[Kharon]

With your indulgence – a ramble.

One of the more serious considerations attending the B200 fatal accident at Essendon (Melbourne) this week is the flavour of response to the ‘fall out’ that may be expected from the government. Major fatal accidents have, in the past, resulted in an ‘inquiry’ of some sort. Advance, Lockhart, Monarch, Seaview etc. There is a fairly substantial list which supports the notion that there may well be an ‘inquiry’ into this latest event. History shows that despite the millions spent and the huge volumes of ‘reports’ very little has changed – except the departments concerned learned how to cover up, abrogate and obfuscate; even developed it into an art form. But enough of that, if the Norfolk/Pel-Air ongoing fiasco can’t convince you that despite the sound, fury and expense, little will change, then there is little to be gained from my ramblings. There is an urgent need for an inquiry – right now. This accident brings together almost every major item of grave concern the industry has.  

Airport land being subsumed and building encroaching to the very limits of ‘safe’ areas; built up to the maximum tolerances allowed by ‘law’ is a serious matter. Take a look at the photograph of Archerfield (Brisbane satellite) aerodrome; the built up areas may well be ‘legal’ to the letter of the limitations; but I for one would be reluctant to take a ‘class’ aircraft there, particularly at night in bad conditions; the loom of the lighting alone can and does play tricks on low cloud and rain; even worse for take off. A take off procedure does not end at the runway end; in fact those few precious seconds, after becoming airborne, are the most critical time. Watch any crew taking off into the ‘murk’; the relaxation is tangible once the aircraft is climbing away, cleaned up and the obstacles have been cleared; before that, they are paying very close attention. Why? Take another look at the Essendon story.  Ten foot – three meters, is a big number margin when the aircraft is ‘low and slow’ and has a ‘problem’. Would ‘time and space’ have saved this aircraft? We don’t know, but it is a fact that the aircraft hit a building very close to the runway; 100 meters @ 180 KpH is not a big distance for an aircraft to travel – work out the time taken, it is not very long at all.

Of course much will depend on the ATSB report and findings; but, on past performance – Pel-Air and Mildura for example, (to mention the ones the public are dimly aware of) have been neither satisfactory or effective nor even timely, let alone of any value in preventing a repeat. There are many serious incidents still awaiting anything more than a ‘lip service’ acknowledgement from ATSB. It is a very long list and some of it damn scary; the Virgin ATR; the Mildura close call etc. Now we must wait for what seems to be the normal time period of two to three years for a report; even then, looking back at the most recent efforts, most will agree the wait was in vain.

Then we must consider the CASA role in the accident. Not the surface shine on the mudguard, but the accumulated crud underneath. Any inquiry mounted must be made aware of and made to understand the ‘true’ depth of CASA involvement; right down to the fine detail of the influence and pressure brought to bear on operators to do it the CASA way – or no way. This despite the muttering of protesting ‘experts’. Many hold the opinion that until CASA is completely reformed, from top to toe; maintaining the peripheral agencies is merely theatre; naught but a magicians pantomime, staged to baffle politicians and bamboozle the public.

Last; but by no means least, although excluded from the Essendon crash, are the mandarins who allow these aberrations to continue. Those who provide top cover and influence to ‘protect’ not only the minister and the public from epiphany; but generate the smoke, manufacture the snake oil and keep the mirrors very highly polished.

So, will there eventually be an inquiry into this accident? It’s a fair bet and the odds are easily determined. It is a much tougher challenge to sort out the odds for that inquiry ever producing a ‘satisfactory’ outcome; but it will be a long odds bet, be assured of that.

Aye well, ‘tis but a speculative ramble; not sure why I bothered really; it’s not as though we haven’t seen it all before. The smoke and flames, burning bodies, ground services swinging into dynamic action; the ‘media’ going nuts, politicians looking sombre, early speculation, the endless TV repeats and ‘expert’ commentary, followed by the ATSB scratching about in the rubble trying to piece it all together, CASA ducking out of the back door at a rate of knots; then - not much more. Time ticks by, the often risible report is finally produced; the politicians bang on; a report is tabled; and, just like that –reboot -  it’s all good again. Nothing has changed – not even the chance of this happening all over again in a shopping mall near you.

End of ramble; opinion expressed, my two bob, spent as pleased me best. Now, the old stable awaits me; a place where there are dogs, a work bench, a rack of sharp tools and a part finished high chair for a new soul entering this world. It is a fine place, balm for heart, hands and mind.

Selah.

[Peetwo]

Tiedy the Iron Ring cleaner? -  

Reference from Mount NCN & the UP...  : A blast from the UP past

“..SUMMARIES OF DISCUSSIONS

Topic 2.5: Implementing new safety management process

44. There was unanimous support for the establishment of a new Annex [19] to the Convention dedicated to safety management responsibilities and processes..”

Meanwhile, in Fort Fumble’s parallel universe, the middle management minions were busy enacting their MAP to roger DJ and the ATsB, while attempting to cover up their obvious shortcomings to properly oversight the PelAir operation.

Anyone else see the irony in the two universes?

List of Participants

AUSTRALIA

MCCORMICK J. CD
FARQUARSON T. ACD
TIEDE A.H.R. ANC
ALECK J. D
BOYD P. D
BROOKS L. D
DOHERTY J. D
EVANS P.K. D
MACAULEY K. D

Remembering that Skidmark gave Tiede a gig back in 2015 I was curious to why he was rubbing shoulders with the likes of McComic, Tezza and Dr A way back at the ICAO HIGH-LEVEL SAFETY CONFERENCE 2010 held in Montréal, 29 March – 1 April 2010.

Well a quick background to the inestimable Mr Tiede IMO creates more of a crater than a dot...

Excerpts from the Tiede CV:

Manager CNS/ATM Branch


Company Name
Civil Aviation Safety Authority  

Dates Employed
Mar 2015 – Present  

Employment Duration
•2 yrs 5 mos  

Location
Canberra, Australia    

CNS/ATM Branch undertakes regulatory oversight of Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR):
 Part 65 – Air Traffic Services Licensing
 Part 139H - Aerodrome Rescue and Fire Fighting Services.
 Part 143 – Air Traffic Services Training Providers
 Part 171– Aeronautical Telecommunications Service and Radionavigation Service Providers
 Part 172 - Air Traffic Services Providers
 Part 173 – Instrument Flight Procedure Design
 Part 175 – Aeronautical Information Services

---

General ANS Consultancy


Company Name
Asteeds  

Dates Employed
Jul 2014 – Feb 2015  

Employment Duration
•7 mos  

---

Air Navigation Commissioner


Company Name
International Civil Aviation Organization  

Dates Employed
Dec 2009 – Jun 2014  

Employment Duration
•4 yrs 8 mos  

Location
Montreal, Canada    

Alternate Australian Representative on the Council of ICAO, Vice President of the ANC (2012 & 2013), member ANC Planning (Executive) Team (2010 - 2013), Chair ANC working group for the "Paperless ANC Chamber" including electronic Notice of Proposed Amendment (eNOPA), member ANC working group on "Modernisation of Panels' , Chair ANC working group preparing for AN-Conf/12 (2010 & 2011)

---

Air Navigation Services (ANS) Regional Officer, Asia & Pacific


Company Name
The International Civil Aviation Organization  

Dates Employed
Mar 2004 – Dec 2009  

Employment Duration
•5 yrs 10 mos  

Location
Bangkok, Thailand    

ICAO regional requirements for Air Traffic Management (ATM), Aeronautical Information Services (AIS) and Search and Rescue (SAR), ANS components of Asia/Pacific Regional Air Navigation Plan, technical secretary, technical officer and moderator to long duration ICAO international meetings including APANPIRG, regular technical assistance missions to States, acting Regional Director & long term acting Deputy Regional Director, USOAP auditor for ANS.

---

Air Navigation Services Management Roles


Company Name
Airservices Australia  

Dates Employed
Jan 1994 – May 2004  

Employment Duration
•10 yrs 6 mos  

Location
Sydney, Melbourne    

2001-2004 ATS Safety Manager for Melbourne FIR; 1999-2001 Manager ATS Procedures & ATS Documentation for Melbourne Adelaide & Perth; 1994-1999 Team Leader Desert GROUP including TAAATS transition - Sydney and Melbourne ATS Centres; 1991-1993 Senior ATC Instructor and Training Course Manager (SERCO, under contract to the Regie des Voies Aerienne, Belgium).

---

Air Traffic Controller, (all ICAO ratings)

Company Name
Airservices Australia
Dates Employed
Jan 1980 – May 2002
Employment Duration: 22 yrs 6 mos
Assistant ATC 1980-1983, ATC 1984 - 2002, Tower, Enroute and Approach ratings, operational duties in Sydney, Canberra, Melbourne, Perth, Port Hedland. ATS instructor and Course Manager for BelgoControl Brussels, Belgium

  
 Got a problem - with Airports and DFO buildings, ATC & Airspace, Air Navigation systems; or even an inconvenient ditching - who you going to call??   


MTF...P2

Ps Tiedy's CV certainly makes Harfwit's CV pale into insignificance...

Pps Is it any wonder Mike Smith got rejected this time around - the Iron Ring firmly back in control...

[Peetwo]

PelAir MK II: The IIC white hat within -

In the course of re-hashing on PelAir MK II this historical ' search 4 IP' post - Ghost who walks & talks beyond Reason - I passed on the following copied email (that was tabled:10 October 2012, in the course of the conduct of the Senate PelAir Inquiry) to a DIP for thoughts on the ID of the email author...  

 

After talking to the DIP, & remembering that I originally suspected that the email may have been composed by Dr Walker, I am now firming to the opinion that the email was a desperate plea to Sangston from the original IIC. I also suspect that that email copy was sent independently of the ATSB and was part of 9 documents that were suspiciously received by the Committee Secretariat 2 weeks before the first public hearing on the 22 October 2012 - reference: Tabled docs 11 thru 18 http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Busi...ubmissions .

The two copied emails (tabled docs 16 & 17) would also seem to support the issues the author of email to Sangston had with the drafted Final Report (at that point in time - 6 August 2012) and ironically with the findings of the Senate PelAir inquiry...

---

  
What is also passing strange is that the infamous Chamber's report (Doc 10) was also supposedly received (10 October 2012) by the Secretariat but not tabled/PDF copied until 14 February 2013. Which happens to correspond with when the Chamber's report was publicly revealed at the 15 February 2013 public hearing:

   
 
From that extraordinary public hearing of revelations, obfuscating admissions, spin, bulldust and denials, it would now appear that some of those involved individuals must have been telling the committee porky pies. This is because the existence of the Chambers Report was known at least 12 days before the first public hearing and is listed as a tabled document from CASA (i.e. 01 CASA_Doc 3_Web - PDF). 


MTF...P2


Ps P2 comment - Personally I find it hard to believe that the Committee Secretariat took 4 months to process the 8 documents (including the Chamber's Report) received on the 10 October 2012.

[Peetwo]

All Pel-Air lines of obfuscation lead to?



Albo...err M&M



Couple more dusted off dots to add to the PelAir 'ditching of inconvenience' portrait but first a reference via this week's SBG: The best laid plans of mice and men.

Note that the date they were all received by the Committee Secretariat was on the 10 October 2012. However; the date that all the offending documents were copied/tabled, therefore made available for the Senator Committee members & public consumption, was on the 14 February 2013. This fits with the extraordinary revelations in the Senate inquiry public hearing the following day:  15 February 2013 Canberra, ACT
(HTML format) (PDF 104KB) (HTML & PDF)    

First QON & OBS (so far):

Q/ What was the delay in processing those documents?

Q/ In the context of this inquiry, how is it possible that such critical information and documentation effectively have been sat on (obfuscated), when the inquiry was still some 12 days from it's first public hearing?

&..

...What this appears to indicate is that the documents were sent collectively by an individual/entity/group, independent (officially) of either the ATSB or CASA. This IMO strongly suggests that this was a whistleblower(s) initiative. 

This opinion/suspicion is reinforced by the fact that the documents were received prior to the 1st public hearing and around the date the submissions from both the ATSB and CASA were received and/or copied/tabled.

Now it could be that the normally efficient Senate RRAT committee Secretariat suddenly got swamped by other priorities; or there was some sort of administrative glitch that prevented the 9 anonymously sent and inquiry 'critical' documents, from being processed/tabled for 4 months (128-129 days). However the evidence would appear to contradict the probability of such an aberration occurring.

To begin the timing of the received documents was within the original submissions due date and 2 days before the substantial submissions from the ATSB and CASA were received (& tabled). I can also personally attest (on behalf of PAIN) that subsequent 'supplementary' in camera submissions were processed and notifications of receipt were promptly sent within days of forwarding to the committee. 

I would also add that on a quick review of the 'additional documents received' list indicates that all other documents were tabled within days of receipt. All of these documents were received after the 10 October 2012.

Which brings me full circle back to my original QON (above) with the added QON of WHO or WHAT individual/entity could subvert/obfuscate/delay a parliamentary inquiry? 

For lots of unresolved COI issues, IMO the most obvious candidate that comes to mind is the former minister Albo...

Reference: The tale of Karen Casey post #97

..Coming back to the bizarre REX 250K donation to the federal ALP, when REX repeatedly made claims of a deep loathing of the Labor party and it's former miniscule for non-aviation Albanese, I came across another interesting tit-bit some 6 months after the VH-NGA ditching at Norfolk Island. In reference to this link - HERE - of the official opening of the REX affiliated AAPA (Australian Airline Pilot Academy) on the 27 May 2010...

...Hmm...I suddenly remembered why that date rings a bell...

From the 2nd supplementary submission by CASA to the Senate PelAir cover-up inquiry, Albo's anointed one, McComic attempted to throw the Murky handpicked Muppet Beaker under the bus (note the date):


Coincidence maybe but what would the chances be that Albo & Sharpie, the very next day, would not have discussed the potential PR disaster if the so called independent ATSB were to point out systemic failures from both the operator & the regulator in their final report??

Two years later REX was to give the highest political donation in their history (250K), not to the Nationals but to the ALP??  Yeah right - BOLLOCKS!

Remember this infamous CASA FOI document? https://www.casa.gov.au/files/foi-ef12-8481pdf



That email exchange was bizarrely made public on the CASA FOI disclosure log and was originally one of six documents released in response to a Karen Casey FOI request addressed to the office of the former minister for Infrastructure & Transport:

Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2012 19:30:40 +1100
Subject: FOI MO 13-03 [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED]

Dear Ms Casey

Decision on access - FOI MO 13-03 – Correspondence regarding Pel Air
 
I refer to your request for access to documents in the possession of the Office of the Minister for Infrastructure and Transport in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (the FOI Act). 
 
Your request sought access to:
 
“specific documentation, that being letter or email, with discussion on the Pel-Air ditching between Mr Anthony Albanese, Mr John McCormick (CASA), Mr Martin Dolan (ATSB Chief Commissioner), Mr John Sharpe (REX/Pel-Air), Mr Lim Kim Hai (REX/Pel-Air), and anybody else in the Minister’s Office dated 18/11/2009 to current.”
 
A statement of reasons is attached.
 
Please note that of the attached documents, Document number 1 is an email which refers to two attachments. It was only identified today that these two attachments are within the scope of your request, and therefore I have commenced consultation on these two documents with the third parties subject to this correspondence. One of the third parties was unable to ok their release today and has raised concern that their release prior to consideration could be inconsistent with the Senate proceedings (and to do so may be a contempt of the Senate). Therefore in order to consult appropriately with the third party, consistent with the intentions of the FOI Act, I have withheld one of the two documents from today’s release. However, I will endeavour to send this through by the end of this week once the third party has responded to my consultation request.
 
