[Gobbledock]

Malcom Turdball pineapples the Heff?

Source of mine tells me there was a little tea party at PM Turdballs house today. Numerous Liberals were given their marching orders by way of being told that they wouldn't have party support if they re-contested their seats. Some dross like Ruddock and Entsch have been boned, but unfortunately the Heff is rumoured to have been axed as well. It will be sad not to see him at Estimates in the near future. A win for the dipshits perhaps?

Ding ding seems like the election bell has been rung and the game of musical troughs begins!


"Safe pineapples for all"

[Kharon]

Now, for the shell game.

Watching the committee deal with the CASA crew in the eternal quest for a ‘straight’ answer, listening to the usual slippery spiel, even the ‘Montreal’ alibi was dragged in, Skidmore declaring ‘before my time’ as an out, is becoming ridiculous.  Sterle managed his temper very well and with some assistance managed to get the points related to ‘Exemptions’ expressed, if not answered.  He is very aware that part of the iron grip CASA have on industry is ‘approval’ and ‘exemption’.  The issuing of either creates a very subtle form of pressure to ensure cooperation, is wide open to suspicion and friction.  Not to mention confusion, as the subjective interpretation of regulation begs serious questions about the shape, form, spirit and intent of a ‘law’.  

Much has been said about the differences in ‘treatment’ applicants receive from CASA.  For instance, we know of one operator (of many) who waited almost two years and spent well over $AUD 100,000 to obtain an Air Operators Certificate (AOC); currently we are sniffing around a very ugly rumour, which appears to be related to some old mates who wanted a fast, inside track to an AOC and received it in record time at very little cost or inconvenience.   This industry is way too small to prevent a rumour like that being exposed as either a fairy story or somewhere closer to the truth.  We shall see; I digress, but Glen Sterle summed the situation up neatly.

Senator STERLE: That is what I am asking. There are a few familiar faces around the table who were. This is what I am trying to find out. We have this every time with CASA, I tell you. You know the pea? You know when you just move those pots around? We should just get rid of the pots. Does anyone know? How do you know what happens? Dr Aleck, you have been around a long time.

By way of comparison, I found the following quote in the AMSA session.  I only publish it to highlight the absolute difference in style and delivery between a professional outfit and a man who knows his onions and the pathetic dribble we get from the same paygrade ‘Shamateurs’ from CASA.

Senator CONROY: When was the decision of HP Ship Management to remove the ratings and tapering crew? When did the event at approximately 1 am on 30 January 2016 come to your attention?

Mr Kinley: I would have to take the exact time and date on notice but it would have been sometime in December. We were advised in December that the company were wishing to amend their safe manning document for the ship in order to change the category of seafarers from integrated ratings to ratings, engine room and deck.

Senator CONROY: Could you explain those different categories again please. Mr Kinley: Apparently I normally sit here with a dumb look on my head, so I will try to answer your questions—that is Senator Sterle's comment from the last hearings. I will try to answer your questions as best I can.

Senator EDWARDS: I will bring it to his attention in the Hansard; he is not listening.

Mr Kinley: The Portland was manned, as most Australian ships are, with engineer officers, deck officers and integrated ratings. Integrated ratings are ratings that are skilled to work either on deck or in the engine room. It is not a terribly common way to do it in the world, and most of the other ships that we see come to Australia have ratings deck and ratings engine room. That is permitted in Marine Orders, and Australia, in Marines Orders 73 schedule 1, there is the ability to have integrated ratings or to have ratings deck and ratings engine room. The operator of the Portland applied to us, under Marine Orders 21, to have their minimum safe manning document amended to change from having integrated ratings to having ratings deck and ratings engine room. Around the same time they also indicated to us that they were intending to apply for certificates of recognition for foreign ratings, and indeed they did for ratings of Indian nationality. That is in accordance with Marine Orders 70 division 4; we have an agreement in place with India to recognise their qualifications. We processed those applications as we would for any other application for that sort of matter

There speaks an honest man, on top of his job, supported by a crew who know their business.   Chalk and cheese.

[Peetwo]

Now, for the shell game.

Watching the committee deal with the CASA crew in the eternal quest for a ‘straight’ answer, listening to the usual slippery spiel, even the ‘Montreal’ alibi was dragged in, Skidmore declaring ‘before my time’ as an out, is becoming ridiculous.  Sterle managed his temper very well and with some assistance managed to get the points related to ‘Exemptions’ expressed, if not answered.  He is very aware that part of the iron grip CASA have on industry is ‘approval’ and ‘exemption’.  The issuing of either creates a very subtle form of pressure to ensure cooperation, is wide open to suspicion and friction.  Not to mention confusion, as the subjective interpretation of regulation begs serious questions about the shape, form, spirit and intent of a ‘law’.  

