[Peetwo]

Remember this off the UP -

Newsflash: JQ is Gobble's new chopper pilot in Montreal!

---

I was half way up Mt Noncompliance contemplating yet another FF crevasse followed by a geyser of FF pony pooh, when lo and behold JQ and Gobbles were hovering above me in a shiny new Bell 406. Gobbles manned the winch and within minutes I was pass the FF PNR onwards and upwards….we proceeded to a point 343 metres above sea level and this is what we found…



Note: Creamy touched on this NCN briefly but perhaps it needs a bit more exploring to test the FF veracity on their proposed actions/inactions (by proxi notified differences) and it is also relevant in regards to the inquiry i.e. Flight recorders err OBRs…err CVRs!

1) FF said they were going to file a difference with ICAO by 31 October 2008! Did they?   
 
Well after much teasing, fluffing, huffing and puffing mixed in with a series of expletives (FFS there must be literally thousands of notified differences to ICAO!) while reading over the extremely convoluted AIP SUP H12/11, I finally think I’ve found it in the Annex 6 section.

Here is what it says at Para 3.6.3.4.2.2…“No standards are specified in Australian legislation for the preservation of flight recorder records.”

However after you read the Annex 6 applicable reference, to which the FAA NCN supposedly refers, you begin to wonder if the notified difference really covers it??

6.3.11.2
To preserve flight recorder records, flight recorders shall be de-activated upon completion of flight time following an accident or incident. The flight recorders shall not be re-activated before their disposition as determined in accordance with Annex 13.

Note 1.— The need for removal of the flight recorder records from the aircraft will be determined by the investigation authority in the State conducting the investigation with due regard to the seriousness of an occurrence and the circumstances, including the impact on the operation.
Note 2.— The operator’s responsibilities regarding the retention of flight recorder records are contained in 11.6.

And 11.6

11.6 Flight recorder records


An operator shall ensure, to the extent possible, in the event the aeroplane becomes involved in an accident or incident, the preservation of all related flight recorder records and, if necessary, the associated flight recorders, and their retention in safe custody pending their disposition as determined in accordance with Annex 13.

I also question the paragraph reference ‘3.6.3.4.2.2’ (or any of the para references for that matter) and what on earth the correlation is to the applicable ICAO reference.

Note: Just out of interest I decided to explore our ANZAC ‘brothers in arms’ over the ditch and how they sort out compliance with the ICAO Annexes, in particular Annex 6. Here is what I found ‘Click Here’.

Very user friendly they even have a web page devoted to ICAO Compliance……yet another tick for the Kiwi system!

Anyway back to the FF promised actions and implementation dates…

2) “Address issue during CASR Part 91 drafting and development”…by 31 December 2008…hmm got a feeling this is heading for another FF crevasse but I could be wrong??

Ah that would be a no and also answers this proposed action by FF… 3) “Develop and promulgate CASR Part 91” by 31 December 2009!

So the jury is out but my bet is on a majority vote of 12 on this NCN!

Doin a Sundy arvo Kelpie!

This post was part of a series of posts where we were climbing the ICAO notified differences - Mount Non-compliance... (Ps Ironically since then, unlike most Mountains in the world, Mount NCN has grown to 3116 NCNs & 318 pages...UDB!) 

This series culminated ( I think??) in the following post:

“The future conundrum of Annex 19”

---

Started a review of the proposed Annex 19 but first a quote from PAIN post #1696 , which is particularly pertinent…

“The proposed ICAO Annex 19, is designed, in part, to assist less fortunate countries achieve compliance with ICAO benchmarks. The Australia - ICAO final report on Safety Oversight Audit of Australia (Feb 2008) released January 2009 provides an excellent starting point for comparison.

There is ever a widening gap between ICAO and the existing Australian version. Annex 19 is about to make that gap almost too large to span. The issues need to be addressed, urgently and properly if Australia is to retain a tenuous hold on its current classification.”

So to the review and warning this is a long post!

From Page 19 of Annex 19:

3.1.2 The acceptable level of safety performance to be achieved shall be established by the State.


Note.— An acceptable level of safety performance for the State can be demonstrated through the implementation and maintenance of the SSP as well as safety performance indicators and targets showing that safety is effectively managed, built on the foundation of implementation of existing safety-related SARPs.

 

This means both FF and ATSBeaker will have to define what are acceptable levels of safety for different types of aviation and how they will measure those levels, probably with leading and lagging safety indicators. That way, all parties will know what they're being judged against, and FF will be called to account if (as is the norm) they launch an original punitive frolic.

From page 26 (my bold):

3.3 The State shall ensure that inspectors are provided with guidance that addresses ethics, personal conduct and the avoidance of actual or perceived conflicts of interest in the performance of official duties.

Well, well Houston we may have a problem?? Not very accommodating for all those imbedded sociopaths like Wodger and that camp guy ‘Bull’.

Then there is page 27 which is headed ‘Resolution of safety issues’(my bold):

8.1 The State shall use a documented process to take appropriate corrective actions, up to and including enforcement measures, to resolve identified safety issues.


8.2 The State shall ensure that identified safety issues are resolved in a timely manner through a system which monitors and records progress, including actions taken by service providers in resolving such issues.

It also looks like the 'gotcha loopholes' in the EM, SM (and presumably IM) may have to be revisited and the ‘due process’ documentation required in those docs will have to be strongly adhered to or else!

Page 29 paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 would appear to mean that FF and ATSBeaker would have to have in place accountable managers that are answerable for compliance with documented SSP procedures. Hmm…wonder how that will go down with the FF and bureau execs currently running the shop?

Next on page 30 we have ‘2.1 Hazard identification’ and ‘3.1 Safety performance monitoring and measurement’, which are less immediate issues for the State service providers. However given the recent track record of blaming and flogging pilots (e.g Dom) these parts of the SSP could potentially cause some major areas of discomfort down the track.

Quoting from page 33 (my bold):

1.3 Accident and incident investigation


The State has established an independent accident and incident investigation process, the sole objective of which is the prevention of accidents and incidents, and not the apportioning of blame or liability. Such investigations are in support of the management of safety in the State. In the operation of the SSP, the State maintains the independence of the accident and incident investigation organization from other State aviation organizations.

Well although the bureau is supposedly ‘independent’ there is one thing that this inquiry has shown and that is the reality is an entirely different matter... “ Beaker please explain!”

Heading of paragraph 1.4 is ‘Enforcement Policy’, and there is enough people on here (and elsewhere..AMROBA, DK, DJ etc) that have an opinion on how that’s working out for the ‘State’, hmm..“Third Reich comes to mind!”

Page 33 and paragraph 2.1 is headed ‘Safety requirements for the service provider’s SMS’. Which again places a requirement on FF to have in place the policies/procedures to ensure transparency in administration. To ensure ICAO compliance these policies will be periodically reviewed…not sure if the Doc’s going to like that too much!

Finally (for now at least) on page 34 we have:

3.1 Safety oversight


The State has established mechanisms to ensure effective monitoring of the eight critical elements of the safety oversight function. The State has also established mechanisms to ensure that the identification of hazards and the management of safety risks by service providers follow established regulatory controls (requirements, specific operating regulations and implementation policies).
These mechanisms include inspections, audits and surveys to ensure that regulatory safety risk controls are appropriately integrated into the service provider’s SMS, that they are being practised as designed, and that the regulatory controls have the intended effect on safety risks.

Fairly long winded I know, however it would appear that FF must have in place a robust fully accountable framework for administering the SSP.

Yeah like that’s going to happen while the present numbnuts are minding the Fort??

Much more to follow me thinks!

Okay so the reason for creating this thread is to; a) kick around and review Murky's latest bollocks SSP; b) attempt to scale (ICAO) Mount Non-compliance and establish whether c) it is possible to reign in the significant growth of NCNs prior to the upcoming ICAO/FAA audit...


MTF...P2  

[Gobbledock]

Doc Voodoo, Murky, and Chester - quick go grab the 44 gallon drum of turd polish cos we are going to need it ASAP

Australia hasn't 'learned' jackshit from past findings. It's current SSP follows the same theme as previous documents - words, words, and more words, all non-committal and written by an author hellbent on taking the mickey bliss out of its legal requirement and deliver SFA under the cloak of smoke and mirrors.

Nothing has changed in 8 years. Lots of musical chairs but the music stays the same, with Doc Voodoo and Murky still the marionettes on duty. Perhaps that is why Carmody is coming back to FF for a wee spell, to ensure the kids have put all their toys away, tidied up their bedrooms, brushed their teeth and made sure no old stinky sandwiches have remained in their school bag lunch boxes over the holidays, before Uncle ICAO and Aunty FAA come to visit again?

Of interest is that an audit of that magnitude often comes with around 6 month advance notice. Now it could be a coincidence but within a roughly 6 month period of time we will have seen the following take place - Skiddy pineappled, Wingnut return to his old stomping ground, Beaker sent packing and Toga boy appointed as Commissioner ATsB.

Now it could all be a coincidence, it could be Murky playing his political ass covering game, it could mean an audit is imminent, it could mean absolutely jackshit, but one thing is certain and that is this; Australia's aviation safety capability has slipped farther into the mire since the international alphabet soupers visited us, and there has been numerous high level shennanigans, the MH370 ATsB investigation joke, and indeed - THE LEVEL OF ICAO FILED DIFFERENCES LODGED BY AUSTRALIA IN REFERENCE TO ICAO is staggering and only grown larger. Much much larger!

Mt Non-Compliance has most certainly grown. The only way you could scale it is with 30 Sherpers, full hiking gear, oxygen tanks, a bloody good set of boots and a cross around your neck for good measure. In Australia's case a gallon of 'anal pineapple repair cream' might also be required for the upcoming trek.

TICK TOCK goes the auditors clock? I believe so, and it may have just struck 23:59!

[Kharon]

Translation mode – selected.

P2’s new thread is not one of whimsy; neither is it sudden rush of blood or a brain fart.  It is in fact another damning chunk of evidence supporting the long held belief that Australia has been in reverse gear for too long.  There is also evidence to support a claim that any  Australian response to an ICAO ‘suggestion’ is to take the Mickey Bliss, pay lip service and continue to do exactly as best pleases.  This involves having all the advantages of being an ICAO ‘citizen’, enjoying the privileges but not seriously getting into the spirit of the thing. There is another argument which supports the notion that Australia just says “Yeah yeah” then in arrogance thumbs its nose through ‘weasel words’ and clever legal double speak.  The notion of embracing the ICAO inferior brand of safety culture being alien and in contradiction with covering the ministerial liability for any damn thing; except acts of God which, as every fool in the market place knows, may only come directly from Canberra; anything else is an opposition plot.

So, for the benefit of our overseas guests: a glossary:-

JQ: John Quadrio humble, honest chopper pilot who suffered greatly at the hand of a malicious ‘safety watch dog’.  His story is one of many from the McCormack reign of terror.

FF: Fort Fumbles i.e. CASA HQ is a colloquialism, one of many, the edifice, cast and crew.

The tale of Mount Noncompliance is stuff of legend, from when we all thought that Pprune was worth the time and effort.

NCN – Non Compliance Notice; a strange hybrid which charges you as guilty – under strict liability; the burden of proof reversed so you must prove your innocence – same-same for all aviation law in the land Down Under.

AIP Aeronautical Information Publication (little Bible) SUP ‘supplement’.

Annexe 6 – Australian registered difference to ICAO (NCN?).

6.3.11.2 is of special interest to AP; the ditching of a PelAir westwind medivac jet, being the focus of an intense Senate Standing Committee (the heavy mob) inquiry into that and the absolute shellacking both CASA and the ATSB received – and ignored.

‘Kelpie’ a legend of the old Prune, a top quality poster who always signed off – More to Follow.  We pinched it – far too good to be wasted on the UP.

Then we arrive at ‘Annexe 19’; which is, rightly so, a favourite hobby horse of P2.  ‘We’ have monitored the progress of this Annexe carefully, expecting to see the usual lip service and escape clauses written out in full; acknowledging the principal, intent and scope.  Well we have not been disappointed; ‘tis a master work which appears to comply, meet and satisfy the requirements, without actually doing a damn thing except write and publish the clap-trap.

So, P2 has decided to ‘take it apart’ and have a close look.  GD has, as usual summed up eloquently.  Why? Well children that is a good question.  The answer is you can do the homework yourself and see why it is abhorrent; or, you can wait until there is a major accident and see the ‘beast’ in action, denying, obfuscating, hiding behind the slippery wall of words and convincing the entire world that there was nothing more the Australian government could possibly do to prevent 'the accident' – they are; after all said and done, completely ICAO compliant.  I suggest do the work and watch this space; particularly those who may think the inimitable Sen. Fawcett has been quiet lately.

Aye; homework is a bitch; but then, so is Karma.  

Toot tick toot tock.