Please contact me if you have any questions regarding the processing of your request. 
 
Kind regards

 
MTF...P2

Ps. From one of the five other documents released by Albo's office ( & bizarrely one by the CASA LSD/FOI office - ), we get a sense of the arrogance and contempt (the former aviation adviser to Albo) Craig Carmody had not only for Senator Xenophon but for the ABC 4 corners program:     

From: Carmody Craig

Sent: Friday, 24 August 2012 14:51

TO: REDACTED ; Dolan Martin

CC: REDACTED

Subject: RE: Norfolk Island Ditching. [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED]

Four Corners has investigated independently? Are they the new ATSB?

Also, if they are such great investigators – tell them to investigate the ATSB website and they will find the report.

CC

UDB! - Must have something to do with that name...

[Kharon]

Spade or shovel?

What shall we call it? It’s about time we decided to call it something.  Of course it matters not what we may call it. ‘We’ may sit here for ever, ad infinitum, calling it whatever the hell we please; but will that change any damn thing – for the better? – No; it bloody well won’t.

This ‘new’ all singing, all dancing, ATSB shakedown of the Pel-Air accident will steal all the oxygen from the real story. Watch and see; hells bells, I can’t cover the bets on it being a ‘clinical’ analysis of what was, in essence, a fairly simple accident – standing alone.

How the accident came to pass is quite another, very interesting, technical story. With every hole in Doc Reason’s cheese perfectly aligned; sooner or later, someone, somewhere, was going to have ‘an event’. Sure as eggs. You will never, not in a million, hear any one of the agencies involved admit they could have done better. Not from CASA who approved (accepted) the procedures, standards and training of Pel-Air pilots; not from the BoM on how maybe their forecasting updates could be done a little better; not from the briefing or ATC services and, most certainly, not from the CASA officers who were responsible for making sure that standards were met. Forget about it – the big money says Manning will ‘oblige’ and write these elements out of the script. These matters are important; but they won’t signify.

The real story is in the Senate inquiry Hansard. Miles and miles of ‘paperwork’, shed loads of the bloody stuff – which no one had the time, inclination or briefing to examine – very carefully; let alone read and analyse, even if they knew what they were looking for. Then, if a case was supported by ‘evidence’ there would still be the need to prove ‘intent’.

Funny word that – intent – even funnier in legal terms (as in peculiar). In primus, the intent to do “what” must be defined, then that must be proven, beyond a reasonable doubt. There, boys and girls is the rub. You, me and Grand Mamma may be ‘tried’ under strict liability, which makes it difficult to defend yourself. But ATSB and CASA are not bound by the toils and nets of ‘strict liability’; no Sir. To prosecute a Dolan, a McConvict, a Hood or even a Chambers, you must be able to prove the case mounted. Deuced tricky and bloody expensive; to prove what every fool in the Souk knows; they lied through their collective teeth. No point to; or, gain from doing it. However; it must never, ever be allowed to happen again.

The Senate must see to this – gods know ‘we’ can’t change it; much as we would love to. FDS we can’t even get a DAS who knows how to spell reform, let alone make it happen. A decent, honest village idiot for a minister could make it happen; but old Turnbull has more to fuss about than the ethics, morals and practices of Australia’s much vaunted ‘aviation safety issues’ being as crooked as a dogs hind leg. Which leaves us with only ICAO to rely on.

Anyone got a number and two bob I could borrow – I’ll give ‘em a ring, talk to his ‘Excellency’ and see what can be done. Yeah, right; that’s bound to work – not.

No matter, new flights on the darts, my ale has arrived and it is my turn to throw. Best crack on and see if I can pin the tail on the donkey; in Shanghai’s at a dollar a point.

Toot – toot.  {Yus P2, us has had had a couple} – Big smile…….(he worries).

[Peetwo]

Further Senate RRAT committee Secretariat aberrations.  

Reference from above:

All Pel-Air lines of obfuscation lead to?



Couple more dusted off dots to add to the PelAir 'ditching of inconvenience' portrait but first a reference via this week's SBG: The best laid plans of mice and men.

Note that the date they were all received by the Committee Secretariat was on the 10 October 2012. However; the date that all the offending documents were copied/tabled, therefore made available for the Senator Committee members & public consumption, was on the 14 February 2013. This fits with the extraordinary revelations in the Senate inquiry public hearing the following day:  15 February 2013 Canberra, ACT
(HTML format) (PDF 104KB) (HTML & PDF)    

First QON & OBS (so far):

Q/ What was the delay in processing those documents?

Q/ In the context of this inquiry, how is it possible that such critical information and documentation effectively have been sat on (obfuscated), when the inquiry was still some 12 days from it's first public hearing?

&..

...What this appears to indicate is that the documents were sent collectively by an individual/entity/group, independent (officially) of either the ATSB or CASA. This IMO strongly suggests that this was a whistleblower(s) initiative. 

This opinion/suspicion is reinforced by the fact that the documents were received prior to the 1st public hearing and around the date the submissions from both the ATSB and CASA were received and/or copied/tabled.

Now it could be that the normally efficient Senate RRAT committee Secretariat suddenly got swamped by other priorities; or there was some sort of administrative glitch that prevented the 9 anonymously sent and inquiry 'critical' documents, from being processed/tabled for 4 months (128-129 days). However the evidence would appear to contradict the probability of such an aberration occurring.

To begin the timing of the received documents was within the original submissions due date and 2 days before the substantial submissions from the ATSB and CASA were received (& tabled). I can also personally attest (on behalf of PAIN) that subsequent 'supplementary' in camera submissions were processed and notifications of receipt were promptly sent within days of forwarding to the committee. 

I would also add that on a quick review of the 'additional documents received' list indicates that all other documents were tabled within days of receipt. All of these documents were received after the 10 October 2012.

Which brings me full circle back to my original QON (above) with the added QON of WHO or WHAT individual/entity could subvert/obfuscate/delay a parliamentary inquiry? 

&.. from the Senate Estimates thread:

The 2013 Senate RRAT committee Secretariat purge -  

In the course of doing some trolling into the possible culprits that aided & abetted the obfuscation/delay on nine critical PelAir inquiry documents - see HERE & HERE - I discovered some 'passing strange' deckchair shuffling at the RRAT committee Secretariat that saw most of the deckchairs shoved off the deck in the lead up to the 2013 election

Trolling through the details of this apparent Senate RRAT committee Secretariat administration glitch/cover-up, of the nine whistleblower documents; reminded me that this wasn't the only time there was such an administrative aberration inside of the PelAir inquiry...   

Reference excerpt PAIN review document 2013: 

MOU – Parallel investigation discrepancy
 
While researching the enforcement process/action leading up to Mr Hood’s ‘Notice of Suspension’ correspondence 24/12/2009 to Dominic James, I came across what appears to be some very disturbing issues in regards to the CASA/ATSB parallel investigation process in regards to the Norfolk ditching investigation. 
 
Chronology 18/11/2009-24/12/2009 (incomplete).
 
18 November 2009: Ditching 3 NM south-west of Norfolk Island Aerodrome.
 
18 November 2009: ATSB notified of accident and ATSB subsequently notify CASA. The ATSB decide to carry out an investigation and CASA decide to run a parallel investigation, which was initiated on 19 November.
 
Notes:
 

• Quotes/excerpts from Special Audit Report and CAIR 09/3:
   
  Ref: Page 3 of SAR
  
  
  Note: The audit report was released 08/01/2010 but it would appear that Mr White was already appointed in the position of MALIU, the following confirms this fact.
   
  Ref: Page 6 of CASA CAIR 09/3 heading ‘Synopsis’.
   
  
    
  Note:
   
  
• Mr White indicates in the synopsis that he was tasked in an official capacity as MALIU on the day of the ditching. He also (if indeed he was the author of CAIR 09/3) indicates that the parallel investigation was in accordance with para 4.1.2 of the MOU.
  
• However the reference was referring to the yet to be officially promulgated 2010 MOU
   
  Ref: 2010 MOU
  
  And:
  
   
  

• Because I was under the impression that in terms of MOUs (* if anything) the Norfolk Investigation should have been operating under the 2004 MOU. * If anything because it had officially expired but could be subject to extension:
   
  
   
   
  
• Therefore the reference for parallel investigations should have been:
   
  
   
  And:
   
  
   
   
  Note: In looking for a version of the 2004 MOU I remembered that I had copied an attachment from the CASA submission (I believe it was originally labelled Attachment D on the Senate submission page).
   
  What the original document that I downloaded (around about the 22/10/2012) contained was all three previous editions of the MOU, the 2010 MOU and hidden at the bottom the CAIR 09/3 report a total of 102 pages.
   
  As I wanted to review the 2004 MOU in particular, and not being able to initially find my downloaded copy, I decided to go back to the Senate submission page and download again. I eventually tracked the missing document (apparently re-labelled Attachment 5, see link below) and downloaded a pdf labelled b_c_ and d_CASA[1]. What I found was that there were now only 82 pages and the 2001, 2004 MOUs had disappeared.
  

Civil Aviation Safety Authority (PDF 397KB) Attachment 1(PDF 5395KB) Attachment 2(PDF 6218KB) Attachment 3(PDF 5596KB) Attachment 4(PDF 6528KB) Attachment 5(PDF 6032KB) 

Link for original undoctored document - see HERE.

MTF...P2

[Kharon]

No matter how much you shake and dance – etc.

Good catch P2 and a nicely timed reminder of why there is a second version of the Pel-Air report due.

Ahem: we have. I believe, mentioned not only the MoU and associated before but also some of the second tier operatives engaged at the time.

8) We respectfully suggest that the Senate enquiry could potentially be viewed
as incomplete should the testimony of the following individuals not be heard,
examined and duly considered in regard to the current Pel Air enquiry.
Mr. John Grima. CASA
Mr. Michael White. CASA
Mr. Roger Chambers. CASA
Mr. Mike Watson. ATSB.
Mr. Joe Hattley. ATSB.

9) We believe that informed inquiry made of these officers statement and
testimony, under oath could dismiss the notions that haunt the matter; such
as:-

a) The perception that the CASA ALIU team have breached s24 of the 1988
Act, within the parallel investigation in regard to radio transmission
transcript, meteorological information and the proposed enforcement action
against the pilot.

b) The perception that the CASA ALIU team have breached the AGIS 2003
Act and the CASA investigators manual within the parallel investigation.

c) The perception that the investigation was not instigated under the protocol
and prescription set down by act of Parliament.

d) The perception that there was an accommodation reached between the
ATSB and CASA to downgrade a critical safety issue to a minor safety issue.

10) In order to disprove and allay the perceptions held by industry, all E-mails,
letters, and communication logs between CASA (Grima, White, Chambers,
Farquharson, McCormick and Anastassi); and, the ATSB (Dolan, Sangston,
Hattley and Watson) be requested and independently examined against the
record and minutes of meetings between ATSB and CASA before and after
Grima became involved.

Manning’s great opus may examine, in detail the incident, down to the last packet of peanuts; but what of the questions posed by the inquiry which remain unanswered? I can’t see how anyone can walk away from them; if we are to have honesty and integrity from our safety agencies. I can’t really see how a revised report stating that the pilot ran out of fuel is even relevant anymore. What we need to know is why was the Senate inquiry mislead about a relatively simple accident investigation and why has it cost a bloody fortune to get the report which should have been published several years ago and why has nothing; and I do mean sweet sod all, changed.

Toot - toot.

[Peetwo]

PelAir (timewarp) on MoU aberrations cont/- 

From off the UP a post of mine dated 31 December 2014 which I hope helps explain the disconnection between the parallel PelAir investigation and the CASA v ATSB MoU:

  

2015 a year of renewal, regaining trust & credibility or oblivion??

---

Quote:
I find it hard to believe that the ATSB is even going to be allowed to investigate the ATSB, let alone under the Sangston ToR, it's outrageous.
IMO - if the self-serving, self-preserving Bea-cur & the sanctimonious Sanga & Jules are left in place and to their own devices (reference the disgusting Sanga ToR) 2015 could well be the last year of existence for the ATsB as we now know it...

---

Oh and how different it could have been if on receiving the Miniscule directive the above mentioned trio decided to come clean, clear the slate & delegate (as is allowable under Annex 13) the PelAir re-investigation to a credible signatory to the Chicago Convention - such as a TSBC, a NTSB or even the Singapore AAIB.

But we can't have that as there is now too much to lose, too many skeletons in the closet and too much evidence of embuggerance & obfuscation that a grown-up, competent State AAI could not possibly fail to uncover. Not to mention how embarrassing it would be if the lead Aussie agency that is currently heading up the search for possibly the greatest aviation mystery of all time - i.e. the disappearance of MH370 - were found to have been complicit and helped facilitate the PelAir cover-up...

However for the final time - in 2014 at least - let us once again revisit the 'timeline of embuggerance' (TOE) in reference to the Ferryman post (above):

---

Quote:
There are subtle differences (see appendix A); which exclude such things as the AILU (CASA White) becoming 'actively' involved. Then we have the small matter of the parallel investigation which got off the mark remarkably quickly, compared to the usual pace at which these events have, historically, taken place. CASA could have requested and been granted a 'representative' to be taken in as part of the 'team', but the AILU swinging into top gear, jumping the gun and getting embroiled begs some interesting questions.

---

This is indeed both intriguing and confusing... Here are the referenced passages from the two MoUs - 1st 2004 Appendix A:

---

Quote:
ATTACHMENT A- Participation in Investigations

The Parties may agree that a CASA Officer will participate in an ATSB investigation. The CASA Officer will be required to sign an agreement acknowledging their rights and duties, appropriate to the level of their involvement in a transport safety investigation.

Where a CASA Officer is participating in an ATSB investigation they will be under the direction of the Investigator-In-Charge (IIC). The CASA Officer will be given access to evidence to the extent necessary to enable the IIC to effectively complete the investigation.

The ATSB will not normally seek to participate in CASA regulatory investigations, but may request participation in, or information from, any defect investigation undertaken by CASA. ATSB Officers who participate in a CASA investigation must comply with any lawful direction given to them by the CASA Officer-in-Charge of the investigation.

---

2010 MoU:

---

Quote:
ATTACHMENT A- Participation in investigations

1. Participation in investigations will be co-ordinated through the Manager ALIU, CASA and the Director Aviation Safety Investigations, ATSB.
2. The Organisations may agree that a CASA officer may act as an observer or an external investigator for the purposes of an ATSB safety investigation under the direction of the Investigator In Charge (IIC). The CASA Officer will be required to sign an agreement acknowledging his or her obligations and duties, appropriate to the level of their involvement in a transport safety investigation.
3. The CASA Officer will be given access to evidence to the extent necessary to enable the IIC to effectively complete the investigation.
4. The ATSB will not normally seek to participate in CASA regulatory investigations, but may request participation in, or information from, any investigation undertaken by CASA. ATSB Officers who participate in a CASA investigation must comply with any lawful direction given to them by the CASA Officer-in-charge of the investigation.

---

Okay so there are subtle differences mainly in the lines of reporting but the question is which version were they operating under in the case of the PelAir investigation??

Well according to what the TSBC were led to believe it was the 2004 MoU that was being adhered to (from TSBC peer review report):

---

Quote:
Throughout the investigation, ATSB staff and management consulted or briefed CASA staff and management. Attachment A of the Memorandum of Understanding between the ATSB and CASA (October 2004) indicated that, upon agreement by both CASA and ATSB, a CASA officer might participate in the ATSB investigation. In this instance, no CASA officer was designated.