Much has been said about the differences in ‘treatment’ applicants receive from CASA.  For instance, we know of one operator (of many) who waited almost two years and spent well over $AUD 100,000 to obtain an Air Operators Certificate (AOC); currently we are sniffing around a very ugly rumour, which appears to be related to some old mates who wanted a fast, inside track to an AOC and received it in record time at very little cost or inconvenience.   This industry is way too small to prevent a rumour like that being exposed as either a fairy story or somewhere closer to the truth.  We shall see; I digress, but Glen Sterle summed the situation up neatly.

Senator STERLE: That is what I am asking. There are a few familiar faces around the table who were. This is what I am trying to find out. We have this every time with CASA, I tell you. You know the pea? You know when you just move those pots around? We should just get rid of the pots. Does anyone know? How do you know what happens? Dr Aleck, you have been around a long time.

The chalk..

By way of comparison, I found the following quote in the AMSA session.  I only publish it to highlight the absolute difference in style and delivery between a professional outfit and a man who knows his onions and the pathetic dribble we get from the same paygrade ‘Shamateurs’ from CASA.

Senator CONROY: When was the decision of HP Ship Management to remove the ratings and tapering crew? When did the event at approximately 1 am on 30 January 2016 come to your attention?

Mr Kinley: I would have to take the exact time and date on notice but it would have been sometime in December. We were advised in December that the company were wishing to amend their safe manning document for the ship in order to change the category of seafarers from integrated ratings to ratings, engine room and deck.

Senator CONROY: Could you explain those different categories again please. Mr Kinley: Apparently I normally sit here with a dumb look on my head, so I will try to answer your questions—that is Senator Sterle's comment from the last hearings. I will try to answer your questions as best I can.

Senator EDWARDS: I will bring it to his attention in the Hansard; he is not listening.

Mr Kinley: The Portland was manned, as most Australian ships are, with engineer officers, deck officers and integrated ratings. Integrated ratings are ratings that are skilled to work either on deck or in the engine room. It is not a terribly common way to do it in the world, and most of the other ships that we see come to Australia have ratings deck and ratings engine room. That is permitted in Marine Orders, and Australia, in Marines Orders 73 schedule 1, there is the ability to have integrated ratings or to have ratings deck and ratings engine room. The operator of the Portland applied to us, under Marine Orders 21, to have their minimum safe manning document amended to change from having integrated ratings to having ratings deck and ratings engine room. Around the same time they also indicated to us that they were intending to apply for certificates of recognition for foreign ratings, and indeed they did for ratings of Indian nationality. That is in accordance with Marine Orders 70 division 4; we have an agreement in place with India to recognise their qualifications. We processed those applications as we would for any other application for that sort of matter

&..the cheese

There speaks an honest man, on top of his job, supported by a crew who know their business.   Chalk and cheese.

Making an ass-out-of-u-&-me

Gold "K"..solid gold, yep Sterlo was in fine fettle the other evening, the lead up (from about 01:00 minute in video) was also worth regurgitating as it further highlights how 'on-song' he truly was.. :

Mr Skidmore : It is something we would have to ask VARA. We would have put the legislation out, but it is Virgin who interpret that and make a determination. - Can you believe that statement? Isn't that the definition of 'regulatory capture'? - UFB!

Senator STERLE: No, but you are the boss.

Mr Skidmore : I am not the boss of Virgin. - Probably the most honest thing Oliver said all night.

Senator STERLE: I wish I could get away with that with the coppers when they were hassling the shit out of me as a truck driver. I wish I could use that excuse: 'You didn't ask me. Come and ask me first. I will tell you what speed I was doing.' You are the regulator. That is all I am asking. - Solid Gold

Mr Skidmore : We put the legislation out and then we try and educate people and get them to follow the legislation and the regulations.

Senator STERLE: Right. So all I want to know is, when they knew that they had to come to 4 February—

Mr Skidmore : I can only assume that it was when the legislation was put in power and the dates were identified.

Senator STERLE: It is dangerous to assume here, Mr Skidmore, because people remember what you assume in further estimates down the track. Would you like to take it on notice and come back? - You can take that to the bank..

Mr Skidmore : We can come back and tell you when the regulation was put into power.

Senator STERLE: Right. And do I assume—which is always deadly—that VARA would have known from that very day that by 4 February 2016 they had to have the ADSB? - Another 'solid GOLD'

Sterlo is obviously well briefed and onto the the Fort Fumble obfuscation & double-standard 'exemption' game. 

"...But it is only for 3 months for a handful of old banger Fokker 50s...what's your point??.."