[Gobbledock]

Ummmm, you left off the list "Kharon" - moderator on AuntyPru, retired UP blogger, master class boat Captain and boss of the Styx River Houseboat...oh, and an all-round good guy who cuts a fine figure in his spandex and is a kick-ass darts champion.

But don't disrespect his houseboat rules by pissing where you stand, you may find yourself on a permanent boat cruise to hell along with many and varied political types, their minions and an assorted dross of bureaucrats...just sayin.

Shucks GD - and a new 'group' to boot; a flock of Doves, a sympathy of Crows and a Dross of Bureaucrats; nice one, we'll keep it.  Cheers, big smile.

[Peetwo]

Q/ Who was it that once said - "I was in Montreal"??

Thank you "K" & Gobbles for the translation..

I sometimes forget that there are many good folk out there that don't have the foggiest when it comes to the infamous Pprune Senate Inquiry thread(s) etc., so please excuse me I will attempt to translate as I go along from now on...

Okay to the task...

To begin I just so happened to be trolling Google for the latest ASA AIP SUPP link for the ever growing pile (Mountain.. ) of notified differences to ICAO. The first thing I noticed was that without any fanfare the SUPP was updated less than 3 weeks after Murky's SSP was promulgated?? This is despite there being more than 2 years before an update is due, see HERE. So maybe Gobbles is right and Murky & co have been given their 6 months heads up from ICAO...

While on the Google search I also noticed another interesting link which took you to a Parliamentary supplementary submission: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...sub1_1.pdf


I then tracked this sup submission to a Joint Standing Committee on Treaties  inquiry into air services agreements/treaties with both Serbia and Vanuatu:

Treaties tabled 11 December 2013

The Treaties Committee is empowered by its resolution of appointment to inquire into and report on 'matters arising from treaties and related National Interest Analysis and proposed treaty actions presented or deemed to be presented to the Parliament.'
As nearly all treaty actions proposed by the Australian Government are tabled in Parliament, this type of review activity accounts for much of the Committee's work.

The Committee invited interested persons and organisations to make submissions by Friday, 31 January 2014. Submissions for this inquiry have now closed.

  
  One of the Joint committee members is none other than Senator David Fawcett and on the 10 February 2014 he was an active participant in the questioning of the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development on the Serbia and Vanuatu air service treaties:

And this was part of the Hansard:

Senator FAWCETT: Can I just follow up on the question Mr Thomson asked about ramp checks. I know CASA has the option to do ramp checks. Have they done any ramp checks on either aircraft from Vanuatu or indeed the other contracting party, who I believe are operating under an MOU at the moment?

Mr Smith : We do not have information on that. That information would be kept by CASA.

Mr Borthwick : We will take that on notice.

Senator FAWCETT: I am asking the question. Can you take that on notice then and find out for us: have any ramp checks been done and have any issues been found with that? Likewise, can you tell me if any differences have been filed by either of the other contracting parties with ICAO that would give them permission to deviate from the ICAO standards?

Mr Borthwick : I would have to take that one on notice as well and take that information back to the committee.

Senator FAWCETT: Take that on notice and get back to us, thanks. Have there been any requests for consultations from CASA with either of the other contracting parties over their regulations or specific operating issues with airlines in those two countries?

Mr Borthwick : Again, I would have to take that one on notice to give you a proper answer. I am not aware—

Senator FAWCETT: They are fairly fundamental questions if you are asking us to sign off on these agreements. So, yes, take it on notice, but for future inquiries it would be good to have that sort of information to hand.

Mr Borthwick : Okay.

Senator FAWCETT: Does this also include charter operations? I am thinking specifically of Vanuatu. That is obviously a tourist type destination, and we have not only regular public transport operators but people who operate a range of aircraft in a charter type category. Does this cover charter operations?

Mr Smith : Charter operations are dealt with separately from scheduled services, which are conducted within the auspices of these air services agreements. We have a specific charter regulatory framework that would cover airlines from Vanuatu, Serbia and other countries as well. They would be treated separately from any air services under these agreements.

Senator FAWCETT: Do we have a charter agreement with Vanuatu?

Mr Smith : It is not a charter agreement; it is a charter policy, for want of a better word, as to how the Australian government deals with requests for charter services from foreign airlines, and Australian airlines as well.

Senator FAWCETT: We had an inquiry only 12 months ago into the Norfolk Island incident, where a charter operator ended up putting an aircraft into the sea because of an inadequate fuel policy about flying to island nations in the Pacific. Following on from that we had an incident with both Virgin and Qantas, where inadequate weather forecasting to a remote Australian inland town led to 737s almost running out of fuel. Specifically, what checks have been made about the fuel policy of airlines operating to Pacific island states to check that they are adequate in the light of those two incidents?

Mr Smith : The charter policy that I referred to is essentially an economic regulatory framework for the operation of charter services. Any charter services that are operated under that framework are still required to comply with any safety requirements that CASA would require of any foreign or domestic airline operating those particular services.

Senator FAWCETT: This question also applies to the air services agreement, though, and it comes to the point of safety in that there has been a real focus here in Australia because of those two incidents. But, clearly, aircraft coming to and from a Pacific island state that are not from Australia are exposed to the same range of safety concerns, whether they are regular scheduled services or not. My question is: what checks have been done to make sure that the lessons we hopefully have learned from the Norfolk Island incident have been taken up by airlines operating from Vanuatu?

Mr Smith : Any services, whether they are operated under the charter framework or under the framework of this air services agreement, still go through the CASA process of safety approvals, so CASA would be better placed to answer any questions in relation to those safety approvals. We are happy to take those questions on notice for you.

Senator FAWCETT: If you could take that on notice, that would be great.

Mrs PRENTICE: Is the treaty only for planes inspected in Australia or can we send CASA to other countries for inspections?

Mr Smith : The safety provisions in the treaties provide the opportunity for the local regulators to inspect the aircraft in the local jurisdiction.

Mrs PRENTICE: Only in the local jurisdiction. If there is a dispute, it would be carried out under the laws of the country we are dealing with?

Mr Smith : Both of the agreements include a dispute resolution procedure which can be activated by either side. It sets out how that dispute will be resolved. It is a process whereby both sides will appoint a particular individual and then I think those two individuals appoint a third, and a tribunal is set up to look at any disputes should it get to that stage. But the agreements are fairly descriptive in how those disputes are resolved.

Mrs PRENTICE: We have had an agreement with Vanuatu for 21 years. Has there ever been a dispute?

Mr Smith : I am not aware of any but I can take that on notice.

Mrs PRENTICE: Thank you.

   
That session also generated a QON which the Department answered like this:

Did the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development collate and analyse the differences lodged with the ICAO by Serbia and Vanuatu when their respective Memoranda of Understanding and proposed Air Services Agreements were being negotiated?

No. Air services arrangements provide an economic framework in which airlines can consider serving a market. Differences lodged by States, among other more pertinent kinds of safety-related information, may be taken into account by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority in the assessment of applications for the operation of foreign aircraft into and out of Australia.

Regards

Gilon Smith

Director (a/g), Air Services Negotiations

Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development

gilon.smith@infrastructure.gov.au Ph: 02 6274 6634

This was the Joint Committee report: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...apter2.pdf

Quote:

Deviation from the International Civil Aviation Organisation standards

2.27 Article 38 of the Chicago Convention requires a Party to notify the ICAO when it finds it impractical to comply in all respects with international standards and practices, and when it is unable to change its standards and practices to comply with standards and practices revised by the ICAO.36

2.28 Both Serbia and Vanuatu have formally notified the ICAO of differences with the ICAO standards. The Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development advised that Serbia has lodged 183 substantive differences and Vanuatu has lodged 82 substantive differences with the ICAO.37

2.29 According to the Department, substantive differences can involve a State being deficient in an ICAO Standard, meeting an ICAO Standard using a method different to that stated in the Standard, or exceeding an ICAO Standard.

2.30 The Department analysed the substantive differences notified by Serbia and Vanuatu and advised the Committee that, in the case of Serbia, 84 of the substantive differences involved exceeding the ICAO Standards, 58 involved meeting the relevant Standard by another means, and 41 involved being deficient in relation to the relevant Standard.39

2.31 Vanuatu exceeded two of the ICAO Standards, complied with 71 Standards by a different method, and was deficient in relation to nine of the Standards.40

2.32 The Department noted:

The majority of differences notified by most countries are those where the ICAO standards and recommended practice is not applicable. An example for both Australia and Vanuatu would be those standards relating to snow-clearing activities at airports.41

2.33 In a later submission, the Department noted that differences to ICAO Standards were not considered when Air Services Agreements were being negotiated. The Department advised that:

Air services arrangements provide an economic framework in which airlines can consider serving a market. Differences lodged by States, among other more pertinent kinds of safety-related information, may be taken into account by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority in the assessment of applications for the operation of foreign aircraft into and out of Australia.42

2.34 The Committee considers that, while the Agreements are principally about opening markets, the preamble to each Agreement includes the following statement:

… Desiring to ensure the highest degree of safety and security in international air transport and reaffirming their grave concern about acts or threats against the security of aircraft, which jeopardise the safety of persons or property, adversely affect the operation of air transport, and undermine public confidence in the safety of civil aviation; …43　

2.35 The Committee also notes that the Agreements themselves contain a significant number of Articles that either directly or indirectly relate to safety.

2.36 The Committee considers that it would be imprudent if the Department’s negotiators did not at least make themselves aware of the differences notified to the ICAO by States with which they are negotiating. The Committee suggests that, as part of the negotiation process of future Air Services Agreements, the Department’s negotiators consult with CASA in order to determine if any of the differences notified by the State with which they are negotiating may pose a safety risk for Australian travellers.

Fuel policy

2.37 In November 2009, a charter aircraft flying from Samoa to Norfolk Island was forced to ditch off Norfolk Island as a result of running out of fuel after being unable to land because of poor weather conditions.44

2.38 The Australian Transport Safety Board (ATSB) found, amongst other things, that the operator of the aircraft had managed fuel planning and risk in a manner consistent with the required regulations, but that the regulations governing fuel planning to remote islands were too general and risked inconsistent decisions on in-flight fuel management and diversion.45

2.39 During the investigation, CASA undertook a review of the relevant regulations and proposed the following changes:

• designating Cocos (Keeling) Island as a ‘remote island’;
  

• removing the provision that allowed an operator not to carry fuel for diversion to an alternate airport;
  

• amending the definition of ‘minimum safe fuel’ to require the calculation of fuel for diversion to an alternate airport in the event of a loss of pressurisation coupled with the failure of an engine;
  
  
• requiring a pilot flying to a remote island to nominate an alternate airport in the event of a diversion;
  

• extending the requirement to carry fuel for diversion to an alternate airport on flights to remote islands to all passenger carrying and regular public transport flights; and allowing for CASA to permit an operator not to comply with these regulations subject to conditions that would not adversely affect safety.46
  

2.40 The Norfolk Island incident was followed by another low fuel incident in June 2013, when two passenger aircraft bound for Adelaide were diverted to Mildura due to poor weather in Adelaide. Poor weather in Mildura, which had not been forecast, combined with the aircraft having insufficient fuel to divert to another airport, caused the pilots of the aircraft to land at Mildura under conditions that breached Civil Aviation Regulations.47

2.41 The ATSB investigation of this incident was not complete at the time this Report was drafted.

2.42 Further, in 2012, the ICAO amended the Annex to the Chicago Convention relevant to in-flight fuel management (Annex 6 Part I) to improve: the definition of a minimum fuel emergency; and procedures for protecting final fuel reserves. In particular, the operator and pilot-in-command of an aircraft are required to continually ensure that the amount of usable fuel remaining on board is not less than the fuel needed to proceed to an airport where a safe landing can be made with the planned final reserve fuel remaining upon landing.48

2.43 To deal with the issues arising from these events, CASA has initiated a project to implement new regulations relating to fuel management. The project proposes to:

• in light of the ICAO amendments, amend regulations on fuel and operational requirements, including provisions for diversion to an alternate airport for flights to isolated airports;
  

• expand the relevant regulations to provide guidance to pilots on when and under what circumstances to consider a diversion;
  

• change the regulations on fuel planning, in-flight fuel management, and the selection of alternate airport to include the methods by which pilots and operators calculate fuel required and fuel on board; 　
  

• specify that the pilot-in-command or the operator, must take reasonable steps to ensure sufficient fuel and oil will be carried to undertake and continue the flight in safety;
  

• require consideration of a ‘critical fuel scenario’ taking into account an aeroplane system failure or malfunction which could adversely affect flight safety;
  

• publish internal and external educational material along with conducting briefings where necessary.49
  

2.44 According to the CASA website, this project is not yet complete.50 The Committee notes that the regulatory changes proposed as part of this Project have a direct bearing on flights between Australia and Vanuatu.