---

{NB: IMO the last line in bold is also significant because prior to PelAir this was a normalised process in cases where AOC holder compliance & regulatory oversight may have been contributory to an accident/incident}

But then two paragraphs down we again get the confusion...:

---

Quote:


On 28 July 2010, CASA briefed the ATSB on the findings of its regulatory investigation into the ditching, which it had done in parallel with the ATSB investigation.Footnote 12 The team leader obtained a copy of the CASA investigation report in March 2011.



Footnote 12 quote...

"...Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), Accident Liaison and Investigation Unit, Accident Investigation Report 09/3: Israeli Aircraft Industry Westwind: VH-NGA: Operated by Pel-Air Aviation Pty Limited: Norfolk Island, 18 November 2009 (Canberra: 21 July 2010)..."

---

See what I mean?? Hmm...but apparently ALIU Whitey was never confused - from the infamous, once hidden CAIR 09/3:

---

Quote:
Synopsis

The Accident was notified to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau {ATSB) who in turn notified the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) on Wednesday 18 November. The ATSB decided to conduct an investigation. The CASA Manager Accident Liaison and Investigation Unit (ALIU) was tasked with conducting a parallel investigation for CASA purposes. An investigation into the circumstances of the accident was commenced the next day. CASA informed the ATSB of the investigation in accordance with sub section 4.1.2 of the joint MOU.

---

Okay so then let us refer to the two MoUs in regards to parallel investigations - 1st 2010 MoU:

---

Quote:
4.1 Parallel investigations:


4.1.1 The ATSB may undertake 'no-blame' safety investigations in accordance with the TSI Act and CASA may separately undertake investigations with a view to possible safety-related action pursuant to its functions under Section 9 and/or Part IIIA of the Civil Aviation Act.
4.1.2 As soon as reasonably practicable after either the ATSB decides to conduct an investigation, or CASA decides to conduct an investigation in relation to a matter that would be a reportable matter to the ATSB, each organisation will notify the other organisation.
4.1.3 If either organisation considers an investigation conducted by the other organisation is creating an unreasonable impediment to the performance of their functions, they will raise the matter with the other organisation.
4.1.4 With respect to its own investigation, each organisation will seek to gather evidence from original sources in the first instance and then, where
practicable, on the basis of information provided by the other organisation.

---

2004 MoU:

---

Quote:
5.1 The parties may undertake separate parallel investigations into an aviation occurrence. In this circumstance the parties agree that the purpose of the ATSB and CASA investigations will be promoted and structured so that there is a clear publicly perceived difference between them, so that the ATSB maintains its prime role as an independent, no-blame investigation agency and CASA's role as
the safety regulator is not compromised.
5.2 Both patties will cooperate to ensure, to the extent practicable, that an
investigation conducted by one party does not impede on an investigation orfunction of the other party.
5.3 If either party considers an investigation is creating an unreasonable impediment to the performance of their functions, they will raise the matter with the other party.
5.4 The ATSB acknowledges that it is not an auditor of CASA's management or operational practices, procedures or decisions. If the ATSB considers that an investigation is likely to extend to involve consideration of CASA's management or operational practices, procedures or decisions (beyond consideration of CASA's regulatory framework), the ATSB will immediately raise the matter with CASA's Deputy Chief Executive Officer before proceeding to investigate that part of the investigation.

---

With the possible exception of the Lockhart River investigation, it would appear that historically it was very rare for CAsA to instigate a parallel investigation on initial receipt of an ATsB notification of an occurrence. Normally CAsA would only become involved in an accident/incident investigation once the ATSB preliminary report had been published and that report indicated areas of regulatory concern. Even then CAsA would be more inclined to instigate a Special Audit and possibly ask to include one of its own in the ATsB investigation of a non-fatal GA (Airwork) incident.

Yes indeed all 'curiously intriguing' but with the Sanga missive not much will be revealed unless of course a certain Senator - who now potentially holds the balance of power - has anything to say about the farce that will be the PelAir re-investigation...

Catch you next year cheers & beers...

[Kharon]

The canary who owns the coal mine; provided he don’t sing.

SBG – Addendum.

Gee Whiz: as they say. I could, with a shove, accept that ATSB and CASA have a huge amount of skin in the Pel-Air game and there is a pressing need to defend their stance. Although how they expect anyone who can read and do ‘joined up’ writing to acquiesce to the current line of fable is just a little outside of my comprehension range.

I wonder how many have actually done the ‘reading’ and joined up the rather large red dots? The dots which can only lead to one, inescapable conclusion – someone was telling fairy stories to a Senate inquiry – well; in my opinion at least they were (for what that’s worth). In the beginning, there was a ‘parallel’ investigation. An almost unprecedented move. As part of that ‘investigation’ the weather forecasts, related to the journey were requested by the AILU (White) and received; so far, so good.

Where one of several wheels come off is when White (whether by accident or design, we don’t as yet know) declares that given the ‘available’ weather information (intimating that the aircrew ignored it) is a 'no brainer' guilty verdict - unimpeachable - what he fails to mention that they were never transmitted.

Now then, picture yourself sitting in a quiet dark cockpit approaching a ‘critical decision point’ you glance at the clock, nudge sleeping beauty awake and say, something along the lines of “what’s the latest at Kickinatinalong (KATA)?” – “Dunno” mutters Sleeping Beauty “didn’t you get the latest?” “Nothing heard; they’re late – busy on HF tonight” you say – “stir ‘em up and see what’s what – PNR in 10 minutes”.  With a little persistence, on the busy night time HF – eventually someone will check the fax and trot out the latest for KATA – then after a moment or three – “there’s an amended for KATA, you want it?”. “Oh yes please” say the crew. About four minutes later the aircraft is diverted to an acceptable alternate aerodrome. That is what happens in reality, when a forecast has not been relayed.

There are some perfectly acceptable reasons for an amended or even a routine forecast not being passed along; well, there are, it happens – no sweat if the operating crew are ‘on the ball’.  This Pel-Air crew were lost in the Twilight Zone of fatigue and complacency; they should have known better, but much like the Lockhart crew they had been deserted and left to fend for themselves by the system, their operations manual, their C&T systems and the company – all under CASA ‘approval’ (acceptance if you want to split the hair).

As far as the Pel-Air crew was concerned everything was ‘groovy’ – routine and no problemo. Had the 0739 and the 0803 reports been passed, matters would have turned out differently - alas.

So much for the flight crew – bit players – they ditched, the rest is history and old hat

What has never been examined is why White (MAILU) melded the weather reports not transmitted into the ‘CAIR 09/3’ travesty. It is (IMO) designed to be read as though the weather reports had been relayed – part of the transcript etc. Which, in turn, begs the question why did CASA persist to support their claims of gross pilot error, through a Senate inquiry? That, boys and girls requires some bloody strong motivation – it was hellish risky. Had there been a quiet withdrawal to a ‘mediated’ ground, such as. “It has come to our attention that that two crucial weather updates were never received by the flight, this, whilst casting some doubt over crew procedures and flight conduct, provides enough grounds to withdraw ‘administrative action’ against the captain." " We as the safety authority, will be conducting an in depth audit of the company procedures, SOP and training”. Fair, yes; reasonable, yes; acceptable, responsible action from the ‘authority’: yes.    

But why, in the light of evidence CASA had before them did they continue to try and avoid the real issues?

But why, in the light of evidence CASA had before them did they do one of the slickest, quickest audits and acquittal of RCA in the history of this planet?

But why, in the light of evidence CASA had before them did they continue and persist in trying to convince a Senate investigation that ‘they’ had the right of it?

But why, in the light of evidence CASA had before them did they continue to embroil the ATSB is this nasty little pantomime?

But why, in the light of evidence CASA had before them did they continue; and, to this day continue, to try and lay all the blame on the flight crew?

Albo washed his hands and turned the dogs loose; Truss tried and ended up with the ASRR which is now an officially ‘forgotten’ document – deemed an inutile opinion. Chester has trouble tying his boot laces without ‘advice’. Three ministers, two governments and CASA just keep on rollin’ along.

I could, I suppose, put it all in simple terms – porky pies have been told– lots of ‘em; the last being the invisible manning’s 531 page edifice which almost, but not quite, fools most of the people, most of the time.

Senators, they are taking the Mickey along with the money and laughing their collective tits off – Hood included. The canary who owns the coal mine, provided he don’t sing. Land rights for gay whales and icebergs in the Yarra don’t signify; not when the integrity and intelligence of a Senate committee is being used to wipe big smiles off smug faces.

P2 has, in some nicely summed up factual data, laid all of this out for you; get one or two of the bright young things to hunt it down and bring it to an end. Before it’s all too little; too late.

Toot (last translation ever) toot. Do try to keep up…….

[Sandy Reith]

Thank you K, your succinct and balanced dissertation nails it perfectly. Nails it with precision and judgment. The two young crew members were brainwashed into believing that the system is so rigorous and all encompassing that it looks after just about every contingency, including passing on crucial information. A system based on fear of the all powerful independent regulator CASA. A system deliberately designed to cower and stultify the untrustworthy scoundrels that recklessly take the unsuspecting into the fearful skies. A system that is not a partnership of responsible equals, but a master and slave system full of strict liability traps with outrageously excessive penalties. A system which is, perversely or inadvertently, aligned to favour the cunning and unscrupulous over the fair and conscientious.

[Peetwo]

The canary who owns the coal mine; provided he don’t sing.

SBG – Addendum.

Gee Whiz: as they say. I could, with a shove, accept that ATSB and CASA have a huge amount of skin in the Pel-Air game and there is a pressing need to defend their stance. Although how they expect anyone who can read and do ‘joined up’ writing to acquiesce to the current line of fable is just a little outside of my comprehension range.

I wonder how many have actually done the ‘reading’ and joined up the rather large red dots? The dots which can only lead to one, inescapable conclusion – someone was telling fairy stories to a Senate inquiry – well; in my opinion at least they were (for what that’s worth). In the beginning, there was a ‘parallel’ investigation. An almost unprecedented move. As part of that ‘investigation’ the weather forecasts, related to the journey were requested by the AILU (White) and received; so far, so good.

Where one of several wheels come off is when White (whether by accident or design, we don’t as yet know) declares that given the ‘available’ weather information (intimating that the aircrew ignored it) is a 'no brainer' guilty verdict - unimpeachable - what he fails to mention that they (the forecasts) were never transmitted.

Now then, picture yourself sitting in a quiet dark cockpit approaching a ‘critical decision point’ you glance at the clock, nudge sleeping beauty awake and say, something along the lines of “what’s the latest at Kickinatinalong (KATA)?” – “Dunno” mutters Sleeping Beauty “didn’t you get the latest?” “Nothing heard; they’re late – busy on HF tonight” you say – “stir ‘em up and see what’s what – PNR in 10 minutes”.  With a little persistence, on the busy night time HF – eventually someone will check the fax and trot out the latest for KATA – then after a moment or three – “there’s an amended for KATA, you want it?”. “Oh yes please” say the crew. About four minutes later the aircraft is diverted to an acceptable alternate aerodrome. That is what happens in reality, when a forecast has not been relayed.

There are some perfectly acceptable reasons for an amended or even a routine forecast not being passed along; well, there are, it happens – no sweat if the operating crew are ‘on the ball’.  This Pel-Air crew were lost in the Twilight Zone of fatigue and complacency; they should have known better, but much like the Lockhart crew they had been deserted and left to fend for themselves by the system, their operations manual, their C&T systems and the company – all under CASA ‘approval’ (acceptance if you want to split the hair).

As far as the Pel-Air crew was concerned everything was ‘groovy’ – routine and no problemo. Had the 0739 and the 0803 reports been passed, matters would have turned out differently - alas.

So much for the flight crew – bit players – they ditched, the rest is history and old hat

What has never been examined is why White (MAILU) melded the weather reports not transmitted into the ‘CAIR 09/3’ travesty. It is (IMO) designed to be read as though the weather reports had been relayed – part of the transcript etc. Which, in turn, begs the question why did CASA persist to support their claims of gross pilot error, through a Senate inquiry? That, boys and girls requires some bloody strong motivation – it was hellish risky. Had there been a quiet withdrawal to a ‘mediated’ ground, such as. “It has come to our attention that that two crucial weather updates were never received by the flight, this, whilst casting some doubt over crew procedures and flight conduct, provides enough grounds to withdraw ‘administrative action’ against the captain." " We as the safety authority, will be conducting an in depth audit of the company procedures, SOP and training”. Fair, yes; reasonable, yes; acceptable, responsible action from the ‘authority’: yes.    

But why, in the light of evidence CASA had before them did they continue to try and avoid the real issues?

But why, in the light of evidence CASA had before them did they do one of the slickest, quickest audits and acquittal of RCA in the history of this planet?

But why, in the light of evidence CASA had before them did they continue and persist in trying to convince a Senate investigation that ‘they’ had the right of it?

But why, in the light of evidence CASA had before them did they continue to embroil the ATSB is this nasty little pantomime?

But why, in the light of evidence CASA had before them did they continue; and, to this day continue, to try and lay all the blame on the flight crew?

Albo washed his hands and turned the dogs loose; Truss tried and ended up with the ASRR which is now an officially ‘forgotten’ document – deemed an inutile opinion. Chester has trouble tying his boot laces without ‘advice’. Three ministers, two governments and CASA just keep on rollin’ along.

I could, I suppose, put it all in simple terms – porky pies have been told– lots of ‘em; the last being the invisible manning’s 531 page edifice which almost, but not quite, fools most of the people, most of the time.

Senators, they are taking the Mickey along with the money and laughing their collective tits off – Hood included. The canary who owns the coal mine, provided he don’t sing. Land rights for gay whales and icebergs in the Yarra don’t signify; not when the integrity and intelligence of a Senate committee is being used to wipe big smiles off smug faces.

P2 has, in some nicely summed up factual data, laid all of this out for you; get one or two of the bright young things to hunt it down and bring it to an end. Before it’s all too little; too late.

Toot (last translation ever) toot. Do try to keep up…….

---

Sandy - Thank you K, your succinct and balanced dissertation nails it perfectly. Nails it with precision and judgment. The two young crew members were brainwashed into believing that the system is so rigorous and all encompassing that it looks after just about every contingency, including passing on crucial information. A system based on fear of the all powerful independent regulator CASA. A system deliberately designed to cower and stultify the untrustworthy scoundrels that recklessly take the unsuspecting into the fearful skies. A system that is not a partnership of responsible equals, but a master and slave system full of strict liability traps with outrageously excessive penalties. A system which is, perversely or inadvertently, aligned to favour the cunning and unscrupulous over the fair and conscientious.

Top post and totally agree Sandy, K unfortunately has taken on the undesirable task of deciphering my research discoveries, ramblings, observations etc. and without exception has been able to translate to at least a level that the average punter can understand...

Now that we are getting to the pointy end of this horrendous tale of unbelievable political/bureaucratic obfuscation, conflict of interest, malfeasance, corruption and self-serving public servant arse covering; I have decided it is about time we re-visited the PelAir chronology/timeline... 

"...Senators, they are taking the Mickey along with the money and laughing their collective tits off – Hood included. The canary who owns the coal mine, provided he don’t sing..."

Based on recent FOI information, combined with many, many more factual dots, dashes and educated analogy I believe the final PelAir portrait will overwhelmingly prove that this sad and sick 8+ year episode in Australian aviation safety history should be properly and independently investigated and prosecuted ASAP -              

Pel-Air: A coverup: a litany of lies? 

Chronology; colour coded to help with making your mind up.

Green - Go head.

Amber - proceed with caution.