Oliver is trying to downplay & plead ignorance on the whole affair but the good Senator is not going to have a bar of it and for good reason to:

Instrument number CASA 08/16


I, MARK ALAN SKIDMORE, Director of Aviation Safety, on behalf of CASA, make this instrument under subparagraph 9B.12 (a) of Civil Aviation Order 20.18 (CAO 20.18) and regulation 11.160 of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998.
[Signed M. Skidmore]
Mark Skidmore AM
Director of Aviation Safety
20 January 2016

Authorisation and exemption — aircraft operating without ADS-B transmitting equipment and carriage of Mode S transponder equipment (Virgin Australia Regional Airlines)

1          Duration
                 This instrument:
(a)   commences on 4 February 2016; and
(b)   expires at the end of April 2016, as if it had been repealed by another instrument.

2          Application
                 This instrument applies to the aircraft mentioned in Schedule 1 operated by Virgin Australia Regional Airlines Pty Ltd, Aviation Reference Number 075986 (the operator).

3          Authorisation
                 I authorise the operator of an aircraft mentioned in section 2 to operate the aircraft without automatic dependent surveillance – broadcast (ADS-B) transmitting equipment.

4          Exemption
                 A person using an aircraft mentioned in section 2 at Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne or Perth aerodrome is exempt from compliance with paragraph 9E.4 of CAO 20.18 in relation to the requirement to carry a serviceable Mode S transponder.

5          Condition
                 A person, who is using an aircraft to which this instrument applies, must ensure that all I.F.R. flight plans for the aircraft in Australian airspace are annotated in Item 18 with “RMK/CASA ADSB EXEMPT” (quotation marks omitted).
Note   If this annotation is not included in a flight plan, the Airservices Australia automated systems will reject the flight plan.

Schedule 1          Aircraft
                 An aircraft of an aircraft type mentioned in column 1 with the registration mark in column 2 of an item in the following table:

Item
Column 1
Aircraft type
Column 2
Registration mark
1
Fokker F50
VH-FNA
2
Fokker F50
VH-FNB
3
Fokker F50
VH-FND
4
Fokker F50
VH-FNE
5
Fokker F50
VH-FNF
6
Fokker F50
VH-FNH
7
Fokker F50
VH-FNI
8
Fokker F50
VH-FSL

 Hmm...so OST personally signed this exemption a little over 3 weeks ago - short term memory loss perhaps..

Wonder why OST didn't suggest that VARA operate a couple of their ATR-72-600s over the routes in the interim??

Oliver's comment about Virgin making their own determination, I wonder if that is what happened to the nearly two year ATSB investigation - AO-2014-032 - i.e. he has let Virgin & ATR get it sorted before the topcover ATSB releases their Final Report...

Updated: 10 June 2014


The occurrences

Flight control occurrence

On 20 February 2014, Virgin Australia Regional Airlines was operating an ATR 72 aircraft, registered VH-FVR, on two scheduled passenger flights from Sydney, New South Wales (NSW) to Canberra, Australian Capital Territory and return. This was to be followed by a charter flight to Narrabri, NSW and return.

The applicable forecasts and reports did not anticipate any significant weather with the only concern to the flight crew being an expected crosswind of up to 30 kt for landing at Canberra. This was taken into account when the captain decided to be pilot flying for the first sector.

Pushback at Sydney was on time at about 1435 Eastern Daylight-saving Time[1] but take‑off was later than planned due to a long taxi and holding for traffic. The departure, climb and cruise were normal. For the descent into Canberra the crew selected a slower airspeed due to the possibility of turbulence. No significant turbulence was encountered until the normally-expected amount of mechanical turbulence on late final approach into Canberra.

The turnaround was conducted within the allocated time and the return flight to Sydney departed Canberra at 1612 with the first officer as the pilot flying. A steeper-than-usual climb was carried out to reduce exposure to turbulence. Other than expected turbulence during the first 1,500 ft, there was nothing significant during the climb to flight level (FL) 170[2].

During cruise the captain was in radio contact with the operator’s personnel who requested that departure from Sydney for the next sector be brought forward by 5 minutes. The captain expressed his concerns about the limited time available for the turnaround to the first officer.

The crew conducted a routine brief for the anticipated arrival to runway 16 Right, which was expected to be standard except for commencement of descent 5 NM (9 km) earlier to compensate for a tailwind. The captain noted that they needed to be cognisant of managing airspeed during the descent as a result of the anticipated decreasing tailwind.
The first officer commenced descent with the autopilot engaged in vertical speed mode and a target airspeed of 235 kt (15 kt less than the maximum operating speed of 250 kt). The descent was stable and smooth.

On first contact with Sydney Approach the crew were assigned runway 16 Left. This was different to the briefed runway and required a change of instrument approach diagrams and navigational aid frequencies.