2.45 The Committee is of the view that the establishment or renewal of Air Service agreements should be a trigger for CASA to undertake a due-diligence review of the status of compliance (including filing of differences with ICAO) with new or revised safety-critical regulations such as those outlined in para 2.42. This review should be completed as part of CASA's input to the evaluation of new or renewed Air Services Agreements and the documented outcomes included in the Department's evidence to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties.

Still joining the dots but it is becoming obvious why it is not a particularly good idea to take the Mickey Bliss out of international conventions like the 1944 Chicago (ICAO) convention, especially when you have the good Senator Fawcett looking over your shoulder...   
MTF...P2

[Kharon]

What we wanted.


For those not familiar, the video posted above serves as an introduction to the good Senator. The quietly spoken, calm surface and patient demeanour are part of the mans natural charm.  A natural leader who is genuinely interested ‘matters aeronautical’ of all weights and kinds. I, for one of many, would not like to be on the spot and being subjected to one of those quietly asked questions; no sir. Not without the answers at my finger tips.  Quite rightly, Fawcett assumes that you are ‘all over’ your subject and can make a fist of answering a question associated with your remit, you may be sure he is.  More often than not the question catches the departmental lizard flat footed and needing to (a) lay the blame on another department; (b) referring to notes which never seem to have the right answer or, © the classic – ‘take it notice’, which is get out of goal free card and a chance to workshop an answer either related to a and b above: or, a non answer.  The non-answer is a classic tactic in which a long time to answer is taken and forces the Senator to rephrase the question, many months later, which will be taken on notice again. Such is the atmosphere Fawcett works in.  I digress.

When the response to a question prompts the following:

Sen. Fawcett –“They are fairly fundamental questions if you are asking us to sign off on these agreements. So, yes, take it on notice, but for future inquiries it would be good to have that sort of information to hand.”

You can almost bet your socks that DF is onto the ICAO ‘differences’ racket and intends to do something about it.  For far too long Australia has been milking this system, dancing around the spirit and intent of the convention, side stepping real commitment while enjoying the benefits.  That said, a careful read of the registered differences reveals two carefully concealed motives for the massive amount tabled.

On the one hand, many of the differences are beneficial to our major carriers, do not affect the ‘safety’ of operations but provide an easement where lack of infrastructure or an imposed restriction artificially constrains sensible, safe operations.  These ‘differences’ are to be maintained, for they benefit the country.

On the other hand, you have the rest – the bulk. These differences need to be forensically examined for they have little to do with aviation safety or the national interest. They are simply governmental ‘arse covers’ whereby all care, but no ministerial responsibility can be laid at the governments door. The differences also very neatly cover the departmental and CASA rear ends from any and all responsibility. Almost without exception the iron clad rule ‘strictly no liability’ applies.

What we got.


(Spello deliberate I'm told)

So it is with the new Annexe 19, the State Safety Program, a forged –copy of a masterpiece which celebrates the masters art.  

ICAO compliance is a state of mind and within tolerances, is flexible and user friendly, with only one purpose – the well being of citizens, not the government of the day or its minions.  The Australian system of aviation safety oversight is in a dreadful state. If as GD suggests audit time is approaching then the guts must be lugged into the neighbour room, windows cleaned, boots polished and all the paperwork neatly stacked.

If Fawcett and his Senate colleagues have decided that enough is enough and the self correction measures they have strongly recommended continue to be flaunted, then, maybe, they have called in the big guns to sort it out, once and for all.

The ICAO topic is not to everyman’s taste, its dry, complex and requires much time to plough through the ‘guff’.  “Why do it?” groans the crowd; well we all want reform; right?  To achieve that the ‘official’ mindset needs to change, to do that ICAO compliance (or near enough for practical purposes) should be a ‘want to do’ thing, not a ‘see and avoid’ game of words and escape clauses.  

Enough, ‘tis P2’s parade we are only here to hold his jacket. 

When in one line two crafts directly meet.
(indicates POLONIUS )
This man shall set me packing.
I’ll lug the guts into the neighbor room.
Mother, good night. Indeed this counselor

Toot – handing over – toot.

[Gobbledock]

'K', it mat be a dry topic indeed, but you are totally on the money when you say that it is imperative to look at how we comply with ICAO. It is the framework of how we aviate in the land down under!

And P2, as always, a brilliant piece of succinct work in your research and dot joining on this issue. Superb!

And finally folks, do take the time to read into Senator Fawcett's line of questions and points raised. This man is not an uneducated bumbling dipshit like the Beaker. This man is a technical expert, genuinely interested and concerned about his country's capacity to safely and compliantly provide the needed oversight of aviation safety. I would fear going before him at a senate inquiry or estimates without all my beards and ducks in a row!

Oh how I would just love to see Fawcett and Xenophon team up together on an aviation battle royale....

[Peetwo]

TICK TOCK goes the ICAO audit clock - The Fawcett inquisition 

Just to tidy up and clarify a few issues from my last post. The extract (table) from the DoIRD supplementary submission was actually an attachment to compliment the submission 1 from the Department. The following is the actual submission made after and in reply to the 10 February 2014 JSCOT public hearing:


And these were the actual QON listed from the hearing itself, note the Fawcett 4th QON and the Dept answer:



One of the many OBS I make from the Dept submission and supplementary submissions, is that the Dept seems to be way too reliant on CASA for direction and interpretation on all matters of aviation safety regulation and oversight. Perhaps this is not the wisest course of no-action when you consider the Dept takes the ultimate responsibility for these international air services agreements...

I also find that quite disturbing when you consider that Mr Borthwick lists his role as - General Manager, Aviation Industry Policy. I would have thought that a bureaucrat with those listed responsibilities should be full bottle on all matters pertaining to our international aviation safety commitments as a signatory to ICAO..

Coming back to that 'categories of differences' table:


  My hope is that due to Senator Fawcett's questioning and in collating that data for the sup submission, the Department may have suddenly come to the realisation that Australia is far from being anywhere near adhering to the spirit and intent of most of the ICAO SARPs.

It is worth noting that of the listed 10,696 notified differences from the three countries, 4024 were from Australia, this is a disturbing 38% of the total. But what is more disturbing is the figure in the 'Less protective or partially implemented or not implemented' category (in other words the 'up yours' category... ), which was an UDB 2078, compared to 41 Serbia & 9 Vanuatu...

4024 notified differences for Australia?? Recently I had collated from the 2015 AIP GEN 1.7 SUP that notified differences had grown to a total of 3116. However in actual fact between the 2011 SUP the figure had grown to 4024 but due to the loose ICAO arrangement of only listing NDs every 3 years this was missed. So from my approximate estimate from 2011 to 2014 the NDs had grown by 2500.

This means that in actual fact in the period between 10 February 2014 till November 2015 the Department has managed to reduce the notified differences by 908.

Still got a long way to go but perhaps this highlights more than anything else the impact that the Senator Fawcett inquisition had way back on the 10 February 2014...

These and other questions

Next I will answer my Q/ at #5, this will also shine the spotlight on the primary suspect for authoring the vast majority of over 4000 ICAO notified differences...       


MTF?- What do you reckon...P2

[Gobbledock]

Next I will answer my Q/ at #5, this will also shine the spotlight on the primary suspect for authoring the vast majority of over 4000 ICAO notified differences...        

MTF?- What do you reckon...P2


YES PLEASE!!!!!!

[Peetwo]

#P666: "YES PLEASE!!"- Patience Grasshopper

 First I want to go back to that JSCOT inquiry report (see my post #5 above) and in particular under the sub-heading Fuel Policy, paragraphs 2.40 to 2.42 :

2.40 The Norfolk Island incident was followed by another low fuel incident in June 2013, when two passenger aircraft bound for Adelaide were diverted to Mildura due to poor weather in Adelaide. Poor weather in Mildura, which had not been forecast, combined with the aircraft having insufficient fuel to divert to another airport, caused the pilots of the aircraft to land at Mildura under conditions that breached Civil Aviation Regulations.47

2.41 The ATSB investigation of this incident was not complete at the time this Report was drafted.

2.42 Further, in 2012, the ICAO amended the Annex to the Chicago Convention relevant to in-flight fuel management (Annex 6 Part I) to improve: the definition of a minimum fuel emergency; and procedures for protecting final fuel reserves. In particular, the operator and pilot-in-command of an aircraft are required to continually ensure that the amount of usable fuel remaining on board is not less than the fuel needed to proceed to an airport where a safe landing can be made with the planned final reserve fuel remaining upon landing.48

Footnote 48 takes you to a number of relevant links in regard to the amended ICAO Annex 6:

http://www.ifalpa.org/store/doc9976.pdf

http://www.ifalpa.org/store/amend36.pdf

http://www.ifalpa.org/downloads/Level1/B...20fuel.pdf

 These events (i.e. PelAir, Mildura) then prompted CASA to start yet another project to again review the regulatory requirements for 'fuel policy':

2.43 To deal with the issues arising from these events, CASA has initiated a project to implement new regulations relating to fuel management. The project proposes to:

• in light of the ICAO amendments, amend regulations on fuel and operational requirements, including provisions for diversion to an alternate airport for flights to isolated airports;
  

• expand the relevant regulations to provide guidance to pilots on when and under what circumstances to consider a diversion;
  

• change the regulations on fuel planning, in-flight fuel management, and the selection of alternate airport to include the methods by which pilots and operators calculate fuel required and fuel on board; 　
  

• specify that the pilot-in-command or the operator, must take reasonable steps to ensure sufficient fuel and oil will be carried to undertake and continue the flight in safety;
  

• require consideration of a ‘critical fuel scenario’ taking into account an aeroplane system failure or malfunction which could adversely affect flight safety;
  

• publish internal and external educational material along with conducting briefings where necessary.49
  

 
Ironically there has been several attempts (projects) by CASA to fiddle with the regulations dealing with 'Fuel Policy', long before the ICAO proposed and then amended Annex 6 Part 1...

This brings me finally to the answer to my QON... - Remember this Gobbles (note the answer is in bold red)??    

Senator FAWCETT: There is actually a broader issue, though, Mr McCormick. There is no closed-loop system so that recommendations that are made by ATSB, that CASA agrees—particularly we have seen a number where, in a coroner's court, the coroner has said, 'We'll close out this issue, because ATSB made a recommendation and CASA said they will do it,' and then a decade later there is has been no action. Is that an issue for the travelling public? I hear you that you were not there for that whole 10 years, but we are talking about a system now, not personalities. Is the system not working as it should?

Mr McCormick : I cannot speak for what happened in 2000. I only got here in 2009. But we have in place now a system where we do track all the recommendations—since 2009 and on-hand at the moment there are 121 recommendations that were made by coroners. There are 16 of those outstanding. Some of them are unfortunately beyond our ability to do, where the coroner may have made quite a reasonable finding but it is impossible for us to implement. Some others we have under review as well. We do have the safety recommendations of the ATSB. We do track those; we have been doing that since I have been here, and we know exactly how many of those are outstanding as well.

Senator NASH: Was anybody at the table employed by CASA in 2000?

Senator FAWCETT: Mr Boyd, were you around?

Mr Boyd : Yes, but not in that position.

Senator NASH: Anybody else? Mr Farquharson? Dr Aleck?

Dr Aleck : I was in Montreal.

Senator FAWCETT: You've got an alibi! Going to the terms of reference here, though, looking at an ATSB report into this incident at Norfolk Island, here are two regulatory issues, one to do with the categorisation of aeromedical flights—and that should have been upgraded to charter so there was more protection granted, and that did not occur—and that we should be more prescriptive about fuel requirements for remote islands. I understand that Pel-Air has actually implemented that, post your special audit, and I understand CASA has undertaken again to look at that issue—both of which point to the fact that here is a regulatory issue that, if implemented 10 years ago, either of those, this accident probably would not have happened. As the regulator, don't you think that the ATSB report should have covered those factors? I know it is not for you to tell them how to do their report, but you are the regulator. Should they have not considered those broader regulatory issues as part of this report? Are you surprised they did not?

Or at approximately 05:15 here:

Okay so here is the rub, for the better part of two decades our main Muppet ICAO representative in Montreal was none other than Dr Aleck. If nothing else this should have provided much continuity when it came to international agreements, compliance and harmonisation of regional air services rules and regulations.

However in referring to the Department table on comparative notified differences to ICAO (over 4000 for Oz in March 2014), even Blind Freddy can see that if anything we have been drastically going backwards in adhering and respecting the agreed international ICAO aviation safety standards. And the main Muppet responsible for allowing that to happen and for apparently writing most of the weasel worded notified differences, was Dr Aleck.

Coming back to the "Fuel Policy", here is an example of the wonderful work our Muppet in Montreal has been doing in regards to the now four year amendment to Annex 6:

Annex VI reference:

4.3.4.2 En-route alternate aerodromes

En-route alternate aerodromes, required by 4.7 for extended diversion time operations by aeroplanes with two turbine engines, shall be selected and specified in the operational and air traffic services (ATS) flight plans.