Red - Stop and think about it. - Handing over::::-

Pel-Air ATSB/CASA Investigation (AO-2009-072) Chronology from 18/11/2009

– 30/11/2017:

---

18 November 2009: Ditching 3 NM south-west of Norfolk Island Aerodrome.

---

18 November 2009: ATSB notified of accident and ATSB subsequently notify CASA. The
ATSB decide to carry out an investigation and CASA decide to run a parallel
investigation, initiated 19 November.

---

19 November 2009: Pel-Air voluntarily suspend Westwind operation.

---

20 November 2009: Quote from page 97 of PelAir MKII Final report - "The ATSB asked CAAF for ATS records for the flight and the weather information that was provided to the flight crew of VH-NGA. CAAF forwarded the request to the ATS provider and then obtained the records in December 2009 to pass on to the ATSB. This included copies of the 0630 METAR, 0800 SPECI and 0830 SPECI."

---

23 November 2009: Richard White MALIU correspondence to ATSB Director Aviation Safety Investigations, Ian Sangston notifying CASA will be conducting a regulatory investigation into the actions of the flightcrew. Note that there is no reference to 'parallel investigations' under either the 2004 or 2010 MOU (ref link - #122 &  #28).

---

23 November 2009: Richard White receives from Airservices Australia  the complete list of Norfolk Island Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts (TAFs) applicable to the occurrence flight timeframe. This included the Nadi non-relayed 0803 AMD TAF, which appears to be underlined (ref link - #122 & #85 )

---

25 November 2009: Greg Hood file note email (cc'd Jonathon Aleck, Terry Farquharson, John McCormick.). File note No.4 reference to flight recorder recovery would appear to show, at that point in time, that recovery was inevitable (ref link - #125 )

---

26 November 2009: CASA initiate a ‘Special Audit’ conducted between the 26/11/2009-
15/12/2009 at the Pel-Air Bases in Sydney, Adelaide and Nowra.

---

7 December 2009: Audit team meet with Pel-Air management to discuss a number of
deficiencies within the Westwind Operation. This was backed up by correspondence from
CASA on 9/12/2009.

---

8 December 2009: E-mail from ATSB to CASA raising the possibility of contributing to a
joint fund sharing arrangement to recover the black box and CASA advised they didn’t
have the necessary funds.

---

16 December 2009: CASA accept the Pel-Air ‘Management Action Plan’ which consisted
of three phases.

---

18 December 2009: Pel-Air successfully completed Phase 1 items and were able to
recommence domestic operations.

---

23-24 December 2009: CASA overseeing FOI of Pel-Air Eric Demarco issues 14 RCA and
a number of AO. The RCAs needed to be acquitted by 28/01/2010.

---

24th December 2009: Dominic James notice of suspension of CPL, ATPL, CIR pursuant
to CAR 265(1)(a). Also given notice to undertake examinations under CAR 5.38.

---

24 December 2009: Pel-Air successfully completed Phase 2 items and were able to
recommence international operations.

---

8 January 2010: CASA issue 7 more RCAs and several more AO, all of which Roger
Chambers the Audit Coordinator signed on behalf of several SAR team members.

---

8 January 2010: Audit Report completed.

---

3 February 2010: Video conference meeting between the ATSB and CASA to discuss
critical safety issue.

---

12 February 2010: Mr R White ALIU Manager contacts Mr Michael Watson the ATSB
‘investigator in charge’ to request a supporting letter that described the critical safety
issue.

---

26 February 2010: Mr Sangston Director of Aviation Safety Investigations writes to Mr
White addressing the critical safety issue with the requested supporting documentation.

---

19 March 2010: CASA LSD draw up and distribute ‘AT10-23 NORFOLK ISLAND SAFETY
ISSUE LEGAL DRAFT 19 MARCH.doc’.

---

20 March 2010: CASA internal e-mail that highlighted a 50:50 split within the CASA
inspectorate on when to divert to an alternate.

---

23 March 2010: ‘AT10-23 NORFOLK ISLAND SAFETY ISSUE LEGAL DRAFT 19
MARCH.doc’ approved for Mr White to send by CASA Corporate Relations and Strategy
(i.e. Grima and co).

---

23 March 2010: Dominic James licenses cancellation matter (CAR 265(1) (a)) was
originally set down for mention in the AAT.

---

26 March 2010: Mr White and CASA initial response to critical safety issue.

---

31 March 2010: ATSB e-mail Mr White ALIU Manager requesting information under S32
on Pel-Air’s Air Ambulance classification of Operations and Noumea French regulator
restrictions on Pel-Air Operations. Note: There is no record/copy of this e-mail.

---

14 April 2010: Mr White’s replies to ATSB e-mail 31 March 2010. Reference Senate
Inquiry page under ‘Additional information’ item 3.

---

22 April 2010: Follow-up meeting between ATSB and CASA (John Grima and co) on the
CSI matter was held in CASA’s Woden, ACT offices. Reference AQON 22/10/12 ATSB
(Hansard, pg 66).

---

15 June 2010: ATSB receive e-mail from Pel-Air detailing actions done in response to
CASA Special Audit.

---

21 July 2010: CAIR 09/3 completed.

---

28 July 2010:  Quote from TSBC peer review report - "On 28 July 2010, CASA briefed the ATSB on the findings of its regulatory investigation into the ditching, which it had done in parallel with the ATSB investigation. Footnote 12 The team leader obtained a copy of the CASA investigation report in March 2011."

---

March 2011: (see 28 July 2010 ref above)

---

11 November 2011: Former Pel-Air Chief Pilot and recently appointed CASA FOI
(February 2011) Mr. Wickham participates (observer) in a CASA approval process for a
Pel-Air Check Pilot. Note: Wickham originally applied for a position with CASA as a Flight
Training Examiner in August 2010.

---

13 January 2010: ATSB issue preliminary report AO-2009-072.

---

26 March 2012: Mr Sangston approves Final Report draft release to the directly involved
parties (DIP) for comment on its factual accuracy. Comments were requested from DIP
by 23 April 2012.

---

16 July 2012: Draft 2 issued to DIP.

---

4 July 2012: The ATSB requested a copy of the CASA special audit report under a
section 32 notice. A copy of the report was received on 9 July 2012.

---

8 August 2012: Flight Nurse Karen Casey submits an FOI request with CASA FOI Legal
Services Division asking for a copy of the CASA Special Audit Report.

---

16 August 2012: ATSB Commission approve s25 release of Final Report AO-2009-072
and officially reclassify the ‘safety issue’ to minor.

---

30 August 2012: ATSB Final Report AO-2009-072 released.

---

31 August 2012: Final Report amended and re-issued.

---

3 September 2012: 4 Corners ‘Crash Landing’ program goes to air 8:30pm.

---

12 September 2012: E-mail chain (Carmody and Dolan) discussing Senator Xenophon’s
proposal for a possible Senate Inquiry into the ATSB Final report AO-2009-072 (the
tendentious bloggers e-mail).

---

13 September 2012: Senate referred the Aviation Accident Investigations (Pel-Air) to
the Senate Standing Committees on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport for inquiry
and report.

---

26 September 2012: CASA FOI and Finance officer (LSD) Jennifer Smith-Roberts
releases a redacted version of the CASA SAR to Karen Casey.

---

26 September 2012: RRAT committee request ATSB for documents to assist the
committee with its inquiry.

---

3 October 2012: Reply from ATSB (Dolan) to committee correspondence requesting
documentation.

---

19 October 2012: ATSB send RRAT Committee correspondence and attachment in
response to submissions from Aherne, Quinn and Currall, which had been approved by
the committee to be publicly available.

---

22 October 2012: First Public Hearing for Senate ‘Aviation Accident Investigations’
Inquiry.

[Peetwo]

Pel-Air: A coverup: a litany of lies? - Version II

Chronology; colour coded to help with making your mind up.

Green - Go head.

Amber - proceed with caution.

Red - Stop and think about it. - Handing over::::-

Pel-Air ATSB/CASA Investigation (AO-2009-072) Chronology from 18/11/2009

– 30/11/2017:

---

18 November 2009: Ditching 3 NM south-west of Norfolk Island Aerodrome.

---

18 November 2009: ATSB notified of accident and ATSB subsequently notify CASA. The
ATSB decide to carry out an investigation and CASA decide to run a parallel
investigation, initiated 19 November.

---

19 November 2009: Pel-Air voluntarily suspend Westwind operation.

---

20 November 2009: Quote from page 97 of PelAir MKII Final report - "The ATSB asked CAAF for ATS records for the flight and the weather information that was provided to the flight crew of VH-NGA. CAAF forwarded the request to the ATS provider and then obtained the records in December 2009 to pass on to the ATSB. This included copies of the 0630 METAR, 0800 SPECI and 0830 SPECI."

---

23 November 2009: Richard White MALIU correspondence to ATSB Director Aviation Safety Investigations, Ian Sangston notifying CASA will be conducting a regulatory investigation into the actions of the flightcrew. Note that there is no reference to 'parallel investigations' under either the 2004 or 2010 MOU (ref link - #122 &  #28).

---

23 November 2009: Richard White receives from Airservices Australia  the complete list of Norfolk Island Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts (TAFs) applicable to the occurrence flight timeframe. This included the Nadi non-relayed 0803 AMD TAF, which appears to be underlined (ref link - #122 & #85 )

---

25 November 2009: Greg Hood file note email (cc'd Jonathon Aleck, Terry Farquharson, John McCormick.). File note No.4 reference to flight recorder recovery would appear to show, at that point in time, that recovery was inevitable (ref link - #125 )

---

26 November 2009: CASA initiate a ‘Special Audit’ conducted between the 26/11/2009-
15/12/2009 at the Pel-Air Bases in Sydney, Adelaide and Nowra.

---

30 November 2009: Richard White email to John Barr (cc Roger Chambers) confirming Airservices passed on weather & received flight plan details from PIC Dominic James by phone in Apia. (ref link - #122 )  

---

7 December 2009: Audit team meet with Pel-Air management to discuss a number of
deficiencies within the Westwind Operation. This was backed up by correspondence from
CASA on 9/12/2009.

---

7 December 2009: FAA/ICAO brief on 'next steps' after poor results/findings in the ICAO USOAP 2008 Australian audit. (ref links - #53 & WikiLeaks cable PDF: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...ileaks.pdf

---

8 December 2009: E-mail from ATSB to CASA raising the possibility of contributing to a
joint fund sharing arrangement to recover the black box and CASA advised they didn’t
have the necessary funds.

---

16 December 2009: CASA accept the Pel-Air ‘Management Action Plan’ which consisted
of three phases.

---

16 December 2009: Dominic James was 'informally' interviewed by CASA  legal and investigative officers. (ref link - #112 )

---

18 December 2009: Pel-Air successfully completed Phase 1 items and were able to
recommence domestic operations.

---

23-24 December 2009: CASA overseeing FOI of Pel-Air Eric Demarco issues 14 RCA and
a number of AO. The RCAs needed to be acquitted by 28/01/2010.

---

24th December 2009: Dominic James notice of suspension of CPL, ATPL, CIR pursuant
to CAR 265(1)(a). Also given notice to undertake examinations under CAR 5.38.

---

24 December 2009: Pel-Air successfully completed Phase 2 items and were able to
recommence international operations.

---

8 January 2010: CASA issue 7 more RCAs and several more AO, all of which Roger
Chambers the Audit Coordinator signed on behalf of several SAR team members.

---

8 January 2010: Audit Report completed.

---

 1 February 2010: Quote from TSBC report ".. the team leader and the general manager (GM) decided to provide CASA with a briefing on the perceived safety issue. The briefing was held by video conference on 03 February 2010. On 12 February, the primary contact at CASA followed up with a phone call to the IIC asking the ATSB to send a letter describing the safety issue.(ref link -

---

3 February 2010: Video conference meeting between the ATSB and CASA to discuss
critical safety issue.

---

12 February 2010: Mr R White ALIU Manager contacts Mr Michael Watson the ATSB
‘investigator in charge’ to request a supporting letter that described the critical safety
issue.

---

15 February 2010: ATSB create a PDF of the Preliminary Report to forward to ICAO ADREP database office. However it would appear that this PDF copy was not forwarded to ICAO until 10 November 2015. (ref link - #149 & ICAO1 ) Ps The original VH-NGA Final Report was never forwarded to ICAO.

---

26 February 2010: Mr Sangston Director of Aviation Safety Investigations writes to Mr
White addressing the critical safety issue with the requested supporting documentation.

---

19 March 2010: CASA LSD draw up and distribute ‘AT10-23 NORFOLK ISLAND SAFETY
ISSUE LEGAL DRAFT 19 MARCH.doc’.

---

20 March 2010: CASA internal e-mail that highlighted a 50:50 split within the CASA
inspectorate on when to divert to an alternate.

---

23 March 2010: ‘AT10-23 NORFOLK ISLAND SAFETY ISSUE LEGAL DRAFT 19
MARCH.doc’ approved for Mr White to send by CASA Corporate Relations and Strategy
(i.e. Grima and co).

---

23 March 2010: Dominic James licenses cancellation matter (CAR 265(1) (a)) was
originally set down for mention in the AAT.

---

26 March 2010: Mr White and CASA initial response to critical safety issue.

---

31 March 2010: ATSB e-mail Mr White ALIU Manager requesting information under S32
on Pel-Air’s Air Ambulance classification of Operations and Noumea French regulator
restrictions on Pel-Air Operations. Note: There is no record/copy of this e-mail.

---

14 April 2010: Mr White’s replies to ATSB e-mail 31 March 2010. Reference Senate
Inquiry page under ‘Additional information’ item 3.

---

22 April 2010: Follow-up meeting between ATSB and CASA (John Grima and co) on the
CSI matter was held in CASA’s Woden, ACT offices. Reference AQON 22/10/12 ATSB
(Hansard, pg 66).

---

26 May 2010: At a 'regular' meeting between John McCormick (former CASA DAS) and Martin Dolan (former ATSB Chief Commissioner), McCormick advised Dolan that in light of the ongoing PelAir parallel investigation, that CASA would be conducting an internal review of it's audit and surveillance processes.(ref link - #97)  

---

27 May 2010: The Hon Anthony Albanese MP and former Minister for Infrastructure, Transport & Regional Development  officially opens the REX Australian Airline Pilot Academy. (ref link - #97)  

---

11 June 2010: Correspondence from CASA ALC (assigned legal counsel) Joe Rule to DJ Legal Counsel in reply to questions asked on the DJ FCL suspension in the lead up to a proposed AAT hearing. This 'answering' correspondence would appear to indicate that CASA LSD were also misled in relation to the 0803 AMD TAF. (ref link - #109 & http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2....6.101.pdf )  

---

15 June 2010: ATSB receive e-mail from Pel-Air detailing actions done in response to
CASA Special Audit.

---

21 July 2010: CAIR 09/3 completed.

---

28 July 2010:  Quote from TSBC peer review report - "On 28 July 2010, CASA briefed the ATSB on the findings of its regulatory investigation into the ditching, which it had done in parallel with the ATSB investigation.Footnote 12 "The team leader obtained a copy of the CASA investigation report in March 2011."

---

11 January 2011: CASA email chain, initiated by Roger Chambers,  on Dominic James CEP (Coordinated Enforcement Process) . Highlights one of the many times the CEP was varied and the senior management ranks that had a vested interest in the PelAir ditching matter. (ref link - #98 )

---

March 2011: (see 28 July 2010 ref above)

---

5 August 2011: With little to no fanfare CASA DAS John McCormick issues a regulatory policy directive ( ref link - #74  & Download das-pn015-2010.pdf)  titled "ATSB Cooperation Policy". Appears to be a threat to any CASA Officers not to talk out of school to the ATSB. 