At the appropriate points the seatbelt sign was turned on and the transition-down checklist carried out. The checklist was held at the last item awaiting a report from the cabin that it was secure.

At 1640 and about 8,500 ft, the crew noticed the airspeed going up quickly and the speed trend excessively high. The first officer reduced engine power and used touch control steering to temporarily disconnect the autopilot before manually raising the nose to control the speed. The aircraft felt ‘heavy’, requiring the first officer’s two hands on the controls to move from the then -4° pitch angle (aircraft nose-up/down). The first officer expected that the pitch correction would be sufficient to arrest the speed trend.

The captain was unsure if the first officer’s control inputs were sufficient to avoid an overspeed so put one of his hands on the controls and disconnected the autopilot to raise the nose further. The captain believed he indicated his intention to take over control and while the first officer could not recall it being verbalised he was aware of the captain’s actions. The first officer recalled that he took his hands off the controls, releasing touch control steering in the process. Shortly after, concerned about a high nose-up attitude, the first officer put his hands back on the controls. To both crew members, what happened next was unexpected and unclear.

Suddenly, the crew felt high positive g,[3] the controls felt different and spongy, and cockpit warnings activated. The crew then verified that the aircraft was under control at a stable attitude and speed. It was level or in a slight descent at an airspeed of about 230 kt.

One of the cockpit warnings was ‘pitch disconnect’, indicating the left and right elevator control systems had been decoupled. This allowed for independent movement of the elevators via the captain and first officer control columns.

The crew consulted the pitch disconnect checklist and worked to identify which control column was free and working normally. Although both controls were free, it was decided that the captain would be pilot flying. During this process an intermediate airspeed around 200‑210 kt was selected before reducing the airspeed to below the 180 kt specified in the checklist.

At some point the cabin crew called the cockpit and advised that the senior cabin crew member had injured her leg and that it might be broken. In the next contact with air traffic control the crew asked for an ambulance to be available after landing. The crew also made a PAN[4] call and requested runway 16 Right to minimise taxi time on the ground. Air traffic control agreed to that request.

The captain flew the approach to runway 16 Right manually with airspeeds, power settings and configurations that were typical of any day-visual approach and landing. After landing and a slight delay the crew taxied the aircraft to the assigned bay (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Aircraft taxiing onto the bay (still image copied from closed circuit TV footage)

Source: Sydney Airport (edited by the ATSB)

After shutdown the crew completed cockpit tasks including reconnection of the two elevator control systems and the captain checked on the condition of the cabin crew member. Airport firefighters provided first aid until an ambulance arrived at the bay 10 minutes after the aircraft parked. The cabin crew member was transported by ambulance to a hospital. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) was advised initially of a turbulence-related event and, based on the nature of the injuries sustained by the flight attendant, commenced an investigation.

Post-occurrence maintenance

Two aircraft maintenance engineers working for the company that provided contract maintenance services to the operator were in attendance at the aircraft. The crew advised the engineers that they weren’t sure what had happened but that the pitch controls had disconnected, with a possible overspeed. From the onboard equipment, the engineers were able to establish that there had not been an overspeed but a vertical load factor of 3.34 g was recorded that exceeded the acceptable limit for the aircraft weight.

One of the engineers took the opportunity to conduct a preliminary walk-around visual inspection and did not observe any aircraft damage. The flight crew entered the pitch disconnect in the aircraft’s technical log and, after a request from the engineers for more information, added that the aircraft had sustained moderate turbulence.

The aircraft was removed from further service that day and towed to a distant parking area to allow for the resulting maintenance inspection to be carried out. The two engineers on duty, one of whom was the senior base engineer, had come in early at 0600 to work on a grounded aircraft. Given this start time and the resulting already long day, the engineers considered that they needed assistance to complete their remaining tasks, which now included an inspection of VH-FVR. An engineer on his rostered day off agreed to come into work to assist with the inspection.

This engineer arrived at work at about 1900 and, after a discussion with the duty engineers, understood that the aircraft operator (maintenance watch) had received the data from the aircraft’s quick access recorder and requested a turbulence inspection after a pitch disconnect in moderate turbulence. He also understood at the time that one of the duty engineers had done quite a detailed walk-around of the aircraft in daylight and found no signs of defects.

The aircraft manufacturer’s job card for a turbulence inspection specified a general visual inspection of the fuselage, stabilisers and wings with more detailed inspections if any anomalies were found. A detailed inspection of the wing attachment fittings was also required irrespective of the results of the general visual inspection.