4.3.4.3 Destination alternate aerodromes

4.3.4.3.1 For a flight to be conducted in accordance with the instrument flight rules, at least one destination alternate aerodrome shall be selected and specified in the operational and ATS flight plans, unless:

a) the duration of the flight from the departure aerodrome, or from the point of in-flight re-planning, to the destination aerodrome is such that, taking into account all meteorological conditions and operational information relevant to the flight, at the estimated time of use, a reasonable certainty exists that:

1) the approach and landing may be made under visual meteorological conditions; and

2) separate runways are usable at the estimated time of use of the destination aerodrome with at least one runway having an operational instrument approach procedure; or

b) the aerodrome is isolated. Operations into isolated aerodromes do not require the selection of a destination alternate aerodrome(s) and shall be planned in accordance with 4.3.6.3 d) 4);

1) for each flight into an isolated aerodrome a point of no return shall be determined; and

2) a flight to be conducted to an isolated aerodrome shall not be continued past the point of no return unless a current assessment of meteorological conditions, traffic and other operational conditions indicate that a safe landing can be made at the estimated time of use.

---

4.3.5 Meteorological conditions

4.3.5.1 A flight to be conducted in accordance with the visual flight rules shall not be commenced unless current meteorological reports or a combination of current reports and forecasts indicate that the meteorological conditions along the route or that part of the route to be flown under the visual flight rules will, at the appropriate time, be such as to enable compliance with these rules.

4.3.5.2 A flight to be conducted in accordance with the instrument flight rules shall not:

a) take off from the departure aerodrome unless the meteorological conditions, at the time of use, are at or above the operator’s established aerodrome operating minima for that operation; and

b) take off or continue beyond the point of in-flight re-planning unless at the aerodrome of intended landing or at each alternate aerodrome to be selected in compliance with 4.3.4, current meteorological reports or a combination of current reports and forecasts indicate that the meteorological conditions will be, at the estimated time of use, at or above the operator’s established aerodrome operating minima for that operation.

4.3.5.3 To ensure that an adequate margin of safety is observed in determining whether or not an approach and landing can be safely carried out at each alternate aerodrome, the operator shall specify appropriate incremental values for height of cloud base and visibility, acceptable to the State of the Operator, to be added to the operator’s established aerodrome operating minima.

Note.— Guidance on the selection of these incremental values is contained in the Flight Planning and Fuel Management

Manual (Doc 9976).

4.3.5.4 The State of the Operator shall approve a margin of time established by the operator for the estimated time of use of an aerodrome.

Note.— Guidance on establishing an appropriate margin of time for the estimated time of use of an aerodrome is contained

in the Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).

4.3.5.5 A flight to be operated in known or expected icing conditions shall not be commenced unless the aeroplane is certificated and equipped to cope with such conditions.

4.3.5.6 A flight to be planned or expected to operate in suspected or known ground icing conditions shall not take off unless the aeroplane has been inspected for icing and, if necessary, has been given appropriate de-icing/anti-icing treatment.

Accumulation of ice or other naturally occurring contaminants shall be removed so that the aeroplane is kept in an airworthy condition prior to take-off.

Note.— Guidance material is given in the Manual of Aircraft Ground De-icing/Anti-icing Operations (Doc 9640).

     
Okay now to Dr A's recently updated notified differences to those references:






As can be seen all bar one of the notified differences fall into the - Less protective or partially implemented not implemented - category. This is despite there still being an active project - OS 09/13 (Ps the 09 means it has been active since 2009) - that now includes a stipulation to consider the November 2012 amendment to ICAO Annex 6 Part 1:

..The amendment to the ICAO Annex 6 standards will be considered, and where appropriate, incorporated into the relevant legislation/advisory publication. In addition it is anticipated that there will be guidance material for operators who can demonstrate a particular level of performance- based compliance. The intent is to provide a bridge from the conventional approach to safety to the contemporary approach that uses process- based methods and Safety Risk Management (SRM) principles...

  
Hmm...no comment required me thinks -



MTF...P2

[P7_TOM]

Uh'mm -I’ll have two bob’s worth.

P2 – “Hmm...no comment required me thinks –“

Certainly non required on the ‘CASA’ input; but I wonder.  Has Fawcett ‘lanced the boil’ so to speak?  At his last committee (above) he informed the ‘treaties’ crew to do their homework and be ready with answers, next time.  Now then; if the ‘department’ have been relying too heavily on CASA ‘advice’ and assume that CASA actually know what they are about (ass-u-me) then this bus could be headed for the CASA bus stop. Make no mistake, if the ‘heavy-duty’ professional public servants are made to look foolish, or embarrassed by CASA, there will be no hesitation – under the bus they go – and a good riddance.

Fuel policy should be, and mostly is (at the big end of town) a company SOP, the regulation should be ‘flexible’ in that it allows for ‘an alternative means of compliance’ to the mandated minimum fuel on board – at the end of the landing roll.  Provided that fuel meets the ‘flight fuel’ reserves; then CASA should be ‘satisfied’; ask Big Q if you have any doubts.  But when it comes to playing fast and loose with ICAO compliance affecting ‘the simplicity’ of operations  and interfering with high level inter governmental treaties; CASA and Aleck are way out of their weight class.  Those as audit on behalf of the ICAO know their business, and know it well.  Australia only just kept their status after the last adventure and escaped by the skin on their teeth, solely due to some pretty hefty political intervention.

Well, the puss is now flowing from the boil Fawcett lanced. Yes, it is an ugly analogy, but then the situation in Australia does equate to ugly, messy and painful.  Let’s hope the grown ups know how to cure the canker.  By the by – I have it on good authority that voodoo smoke and mirrors prescribed treatments, just don’t work; not worth a tinkers cuss.

[Gobbledock]

He did it, she did it....

Oh P2, how could we forget that gem;

This brings me finally to the answer to my QON...  - Remember this Gobbles (note the answer is in bold red)??

Yes indeed P2 my friend. A laugh-a-minute as all the rats scurried in a panic, looking for the nearest drain pipe. As I recall;

- 'I know nothing, I wasn't around at the time' bellows the angry man, Herr Skull.

- 'Not me sir, I was in Montreal' whispers the gentle Witchdoctor in his 'kind' voice.

- 'Um I was here but I wasn't', comments Peter Boyd obtusely.

- 'ZZZZZZZZZ' no comment as Mr Far'q'hard'son snores the day away.

Spineless dross. Not a single testicle between the lot of them. All gutless bullshit artists. Fawcett and Co had them dancing on hot coals. All of them did a Sargent Shultz, played dumb and pretty much pleaded the 5th amendment.

P.S When Dr Voodoo finished his little jollie working in Montreal the place almost erupted in cheers. He was a complete pain in the ass known for his stupid musings, empty words, and high level bureaucratic dribble and obsfucation. I don't think he has anybody in Canberra excited either !

CAsA Execs getting down to business;

[Peetwo]

Uh'mm -I’ll have two bob’s worth. Part II - The reply

P2 – “Hmm...no comment required me thinks –“

Certainly non required on the ‘CASA’ input; but I wonder.  Has Fawcett ‘lanced the boil’ so to speak?  At his last committee (above) he informed the ‘treaties’ crew to do their homework and be ready with answers, next time.

P2 - I think you might be spot on Ol'Tom

Now then; if the ‘department’ have been relying too heavily on CASA ‘advice’ and assume that CASA actually know what they are about (ass-u-me) then this bus could be headed for the CASA bus stop. Make no mistake, if the ‘heavy-duty’ professional public servants are made to look foolish, or embarrassed by CASA, there will be no hesitation – under the bus they go – and a good riddance.

P2 - Again I would suggest, given that in 21 months (from March 2014 to November 2015) the Department has reigned in the rapid escalation of differences (still not sure if they were notified to ICAO??) and in fact decreased the total by at least 908, that the Department has come to the realisation that CASA were taking the Mickey Bliss when it came to our obligations to ICAO.    

Fuel policy should be, and mostly is (at the big end of town) a company SOP, the regulation should be ‘flexible’ in that it allows for ‘an alternative means of compliance’ to the mandated minimum fuel on board – at the end of the landing roll.  Provided that fuel meets the ‘flight fuel’ reserves; then CASA should be ‘satisfied’; ask Big Q if you have any doubts.  But when it comes to playing fast and loose with ICAO compliance affecting ‘the simplicity’ of operations  and interfering with high level inter governmental treaties; CASA and Aleck are way out of their weight class.

P2 - Again totally on the same page Ol'Tom and it is somewhat ironic that the ICAO Annex 6 amendment also allows for this:

4.3.4.4 Notwithstanding the provisions in 4.3.4.1, 4.3.4.2 and 4.3.4.3, the State of the Operator may, based on the results of a specific safety risk assessment conducted by the operator which demonstrates how an equivalent level of safety will be maintained, approve operational variations to alternate aerodrome selection criteria. The specific safety risk assessment shall include at least the:

a) capabilities of the operator;

b) overall capability of the aeroplane and its systems;

c) available aerodrome technologies, capabilities and infrastructure;

d) quality and reliability of meteorological information;

e) identified hazards and safety risks associated with each alternate aerodrome variation; and

f) specific mitigation measures.

Note.— Guidance on performing a safety risk assessment and on determining variations, including examples of variations, is contained in the Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976) and the Safety Management Manual (SMM)

(Doc 9859).

Those as audit on behalf of the ICAO know their business, and know it well.  Australia only just kept their status after the last adventure and escaped by the skin on their teeth, solely due to some pretty hefty political intervention.

P2 - Interestingly with 2008 ICAO audit the issue of notified differences was a highlighted bone of contention with the FAA and ultimately led to an NCN being issued.

Reference para 3.2.3 and Appendix 3.1.1 of the 2008 ICAO audit report:  

3.2.3 For the regulatory framework and rulemaking procedures, the Regulatory Development Management (RDM) Manual, dated 20 February 2008, describes the processes and requirements involved in the making of aviation safety regulations, standards and associated advisory materials. Procedures for amending regulations, including identifying and notifying differences to ICAO, are established and documented in the manual. In addition, the manual provides an overview of the requirements established by the Australian Government for conducting consultations on regulatory requirements and following other regulatory “best practices.” However, the procedures described in the new manual for the amendment of regulations and for the identification and notification to ICAO of differences existing between the ICAO SARPs and PANS (Procedures for Air Navigation Services) do not address adopted regulations and have not kept the national regulations in pace with ICAO Annex amendments, in particular for personnel licensing, airworthiness and aircraft operations. In addition, not all differences to ICAO SARPs have been notified to ICAO.

 


I would suggest that since the 2008 ICAO audit there is only one agency that has proactively addressed NCN 1-1-1, can you guess which of the listed agencies this is? (Hint: Think annex 12.. )  

Well, the puss is now flowing from the boil Fawcett lanced. Yes, it is an ugly analogy, but then the situation Australia is in equates to ugly, messy and painful.  Let’s hope the grown ups know how to cure the canker.  By the by – I have it on good authority that voodoo smoke and mirrors prescribed treatments, just don’t work, not worth a tinkers cuss.

P2 - To confirm to myself that Senator Fawcett on a mission to 'lance the boil', I decided to review the SCOT reports after the 139 report (i.e. the Serbia & Vanuatu air services agreement).

I discovered that there was indeed one more air services agreement that
the Joint treaties committee reviewed in the 44th Parliament: Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic Relating to Air Services .

The following was from the recorded Hansard from the brief public hearing:

ACTING CHAIR: During the inquiry into air services agreements between Australia and Serbia and Vanuatu last year, the committee was told that, as well as having an agreement in place, foreign airlines need to satisfy safety standards as assessed by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, CASA. This includes considering how their practices differ from International Civil Aviation Organization standards. In our report, the committee suggested that the DFAT negotiators should consult with CASA as to whether potential agreement parties are meeting the International Civil Aviation Organization standards or whether there are safety concerns. So the question is: did the department consult with CASA about Laos's performance against the International Civil Aviation Organization standards during the negotiations for this agreement?

Mr Smith : There was consultation with CASA for the negotiation of this agreement. Just looking at the time frame of the two agreements that you referred to that were before the committee last time, there was not that specific additional level of consultation that was mentioned with Serbia and Vanuatu. Discussions have taken place with CASA about expanding the level of consultations prior to future negotiations.

Senator FAWCETT: Clearly before you came to this committee you had the previous reports. I accept the fact that this was negotiated a year ago, but you have had the report since then. Have you gone back to CASA to ask them, for example, what the latest IATA, ICAO or FAA audits were on Laos?