---

11 November 2011: Former Pel-Air Chief Pilot and recently appointed CASA FOI
(February 2011) Mr. Wickham participates (observer) in a CASA approval process for a
Pel-Air Check Pilot. Note: Wickham originally applied for a position with CASA as a Flight
Training Examiner in August 2010.

---

13 January 2010: ATSB issue preliminary report AO-2009-072.

---

26 March 2012: Mr Sangston approves Final Report draft release to the directly involved
parties (DIP) for comment on its factual accuracy. Comments were requested from DIP
by 23 April 2012.

---

27 March 2012: CASA Delegate Greg Hood signs a 'notice of variation' & 'notice of revocation' correspondence to Dominic James . This notice was supported by, a Hood signed, Roger Chambers authored  'Standard Form Recommendation'. (ref link - http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/FOI4.pdf )

---

30 March 2012: Roger Chambers correspondence to CASA (cast of thousands) officers involved in DJ CEP, notifying for administrative purposes the Hood signed 27 March 2012 notice. (ref link - #98 & #100 ) 

---

30 June 2012: Roger Chambers correspondence to DJ notifying him that omission of the agreed conditions on his FCL is illegal and those conditions will now have to be published on his FCL. This notice gave DJ seven days to respond. (ref link - #103 )  

---

4 July 2012: The ATSB requested a copy of the CASA special audit report under a
section 32 notice. A copy of the report was received on 9 July 2012.

---

16 July 2012: Draft 2 issued to DIP.

---

18 July 2012: Roger Chambers recommendation to add conditions to DJ FCL. Included a Roger Chambers authored SFR that was not signed by CASA Delegate. (ref link - #103 & http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Dominic-James-documents-released-19-Oct-17-Volume-1.pdf )

---

July-Aug 2012: REX Airlines declares political donations of 250K to the ALP; 95.7K to the Nationals; & 40K to the Liberals (ref link - http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-10-24/ae...le/7959394 & #94)

---

8 August 2012: Flight Nurse Karen Casey submits an FOI request with CASA FOI Legal
Services Division asking for a copy of the CASA Special Audit Report.

---

16 August 2012: ATSB Commission approve s25 release of Final Report AO-2009-072
and officially reclassify the ‘safety issue’ to minor.

---

30 August 2012: ATSB Final Report AO-2009-072 released.

---

31 August 2012: Final Report amended and re-issued.

---

3 September 2012: 4 Corners ‘Crash Landing’ program goes to air 8:30pm.

---

12 September 2012: E-mail chain (Carmody and Dolan) discussing Senator Xenophon’s
proposal for a possible Senate Inquiry into the ATSB Final report AO-2009-072 (the
tendentious bloggers e-mail).

---

13 September 2012: Senate referred the Aviation Accident Investigations (Pel-Air) to
the Senate Standing Committees on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport for inquiry
and report.

---

26 September 2012: CASA FOI and Finance officer (LSD) Jennifer Smith-Roberts
releases a redacted version of the CASA SAR to Karen Casey.

---

26 September 2012: RRAT committee request ATSB for documents to assist the
committee with its inquiry.

---

3 October 2012: Reply from ATSB (Dolan) to committee correspondence requesting
documentation.

---

10 October 2012: Ten documents, including the infamous Chambers Report, were received (presumably sent anonymously) by the RRAT Committee Secretariat in relation to the Senate AAI Inquiry. However these documents were not formally tabled till the day before the extraordinary 15 February 2013 public hearing. (ref link - #24 )    

---

19 October 2012: ATSB send RRAT Committee correspondence and attachment in
response to submissions from Aherne, Quinn and Currall, which had been approved by
the committee to be publicly available.

---

22 October 2012: First Public Hearing for Senate ‘Aviation Accident Investigations’
Inquiry.

---

10 November 2015: PDF copy of 2010 AO-2009-072 Preliminary report ( Aus_Isreal_VH-NGA_18Nov2009_prelim.pdf) is bizarrely modified and added (2126 days after it was created) to the ICAO iSTAR/ADREP database by the ATSB REPCON Manager Elaine Hargreaves. (ref links - 15 February 2010 entry & #56 + https://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking.../17/52003/) 

---

30 November 2017: Quote from CASA FOI Officer David Gobbitt correspondence email to Dominic James - "I have not been able to locate a signed copy of the SFR...However, as stated by Adam Anastasi in his email to you dated 27 October 2017, even if the delegate had not signed the SFR, the fact of the delegate sending the decision letter to you on 24 December 2009 would clearly have signified that the delegate accepted the recommendations in the SFR..." (ref - #126 & #331.)

[Kharon]

Er -That’s the wrong way to tip er rary.

“But, but there’s Choc frog in it for him” P2 muttered: “what’s the hold up?” “You may want to up the ante” say’s P7 “try Ale – works like a charm”. Or so the story goes anyway. Truth is it takes hours to join the dots; do the reading, check the facts and then translate the whole thing into ‘Muggle-speak’. “Can’t do ‘em all at once” says I; P2 nods and say’s “that suits me, if we can just chip away at the pile, it’ll get done”.  “Start on the ‘red’s” say’s P7. So it was agreed; each ‘red’ goes to the network – the responses have to be read and the ‘majority opinion’ presented – “Begin at the beginning” said the King of Hearts.

18 November 2009: ATSB notified of accident and ATSB subsequently notify CASA. The ATSB decide to carry out an investigation and CASA decide to run a parallel investigation, initiated 19 November.

What for and why? The last recorded ‘pseudo’ parallel investigation we can find is the ‘Lockhart River’ event; and even that could not be classified a truly parallel. What is ‘passing strange’ is that there was a song and dance about the role CASA played in operational approvals – led to a mighty big inquiry. Nothing of value to industry came of that expenditure. So we must wonder what prompted (goosed some say) CASA to leap into action under the auspices of a not yet operational MOU, under a brand new Manager of such things. It may well be the first ‘parallel investigation’ in the history of Australian aviation. So why the ‘rush’? ATSB would have plodded their way through the event, come up with some form of answer, maybe even hand balled it over to the CASA front row – something along the lines of “look here – we think the pilot broke a rule or two – you blokes want to check it out?”. That would smack of the normal, the routine and reflect past actions. White had James hung, drawn and bloody near quartered before the aircraft was settled on the ocean floor. Interesting in that context - at least when you consider this:-

23 November 2009: Richard White MALIU correspondence to ATSB Director Aviation Safety Investigations, Ian Sangston notifying CASA will be conducting a regulatory investigation into the actions of the flight crew. Note that there is no reference to 'parallel investigations' under either the 2004 or 2010 MOU (ref link - #122 &  #28).

It becomes intriguing when you weigh in

20 November 2009: Quote from page 97 of Pel-Air MKII Final report - "The ATSB asked CAAF for ATS records for the flight and the weather information that was provided to the flight crew of VH-NGA. CAAF forwarded the request to the ATS provider and then obtained the records in December 2009 to pass on to the ATSB. This included copies of the 0630 METAR, 0800 SPECI and 0830 SPECI."

Within 24 hours ATSB had the ‘official’ record of the flight information provided by CAA Fiji Nadi (Nandi). The ‘majority’ wonder why the BoM/ Air Services list of ‘available’ weather reports differs from the CAAF version. The 0739 and the 0803 critical forecasts existed, a simple cross check would have begged the questions – why did the flight crew not receive them? Did the Fiji ATC actually receive them? These reports are pivotal – with them the decision to divert became option one; without the information – the flight was doomed.

23 November 2009: Richard White receives from Airservices Australia  the complete list of Norfolk Island Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts (TAFs) applicable to the occurrence flight timeframe. This included the Nadi non-relayed 0803 AMD TAF, which appears to be underlined (ref link - #122 & #85 ).

By Nov 23, 09 White had the complete list of weather reports; it must have been a clear as crystal that the flight never received that crucial information. So why persist; even more intriguing is why this information was tarted up and slipped into a report as being ‘received’? That is was not received is bad enough; but to obfuscate the fact to imply that the reports were made available and ignored by the captain is just a little bit naughty.

There, that should get a seeker of truth going, the links provided by P2 provide some fairly easy to follow bread crumbs. You will need to refer back to Post #31 to access those links in the chronology. Having ‘an opinion’ is a thing you are entitled to; having an informed opinion is a thing you need – so they say.

Toot - toot...MTF

[Peetwo]

UP & Lead Balloon catching up -

From chronology:

7 December 2009: FAA/ICAO brief on 'next steps' after poor results/findings in the ICAO USOAP 2008 Australian audit. (ref links - #53 & WikiLeaks cable PDF: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...ileaks.pdf

I note that off the UP Lead Balloon has joined the same dots...

Lead Balloon #1157 - There is probably no single ‘smoking gun’ to explain the energetic efforts to blame the PIC of NGA alone.


The Mildura event merely exposed dysfunction in BOM (and to some extent the ANSP) and accordingly the regulator. It was mostly luck that there was no hull loss and injuries or fatalities. So pretty easy to use the ‘move on nothing to see here’ tactic.

The coin having fallen the other way on 18 November 2009, the PIC of NGA exposed fundamental flaws in:

- Australia’s Pacific neighbours’ flight services
- BOM
- Australia’s ANSP
- the governance of an external Australian territory
- the operations of a politically-connected air operator, and
- the regulator’s oversight of the air operator.

This around the time of the FAA audit.

Very, very inopportune circumstances for a pilot to make a mistake. Way too many embarrassments.

The subsequent attempted whitewash managed to expose the increasing dysfunction in the ATSB.

These factors (and Australia’s airport infrastructure) are why Australia’s international reputation is that it is the only third world aviation nation in which you can safely drink the tap water.

Naturally, in the Orwellian world of 21st century government, all these organisations have to pretend that they’re doing a great job and ‘punching above their weight’. FWGJAU!

Coincidentally - purely coincidentally - the governance arrangements for the external Australian territory in question were, subsequent to the ditching, changed, and YSNF coincidentally - purely coincidentally - reappeared in the Area Forecasts for Area 20.

I should note that I’m not criticising any individual. I’m not criticising any individual who provides air traffic control or flight information services, or weather forecasting or reporting services, or individual investigators or operations or airworthiness inspectors. What’s at fault is the busted organisations in which they work - organisations that as a whole are now much less than the sum of their parts.

Choccy Frog LB -



MTF...P2

[Kharon]

Check Post 32 – P2 is adding more ‘links’, notes and dates to the chronology of this ‘passing strange’ affair.  

Meanwhile:-

`It's the oldest rule in the book,' said the King.
Then it ought to be Number One,' said Alice.
The King turned pale, and shut his note-book hastily. `Consider your verdict,' he said to the jury, in a low, trembling voice.
`There's more evidence to come yet, please your Majesty,' said the White Rabbit, jumping up in a great hurry; `this paper has just been picked up.'

24th December 2009: Dominic James notice of suspension of CPL, ATPL, CIR pursuant to CAR 265(1)(a). Also given notice to undertake examinations under CAR 5.38.


“I have not been able to locate a signed copy of the SFR.”

The immortal words of one D. Gobbit, Esq to Adam Anastasi, CASA FOI specialist. Now then, despite Aleck’s say -so; Carmody agreed with the Senator, it seems ‘reasonable’ that a document suspending; or, at least ‘limiting’ a heavy weight item like a pilot’s licence should be signed off by the officer with the ‘juice’ to do it. I’ve lost track of the number of SFR James has on his sheet, three seems to ring a bell; no matter – it all takes us back to Chambers running the scam and Hood nodding, but not signing. Which leaves us not only looking askance at the McConvict/Chambers game plan, but asking what the devil Hood was about. There seems to be good reason to question the integrity of the whole action against James, right there. Even if it is only to ‘eliminate’ the item from the suspicion list. Chambers seems to have been determined to ensure that all the blame and paperwork landed on the pilot’s head; which is fine – provided it has all been done according to Hoyle. Hood, despite his protests of innocence and sanctimonious ‘reclusive’ stance, was up to his nuts in some glaring unfortunate administrative ‘errors’. If it can ever be proven that Chambers was off the reservation on McConvicts authority and our Hi Viz Canary - Hood knew it; there’ll be hell to pay. There is quite a long list of unsigned or not signed by author documents, RCA and SFR etc. We wonder why?

Meanwhile – back at the coal face:-

7 December 2009 (Monday): Audit team meet with Pel-Air management to discuss a number of deficiencies within the Westwind Operation. This was backed up by correspondence from CASA on 9/12/2009.

16 December 2009 (Wednesday) : CASA accept the Pel-Air ‘Management Action Plan’ which consisted of three phases

18 December 2009 (Friday): Pel-Air successfully completed Phase 1 items and were able to recommence domestic operations.

What a very ‘interesting’ ten days. Two of them a weekend, which leaves us eight working days. Here is an operation which, in less than a week, managed to answer all the RCA/NCN; have them acquitted and signed off as ‘satisfactory’. Amended operations manuals; FRMS, SMS and international flight protocols, informed flight crew and where required retrained and qualified crew scattered over a few bases - then got it all past CASA – in that short period of time? Bollocks. And anyway – why was Chambers signing the RCA on behalf of the original author? I won’t bang on about this element yet, nor the comparative ‘time-lines’ from other operations beset by CASA RCA. But, for a starter, ask any chief pilot or manager about the time and hassle of acquitting a RCA (NCN) resulting from an audit. There will be much more to follow on this element – standing alone, it’s worth a Senate inquiry – even leaving aside the CASA hiring the chief pilot. But I digress.

8 December 2009: E-mail from ATSB to CASA raising the possibility of contributing to a joint fund sharing arrangement to recover the black box and CASA advised they didn’t have the necessary funds.

This is an interesting part – for the connoisseur of puzzles. Remarkable thing this flat refusal to collect the CVR and FDR. Even if it was an old one with the last 30 minutes of the flight recorded – it was deemed to be irrelevant by Dolan (ATSB), this fully supported by McComic (CASA).  This, despite the fact that both ATSB & CASA, both knew ‘the box’ was a newer version and held 120 minutes of data. “Can’t afford it” they mewled together. Hells Bells McConvict spent almost that much, a month, keeping the lovely Libby, then Industry Complaints Commissioner (ICC) in chocolates and champagne. This one, singular aberration typifies, more than any other the determination to force a preordained result into conclusion and fact. In the beginning, the Norfolk locals would have raised the CVR for little more than the price of a carton of beer(Norfolk tourist prices). Gods alone know what the total cost of that CVR recovery is now – when you consider the total cost of a Senate inquiry; plus the total cost of the ASRR, plus the total cost of the TSBC review, plus the cost of a second report. Bloody astronomical.

Easy audit; rapid acquittal, speedy corporate and cultural changes, quickest catch up in flight management and operational procedure/SOP in the history of aviation and the slowest ever recorded retrieval of a critical ‘Black box’ from shallow, still, warm, sunlit waters.

Forget about the aircrew – focus on what Chambers and his merry band of sidekicks were playing at; define why. Then think on the Senate inquiry and ask why, to what end and purpose did ATSB and CASA face down and try to bluff their way out of it; particularly when not only was the simple truth was in their hands, but many alternate escape paths were available.

Aye; ours is not reason why; but we do. We also know that the FAA auditors would not give a flying fundamental about the ditching ‘incident’ in relation to their audit of Australian aviation. But, they may pay a little more attention to this disgraceful shambles and expense foisted on the public purse, next time they visit.


Toot toot.

[Kharon]

A kingdom, on the toss of a coin.

The coin having fallen the other way on 18 November 2009, the PIC of NGA exposed fundamental flaws in:

- Australia’s Pacific neighbours’ flight services
- BOM
- Australia’s ANSP
- the governance of an external Australian territory
- the operations of a politically-connected air operator, and
- the regulator’s oversight of the air operator.