Over the course of the evening the non-rostered engineer and one of the duty engineers worked on disassembling some of the aircraft interior to access the wing attachment fittings. The duty engineers left at 2200, leaving the non-rostered engineer to complete the task. At about 2300 the engineer borrowed a nearby stand to provide a platform at about wing height. While on the stand positioned behind the left wing near the fuselage, the engineer inspected the upper surface of the wing, rear fuselage and tail by torchlight. The engineer finished work shortly after and returned to work at 0600 the next morning.
No defects were identified from any of the inspections and the aircraft was returned to service the next day.

Suspected birdstrike

Subsequent to the occurrence on 20 February, the aircraft was operated on 13 sectors, the last of which was a scheduled passenger flight from Sydney to Albury, NSW on 25 February 2014. On descent into Albury the aircraft passed in close proximity to birds, which alerted the captain to the possibility of a birdstrike. There were no indications that a bird had struck the aircraft but on the ground, the aircraft’s pitch trim system fluctuated abnormally.

The captain conducted a walk-around inspection with an expectation of bird damage to the left side of the aircraft. The only abnormality found was a deformity to a fairing at the top leading edge of the vertical stabiliser, which might have been the result of a birdstrike. The captain advised maintenance watch who dispatched an engineer to inspect the aircraft.

The engineer used scissor lift equipment to inspect the tailplane and confirmed that the fairing might have been damaged by a bird but that there was also significant structural damage on top of the tailplane. The aircraft was grounded and the ATSB advised.

Later information from the operator suggested that the damage to the tailplane might have been a result of the occurrence involving VH-FVR on 20 February 2014. On this basis, the ATSB combined its investigation into the aircraft damage identified in Albury with its investigation into the earlier flight control occurrence.

The flight crew of the earlier pitch‑disconnect flight and the engineers involved in the post-flight maintenance were interviewed and the damage to the aircraft was inspected at Albury. The ATSB downloaded data for the pitch-disconnect flight and subsequent flights from the flight data recorder and data for the pitch‑disconnect flight and last flight from the cockpit voice recorders that were installed in the aircraft for those flights.

Initial examination

An initial examination of the recorded data showed that when the airspeed approached 240 kt, at about 8,500 ft during the descent into Sydney on 20 February, the first officer used touch control steering and manually pitched the aircraft up. The airspeed increased again and then both the first officer and captain pulled on the control column. Shortly after, when the vertical load factor was increasing through 1.8 g, the first officer began to push the control column. The differential force on the control column that resulted from the captain and first officer applying an opposing force exceeded the differential force required to generate a pitch disconnect. Each pilot was then controlling the elevator on their side of the aircraft in opposite directions for a brief period before the first officer released his control column.

The aircraft manufacturer inspected the aircraft and found broken carbon plies, cracked joint sealant, and deformation in and around the area where the horizontal stabiliser attaches to the vertical stabiliser (Figures 2 and 3). There was also some minor damage to the rudder. The damage was assessed as being consistent with an overstress condition. Subject to further assessment and non-destructive testing, the aircraft manufacturer recommended replacement of the horizontal stabiliser, elevators, and vertical stabiliser.

Figure 2: Tailplane external damage (indicated by marks and stickers)

Source: ATSB          
 
Figure 3: Left tailplane attachments (fairing removed)

Source: ATSB
Ongoing investigation

The investigation is continuing and will include review of the:

• meteorological data
  
• data from the flight data recorder
  
• data from the cockpit voice recorder
  
• closed circuit TV footage
  
• aircraft operator’s procedures and training
  
• aircraft maintenance records
  
• maintenance organisation’s procedures and equipment
  
• arrangements between the aircraft operator and maintenance organisation
  
• aircraft manufacturer’s maintenance instructions
  
• information as it becomes available during the repair process.
  

 
That could also explain the nearly 3 year delay with the Mildura Fog Duck-up (AO-2013-100); or the continued 'no comment' on how the CASA ALIU 'parallel investigation' into a couple of serious Jetstar incidents - AO-2015-139 - that occurred at the tail-end of 2015.

Courtesy Australian Aviation:

Separately, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has launched its own probe into the two Jetstar flights, which would run in parallel to the ATSB’s investigation and focus on “regulatory compliance and relevant ongoing safety of flight issues”.

“This investigation is focusing on the root causes of the passenger loading errors, relevant systems and processes and Jetstar’s subsequent actions,” CASA said in a statement.

“The travelling public can be assured CASA will take all appropriate actions to ensure Jetstar maintains robust and appropriate systems and processes to ensure passenger loading mistakes do not recur.”

 
Why does the Oliver show of goodwill & professed CASA oversight actions - in the above incidents - not fill me with a lot of confidence that all the potential safety risks will be identified by the ATSB/CASA & effectively mitigated .

Oh well we must just have faith that the safety departments of these airlines has made their own determinations that mitigate the risk...