Mr Smith : In September 2015, ICAO published its report on the most recent audit evaluation, undertaken in April 2015, of the Lao PDR. The audit was a targeted review of the 224 unsatisfactory findings made by ICAO during an earlier full audit undertaken in 2010 and it intended to find an update of the assessed safety oversight of the status of Laos. No significant safety concerns were identified during the audit. ICAO uses the 'effective implementation' terminology as a measure of a state's safety oversight capability, and a higher 'effective implementation' indicates that a state's safety oversight system has a greater degree of compliance with ICAO provisions. In 2010, Lao PDR was assessed as having an EI of 65.31 per cent and, following the April 2015 audit, the Lao PDR has improved its score to 73.03.

Senator FAWCETT: I hear that, and that has been in the media recently. Laos are very proud of that—and so they should be—but you did not answer my question. Having had that gap between the issue of our last report and this appearance, have you gone back to CASA to ask them for their opinion? For example, Laos is not registered with IATA. They do not have the IOSA audit, which is kind of the benchmark for international airlines. Generally speaking, the perception is that if you have not had an IOSA audit then perhaps you do not think you are ready for it. It is kind of the gold standard for international airlines. The majority of airlines are; Laos is not. Have you gone back and asked CASA their opinion on what may be lacking that has caused Laos to not actually pursue the IATA accreditation?

Mr Smith : CASA were consulted on the text before it was finalised, but we did not specifically ask the sorts of questions that you have outlined. Part of the rationale surrounds the likelihood of Lao Airlines serving the Australian market with their own aircraft. The agreement was settled to provide both for own-operated services and, primarily, for code-share services. In the event that the operation into Australia of Lao carriers with Lao-registered aircraft becomes more likely, I think that issue would become more topical and would certainly interest and exercise CASA's attention. Certainly, the air services agreement we are discussing today includes the standard safety clause that is included in our air services agreements, which provides CASA with the scope and ability to enforce the minimum ICAO standards, as well as applying the domestic standards that they would apply before issuing FAAOCs and the like.

Senator FAWCETT: I still just make the note that, having issued a report recommending a particular course of action, I am a little disappointed that that has not been followed through prior to this hearing so that we have an assurance. Taking on board what you are saying—that, at this stage, you do not anticipate a Lao-registered aircraft to operate here—and noting also the recent ICAO evaluation, I still think that is a loop that should be closed before the committee actually considers the report.

This led to these critical comments in the final committee report...

Consultations with CASA

2.54 In 2014, the Committee reviewed air services agreements between Australia and Serbia and Vanuatu.64

2.55 In Report 139, the Committee stated:

Article 38 of the Chicago Convention requires a Party to notify the ICAO when it finds it impractical to comply in all respects with international standards and practices, and when it is unable to change its standards and practices to comply with standards and practices revised by the ICAO.65

2.56 The Committee found that both Serbia and Vanuatu had lodged notices of difference with the ICAO.66

2.57 At the time, the Department advised the Committee that relevant notices to the ICAO were not considered as part of the process of negotiating air services agreements because air services agreements were essentially economic agreements.67

Air services arrangements provide an economic framework in which airlines can consider serving a market. Differences lodged by States, among other more pertinent kinds of safety-related information, may be taken into account by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority [CASA] in the assessment of applications for the operation of foreign aircraft into and out of Australia.68

2.58 The Committee’s conclusion was that:

… it would be imprudent if the Department’s negotiators did not at least make themselves aware of the differences notified to the ICAO by States with which they are negotiating. The Committee suggests that, as part of the negotiation process of future Air Services Agreements, the Department’s negotiators consult with CASA in order to determine if any of the differences notified by the State with which they are negotiating may pose a safety risk for Australian travellers.69

2.59 Bearing in mind that the proposed Agreement was negotiated in 2012, before the Committee’s views on the matter were made clear in Report 139, the Committee asked the Department’s representative whether the Department had attempted to consult with CASA and other relevant agencies regarding the proposed Agreement since the tabling of Report 139 in May 2014. The Department responded that:

Since the Committee’s hearing on 12 October 2015, CASA was again consulted, and was asked whether Laos is meeting the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards or whether there are any concerns.

CASA noted that Lao-registered aircraft do not currently operate to Australia, and that before a Foreign Aircraft Air Operator’s Certificate (FAAOC) is issued to a foreign airline operator, and as part of CASA’s ongoing oversight of the holder, CASA assesses the application against ICAO Annex 6 criteria, as well as the relevant provisions of the Australian civil aviation legislation.

CASA advised that, in the absence of an application for an FAAOC or a similar permission, it would not actively monitor a foreign operator or the regulatory authority responsible for the safety oversight of the prospective operator. CASA confirmed that the safety article in the proposed agreement with Laos provides it with the regulatory authority it requires to deal with any future applications from Lao-registered aircraft operators.70

Conclusion

2.60 The Committee reiterates its view that consultation between CASA and the Department should be taking place on safety issues pertaining to a country with which Australia is negotiating an air services agreement.

2.61 Where such agreements have already been negotiated, the Committee considers that it would be prudent for the Department to ensure that such consultation takes place before the relevant treaty is tabled in Parliament.

2.62 Nevertheless, the Committee supports the proposed Agreement and recommends that binding treaty action be taken. 

 

Hmm...again err...no comment -

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

A timeline of SSP & ICAO obfuscation? - When Senator Fawcett first mentioned the concept of 'closing the safety loop' in Senate estimates, I don't think he envisaged that to mean closing all industry participants out of the loop. Rather I think he meant that all participants, CASA, the ATSB, ASA, Coroners Courts, the Department etc. were actively involved and consulted in the endeavour to plug up all the identified and potential holes in the State SSP (i.e. closing the safety loop).

However reality seems to be vastly different...   Reference post from the safety loop thread:

Closing the safety loop #34 - Gobbles said:

"..What is interesting is that the 70's was the decade for CFIT. The GPWS was introduced. It made an incredible difference and improved safety. Problem identified and problem solved, mostly..."

Thanks to This Man, Airplanes Don’t Crash Into Mountains Anymore

The wreckage of Alaska Airlines Flight 1866, a Boeing 727, smolders as recovery workers search for the bodies of 111 victims on Sept. 7, 1971, in Juneau, Alaska.
Photographer:AP

Don Bateman’s terrain mapping device has nearly eliminated the largest cause of death in jetliner accidents.

By Alan Levin | August 10, 2016

As Gobbles alludes in his post the introduction of lifesaving risk mitigation technology, like GPWS & TCAS, was due in large part to many findings & safety recommendations from effective AAI (Aviation Accident investigation) as per ICAO Annex 13 throughout the 70s, 80s & early 90s. Since that time we've seen the onset of safety issues revolving around automation dependency. Subsequently there has been many proactive safety recommendations attempting to mitigate this now repetitively identified safety issue.

Unfortunately in Australia our State AAI, the ATSB, is yet to clearly identify 'automation dependency' as a significant safety issue in modern day 'next generation' RPT aircraft.  

Click on a photo for more information.

 

Related: SafetyWatch
 

This is despite the quite disturbing findings in previous Senate Inquiries like:
Pilot training and airline safety; and Consideration of the Transport Safety Investigation Amendment (Incident Reports) Bill 2010
&..
Aviation Accident Investigations
The former inquiry, at Recommendation 9, actually called for the relevant agencies to review the findings & recommendations to come from the AF447 Final Report:

2.299    The committee recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) and Australian aviation operators review the final findings of France's Bureau of Investigation and Analysis into Air France 447, including consideration of how it may apply in the Australian context. Subject to those findings, the committee may seek the approval of the Senate to conduct a further hearing in relation to the matter.

However like the vast majority of well considered Senate & Government non-partisan review findings, these potential risk mitigation recommendations were completely ignored by CASA, ATSB, Airservices Australia & Murky's department.

Therefore rather than being at the forefront in aviation safety, Australia is now severely lagging behind the rest of the world and in some cases our aviation safety agencies are consistently becoming part of the causal (Reason model) chain...

On data input errors and to a degree 'automation dependency', the recently released final report into a March 2015 Air Asia X A330 incident on departure Sydney is a classic example:
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/inve...-2015-029/

What happened

On 10 March 2015 Airbus A330, registered 9M-XXM and operated by Malaysian‑based airline AirAsia X, was conducting a regular passenger service from Sydney, New South Wales to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. On departure from runway 16R the aircraft was observed by air traffic control to enter the departure flight path of the parallel runway 16L. Following advice from air traffic control, the flight crew identified a problem with the onboard navigation systems. Attempts to troubleshoot and rectify the problem resulted in further degradation of the navigation system, as well as to the aircraft’s flight guidance and flight control systems. The crew elected to discontinue the flight but were unable to return to Sydney as the weather had deteriorated in the Sydney area and the available systems limited the flight to approaches in visual conditions. The aircraft was instead radar vectored to Melbourne, Victoria and the flight completed in visual conditions.

What the ATSB found

The ATSB found that when setting up the aircraft’s flight management and guidance system, the captain inadvertently entered the wrong longitudinal position of the aircraft. This adversely affected the onboard navigation systems however, despite a number of opportunities to identify and correct the error, it was not noticed until after the aircraft became airborne and started tracking in the wrong direction. The ATSB also found that the aircraft was not fitted with an upgraded flight management system that would have prevented the data entry error via either automated initialisation or automatic correction of manual errors.

The flight crew attempted to troubleshoot and rectify the situation while under heavy workload. Combined with limited guidance from the available checklists, this resulted in further errors by the flight crew in the diagnosis and actioning of flight deck switches.
Finally, the ATSB identified that effective monitoring and assistance by air traffic control reduced the risk to the occurrence aircraft and other aircraft in the area.

What's been done as a result

In response to this occurrence the aircraft operator undertook safety action, including:

• the development of a training bulletin and package for its flight crews that emphasised the correct operation and alignment of the air data and inertial reference system
  
• sharing the lessons learnt from the operator’s internal investigation with all pilots and reviewing the recovery procedures to be undertaken in the form of a flight safety notice.
  

Safety message

This occurrence highlights that even experienced flight crew are not immune from data entry errors. However, carrying out procedures and incorporating equipment upgrades recommended by aircraft manufacturers will assist in preventing or detecting such errors.
Additionally, the airborne management of this occurrence illustrates the importance of effective communication when dealing with an abnormal situation under high workload conditions. This is especially the case when there is limited guidance available to resolve the issue.

Photograph of A330-343 9M-XXM

Source: Airliners.net

 
Our authorities also seem to have this aversion to thoroughly scrutinising certain international operators (like AirAsia & AirAsia X). This is despite numerous incidents/accidents pointing towards serious systemic safety issue deficiencies within these airlines.

Other countries have considered these safety deficiencies serious enough to issue a blanket ban on these airlines and in some cases their affiliates.

However here in Australia we consider 'our' system of oversight of international carriers robust enough to capture any miscreant airlines entering our borders and endangering citizens. Remember this captured on AP from Skidmore's first foray into Senate Estimates?

P7- ...When you read Hansard the intent and the purpose of the question was – how come operators which are blacklisted in Europe can operate into Australia?.  What was needed, by way of answer was an explanation of the differences between Australia and Europe: given that ICAO compliance in the real world is the norm, rather than the 1600 (Edit correction) 4000 odd differences package which keeps Australia off the real compliance radar, using stealth and technical lip service.

I wonder how long ICAO will sit still, when the world is blatantly taking the Mickey out of Annexe 13.  Perhaps they will start to hunt down a fat, juicy high roller for to make an example of?

Well, poor old Skidmore was lured into a velvet lined trap, foiled by smoke, dazzled by mirrors and succumbing to the oldest trap in the world – the whispered "trust me".

You know the old gag – "I'll only pop it in a little way, if you don't like it, I'll take it out; trust me"..... ......

Tower Chair are we clear to backtrack?

Although personally I was much more interested in other passages of play at the time, I did find that Air Asia ......? (fill out on the dotted line.. ) & EU blacklist thing intriguing and now with Skates 1st Estimates retraction, even more so???

Anyway for those interested here is the "exchange" in pictures - fascinating how Hoodoo Voodoo seems to know in almost intimate detail the previous (prior to December 2014) EU blacklist??

 
Later on in that exchange can anyone else see the bizarre contradiction in the spin and weasel words from 1st Dr Aleck and then Mrdak, when compared to the deliberations of Senator Fawcett and the Treaties committee on assessing airservices agreements with Serbia, Vanuatu & Laos?

Dr Aleck : Can I just add quickly that, in 2009, we amended our legislation specifically to enable us to look at these issues more closely. We exercised those powers in connection with any operator who draws our attention to their activities, and an accident would be a flag.

CHAIR: It is a long time since I learned to fly. You may be captured by an area that has been black listed, but generally what goes wrong when an airline gets black listed in Europe?

Mr Mrdak : Generally, it starts with a concern about the safety regulator in that country in which the airline is based.

CHAIR: The skill of the pilot, the servicing of the plane?