The LB ‘list’ of fundamental flaws is particularly useful up to the point of impact. The holes in the safety net are exposed and, IMO, form a great part of the causal chain. Had those areas of interest been the subject of the Senate inquiry, we may have seen some ‘reform’ of the system to mend the net. The short list of ‘system’ flaws, properly addressed, is a good place to start reform – from an air safety perspective. There would be a gold star from an external auditor if these matters were ‘sorted’, particularly if the agencies concerned could say ‘hand on heart’ that they identified and corrected these deficiencies without prompting or ministerial involvement; part of a developing improving safety culture. Alas. Up went the drawbridge, out came the defenders armed with denial and obfuscation. This is bad enough and typifies the Hedgehog like defence mechanisms automatically deployed when a ‘threat’ is nearby.

It reminds me of the old WWII tale, told by an Uncle who flew during that dreadful conflict. When aircraft returned from a mission – shot full of holes, the ‘engineers’ not only repaired the damage but added additional armour plating to the damaged area. Nothing changed; the aircraft which returned still had holes shot in them, in roughly the same places. This went on until some bright spark said “it’s the ones which are not returning we need to examine; that will tell us where to reinforce”. Well, seems they had a look at a few lost aircraft and began putting the ‘armour’ in the vulnerable places, the places which cost lives and machinery. Immediate improvement – lesson learnt. No one got blamed or denigrated; they were all too busy and pleased to be able to reduce losses. Seems to me like a bloody good place to start an overhaul of ‘service’ to industry.

If you continue along LB’s line (as you must) then the next step involves the handling of the Norfolk debacle by ATSB and CASA. The extraordinary behaviour of the ‘Bankstown’ crew and management; after the event, does little in the way of begging for answers – it stridently demands those answers. The aircrew are being used as a focus point, bait for the ‘looky-loo’s’. This distracts attention away from the almost incredible behaviour of upper, middle and low level management. The Pel-Air operation was almost a basket case, sliding along mostly on luck, benign weather and ‘derring-do’. A protected species, there is no audit trail showing where CASA brought deficiencies to the attention of ‘management’. There is no record of extensive, progressive amendments to the company operations manual supporting the changes in operational dynamics. There is no record of ‘international’ operations being a recognised risk area nor of a progressive maturing of both system and guidance, let alone education. Hells bells, Pel-Air could not even address the demands of the French authority; choosing instead to let it be known to ‘avoid’ Noumea whenever possible – even if not possible…..

If and it is a big IF, the Senate committee ever decide to take another look at the Pel-Air debacle it should focus on the behaviour of ‘the regulator’ throughout not only this disgraceful episode, but of several ‘other’ bizarre events which, IMO demand answers. There are many strange tales told from across the wide, brown land of CASA behaviour; some are likely to be true – but non so strange as the tale of Wodger and his merry band of misfits.

Not that any of this matters anymore than a Tinkers curse. The minister will return to his man-scaping activities; St Carmody will pour oil on troubled waters, Aleck will continue to confound and confuse; the rest will simply sit back, do as they are directed, count their super and wait for the opportunity to extract pay-back, from those who dare to mention how severely ducked up CASA is, in reality. So don’t say word children – lest the bogey –man turn up at your next audit. “Is he really real?” asks one of innocent faces “Yes child, I’m afraid he is”.

“I am not even prepared to meet Professor Einstein or Bertrand Russell; why should I vaingloriously assume that God would find me interesting?  (Robertson Davies).

Toot (sigh) toot…

[Peetwo]

Political donations & the Pelair cover-up -

Recent additions to the Post 32 chronology:

26 May 2010: At a 'regular' meeting between John McCormick (former CASA DAS) and Martin Dolan (former ATSB Chief Commissioner), McCormick advised Dolan that in light of the ongoing PelAir parallel investigation, that CASA would be conducting an internal review of it's audit and surveillance processes.(ref link - #97)  

---

27 May 2010: The Hon Anthony Albanese MP and former Minister for Infrastructure, Transport & Regional Development  officially opens the REX Australian Airline Pilot Academy. (ref link - #97)  

---

July-Aug 2012: REX Airlines declares political donations of 250K to the ALP; 95.7K to the Nationals; & 40K to the Liberals (ref link - http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-10-24/ae...le/7959394 & #94)

---

---

Of particular interest was Rex’s $250,000 donation to the federal ALP given the airline was a highly vocal critic of the Labor government.

In 2013 Rex publicly said the ALP was “hellbent” on destroying regional aviation and “along with it pretty much the rest of the economy”.

Mr Xenophon said it appeared to defy reason why Rex would donate heavily to a government it would shortly afterwards describe as “destroying its industry”.

“Perhaps Rex had a case of Stockholm syndrome?” he said.

In 2009 a Rex aeroplane — operated under the group’s Pel-Air brand — ditched into the ocean with six passengers on board, badly injuring one.

A lengthy Australian Transport Safety Board investigation blamed the Pel-Air pilot involved in the crash but failed to mention 57 breaches or “serious deficiencies” at Pel-Air.

Mr Xenophon headed a Senate committee inquiry into that botched investigation, which led to the federal government last month calling on the ATSB to reopen the investigation.

Given the recent MSM coverage on certain Chinese political influences and donations I was interested to review the ABC's coverage of the AEC 2015-16 list of political donations. From that I was only able to find one donation from REX Regional Express Airlines: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-01/au...16/8208090

National Party of Australia - Regional Express Holdings Ltd - 33,000

Hmm...and what party is miniscule 6D AGAD Chester from?



MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

Pel-Air: A coverup: a litany of lies? - Version III

Chronology; colour coded to help with making your mind up.

Green - Go head.

Amber - proceed with caution.

Red - Stop and think about it. - Handing over::::-

Pel-Air ATSB/CASA Investigation (AO-2009-072) Chronology from 18/11/2009

– 30/11/2017:

---

23 September 1999: Qantas Flight 1 overshoots runway at Bangkok. (ref - #221 & https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/1999/AAIR/aair199904538.aspx )

---

11 March 2003: 2nd phase of cooperative Qantas/CASA/University of SA FRMS study.(see links above & https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articl...on-162972/)

---

18 November 2009: Ditching 3 NM south-west of Norfolk Island Aerodrome.

---

18 November 2009: ATSB notified of accident and ATSB subsequently notify CASA. The
ATSB decide to carry out an investigation and CASA decide to run a parallel
investigation, initiated 19 November.

---

19 November 2009: Pel-Air voluntarily suspend Westwind operation.

---

20 November 2009: Quote from page 97 of PelAir MKII Final report - "The ATSB asked CAAF for ATS records for the flight and the weather information that was provided to the flight crew of VH-NGA. CAAF forwarded the request to the ATS provider and then obtained the records in December 2009 to pass on to the ATSB. This included copies of the 0630 METAR, 0800 SPECI and 0830 SPECI."

---

23 November 2009: Richard White MALIU correspondence to ATSB Director Aviation Safety Investigations, Ian Sangston notifying CASA will be conducting a regulatory investigation into the actions of the flightcrew. Note that there is no reference to 'parallel investigations' under either the 2004 or 2010 MOU (ref link - #122 &  #28).

---

23 November 2009: Richard White receives from Airservices Australia  the complete list of Norfolk Island Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts (TAFs) applicable to the occurrence flight timeframe. This included the Nadi non-relayed 0803 AMD TAF, which appears to be underlined (ref link - #122 & #85 )

---

25 November 2009: Greg Hood file note email (cc'd Jonathon Aleck, Terry Farquharson, John McCormick.). File note No.4 reference to flight recorder recovery would appear to show, at that point in time, that recovery was inevitable (ref link - #125 )

---

26 November 2009: CASA initiate a ‘Special Audit’ conducted between the 26/11/2009-
15/12/2009 at the Pel-Air Bases in Sydney, Adelaide and Nowra.

---

30 November 2009: Richard White email to John Barr (cc Roger Chambers) confirming Airservices passed on weather & received flight plan details from PIC Dominic James by phone in Apia. (ref link - #122 )  

---

7 December 2009: Audit team meet with Pel-Air management to discuss a number of
deficiencies within the Westwind Operation. This was backed up by correspondence from
CASA on 9/12/2009.

---

7 December 2009: FAA/ICAO brief on 'next steps' after poor results/findings in the ICAO USOAP 2008 & FAA Nov 30- Dec 4 2009 Australian audits. (ref links - #53 & WikiLeaks cable PDF: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...ileaks.pdf

---

8 December 2009: E-mail from ATSB to CASA raising the possibility of contributing to a
joint fund sharing arrangement to recover the black box and CASA advised they didn’t
have the necessary funds.

---

11 December: Advice from the UK Civil Aviation Authority to CASA providing an assessment of the fatigue scores for the accidental flight (ref link - #122 & PDF 881KB )  

---

16 December 2009: CASA accept the Pel-Air ‘Management Action Plan’ which consisted
of three phases.

---

16 December 2009: Dominic James was 'informally' interviewed by CASA  legal and investigative officers. (ref link - #112 )

---

18 December 2009: Pel-Air successfully completed Phase 1 items and were able to
recommence domestic operations.

---

21 December 2009: CASA Special Audit of Pel-Air Fatigue Risk Management System ( ref links - #217 & PDF 5428KB )

---

23-24 December 2009: CASA overseeing FOI of Pel-Air Eric Demarco issues 14 RCA and
a number of AO. The RCAs needed to be acquitted by 28/01/2010.

---

24th December 2009: Dominic James notice of suspension of CPL, ATPL, CIR pursuant
to CAR 265(1)(a). Also given notice to undertake examinations under CAR 5.38.

---

24 December 2009: Pel-Air successfully completed Phase 2 items and were able to
recommence international operations.

---

8 January 2010: CASA issue 7 more RCAs and several more AO, all of which Roger
Chambers the Audit Coordinator signed on behalf of several SAR team members.

---

8 January 2010: Audit Report completed.

---

13 January 2010: ATSB issue preliminary report AO-2009-072.

---

 1 February 2010: Quote from TSBC report ".. the team leader and the general manager (GM) decided to provide CASA with a briefing on the perceived safety issue. The briefing was held by video conference on 03 February 2010. On 12 February, the primary contact at CASA followed up with a phone call to the IIC asking the ATSB to send a letter describing the safety issue.

---

3 February 2010: Video conference meeting between the ATSB and CASA to discuss
critical safety issue.

---

4 February 2010: Internal CASA email ATSB identification of a 'critical safety issue' may have ramification for CASA actions in relation to Mr James (ref links - #217 & PDF 913KB )

---

9 February 2010: Internal ATSB email regarding the ATSB and CASA's approach to the Pel-Air investigation (ref links - #217 & PDF 1093KB )

---

12 February 2010: Mr R White ALIU Manager contacts Mr Michael Watson the ATSB
‘investigator in charge’ to request a supporting letter that described the critical safety
issue.

---

15 February 2010: ATSB create a PDF of the Preliminary Report to forward to ICAO ADREP database office. However it would appear that this PDF copy was not forwarded to ICAO until 10 November 2015. (ref link - #149 & ICAO1 ) Ps The original VH-NGA Final Report was never forwarded to ICAO.

---

26 February 2010: Mr Sangston Director of Aviation Safety Investigations writes to Mr
White addressing the critical safety issue with the requested supporting documentation.

---

19 March 2010: CASA LSD draw up and distribute ‘AT10-23 NORFOLK ISLAND SAFETY
ISSUE LEGAL DRAFT 19 MARCH.doc’.

---

20 March 2010: CASA internal e-mail that highlighted a 50:50 split within the CASA
inspectorate on when to divert to an alternate.

---

23 March 2010: ‘AT10-23 NORFOLK ISLAND SAFETY ISSUE LEGAL DRAFT 19
MARCH.doc’ approved for Mr White to send by CASA Corporate Relations and Strategy
(i.e. Grima and co).

---

23 March 2010: Dominic James licenses cancellation matter (CAR 265(1) (a)) was
originally set down for mention in the AAT.

---

26 March 2010: Mr White and CASA initial response to critical safety issue.

---

31 March 2010: ATSB e-mail Mr White ALIU Manager requesting information under S32
on Pel-Air’s Air Ambulance classification of Operations and Noumea French regulator
restrictions on Pel-Air Operations. Note: There is no record/copy of this e-mail.

---

14 April 2010: Mr White’s replies to ATSB e-mail 31 March 2010. Reference Senate
Inquiry page under ‘Additional information’ item 3.

---

22 April 2010: Follow-up meeting between ATSB and CASA (John Grima and co) on the
CSI matter was held in CASA’s Woden, ACT offices. Reference AQON 22/10/12 ATSB
(Hansard, pg 66).

---

10 May 2010: 'Special Fatigue Audit: Jetstar' the 'Cook report' was released (ref links - #219 & PDF 5210KB )

---

26 May 2010: At a 'regular' meeting between John McCormick (former CASA DAS) and Martin Dolan (former ATSB Chief Commissioner), McCormick advised Dolan that in light of the ongoing PelAir parallel investigation, that CASA would be conducting an internal review of it's audit and surveillance processes.(ref link - #97)  

---

27 May 2010: The Hon Anthony Albanese MP and former Minister for Infrastructure, Transport & Regional Development  officially opens the REX Australian Airline Pilot Academy. (ref link - #97)  

---

11 June 2010: Correspondence from CASA ALC (assigned legal counsel) Joe Rule to DJ Legal Counsel in reply to questions asked on the DJ FCL suspension in the lead up to a proposed AAT hearing. This 'answering' correspondence would appear to indicate that CASA LSD were also misled in relation to the 0803 AMD TAF. (ref link - #109 & http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2....6.101.pdf )  

---

15 June 2010: ATSB receive e-mail from Pel-Air detailing actions done in response to
CASA Special Audit.

---

21 July 2010: CAIR 09/3 completed.

---

28 July 2010:  Quote from TSBC peer review report - "On 28 July 2010, CASA briefed the ATSB on the findings of its regulatory investigation into the ditching, which it had done in parallel with the ATSB investigation.Footnote 12 "The team leader obtained a copy of the CASA investigation report in March 2011."

---

1 August 2010: 'Chambers report' created (ref link - #217 ) 18 August 2010: Internal CASA email regarding the discussion with the ATSB over the content of the ATSB report (ref links - #217 & PDF 1193KB )

---

11 January 2011: CASA email chain, initiated by Roger Chambers,  on Dominic James CEP (Coordinated Enforcement Process) . Highlights one of the many times the CEP was varied and the senior management ranks that had a vested interest in the PelAir ditching matter. (ref link - #98 )

---

18 March 2011: Tabled document received from Senator Xenophon in Canberra. Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) report titled on 'Special Fatigue Audit: Jetstar' (ref links - #219 & PDF 5210KB ) 

---

18 March 2011: Pilot Training Inquiry QON asked in the course of public hearing (ref links - #219 & QON 18/03/2011 )

---

March 2011: (see 28 July 2010 ref above)

---

5 August 2011: With little to no fanfare CASA DAS John McCormick issues a regulatory policy directive ( ref link - #74  & Download das-pn015-2010.pdf)  titled "ATSB Cooperation Policy". Appears to be a threat to any CASA Officers not to talk out of school to the ATSB. 

---

11 November 2011: Former Pel-Air Chief Pilot and recently appointed CASA FOI
(February 2011) Mr. Wickham participates (observer) in a CASA approval process for a
Pel-Air Check Pilot. Note: Wickham originally applied for a position with CASA as a Flight
Training Examiner in August 2010.

---

26 March 2012: Mr Sangston approves Final Report draft release to the directly involved
parties (DIP) for comment on its factual accuracy. Comments were requested from DIP
by 23 April 2012.