MTF...P2   

[thorn bird]

"Much has been said about the differences in ‘treatment’ applicants receive from CASA.  For instance, we know of one operator (of many) who waited almost two years and spent well over $AUD 100,000 to obtain an Air Operators Certificate (AOC); currently we are sniffing around a very ugly rumour, which appears to be related to some old mates who wanted a fast, inside track to an AOC and received it in record time at very little cost or inconvenience."

$100,000 is cheap for an AOC boatman.
One operator in NSW shelled out a quarter of a million and that didn't include his interest bill while quite a few millions of $$$ worth of machinery sat idle for the two years it took.

[Kharon]

From the sublime to the ridiculous is but a step. (Napoleon).

The tales are legend Thorny; I won’t bore you with a long list or the incredible sums expended by operators who have ended up needing therapy; the chief pilots who have ‘gone postal’ and of many others gone 'barking', while trying to deal with CASA. The operator in NSW had a particularly bad time; I believe there was a huge bill (five figures) for unnecessary maintenance training, an extended delay related to acceptance of check lists and the final insult bearing the cost for an FOI type rating (which is story for another day), to end up with one of the most inutile, disingenuous, dangerous of that tribe brow beating an experienced chief pilot.  And yet, just down the road a bit, life is peachy.  

If there was ever a commission or inquiry made into the madness of doing business with CASA, the submissions would blow your socks off, further inquiry into the manner in which CASA operate would beggar belief.  Perhaps there’s a solution right there, demonstrate the actual waste of time, money and resources; all pissed up the wall ‘satisfying' CASA.  What a fell tale that would make.

Aye, but there’s the rub; to speak out is akin to setting fire to your feet in an attempt to keep your hands warm.  Particularly for those who rely on the time honoured exemption, good will and approval system for survival.  Wasn’t there a proposal 30 years ago to make a rule set which would eliminate the need for ‘exemption’, individual approval and dependence on remaining in favour with the powers that be?   I wonder what ever happened to that notion.

Toot toot.

[Kharon]

In post 282; I was intrigued by the stark differences between the CASA and AMSA approach to answering questions.  

By way of comparison, I found the following quote in the AMSA session.  I only publish it to highlight the absolute difference in style and delivery between a professional outfit and a man who knows his onions and the pathetic dribble we get from the same paygrade ‘Shamateurs’ from CASA.

There has been some discussion on this facet of how the CASA preferred method for not answering directly; with truthful statement, led them into a minefield.   Not stating the blindingly obvious which would not only be (a) factual; but, (b) put a full stop on the discussion is the default setting.  So far distant from probity is the corporate mindset, that anything may be used, rather than provide a straight answer.  The facts in this instance would certainly set them free. Instead, mother Skidmore's child began bleating about aged aircraft and dropped the ‘financial’ element into play, right on his thick skull. The absolute dogs breakfast they made of the answer, through a natural aversion to automatically relying on facts made them seem not only incompetent and disingenuous, but wide open to allegations of ‘advantage’ or capture.  

It’s not true of course; the simple, truthful answer would be that the ATC guarantee minimum separation standards and there is no question of separation being compromised (not often at least).  There are rules in place for failure of ADSB, just as there are rules for operating in Reduced Vertical Separation airspace; just as there are rules for the places where radar separation is not available; in short with or without ADSB or indeed even radar the system keeps aircraft separated.  

I forget what the specification is (10 minutes or 17 miles?) but anyway, non equipped (failed) ADSB aircraft have a greater time and/or a distance ‘penalty’ imposed to ensure they are safely distanced from ‘traffic’.   The VARA exemption could have been totally justified by truth and fact.  It was not; instead we have the national director becoming an embarrassment to professional industry. Watch from about the three minute mark as ignorance, folly and a natural aversion to even consider speaking the truth turn into frustration and anger.  That segment, professionally managed should have provided Glen Sterle (legend) with satisfactory answers and raised his estimate of CASA. Alas, they failed to impress, yet again, dismally.

Toot toot.

[thorn bird]

Boatman,
I look at these podcasts and I can only conclude these bureaucrats make sheep look like independent thinkers.

[Peetwo]

In post 282; I was intrigued by the stark differences between the CASA and AMSA approach to answering questions...

...The VARA exemption could have been totally justified by truth and fact.  It was not; instead we have the national director becoming an embarrassment to professional industry. Watch from about the three minute mark as ignorance, folly and a natural aversion to even consider speaking the truth turn into frustration and anger.  That segment, professionally managed should have provided Glen Sterle (legend) with satisfactory answers and raised his estimate of CASA. Alas, they failed to impress, yet again, dismally.