Mr Mrdak : Generally, it starts with concerns about the quality of the safety assurance process in the country in which the airline is based, and the safety regulatory record of the jurisdiction before it gets to the individual aircraft operator. It is much more complex than simply the operator itself.

That part in red sounds a lot like the definition, purpose and proper functioning of a State (Annex 19) SSP to me??

Oh but that's right we don't need that, after all we have the indefatigable CASA and their team of flight ops experts, that so effectively oversighted PelAir's international jet operations prior to the 'pilot did it' ditching at Norfolk island - FDS...


MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

A timeline of SSP & ICAO obfuscation? -

However like the vast majority of well considered Senate & Government non-partisan review findings, these potential risk mitigation recommendations were completely ignored by CASA, ATSB, Airservices Australia & Murky's department.

Therefore rather than being at the forefront in aviation safety, Australia is now severely lagging behind the rest of the world and in some cases our aviation safety agencies are consistently becoming part of the causal (Reason model) chain...

On data input errors and to a degree 'automation dependency', the recently released final report into a March 2015 Air Asia X A330 incident on departure Sydney is a classic example:
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/inve...-2015-029/

Photograph of A330-343 9M-XXM

Source: Airliners.net

 
Our authorities also seem to have this aversion to thoroughly scrutinising certain international operators (like AirAsia & AirAsia X). This is despite numerous incidents/accidents pointing towards serious systemic safety issue deficiencies within these airlines.

Other countries have considered these safety deficiencies serious enough to issue a blanket ban on these airlines and in some cases their affiliates.

However here in Australia we consider 'our' system of oversight of international carriers robust enough to capture any miscreant airlines entering our borders and endangering citizens. Remember this captured on AP from Skidmore's first foray into Senate Estimates?

P7- ...When you read Hansard the intent and the purpose of the question was – how come operators which are blacklisted in Europe can operate into Australia?.  What was needed, by way of answer was an explanation of the differences between Australia and Europe: given that ICAO compliance in the real world is the norm, rather than the 1600 (Edit correction) 4000 odd differences package which keeps Australia off the real compliance radar, using stealth and technical lip service.

I wonder how long ICAO will sit still, when the world is blatantly taking the Mickey out of Annexe 13.  Perhaps they will start to hunt down a fat, juicy high roller for to make an example of?

Well, poor old Skidmore was lured into a velvet lined trap, foiled by smoke, dazzled by mirrors and succumbing to the oldest trap in the world – the whispered "trust me".

You know the old gag – "I'll only pop it in a little way, if you don't like it, I'll take it out; trust me"..... ......

Tower Chair are we clear to backtrack?

Although personally I was much more interested in other passages of play at the time, I did find that Air Asia ......? (fill out on the dotted line.. ) & EU blacklist thing intriguing and now with Skates 1st Estimates retraction, even more so???

Anyway for those interested here is the "exchange" in pictures - fascinating how Hoodoo Voodoo seems to know in almost intimate detail the previous (prior to December 2014) EU blacklist??

 
Later on in that exchange can anyone else see the bizarre contradiction in the spin and weasel words from 1st Dr Aleck and then Mrdak, when compared to the deliberations of Senator Fawcett and the Treaties committee on assessing airservices agreements with Serbia, Vanuatu & Laos?

Dr Aleck : Can I just add quickly that, in 2009, we amended our legislation specifically to enable us to look at these issues more closely. We exercised those powers in connection with any operator who draws our attention to their activities, and an accident would be a flag.

CHAIR: It is a long time since I learned to fly. You may be captured by an area that has been black listed, but generally what goes wrong when an airline gets black listed in Europe?

Mr Mrdak : Generally, it starts with a concern about the safety regulator in that country in which the airline is based.

CHAIR: The skill of the pilot, the servicing of the plane?

Mr Mrdak : Generally, it starts with concerns about the quality of the safety assurance process in the country in which the airline is based, and the safety regulatory record of the jurisdiction before it gets to the individual aircraft operator. It is much more complex than simply the operator itself.

That part in red sounds a lot like the definition, purpose and proper functioning of a State (Annex 19) SSP to me??

Oh but that's right we don't need that, after all we have the indefatigable CASA and their team of flight ops experts, that so effectively oversighted PelAir's international jet operations prior to the 'pilot did it' ditching at Norfolk island - FDS...

Update to the AirAsia X incident & the indefatigable CASA...

Via the New Daily & the West Oz:

AirAsia in aviation crackdown after incidents

@TheNewDailyAU

Australia’s Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has confirmed it has been doing increased checks on budget airline AirAsia since a dangerous navigation bungle last year.

The West Australian newspaper reports that CASA had been watching AirAsia more closely since a captain inadvertently entered the wrong longitude in a plane’s navigation system taking off from Sydney in March 2015.

The error placed the Kuala Lumpur-bound plane 11,000km away from its actual location, causing the plane to turn wrong way after taking off and cross the departure path of an adjacent parallel runway.

The plane was not fitted with an upgraded flight-management system that would have prevented the data-entry error, according to a report by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau published last week.

A CASA spokeswoman told the paper that AirAsia X had been involved in two incidents in the past 18 months, including the one involving the departure from Sydney Airport.

Related Coverage

Pilot error blamed for Sydney flight failure

[/url]
‘These airlines should be banned in Australia’
[url=http://thenewdaily.com.au/life/travel/2016/05/03/airasia-safety-australia/]
The second involved a close mid-air shave between an AirAsia A330 and an Airbus A320 on the Gold Coast on July 21 that was still under investigation.

The AirAsia group was reportedly also involved in an incident at Perth Airport in February when the pilots of an Indonesia AirAsia flight approaching the airport at night were told to abort their landing because they were 300m too low.

The West Australian reported further that it had uncovered evidence that an Indonesia AirAsia plane involved in a fatal crash in December 2014 between Surabaya and Singapore had flown 38 return trips between Perth and Bali with the same recurring fault.

That same fault was blamed for the events led to the plane crashing, killing all 162 people aboard.

AirAsia X confirmed that it had upgraded flight management systems before the publication of last week’s ATSB report and developed a training package for crew on correct operation and alignment of air data and reference systems.

In a statement to The New Daily, the airline said “the safety of all guests and crew are our utmost priority at all times”.

“AirAsia X has in place robust management systems to monitor and prevent similar incidents from reoccurring.”

“The airline has regularly passed safety and security audits conducted by various international and local regulators. We remain committed to ensuring our compliance to all safety and security regulations.”

MTF...P2

[Gobbledock]

AirAsia in aviation crackdown after incidents

@TheNewDailyAU

The second involved a close mid-air shave between an AirAsia A330 and an Airbus A320 on the Gold Coast on July 21 that was still under investigation.

The AirAsia group was reportedly also involved in an incident at Perth Airport in February when the pilots of an Indonesia AirAsia flight approaching the airport at night were told to abort their landing because they were 300m too low.

The West Australian reported further that it had uncovered evidence that an Indonesia AirAsia plane involved in a fatal crash in December 2014 between Surabaya and Singapore had flown 38 return trips between Perth and Bali with the same recurring fault.

That same fault was blamed for the events led to the plane crashing, killing all 162 people aboard.

AirAsia X confirmed that it had upgraded flight management systems before the publication of last week’s ATSB report and developed a training package for crew on correct operation and alignment of air data and reference systems.

In a statement to The New Daily, the airline said “the safety of all guests and crew are our utmost priority at all times”.

“AirAsia X has in place robust management systems to monitor and prevent similar incidents from reoccurring.”

“The airline has regularly passed safety and security audits conducted by various international and local regulators. We remain committed to ensuring our compliance to all safety and security regulations.”

AirAsia X digs deep into the tin of turd polish

Two scoops of turd polish applied for trotting out the old 'safety of passengers first' bullshit;

In a statement to The New Daily, the airline sIn a statement to The New Daily, the airline said “the safety of all guests and crew are our utmost priority at all times”.

Three scoops of turd polish applied, as evidenced by use of the word 'robust';

“AirAsia X has in place robust management systems to monitor and prevent similar incidents from reoccurring.”

Five scoops of turd polish applied liberally in this statement that still doesn't list the total of NCN's they have received while still being allowed to keep their AOC;

“The airline has regularly passed safety and security audits conducted by various international and local regulators. We remain committed to ensuring our compliance to all safety and security regulations.”aid “the safety of all guests and crew are our utmost priority at all times”.

Oh well, with the changes to the Gold Coast ILS you now have more of these giant pieces of tin flying closer to land and over buildings. Nothing here for CAsA to see, nothing to do, all go home now.

TICK TOCK

[Peetwo]

AirAsia in aviation crackdown after incidents

@TheNewDailyAU

The second involved a close mid-air shave between an AirAsia A330 and an Airbus A320 on the Gold Coast on July 21 that was still under investigation.

The AirAsia group was reportedly also involved in an incident at Perth Airport in February when the pilots of an Indonesia AirAsia flight approaching the airport at night were told to abort their landing because they were 300m too low.

The West Australian reported further that it had uncovered evidence that an Indonesia AirAsia plane involved in a fatal crash in December 2014 between Surabaya and Singapore had flown 38 return trips between Perth and Bali with the same recurring fault.

That same fault was blamed for the events led to the plane crashing, killing all 162 people aboard.

AirAsia X confirmed that it had upgraded flight management systems before the publication of last week’s ATSB report and developed a training package for crew on correct operation and alignment of air data and reference systems.

In a statement to The New Daily, the airline said “the safety of all guests and crew are our utmost priority at all times”.

“AirAsia X has in place robust management systems to monitor and prevent similar incidents from reoccurring.”

“The airline has regularly passed safety and security audits conducted by various international and local regulators. We remain committed to ensuring our compliance to all safety and security regulations.”

AirAsia X digs deep into the tin of turd polish

Two scoops of turd polish applied for trotting out the old 'safety of passengers first' bullshit;

In a statement to The New Daily, the airline sIn a statement to The New Daily, the airline said “the safety of all guests and crew are our utmost priority at all times”.

Three scoops of turd polish applied, as evidenced by use of the word 'robust';

“AirAsia X has in place robust management systems to monitor and prevent similar incidents from reoccurring.”

Five scoops of turd polish applied liberally in this statement that still doesn't list the total of NCN's they have received while still being allowed to keep their AOC;

“The airline has regularly passed safety and security audits conducted by various international and local regulators. We remain committed to ensuring our compliance to all safety and security regulations.”aid “the safety of all guests and crew are our utmost priority at all times”.

Oh well, with the changes to the Gold Coast ILS you now have more of these giant pieces of tin flying closer to land and over buildings. Nothing here for CAsA to see, nothing to do, all go home now.

TICK TOCK

Compare that to the Thai Airways situation and you start to see a pattern emerging on the strange, adhoc, 'double standard', dichotomy that is inherently regarded as normal ops for CAsA's monitoring/oversight of both international & domestic operators and/or airlines: 

Thai Airways Int'l delays A350's longhaul debut

© Airbus Industrie Thai Airways International Airbus A350-900

11SEP2016
Thai Airways International (TG, Bangkok Suvarnabhumi) has been forced to delay the launch of its first A350-900-operated international route - Bangkok Suvarnabhumi-Melbourne Tullamarine, Australia - airline president Charamporn Jotikasthira has revealed.

In an interview with The Bangkok Post, Charamporn attributed the delays to the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority's (CASA) lengthy type certification procedures. As such, the first A350 longhaul service, which was scheduled for September 16, has now been pushed back indefinitely.

Until such time that it does get the official nod from Canberra, the aircraft will be retained on domestic Thai services from Bangkok Suvarnabhumi to Chiang Mai and Phuket.

Thai Airways took delivery of its first of twelve A350-900s - HS-THB (cn 44) - on August 30.

Here is what is at stake for Thai Airways:

Special Report: Why THAI’s new aircraft acquisitions are so important

SPECIAL REPORT – Many local carriers are regaining momentum, as they experience surging demand. Recent fleet re-alignments and route adjustments are being converted into financial improvement. This is leading to renewed optimism about fleet and network growth, both for major carrier Thai Airways and smaller players such as Thai AirAsia and Nok Airlines.
tourism, transport, economics,

---

The Phuket News

Monday 12 September 2016, 12:06PM

---

[/url]










[url=http://www.thephuketnews.com/photo/listing/2016/1473656721_7476-org.jpg]






THAI is using greater reliance on leasing for new aircraft acquisitions. Photo: AJ Wood

BANGKOK: Back in January there were talks of the possibility of Thailand’s national carrier Thai Airways International (THAI) going bankrupt, however more recently there is renewed optimism and it looks as though the national carrier may have turned the corner.

I recently travelled BKK-LON-BKK on THAI’s new A380. I travelled business class at my own expense, it was a family trip and I spent the summer at home in the UK. From a comfort and service point of view it was very evident that THAI is back and they well deserves their recent Skytrax Award 2016 as the World’s Most Improved Airline.

