In short, a routine check and training flight ended with two deaths. The question left begging is why two experienced, qualified pilots died that day. The ‘new’ procedures being used were ‘approved’ by CASA, have to be. The practices used in the simulator take the aircraft into ‘borderline’ dangerous situations; which is fine, and; in theory, those practices should translate into in-flight scenario. Well, they did not. There is a CASA FOI who we believe has much to answer for, still gainfully employed, at the well hidden roots of this accident. Part of the ‘organizational’ causal chain; sure, but acknowledged? Don’t be naïve...

P2 comment: "..still gainfully employed.."   Fortunately that Worthless individual is no longer gainfully employed -     
MTF...P2