The trouble with spin-n-bulldust when you have NFI -

Totally agree "K" the difference in the professionalism & clarity of factually backed answers, by AMSA, versus the CASA default setting (which obviously continues under Skidmore) of  deliberately obfuscating all their answers with spin & bollocks is quite remarkable.

The trouble for CASA is that the Senators are right onto this, perhaps best highlighted by Sterle's  pea & pod example...

"..We have this every time with CASA, I tell you. You know the pea? You know when you just move those pots around? We should just get rid of the pots. Does anyone know? How do you know what happens? Dr Aleck, you have been around a long time..."    

We also had it happen earlier in the session with new-comer to the committee Senator O'Sullivan, fortunately he to was right onto the attempted subterfuge through bollocks  : 

..Mr Skidmore : We have participated in a tear-down of an engine with the three modifications, and that was at roughly 900 flight hours.

Dr Aleck : The standard calls for 200 hours. The test would be effective if it operated for 200 hours. This aircraft had 900, so that was quite impressive.

Senator O'SULLIVAN: The engine had.

Dr Aleck : Sorry, the engine had.

Senator O'SULLIVAN: During a meeting on 14 November were you advised that there had been design developments that had been made to the Jabiru engine over recent years? You were made aware of that?

Dr Aleck : That there had been design developments to the engine over the years—yes, certainly. We were aware—

Senator O'SULLIVAN: And they submitted to you that they felt they had resolved some of these critical issues that you had used to place these limitations on them? Did they make that submission to you?

Dr Aleck : They suggested that was so. I think the—

Senator O'SULLIVAN: Thank you for that. What evaluation have you now done on the enhanced engines to see whether their performance is better, and up to an acceptable standard, versus the old engines? Gentlemen, this company is on the verge of tipping over and this has been a long-running saga. I do not have time because, obviously, we have to restrict our time amongst ourselves. If any of the facts that are being presented to me are correct in relation to how CASA has dealt with this company—how long it has taken and the manner in which the consultations occurred—then there is a problem: a serious problem. I will not have time to deal with it today, but maybe we can have a quiet audience for me to go through some of these issues with you; otherwise I will be asking my colleagues to join me to have an inquiry to have a look at how you have dealt with this.

Dr Aleck : Certainly happy to have a discussion.

Senator O'SULLIVAN: All right, I will be in touch.

Then there was Senator 'Wacka' Williams realisation that he & his constituents had also been misled by the smooth talking charlatan DAS Skidmore:

Senator WILLIAMS: Mr Skidmore, at last estimates we were talking about the cost of the SIDs compliance program:


The evidence we have or the investigation that we did led to an indication that the SIDS compliance or initial test result of investigations were in the order of $15,000 to $20,000 but then, depending on that, would determine the work that needs to be done and the cost involved in that.

So, you are talking $15,000 to $20,000, okay?

Mr Skidmore : It depends on the aircraft. It depends on who is doing the maintenance, but that was the rough indication.

Senator WILLIAMS: Okay, that is what you said:

The evidence we have or the investigation… were in the order of $15,000 to $20,000, …

But then repairs if necessary.

I have a friend who has a 1972 310Q Cessna with about 5,000 hours. He received three quotes to make his SIDs compliant. All three quotes were within $5,000 of each other and the lowest quote was for $60,000. It is now parked up. It does not fly and, as you said in Armidale—I really appreciated you coming to Armidale that day—you want to see people flying. He is now parked up because three quotes were all within $5,000 of each other and the cheapest was $60,000.

CHAIR: Is it a 172?

Senator WILLIAMS: Sorry?

CHAIR: Is it a 172?

...Senator WILLIAMS: No, a 310. When you were saying at last estimates about $15,000 to $20,000, where can he get them for $15,000 to $20,000?

Mr Skidmore : It depends on the model of the aircraft. You wanted a rough sort of number with regard to the average. We have models going from the 100 series to the 200 series, and from the 300 to the 400 series. So it could vary throughout those series. I apologise if it sounds like we got it horribly wrong, but it might have been the case of a 100 series being roughly around $3,000 to $5,000, or $10,000, and anywhere up to the $60,000.

Senator WILLIAMS: That is where he is at—$60,000; hence it is parked in the shed. The value of these planes deteriorates something terrible. You received a letter from Mr Charles Koebel, from Walcha, who says:

Last year I was at Lake Hood in Alaska where there are about 600+ float planes. On walking around the lake I asked quite a few Cessna owners about SIDS. Not one of them had even heard of it.

Mr Skidmore : The FAA operates under a different regulatory system to ours...  
- that is about the most honest fact stated by OST throughout the whole session

..The Cessna SIDS was put out as an airworthiness limitation. It was necessary under our schedule of maintenance to implement—

Senator WILLIAMS: By CASA?

Mr Skidmore : In accordance with our regulations.