The aircraft, service and facilities were world class. I was proud again of Thailand’s national airline. It is so important to have a modern fleet, no-one knows that better than other Asian airlines and the Middle Eastern carriers who have been chipping away at THAI’s market share for years.

The long loss-making airline, under a restructuring programme and helped by lower fuel prices and an increase in tourism, this year aims at achieving an operating profit of B12 billion (about US$344 million) and a net profit of B2bn (about US$57mn). The airline’s revenue is projected to surge to B194bn (US$5.58bn), up 7 per cent from 2015.

This would be a big leap for Thai Airways chief Charamporn Jotikasthira, former head of the Stock Exchange of Thailand, who was tasked to initiate and oversee the carrier’s turnaround by the Thai government in 2014. He started changing the airline’s management structure, reduced its workforce – particularly its overstaffed administration – and expenses, cut non-performing routes and partially sold assets including unnecessary aircraft. He also improved the airline’s sales strategy.

In detail, Thai Airways trimmed its fleet to 95 aircraft from 102 and cut 1,277 jobs, or 5% of its staff, under an early-retirement programme. The company also sold its headquarters building in Bangkok and cut down on generous, costly perks such as lifetime free first-class travel for directors and their families, including more than 100 former executives and board members.

SEVERE TURBULENCE

In 2014, Thai Airways posted net losses of B15.6bn, the worst financial performance of any Asean state carrier in that year. This was followed by losses of B14bn in 2015 and there was pressure for Mr Charamporn to step down. However, in the fourth quarter of last year THAI made its first net profit (about B4bn) in four years, indicating that the restructuring has become effective.

In the first quarter of 2016, revenue of the carrier was B48.8bn, missing its target by just 1%, whereas spending was cut by 13%, or about B1bn, it was announced on April 20.

To bring it on par with its main rival carriers, THAI is also seeking to raise its seat-occupancy rate to 80% from 75% in 2015 and 69% in 2014. In addition, it plans to raise the ratio of air tickets sold online from 16% to an industry average of between 30% and 40%.

Some of these initiatives are not new. Back in 2009, the then-THAI President Piyasvasti Amranand, who was appointed in June of that year, initiated closer co-operation with Star Alliance carriers and THAI’s low-cost carrier Nok Air. He also transferred more of its Boeing 737-400s aircraft and domestic routes to Nok.

In order to reduce the carrier’s B160bn debt, Mr Piyasvasti leased more aircraft – rather than relying on aircraft purchases – and introduced a new fleet plan to be implemented in 2010. And also in 2010, he secured B23bn of funding from four banks: the Government Savings Bank, Bangkok Bank, Kasikorn Bank and Siam Commercial Bank.

This year, the current Thai military government, has set tough restructuring targets not just for THAI, but a number of other state enterprises.

And it appears to be working. Mr Charamporn reported in the first quarter of 2016, THAI’s seat occupancy was already at 77.9%. Also 21.2 million passengers used the airline in 2015, up 11% from 2014.

Fuel surcharges, however, continue to rankle customers, even though oil prices have fallen sharply. In 2015, average jet-fuel prices were down by US$66 per barrel from the 2014 level. However, few premium airlines were able to cut airfares, due to high fuel-hedging ratios.

According to Thailand’s The Nation newspaper, between April and September 2015, Singapore Airlines hedged 57% of its fuel requirements, at a weighted average of US$106 per barrel. When jet-fuel prices during the period dropped by 41.1% from a year earlier.

It should have locked in over 1 billion Singapore dollars (B25.5bn) in cost savings. In reality, hedging eroded those savings by nearly half.

The situation could be better this year. According to the International Air Transport Association (IATA), a grouping of over 200 airlines, the average price of jet fuel is expected to fall further to US$41.20 per barrel in 2016, offering a chance for airlines to save US$104.6bn in fuel expenditure.

There is no information on the hedging ratio at THAI, but it is believed to be high. Hedging became a norm when oil prices hit new highs after the global financial crisis. But most airlines are under pressure to cut airfares and other costs anyway to stay competitive.

THAI President Charamporn also recently announced that the company has ordered 12 Airbus A350 XWB aircraft (Extra Wide Body), which will greatly modernise the fleet and maintain the airline’s quality standards and provide passengers with more convenience.
The first two aircraft, each with a price list of US$355.7m (more than B12,4bn), after an initial period flying on regional services between Bangkok and Chiang Mai, the aircraft will be deployed on long-haul flights, starting in September 2016.

Currently, THAI has 23 Airbus aircraft in its fleet. The new Airbus A350 is among 14 planes purchased by THAI amid plans to offer new routes to Russia, China and several countries in Europe. Of the 14 aircraft, 12 are Airbus A350 XWBs and two are Boeing 787s.

Melbourne will be the first city to welcome Thai Airways International’s brand-new Airbus A350 XWB aircraft and Sydney next year.

Thai Airways will operate a daily Melbourne-Bangkok service aboard the Airbus A350 XWB, replacing one of the Boeing 777-200s the airline currently flies on the route. This is the precursor to a twice-daily A350 XWB Melbourne-Bangkok service when the airline takes delivery of its second A350 later in September. All 12 brand-new A350s will be in service within 2 years.

The A350 XWB is branded the world’s most advanced twin-aisle aircraft, Airbus’ response to the Boeing 787 Dreamliner. Along with the A380, they are a vital piece of the jigsaw in the future to bring back THAI to the pinnacle it once enjoyed for so many years.

THAI’s strategies to bring passengers back include an upgraded first and business class service, new routes such as a direct Frankfurt-Phuket service, a resumption of the service to Moscow and the revival of flights to Tehran.

SAFETY

Another issue that THAI must address is air safety. In March last year, Thai airlines were placed under “special measures” by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) prompting Japan and South Korea to block new flights from Thai-registered airlines.
This forced airlines, including budget carriers Thai AirAsia X, NokScoot and Asia Atlantic Airline, to cancel extra flights that they had been planning. THAI was also affected.

The audit revealed some safety concerns, primarily relating to air operator certification procedures. Thailand provided the ICAO with the details of its corrective actions and mitigation measures and the ICAO is working with Thai authorities.

A spokesman for the European Aviation Safety Agency said, “We inspected in October last year THAI and those airlines in Thailand which applied for a Third Country Operators (TCO) authorisation – authorisation that any non-European Union airline willing to fly in and out of the EU must get, and they were okay.”

Read more at http://www.thephuketnews.com/special-rep...LvFy0FG.99

Hmm...so what's the hold up, I'm sure that the city of Melbourne would appreciate CASA pulling their finger out? Maybe it is because it is a new type; or maybe the obligatory brown paper bag was considered too 'light' weight? Either way if I was the responsible Ministers in the Turnbull Government, I'd be asking for a 'please explain'...   


MTF...P2

[Gobbledock]

P2;

Hmm...so what's the hold up, I'm sure that the city of Melbourne would appreciate CASA pulling their finger out?

Well firstly, I hope Thai haven't put all their eggs in the CAsA basket. If you are waiting on them the Thai CEO's kids will have grown up, got married, had their own grandchildren and the Thai CEO would have been retired for 30 years!

CAsA's hold up will be due to 'institutionalisation'. They would be hitting panic station. What do we do? How do we do it? We will have to make an actual decision and we don't do that? How can we allow it but abstain from any ACCOUNTABILTY? Will we need to get one of our geriatric FOI's with L/H seat time on b727's and DC9's up skilled? What to do what to do. Idiots. Poor Thai, enjoy the wait boys.

P.S A little plug for Thai. I used to work for a while with Mobil in Cyprus. Thai in those days offered a business/first class service that was absolutely second-to-none. Beautiful service, beautiful people, top notch.

[Peetwo]

KC & the luck of the Irish -

In reference to this quoted post off the AMROBA thread...

Evidence: CASA holding back industry innovation & investment-

New  Implementation Procedures for Airworthiness - USA
        Status: Current
        Date Referred: 12 September 2016

Track Inquiry                

Now if you go to the submission, you will see (at this stage) there is only one submission from AMROBA:

1 AMROBA (PDF 90 KB) 

Committee Secretary
Joint Standing Committee on Treaties
PO Box 6021
Parliament House
Canberra ACT 2600

The Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement (BASA) between Australia and the United States has been fairly restrictive for Australian aviation businesses to trade with the United States of America. Australian manufactured aviation products approved by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) are available to be sold now. The only thing that is holding our industry back is this international agreement and CASA/FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] Implementation Procedures. The CASA/FAA Implementation Procedures cannot be signed until the BASA has Parliamentary approval. It needs to approved this year.

Over the last couple of years, industry has been requesting these changes to this Agreement so Australian manufactured aviation products can be sold in the USA.

The FAA required analysis and assessment of the CASA approval process has been completed and sample manufactured products have been accepted by the FAA.

Australian manufacturers are concerned that administrative delays in getting these changes to the BASA can be stalled in Parliament if the amended document sits for the 20 day period. This could delay the approval by the FAA of amendments to the Implementation Procedures between CASA and the FAA.

Australian manufacturers have CASA approved products ready to market in the USA. CASA and the FAA have agreed to amend "Implementation Procedures" and can be signed this year if the BASA is expidited through parliament so it does not have to tabled for the standard 20 days.

CASA staff are with the FAA next week.

The Minister of Innovation, Mr Wyatt Roy is fully aware of one such product and has promised support.

Regards

Ken Cannane

Executive Director

AMROBA

www.amroba.org.au

Safety All Around.

Treaties tabled on 2 February 2016

Submission 1

 
However prior to end of the last Parliament there was one public hearing that was particularly interesting...

Here is the Hansard where Senator Fawcett once again made the CASA executive trough dwellers, look quite frankly like deer in the headlights, inept & completely out of touch with reality   (P2 - Also note the part in bold from MP Whiteley):

Senator FAWCETT: I want to take you to a couple of points. One is just a question of clarification. My understanding is that CASA STCs for part 25, 27 and 29 aircraft are limited. So where Australia is the designer of the aircraft or where the US is the designer of a small aircraft essentially we can provide STCs for anything, but as soon as we get into the commercial field and the RPT type aircraft my understanding from my notes here is that it is limited. Can you expand on what that means? It appears to limit or put barriers in the way of the most lucrative part of the American market.

Mr Nikolic : Regarding the way this was negotiated, when we approached the FAA for the first time with the wish to expand our scope they requested that we provide them with evidence of our competency—CASA as well as industry. We provided a number of STCs in different categories to demonstrate that competency. They reviewed that and they based their limitation and scope on the basis of what we could demonstrate at the moment as a level of competency, so on those bases they could simply accept those approvals without any further validation. Regarding the way the amendment is structured, we have two tiers of STCs. The first tier will be the one that will be automatically accepted, which means that they will administratively just accept the application and will issue their validated certificate without actually checking anything. The second tier is anything else.

When it comes to anything else, basically that is open to any STC and then it will come to a negotiation between the FAA and CASA as to how deep they need to dig into that more complex STC that they deem outside that initial scope.

What we achieved with that first tier, which is acceptance, is that we managed to cover probably 80 to 90 per cent of the work that is currently being done in Australia, especially when it comes to part 25 and potentially part 29 transport category fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft. The acceptance will be related to cabin refurbishments, which is the main thing for airlines. Every 3 to 5 years they refresh the cabin to be more competitive. It will also cover automatic acceptance for emergency medical outfits, which is what is mainly done by our design organisations to equip new helicopters for state emergency services and so on. These are probably the most lucrative areas that currently could be exported to the US and other countries. From the savings point of view, what Qantas and Virgin told us is that each of these STCs when contracted in the US would cost between $2 million and $4 or $5 million. They do probably between three and five projects every year. So there are significant savings there. Also, there is the potential for further development of the manufacturing sector in that particular area. It is potentially undeveloped for the reason that in the past that work was mainly outsourced to the US. That is a big—

Senator FAWCETT: Under the current assessment of this limitation where does that leave, for example, the firm down at Moorabbin that under APMA approvals used to manufacture landing gear struts for Metroliners? They had a very large market in the United States. Where do they stand under this new interpretation of limitations?

Mr Nikolic : If they specifically work on landing gear or for part 25 aircraft they would probably need to go to a slightly higher level of review by the FAA. However, up to this point they did not have any option. They could not enter that market at all with the Australian—

Senator FAWCETT: They have been in the market for five or six years.

Mr Nikolic : Only if they have the FAA approvals. If they have an FAA approval, which means they would need to contract an FAA design organisation, and they have an overarching FAA production approval holder who would take them as a supplier, then they could access that market. With this particular arrangement they would be able to contract an Australian design organisation, get a CASA approved STC and then under their own production approval they would be able to export that. So the option is there. How deep the FAA would seek to go into validation of that STC is a matter of negotiation.