---

24 May 2012: Internal ATSB email- reviewer wanting to look more closely at FRMS and re-interview pilots (ref links - #217 & PDF 535KB )

---

24 May 2012: Internal ATSB email- reviewer indicating they can't deviate at this point and they have to work with what they have (ref links -  #217 & PDF 360KB )

---

27 March 2012: CASA Delegate Greg Hood signs a 'notice of variation' & 'notice of revocation' correspondence to Dominic James . This notice was supported by, a Hood signed, Roger Chambers authored  'Standard Form Recommendation'. (ref link - http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/FOI4.pdf )

---

30 March 2012: Roger Chambers correspondence to CASA (cast of thousands) officers involved in DJ CEP, notifying for administrative purposes the Hood signed 27 March 2012 notice. (ref link - #98 & #100 )

---

30 June 2012: Roger Chambers correspondence to DJ notifying him that omission of the agreed conditions on his FCL is illegal and those conditions will now have to be published on his FCL. This notice gave DJ seven days to respond. (ref link - #103 )  

---

4 July 2012: The ATSB requested a copy of the CASA special audit report under a
section 32 notice. A copy of the report was received on 9 July 2012.

---

16 July 2012: Draft 2 issued to DIP.

---

18 July 2012: Roger Chambers recommendation to add conditions to DJ FCL. Included a Roger Chambers authored SFR that was not signed by CASA Delegate. (ref link - #103 & http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Dominic-James-documents-released-19-Oct-17-Volume-1.pdf )

---

July-Aug 2012: REX Airlines declares political donations of 250K to the ALP; 95.7K to the Nationals; & 40K to the Liberals (ref link - http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-10-24/ae...le/7959394 & #94)

---

6 August 2012:  Internal ATSB email regarding the inconsistency in safety knowledge of ATSB staff ( ref links - #217 & PDF 1597KB )

---

8 August 2012: Flight Nurse Karen Casey submits an FOI request with CASA FOI Legal
Services Division asking for a copy of the CASA Special Audit Report.

---

16 August 2012: ATSB Commission approve s25 release of Final Report AO-2009-072
and officially reclassify the ‘safety issue’ to minor.

---

30 August 2012: ATSB Final Report AO-2009-072 released.

---

31 August 2012: Final Report amended and re-issued.

---

3 September 2012: 4 Corners ‘Crash Landing’ program goes to air 8:30pm.

---

12 September 2012: E-mail chain (Carmody and Dolan) discussing Senator Xenophon’s
proposal for a possible Senate Inquiry into the ATSB Final report AO-2009-072 (the
tendentious bloggers e-mail).

---

13 September 2012: Senate referred the Aviation Accident Investigations (Pel-Air) to
the Senate Standing Committees on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport for inquiry
and report.

---

26 September 2012: CASA FOI and Finance officer (LSD) Jennifer Smith-Roberts
releases a redacted version of the CASA SAR to Karen Casey.

---

26 September 2012: RRAT committee request ATSB for documents to assist the
committee with its inquiry.

---

3 October 2012: Reply from ATSB (Dolan) to committee correspondence requesting
documentation.

---

10 October 2012: Ten documents, including the infamous Chambers Report, were received (presumably sent anonymously) by the RRAT Committee Secretariat in relation to the Senate AAI Inquiry. However these documents were not formally tabled till the day before the extraordinary 15 February 2013 public hearing. (ref link - #24 )    

---

19 October 2012: ATSB send RRAT Committee correspondence and attachment in
response to submissions from Aherne, Quinn and Currall, which had been approved by
the committee to be publicly available.

---

22 October 2012: First Public Hearing for Senate ‘Aviation Accident Investigations’
Inquiry.

---

6 March 2014: Senator Xenophon's CAO 48.1 disallowance motion gets voted down in the Senate (ref Hansard: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genp...tion%2Fpdf & http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/sear...%2F0120%22 )

---

10 November 2015: PDF copy of 2010 AO-2009-072 Preliminary report ( Aus_Isreal_VH-NGA_18Nov2009_prelim.pdf) is bizarrely modified and added (2126 days after it was created) to the ICAO iSTAR/ADREP database by the ATSB REPCON Manager Elaine Hargreaves. (ref links - 15 February 2010 entry & #56 + https://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking.../17/52003/) 

---

24 October 2017: The CASA Board has directed that an independent review of the fatigue rules for operators and pilots contained in Civil Aviation Order (CAO) 48.1 Instrument 2013 will be undertaken in 2017 as a result of feedback received from various sections of the aviation industry.

---

30 November 2017: Quote from CASA FOI Officer David Gobbitt correspondence email to Dominic James - "I have not been able to locate a signed copy of the SFR...However, as stated by Adam Anastasi in his email to you dated 27 October 2017, even if the delegate had not signed the SFR, the fact of the delegate sending the decision letter to you on 24 December 2009 would clearly have signified that the delegate accepted the recommendations in the SFR..." (ref - #126 & #331.)

[Peetwo]

FAA IASA audit, FRMS & an 'inconvenient ditching'?

From a search 4 IP post #222:

"..Then came the ditching off Norfolk Island. Any serious investigation into systematic flaws would reveal and confirm the worst fears of the ICAO and FAA audits. Although the mystery of two resignations and the decision to discard some fairly important reports is yet to be solved, there remains one curiously intriguing element yet to be satisfactorily resolved. I will leave providing the ‘dots’ up to P2 (patience, patience). I will make a dash toward a conclusion, the reader may make of it what they will..."

This is a long and ongoing tale, so let us begin by setting the scene :

A series of fatal accidents around the world over the past decade have been linked to pilot fatigue, in response the International Council of Aviation will put in place new rules next year, to manage pilot exhaustion, in one of the biggest shake-ups in 50 years of commercial aviation.


To see the ABC 7:30 report: http://www.abc.net.au/reslib/200912/r487807_2516710.asx

How would react, if you opened the cockpit door and saw both pilots fast asleep!  It really happened on a commercial flight.

Such incidents are not the norm, but even these rare occasions need to be managed, as in the aviation industry there is little room for error.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau concluded after investigating the incident in 1999, when a Qantas 747 overshot the runway at Bangkok, that despite both pilots having been awake for 19 and 21 hours respectively, it was not fatigue related (insufficient evidence)!
Last year, the UN body detailed 26 accidents around the world since 1971 in which fatigue was a factor. Here in Australia, the Transport Safety Bureau has investigated six air safety breaches which have been identified as fatigue related in the past 10 years.

Prof Drew Dawson and Dr Matthew Thomas of the Sleep Research Unit at the University of South Australia conducted an in depth study involving 260 pilots.  They wanted to find out how much sleep people were getting as pilots out on the line and we also wanted to know what was the effect of sleep loss on cockpit performance.   They found that even though pilots are compliant with the rules, there are a small number of occasions when they aren’t actually getting sufficient sleep to be safe.  Pilots who had less than five hours’ sleep were twice as likely to make safety errors.

The incident of this happen is relatively small.  “The broader studies which show us that it’s a small percentage, but every day there would be some. It’s in the magnitude of five to 10 per cent who are operating at the five to six hour sleep in the prior 24 hours. So maybe one in 10, maybe one in 20 pilots”. That is still 10 to 20 pilots too many in my book!

Prof Dawson: “The aviation industry in Australia is surprisingly slow to react to the studies report’s recommendations.  I think the important issue is to acknowledge the level of risk that fatigue poses and to take an appropriate level of response to it. That is, you don’t wanna shut down the industry, but where there is risk, and we know that there are on occasions a low number of events that carry a high level of risk with them, that we should be able to intervene and manage those in a highly targeted way“.

Better check on your pilots, when you go on holidays…

Source: http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2009/s2773888.htm#[/url]

To put that quite disturbing 7:30 report segment in context, it is worth remembering that it was released 9 days after the FAA IASA audit findings were discussed with CASA:

---

7 December 2009: FAA/ICAO brief on 'next steps' after poor results/findings in the ICAO USOAP 2008 Australian audit. (ref links - [url=http://www.auntypru.com/forum/showthread.php?tid=149&pid=7350#pid7350]#53 & WikiLeaks cable PDF: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...ileaks.pdf

---

Reflect on this: "...concluded after investigating the incident in 1999, when a Qantas 747 overshot the runway at Bangkok, that despite both pilots having been awake for 19 and 21 hours respectively, it was not fatigue related (insufficient evidence)!.." 

& this from McCormick: "..If I was to turn around and say can point to an accident where it 100 per cent was the cause of fatigue, I think I would struggle to find one. Would I turn around and find that fatigue has been a factor in many incidents that have happened, yes, it has been. So fatigue is on our list. It is a high priority..."

Now fast forward to August 2012, via ABC 4 Corners 'Crash landing':  

GEOFF THOMPSON: ..It was hours before the flight crew got access to hotel rooms to get some - interrupted - sleep.

By now they'd been awake for more than 24 hours.

GEOFF THOMPSON: And how much sleep did you get?

DOMINIC JAMES: Not much. Couple of hours.

GEOFF THOMPSON: Were you tired?

DOMINIC JAMES: I didn't feel tired, no.

BRYAN AHERNE: It sounded like to me that he was fatigued. When you do the timelines, it's, it would be impossible for anyone to suggest otherwise.

HOUSEMAID (Reconstruction): (Knocking on door) House-keeping.

MICK QUINN: He misses two nights' sleep, basically. The accident happened on the second night of him missing sleep.

GEOFF THOMSON: CASA's special audit found that Pel-Air failed to comply with approved fatigue management systems. It concludes that:

(Reads audit report): "Pel-Air have not managed fatigue risk to a standard considered appropriate, particularly for an operator conducting ad hoc 24 hour medivac operations"

MARTIN DOLAN: There was an indication there fatigue may have had a role to play. But the evidence available to us wasn't such that we'd come to the definitive view that there was a major fatigue related element.

JOHN MCCORMICK: In the end it's only the pilot who can decide whether he is fatigued or he or she is fatigued and unable to conduct a flight.

---

&..

...But there's a document which the Australian public was never meant to see.

It's CASA's special audit of Pel-Air, completed just after the ditching in 2009.

It identifies significant deficiencies within the company's Westwind operations in Pel-Air.

What it describes sounds like an accident waiting to happen.

It lists numerous breaches of aviation regulations and legislation covering fuel policy, flight planning and pilot training.

JOHN MCCORMICK: None of those, 31 I think it is, requests for corrective action that we found when we did the in-depth audit of Pel-Air would've affected that accident or prevented that accident.

GEOFF THOMPSON: But given that the operator was failing in areas of fuel planning, fatigue, check and training, lack of support for pilots, and these were regulatory breaches, isn't that something the Australian public has the right to know about, given that that's what the operator was doing when this ditching occurred?

JOHN MCCORMICK: Well as I say, none of those particular incidents or events that we looked at within that audit would've prevented that accident. The accident was caused by poor fuel planning, poor decision making.

Now rewind and this is what former AIPA President Captain Woodward said approximately one month after the ditching:

RICHARD WOODWARD: The standard answer you get in every accident is 60 per cent or 70 per cent of the accident's caused by the pilots. Well, pilots are human beings; human beings make mistakes, and human beings make lots of mistakes when they're tired.

Five days later Ben Cook and Mal Christie presented their comprehensive scientifically based findings on the CASA approved Pelair FRMS. Extract example from that report (note that the email to Wodger, the 'audit coordinator', was sent the day after the FAA IASA findings were handed down):

---

---

Now again let's rewind to exactly a week after the 'inconvenient ditching' to this inconvenient US embassy cable that WikiLeaks also released in August 2011: http://cables.mrkva.eu/cable.php?id=236548

SUBJECT: FAA'S UPCOMING ASSESSMENT OF AUSTRALIAN CIVIL
AVIATION

REF: STATE 119313

1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Australian aviation authorities will
release a statement on the FAA's upcoming assessment of
Australia's civil aviation, which is scheduled for November
30 - December 4 (reftel).  The government release will be out
in the next day and could be in the press as early as Friday,
November 27.  Post would appreciate press guidance in case
this becomes an issue.  End Summary.

2.  (SBU) Terry Farquharson, head of the host delegation from
the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA),
alerted Econoff November 25 that the office of Minister
Albanese (Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional
Development and Local Government, which oversees CASA) had
decided, against CASA's recommendation, to carry out a press
release regarding the upcoming FAA assessment.  In the coming
day, CASA will post the statement (a draft of which
Farquharson read to Econoff) on its website and will conduct
an interview with a reporter, with a strong possibility that
an article may appear in the aviation section of "The
Australian" newspaper's Friday edition.  It should be noted
that the draft release did not contain anything controversial
and points out that the assessment visit is being conducted
at the request of CASA.

3.  (SBU) CASA's view is that the press exposure may
unnecessarily complicate the conduct of the assessment, given
that at its core, the assessment is an attempt to clear the
record from a previous audit in which several shortcoming
were identified (see reftel).  The Ministry's office
preferred to carry out the release for the sake of
transparency and in order to preempt after-the-fact
questioning of what the Minister knew or did not know prior
to the FAA teams arrival.

4.  (SBU) Comment:  We are in close contact with both FAA and
CASA and are facilitating final coordination of the visit.
We do not anticipate this media release will become a
problem, but do expect questions from the press.  We would
appreciate press guidance from the Department and/or FAA.


BLEICH

   
On review of former Minister Albo, CASA, Department and the Australian media archives it would appear that by November 27th the 'powers to be' (Iron Ring) eventually got a rope on Albo as there was no formal MR announcing the imminent arrival of the FAA audit team...

In fact it wasn't till around 8 months later that I can find a passing 'off the cuff' comment by the former Minister for Non-Aviation on the FAA IASA audit: http://anthonyalbanese.com.au/category/m...hes/page/9

---

...CASA, the nation’s independent aviation safety watchdog, will recruit almost 100 additional frontline staff with the $89.9 million in new funding provided by the Budget. This extra investment in safer skies will be funded via a small increase in the aviation fuel excise, from 2.8 cents per litre to 3.5 cents per litre. The Government considers this to be a reasonable and responsible step considering the industry’s continued growth depends on the public’s ongoing confidence in its safety standards. Following the ICAO and FAA audits this investment in CASA’s staff and training is critical, and will strengthen the organisation’s oversight of the industry. Aviation safety should be bi-partisan, and the Government puts the safety of passengers ahead of other interests...

---

And from the former DAS McCormick there was no mention, that I can find, of the FAA audit findings till nearly a year later in his 'review' contained in the 2009-2010 Annual Report (note there is no mention of the fact that the FAA were three steps away from consigning Australia to CAT II):

---

...A comprehensive training and professional development
program has been put in place to ensure that our
staff have ongoing training. Technical training was
identified as an issue by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) in its 2008 audit and in the US
Federal Aviation Administration’s International Aviation
Safety Assessment (IASA) audit. We have responded
by developing a comprehensive technical training and
professional development program to enhance staff
capability in areas such as leadership, regulatory skills
and technical expertise...

---

(P2 comment: Hmm...kind of ironic that in the same year CASA was to lose two of the foremost experts in Australia on aviation Human factors and FRMS/SMS)

Quote from 7:30 report segment: Almost 10 years ago, pilot fatigue was on the radar of the Australian aviation industry. It was the subject of a landmark multi-million dollar study funded by Qantas and supported by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Australia's International Pilots' Union and the University of South Australia.

Finally (in reference to the above quote) let's rewind to nearly 15 years ago to this 'Business Wire' article:

---

  Qantas Joins Forces to Fight Fatigue


March 11, 2003 05:34 PM Eastern Standard Time
SYDNEY--(BUSINESS WIRE)--March 11, 2003--Qantas, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), the Australian and International Pilots Association (AIPA) and the Centre for Sleep Research at the University of South Australia have joined forces to conduct a major study on pilot fatigue with a view to enhancing safety for the traveling public.