Senator FAWCETT: My next question goes to CASA's capacity to support industry. The feedback that I got extensively a couple of years back when we were doing the Forsyth review was that for people who want to export parts or services into foreign markets time to market was critical. Someone would identify, they would put up a request for tender, people would tender but then they had to deliver within a pretty quick time frame. The feedback that I got consistently was that for anything that was delegated under the old CAR 35 system, where an engineer would sign off on CASA's behalf, that tended to work well but, wherever CASA needed to have its people look at things, capacity constraints—and sometimes it was possibly linked to a shortage of people within CASA with the relative experience—meant that what an independent engineer could sign off within a week was taking up to a year. I think the worst case I came across was nearly two years for CASA to sign off, which meant that it was impossible for them to meet market demands. Where is CASA at at the moment in having the capacity to work with industry and get timely turnarounds so that they can take advantage of this?

Mr Weeks : Senator, that is a difficult question. Because industry is aware that this is likely to occur, we have certainly seen an increase in the number of applications for things like STCs. The branch is working on those applications as we speak. I think it is up around 40 or so. Each STC does take variable time to assess, depending on the complexity of the product that is being applied for. I am confident that with the staff we have we are prioritising the STCs that require the approval. But it is variable, unfortunately.

Senator FAWCETT: That is not quite my question, though. My question is: are you adequately resourced? If the government's agenda is to encourage innovation and agile activity by industry to export and if a regulatory clearance is part of the system that they have to negotiate, then if you are already under-resourced in your ability to respond in a timely manner—which is what I have been hearing from industry—if the demand goes up because of agreements like this it is just going to make the situation worse. My question is: are you currently adequately resourced? Industry is telling me the answer is no, so I am interested in your perspective. And either what would you need to do to be adequately resourced internally or do you have planning in place to look at how you can delegate engineering authority to third parties to whom CASA has said, 'We accept your degree of competence and you can sign on CASA's behalf'?

Mr Weeks : Senator, in broad terms—and I will ask Mr Nikolic to provide some greater detail—it would be fair to say that if we received a significant increase in applications that would place pressure on us. In the current process I think we have a reasonable degree of being able to handle that, but Mr Nikolic will give more detail on that.

Senator FAWCETT: Just before Mr Nikolic starts, the third part of that question was around delegating to third parties. You have done that in the past. That appears to have contracted somewhat. What is CASA's current view? Do you have plans to reimplement some of those delegated options?

Mr Weeks : Yes. Mr Nikolic will provide more detail, but we have moved away from the CAR 35 process into the CASR part 21 approved design organisation process. There are some things for which at the moment CASA only issues the approvals, but there are also a wide range of approvals that are delegated or given to a part 21 design organisation. Mr Nikolic will—

Senator FAWCETT: Again, sorry just before we go to that I want to talk at the strategic level initially. Again the feedback I have had from industry is that there are frequently people with more expertise in industry than CASA has been able to employ and retain, which leads to deep frustration in industry when there are capacity constraints at CASA. Why are you not looking for an opportunity to outsource the maximum extent possible, as opposed to retaining a range of functions within CASA, if industry can demonstrate that they actually have more capacity and demonstrated competence?

Mr Weeks : That is a good point and that is the model of part 21—to the maximum extent possible have the experts and industry undertake those types of design and approval processes. In terms of our obligations as a regulator, there are some things that we will obviously need to continue to be involved in.

Mr WHITELEY: Can you give a percentage break up of those two differentials? What do you retain for whatever reasons you retain? You said you retain some and you are acknowledging that you already do outsource some, so what bits?

Mr Nikolic : The percentage is difficult to give because all these tasks are random. They do not come in a scheduled manner. However, from a strategic perspective I can say that all minor modifications and minor repairs are already delegated 100 per cent to industry and with major modifications and major repairs there are two options. One is that industry would come to CASA and request that they approve, in which case we would be looking at what the actual request is and in many cases delegate that to industry, and in some cases, if it is a very complex task, we would probably do a partial delegation to industry and partially keep it in CASA. This is the setup that has been in place since CAR 35 days, so it has not changed.

We also looked into strategically delegating more to industry and for that purpose a regulation was put in place two years ago, which is known as subpart 21J approved design organisations. That particular regulation allows an approval to industry, to an approved design organisation, that basically will have almost all the options and approval powers as CASA. There are certain areas where industry would literally have everything except the issuing of the final certificate, which is kept for CASA. So that is already in place.

Senator FAWCETT: My concern comes from a recent visit I made of a firm which for many years has been one of Australia's leading aviation providers that modifies aircraft and does things with delegated authority. Now for the things that are not structural, not external to the aircraft, not impacting at all on the safety of the aircraft—and purely for domestic use, not for export—CASA are insisting on sending staff to look at frames and brackets that are being fitted inside the aircraft. So if you are resource constrained already I question why for something this company has done without issue, safety breach or anything for years CASA is now all of a sudden delaying the process considerably by insisting people come out and check step by step the installation of essentially some frames and brackets for equipment to go on the back of an aircraft. It strikes me that there is a mismatch there between what you are telling us and what is actually happening on the ground. I am just trying to understand why. There are always two sides to a story. I went for a visit and asked some questions and this is what I heard. I would like to hear CASA's perspective.

Mr Nikolic : Without getting into the detail of what firm that is—and it is difficult to talk hypothetically without a specific example—I would assume that we are talking about certain conformity inspections that are done by CASA. We are in the process of making arrangements to be able to delegate those as well. That has not been done up till recently.

Senator FAWCETT: Can I say: in the past—

CHAIR: We are running out of time, Senator. Can I just ask that you write to us and provide further information along those lines, and detail where you are at. You get the thrust of where Senator Fawcett is coming from.

Senator FAWCETT: Chair, can I just ask one last question?

CHAIR: Very quickly.

Senator FAWCETT: You can take it on notice if you need to. Does this agreement—and it strikes me that you are doing some restructuring to facilitate this agreement with the FAA—still provide local companies the option to say, 'We don't want to export. This is purely a modification. We would like to do it under an engineering order'—as they have done in the past? Or are they now required to go through this process? It strikes me that, if somebody has no intention to export, and if they are aware of all the limitations of doing it domestically and having to take it back to the FAA baseline, can they still do that? Or is that commercial impost an unintended consequence of this agreement?

Mr Nikolic : They can still do it using the existing systems. We are currently going through a post-implementation review of the Part 21. We are trying to find other solutions for general aviation apart from the approved design of implementation of 21J. We have a significant group of industry advisers in a working group that work with us. We are trying to find a workable, sensible solution so that not necessarily everyone needs to be a 21J-approved design organisation, and not necessarily everyone needs to have an overhead cost of a design organisation. So we are working on that, as well.

CHAIR: Deputy Chair?

Mr KELVIN THOMSON: In the interest of time, Chair, I will let that opportunity pass.

CHAIR: Mr Whiteley?

Mr WHITELEY: No, I will leave it. It was a very good line of questioning, I have to say. There are a number of obvious questions that could be followed up. I think we should wait. There is an obvious theme within the Senator's line of questioning that, I think, should be taken very seriously. The general perception is that the organisation is nowhere near as efficient or as best practice or as industry standard—whatever the words are—as it should be. My only query would be is that, at the moment, with the current level of applications, you are resource okay. But I think I heard you say that, if it goes up, which we believe it will, you probably would not be. My only question would be, and you might want to address it in your letter, is: right now, are you at industry standard? Are you as efficient through the approval process and the certification process as it would be if a third-party independent contractor was used? I would be interested to hear that.

CHAIR: Senator Fawcett, we do have a couple of minutes left if you have a final question.

Senator FAWCETT: You rushed me to a conclusion!

CHAIR: Sorry, but I thought the Deputy Chair had some questions which he wished to ask. I apologise for that. Being almost 11.45 am, we will bring it to a conclusion. Thank you for attending and for giving evidence today. If the committee has any further questions, the committee's secretariat may seek further comment from you at a later date.

Well as luck would have it, again very much related to this thread, KC and AMROBA have released yet another informative article on the fundamental importance of our NAA (CASA) establishing a pathway to harmonising our regulations with the rest of the world:

Breaking News

Breaking News 
CASR Part 145 AMOs
September 14, 2016 Ken Cannane
mro-industry-2016
Read more

Again the message is clear we need harmonisation, PBR and minimising the differences with international standards (ICAO SARPs). It is not rocket science but FDS it is sure taking a long time for the penny to drop in Aviation House...

As usual choccy frog quality post from KC...

MTF...P2 

[Kharon]

A vexed question - Responsibility, not laws.

Reading through the Thorny and GD offerings triggered a line of thought which needs to be aired. I’m not even sure I’ve got the right end of the stick, but it’s worth a few lines to try and tease some sense out of a jumble of stray thoughts.

One of the things I do not like about Australia is the perennial  ‘habit’ of bleating for more and more rules; at all levels. In the workplace we are drowning in ‘rules’; in industry we are submerged in ‘rules’; in our private lives, our homes, our hospitals, our cars; in every facet of life from waking to toddling up the wooden hill to bed; rules rule. I’d bet there are even rules about sleeping.  Why is it so?  The best answer I can come up with is that ‘we’ keep asking for them. All a politician can do – in reality – is pass law (well that and wind). From the town council to the Senate – law after law after law.  Miles and miles of paper; millions of dollars and a huge industry associated with ‘law’. When faced with a complex problem, I often try to boil it down and relate it to a ‘simple’ element; like algebra – once you can ‘understand’ the fundamentals; complex equations become simple as the elements break down into manageable pieces of the puzzle.

Dogs – were the first and easiest example I could work with. Lots of ‘em, across a huge range of breeds and a wide cross section of the community. There are some pretty draconian ‘laws’ surrounding simple dog ownership – at council level – some good, some silly and others used cynically as a revenue raising tool.  Take registration and micro-chip tagging of your dog; bloody good idea, no brainer.  Then look at the problems ‘off leash’ creates for a council; it totally discriminates against owners with properly managed animals and is also a great little earner.  At 6am, in an empty park, you will be fined if Fido is ‘off leash’. No matter that Fido is a geriatric, miniature poodle, four Kg over weight and toothless.  The law cannot discriminate or be flexible – it’s one way for all.  At 10 am, in the same park, some fool letting a fighting fit big pit bull run loose where the kids are playing footy, rampaging through the picnics – same fine.  What a law cannot do is teach responsibility or common sense.  The reason for the law is that through irresponsible owners, someone got offended; or, hurt, or; some fool kid decided it was great sport to torment an animal and got roughed up (lack of parental responsibility, more rules).  Same-same; there is a bleating group at council, demanding ‘they’ do something.  Council go for the quick, cheap, easy fix with an eye on the revenue.  This is easier than tackling the real problems; teaching owner responsibility and helping those who cannot train their animal to do so.  Issue a licence to those who can prove, through established tests, that ‘their’ dog is reliable and may be ‘off-leash’; provided, the owner accepts full criminal responsibility for any damage or injury caused by their dog. In short, place the responsibility and legal onus firmly where it belongs.

Australians in general always seem to want ‘something’ done by someone else. Bleat long and loud and get a new law passed. This does not prevent those determined to do something from doing it, simply gives the prosecution a platform to sheet home blame – after the fact.  There are laws against murder; many of ‘em, from the Bible through to the World court; do they prevent murder?  You know they don’t.  There are laws about dogs off leash; do they prevent the fool with a mutt running amuck at the cricket; again, you know they don’t.  So WTD has this to with aviation? Good question.

With one notable exception, every operator I’ve ever had to do with wanted to ‘do the right thing’.  Even the greedy and venal realise that there is more money to be made by operating ‘efficiently’ and operating ‘safely’ is a must as accidents cost a lot more. There needs to be a basic standard set, basic rules to prevent incident and accident; the ten commandments if you will. After that, responsible operators will always try to do the right thing – it is, after all in their best interests to do so.  But in the end it is solely ‘their’ responsibility; the law reflects that.  So why not strip away the layers of law which were produced to simply absolve the government and the department of any or all responsibility. “Thou shalt not run out of fuel”. If you do, we will come down like a ton load of bricks – unless there is a reasonable excuse.  There is no need for thousands and thousands of nit-picking, revenue generating, work creating ‘regulations’ which were created in deep knee jerk.  The responsibility for safe operation rests entirely with the operator; same as the hapless dog owner with NFI and who could care less, but penalises the rest – by default.  Simple rules are hard to break, no wriggle room.  

Aye well, it is Sunday and a ramble is allowed (rules). Not certain I’ve made the point, actually I’m not sure there is a point; except I’m sick to my back teeth of pointless, mindless acres of ‘rules’ which will never prevent those who intend to break ‘em, doing so.

Enough of random thoughts and trying to solve puzzles. There are folk cleverer than I who have tried to solve this riddle – probably all went mad trying. So, I shall cease and desist while the old brain is still capable of hunting down a second coffee; and perhaps a Blueberry muffin.

Toot toot.