The three-year study will set a world first by developing a new risk management-based system for flight crew rostering. This is the first time that an airline, safety regulator, pilots' association and academics have collaborated to find a scientific way of managing the risks associated with fatigue.

“The FRMS has the potential to be the single biggest improvement in the management of pilot fatigue and rostering since flight time limitations were introduced”
Tweet this

The Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) study will be conducted in three phases. In the first phase, which is well underway, volunteer flight crew have kept sleep-wake diaries and worn special activity monitors to obtain data on sleep patterns. Over the past 12 months, researchers have collected data on about 4,000 sleep-wake cycles. A further 4,000 sleep-wake cycles of data will be collected over the next 12 months.

In the second phase, as well as collecting sleep-wake data, additional research will be undertaken to determine how quickly pilots' body clocks adapt to changes in time zones.

In the final phase, pilots will be observed in flight simulators to link real performance measures with predicted fatigue.

The research data will then be used to develop methods to determine how different flight tasks are affected by fatigue, and thus be used to determine pilot rosters, shifts and duty time in the cockpit.

Qantas Executive General Manager Aircraft Operations David Forsyth said the study was an exciting development in air safety.

"Qantas has earned a reputation for leading the world in aviation safety and our involvement in this world-class study is a further commitment to improving air safety for our employees and customers."

CASA's Director of Aviation Safety Mick Toller said the study would provide real and lasting improvements in safety.

"This project gives the regulator the first useful access to scientific data to predict when pilots are likely to have lower performance levels due to fatigue. We all know when we are tired, but fatigue is more complex, particularly for pilots doing long flights and operating through numerous time zones most of their working week. Aviation safety will be better for this knowledge."

Professor Drew Dawson, Director of the Centre for Sleep Research, commented that this project is an example of what can be achieved when industry, unions, regulators and the scientific community collaborate to solve problems.

AIPA's Technical and Safety Director Captain Richard Woodward said the study had received enthusiastic support from the pilot research volunteers.

"The FRMS has the potential to be the single biggest improvement in the management of pilot fatigue and rostering since flight time limitations were introduced," he said.  

---

       - No comment required...


MTF? - Definitely...P2  

[WTFIncorporated]

FAA IASA audit, FRMS & an 'inconvenient ditching'?

From a search 4 IP post #222:

"..Then came the ditching off Norfolk Island. Any serious investigation into systematic flaws would reveal and confirm the worst fears of the ICAO and FAA audits. Although the mystery of two resignations and the decision to discard some fairly important reports is yet to be solved, there remains one curiously intriguing element yet to be satisfactorily resolved. I will leave providing the ‘dots’ up to P2 (patience, patience). I will make a dash toward a conclusion, the reader may make of it what they will..."

This is a long and ongoing tale, so let us begin by setting the scene :

A series of fatal accidents around the world over the past decade have been linked to pilot fatigue, in response the International Council of Aviation will put in place new rules next year, to manage pilot exhaustion, in one of the biggest shake-ups in 50 years of commercial aviation.


To see the ABC 7:30 report: http://www.abc.net.au/reslib/200912/r487807_2516710.asx

How would react, if you opened the cockpit door and saw both pilots fast asleep!  It really happened on a commercial flight.

Such incidents are not the norm, but even these rare occasions need to be managed, as in the aviation industry there is little room for error.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau concluded after investigating the incident in 1999, when a Qantas 747 overshot the runway at Bangkok, that despite both pilots having been awake for 19 and 21 hours respectively, it was not fatigue related (insufficient evidence)!

Last year, the UN body detailed 26 accidents around the world since 1971 in which fatigue was a factor. Here in Australia, the Transport Safety Bureau has investigated six air safety breaches which have been identified as fatigue related in the past 10 years.

Prof Drew Dawson and Dr Matthew Thomas of the Sleep Research Unit at the University of South Australia conducted an in depth study involving 260 pilots.  They wanted to find out how much sleep people were getting as pilots out on the line and we also wanted to know what was the effect of sleep loss on cockpit performance.   They found that even though pilots are compliant with the rules, there are a small number of occasions when they aren’t actually getting sufficient sleep to be safe.  Pilots who had less than five hours’ sleep were twice as likely to make safety errors.

The incident of this happen is relatively small.  “The broader studies which show us that it’s a small percentage, but every day there would be some. It’s in the magnitude of five to 10 per cent who are operating at the five to six hour sleep in the prior 24 hours. So maybe one in 10, maybe one in 20 pilots”. That is still 10 to 20 pilots too many in my book!

Prof Dawson: “The aviation industry in Australia is surprisingly slow to react to the studies report’s recommendations.  I think the important issue is to acknowledge the level of risk that fatigue poses and to take an appropriate level of response to it. That is, you don’t wanna shut down the industry, but where there is risk, and we know that there are on occasions a low number of events that carry a high level of risk with them, that we should be able to intervene and manage those in a highly targeted way“.

Better check on your pilots, when you go on holidays…

Source: http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2009/s2773888.htm#[/url]

To put that quite disturbing 7:30 report segment in context, it is worth remembering that it was released 9 days after the FAA IASA audit findings were discussed with CASA:

---

7 December 2009: FAA/ICAO brief on 'next steps' after poor results/findings in the ICAO USOAP 2008 Australian audit. (ref links - [url=http://www.auntypru.com/forum/showthread.php?tid=149&pid=7350#pid7350]#53 & WikiLeaks cable PDF: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...ileaks.pdf

---

Reflect on this: "...concluded after investigating the incident in 1999, when a Qantas 747 overshot the runway at Bangkok, that despite both pilots having been awake for 19 and 21 hours respectively, it was not fatigue related (insufficient evidence)!.." 

& this from McCormick: "..If I was to turn around and say can point to an accident where it 100 per cent was the cause of fatigue, I think I would struggle to find one. Would I turn around and find that fatigue has been a factor in many incidents that have happened, yes, it has been. So fatigue is on our list. It is a high priority..."

Now fast forward to August 2012, via ABC 4 Corners 'Crash landing':  

GEOFF THOMPSON: ..It was hours before the flight crew got access to hotel rooms to get some - interrupted - sleep.

By now they'd been awake for more than 24 hours.

GEOFF THOMPSON: And how much sleep did you get?

DOMINIC JAMES: Not much. Couple of hours.

GEOFF THOMPSON: Were you tired?

DOMINIC JAMES: I didn't feel tired, no.

BRYAN AHERNE: It sounded like to me that he was fatigued. When you do the timelines, it's, it would be impossible for anyone to suggest otherwise.

HOUSEMAID (Reconstruction): (Knocking on door) House-keeping.

MICK QUINN: He misses two nights' sleep, basically. The accident happened on the second night of him missing sleep.

GEOFF THOMSON: CASA's special audit found that Pel-Air failed to comply with approved fatigue management systems. It concludes that:

(Reads audit report): "Pel-Air have not managed fatigue risk to a standard considered appropriate, particularly for an operator conducting ad hoc 24 hour medivac operations"

MARTIN DOLAN: There was an indication there fatigue may have had a role to play. But the evidence available to us wasn't such that we'd come to the definitive view that there was a major fatigue related element.

JOHN MCCORMICK: In the end it's only the pilot who can decide whether he is fatigued or he or she is fatigued and unable to conduct a flight.

---

&..

...But there's a document which the Australian public was never meant to see.

It's CASA's special audit of Pel-Air, completed just after the ditching in 2009.

It identifies significant deficiencies within the company's Westwind operations in Pel-Air.

What it describes sounds like an accident waiting to happen.

It lists numerous breaches of aviation regulations and legislation covering fuel policy, flight planning and pilot training.

JOHN MCCORMICK: None of those, 31 I think it is, requests for corrective action that we found when we did the in-depth audit of Pel-Air would've affected that accident or prevented that accident.

GEOFF THOMPSON: But given that the operator was failing in areas of fuel planning, fatigue, check and training, lack of support for pilots, and these were regulatory breaches, isn't that something the Australian public has the right to know about, given that that's what the operator was doing when this ditching occurred?

JOHN MCCORMICK: Well as I say, none of those particular incidents or events that we looked at within that audit would've prevented that accident. The accident was caused by poor fuel planning, poor decision making.

Now rewind and this is what former AIPA President Captain Woodward said approximately one month after the ditching:

RICHARD WOODWARD: The standard answer you get in every accident is 60 per cent or 70 per cent of the accident's caused by the pilots. Well, pilots are human beings; human beings make mistakes, and human beings make lots of mistakes when they're tired.

Five days later Ben Cook and Mal Christie presented their comprehensive scientifically based findings on the CASA approved Pelair FRMS. Extract example from that report (note that the email to Wodger, the 'audit coordinator', was sent the day after the FAA IASA findings were handed down):

---

---

Now again let's rewind to exactly a week after the 'inconvenient ditching' to this inconvenient US embassy cable that WikiLeaks also released in August 2011: http://cables.mrkva.eu/cable.php?id=236548

SUBJECT: FAA'S UPCOMING ASSESSMENT OF AUSTRALIAN CIVIL
AVIATION

REF: STATE 119313

1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Australian aviation authorities will
release a statement on the FAA's upcoming assessment of
Australia's civil aviation, which is scheduled for November
30 - December 4 (reftel).  The government release will be out
in the next day and could be in the press as early as Friday,
November 27.  Post would appreciate press guidance in case
this becomes an issue.  End Summary.

2.  (SBU) Terry Farquharson, head of the host delegation from
the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA),
alerted Econoff November 25 that the office of Minister
Albanese (Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional
Development and Local Government, which oversees CASA) had
decided, against CASA's recommendation, to carry out a press
release regarding the upcoming FAA assessment.  In the coming
day, CASA will post the statement (a draft of which
Farquharson read to Econoff) on its website and will conduct
an interview with a reporter, with a strong possibility that
an article may appear in the aviation section of "The
Australian" newspaper's Friday edition.  It should be noted
that the draft release did not contain anything controversial
and points out that the assessment visit is being conducted
at the request of CASA.

3.  (SBU) CASA's view is that the press exposure may
unnecessarily complicate the conduct of the assessment, given
that at its core, the assessment is an attempt to clear the
record from a previous audit in which several shortcoming
were identified (see reftel).  The Ministry's office
preferred to carry out the release for the sake of
transparency and in order to preempt after-the-fact
questioning of what the Minister knew or did not know prior
to the FAA teams arrival.

4.  (SBU) Comment:  We are in close contact with both FAA and
CASA and are facilitating final coordination of the visit.
We do not anticipate this media release will become a
problem, but do expect questions from the press.  We would
appreciate press guidance from the Department and/or FAA.


BLEICH

   
On review of former Minister Albo, CASA, Department and the Australian media archives it would appear that by November 27th the 'powers to be' (Iron Ring) eventually got a rope on Albo as there was no formal MR announcing the imminent arrival of the FAA audit team...

In fact it wasn't till around 8 months later that I can find a passing 'off the cuff' comment by the former Minister for Non-Aviation on the FAA IASA audit: http://anthonyalbanese.com.au/category/m...hes/page/9

---

...CASA, the nation’s independent aviation safety watchdog, will recruit almost 100 additional frontline staff with the $89.9 million in new funding provided by the Budget. This extra investment in safer skies will be funded via a small increase in the aviation fuel excise, from 2.8 cents per litre to 3.5 cents per litre. The Government considers this to be a reasonable and responsible step considering the industry’s continued growth depends on the public’s ongoing confidence in its safety standards. Following the ICAO and FAA audits this investment in CASA’s staff and training is critical, and will strengthen the organisation’s oversight of the industry. Aviation safety should be bi-partisan, and the Government puts the safety of passengers ahead of other interests...

---

And from the former DAS McCormick there was no mention, that I can find, of the FAA audit findings till nearly a year later in his 'review' contained in the 2009-2010 Annual Report (note there is no mention of the fact that the FAA were three steps away from consigning Australia to CAT II):

---

...A comprehensive training and professional development
program has been put in place to ensure that our
staff have ongoing training. Technical training was
identified as an issue by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) in its 2008 audit and in the US
Federal Aviation Administration’s International Aviation
Safety Assessment (IASA) audit. We have responded
by developing a comprehensive technical training and
professional development program to enhance staff
capability in areas such as leadership, regulatory skills
and technical expertise...

---

(P2 comment: Hmm...kind of ironic that in the same year CASA was to lose two of the foremost experts in Australia on aviation Human factors and FRMS/SMS)

Quote from 7:30 report segment: Almost 10 years ago, pilot fatigue was on the radar of the Australian aviation industry. It was the subject of a landmark multi-million dollar study funded by Qantas and supported by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Australia's International Pilots' Union and the University of South Australia.

G'Day Aunty, long time reader. Bloody good stuff.

So P2, let me check if a boofhead like me has got a grip on this Pel-Air/FRMS situation mate.

The ïnconvenient ditching" happened bang smack at a time when a new DAS was appointed, the FAA & ICAO were sniffing around and a new airline academy, owned by the "ditched jet"company was goin' on.

FRMS was on the FAA & ICAOs radar from a previous visit. A possible downgrade was on the horizon...then that bloody ditching put a big fat fly in their (CASA) chardonnay!

Experts like Ben Cook (ex-CASA) showed clear evidence that FRMS was an issue within Pel-Air and Aviation in general. 

That's when the öh shit" happened within the agencies and the snowball of collusion, corruption & witch hunting started.

Then the bloody first report had no FRMS issues in it & wasn't reported to ICAO. Struth mate, this is serious enough, but it seems to get worse.

The Senate documents (those 9 emails) of more evidence showing what the turds were up to was hidden for 4 months. So the Senators were not able to read them before the inquiry & ask questions. Shit mate, they were only put back on the Senate website less than 24 hours of starting the inquiry. I dunno about you lot reading this stuff, but that is an obstruction of justice. Someone took a big dump on those good Senators. Gotta be a mole from inside. 

Albo did nothing, right? His Aviation White paper became Aviation's Invisible paper. I think I saw  a picture of him not long after with John Sharp. He's the CEO of Pel-Air. Fancy that, bloody grubs. Albo & John opened the Airline Academy 5 months after the ditching.

Well that makes no bloody sense now, does it. Have a massive screw up then teach the world how to fly. You've gotta be joking!

REX/Pel- Air have a serious incident. So many flaws in their operations. Audit issues coming out of their ears, government investments into the Academy...no wonder the pricks ignored the FRMS problems...would've been the friggin nail in their coffin mate.

REX even donated 300k around the same time the Senate was going on. Albo got a chunk, 100k I think. I mean shit, blind Freddy could figure out what's happening here.

How much money over the eights years has been spent off Tax Payers coin. Gotta be in the millions? 

That wingnut Carmody better put his big girl pants on if he is going try & deal with this Snowball of Corruption. They've got no chance of skipping away from this.

The other bloke, Hood...what a tool. He needs to grow a set too. These guys have a shitload of explaining to do. Hopefully in front of the Senators real soon. 

Can't see the Senators being impressed with the second report either. Just have to wait & see hey?

Yeah, nah, yeah, nah, yeah, nah, yeah mate. I can see where you're coming from now.

Awesome bloody reading. Keep digging mate, you're surfing on the edge of a frothy revolution in Aviation Safety.

Good onya Aunty.

WTFIncorporated salutes your fact finding! 

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P2 comment - For a 1st post, & from a layman's POV, bloody good dot joining WTFI - chocfrog is in the mail...    

Ps Luv the meme too!