Senator WILLIAMS: So CASA has introduced SIDS?

Mr Skidmore : No, Cessna has introduced the SIDS program.

Senator WILLIAMS: He says in this letter they have never heard of it over there. Do we know of any catastrophes in Australia because of the condition of these Cessnas—their frame, or the reason the SIDS program has to be carried out? Have we had any fall out of the sky?

Mr Skidmore : The only one I can refer to is an ATSB investigation on a Cessna 208, I think—I would have to get the details—where there was a structural failure of the elevator. That was not in flight—luckily it was found on the ground.

Senator WILLIAMS: This bloke has his plane parked in a rust free area, in Armidale—it is a long way to the coast and salt water. Vehicles do not rust there, or very little, and yet we are getting all these planes grounded. Of course if they go to sell their plane they cannot get any money for it because it has to have a SIDS inspection—time is up.

Mr Skidmore : It was a program put in place by Cessna. I have seen their limitation, I have seen the actual documentation that says it is a mandatory inspection. In accordance with our legislation we have to implement that.

CHAIR: It is called buyer beware.

Senator WILLIAMS: It is the end of second-hand Cessnas in Australia, by the sound of that.

Different dog barking but Leopard & spots comes to mind when it comes to CASA & its Iron Ring...


MTF..P2  

[P7_TOM]

O’Sullivan and Williams make to the AP hall of fame; the real questions asked were simple enough.

Pants on fire Mr Skidmore?

No?; well something is burning.

P.S. Have you noticed – OST is starting to do that ‘head wobbling’ thing Dolan does when the heat is turned up.   Oh, for a no holds barred game of Poker; happy daze.


 ....

[Kharon]

Piss and wind.

After watching the estimates recordings you have to wonder whether Skidmore realises that the loyalty he shows his ‘top guns’ is not returned.  He is simply the donkey on which the tail of incompetency will be pinned.  With a couple of exceptions his top line crew are about as much use to him as a chocolate firewall, with the structural integrity of a rice pudding and the morals of alley cats.

Conversely, you may wonder if he is happy with the crew and gleefully joins in the destruction of industry; perhaps he was the right man after all.  On track record so far it is starting to look very much that way; a sensible man would not go out of his way to offend or annoy Senators, unless the robust ‘system’ supported such affront.  

No doubt MM will be happy to be shut off them; I wonder how much of his time and resources are wasted piddling on fires he never started?  He has other ‘officials’ who appear sane, competent and can supply reasoned answers to sensible questions; clearly the three stooges cannot.  For proof, read the Rihannon questions, deadly boring to listen to, but she has out foxed the crew.  

We can live in hope that the PMC pays some attention, the Senators fully brief Chester and Nash assists with the transition.  Maybe then, we’ll see some positive action, other than producing more and more exemption to a completely useless rule set in Part 61 and prevent more of the same legal excrement being dumped on the long suffering, hard working industry.  Maybe not, who’d know.

Window dressing, smoke and mirrors are all well and good at the theatre; but do not put bread and butter on the table or pay the mortgage.  Enough of pantomime; Skidmore needs to pee in the pot or get off it.

Here I sit, broken hearted
Paid a penny and only farted.

Toot toot.

[Peetwo]

TICK..TICK..TICK - What will it take?

From off the 'bump in the night' thread post #

Next we had NX on those YMML incidents etc.

OK so that is OST's non-plussed, NFI on all these pesky, pain in the ass "GA issues" - with some input from the Witch Doctor stating the standard "small operators" don't signify mantra.

And this was the Harfwit - Creedy prepared - take on the same matters:

  

 


As much as the Dick Smith detractors will say that he is overdramatising issues for his own agenda -"..yada..yada.." - there is no denying that he is in a fairly unique situation when it comes to experiencing the highs & lows (pun partly intended ) of the day to day functioning, warts and all, of the Australian ATC/Airspace system.

The following is an example from the first part of Dick's appearance at the 18/08/15 ASA Performance hearing:

"..Compared with other countries, in Australia you are almost in complete silence all the time. I have said to the air traffic controllers, 'But couldn't you do a little bit more of a workload and actually give us an air traffic control service where we need it?' And quite a few of the controllers have said to me, 'Well, of course we can, but don't tell anyone I told you that'! I fly to Ballina from time to time, and you get this superb service from Bankstown's air traffic control; you just do what you are told. You get told to taxi out to the runway, and you ask for a clearance for take-off, and you take off, and the controller says 'Turn right to 120 degrees', and you meet the airway, and he or she says 'Turn left' and you follow the airway under air traffic control. The most amazing thing is that as you get to 8½ thousand feet, that is the only place on the whole trip where you can actually run into somebody. Up at 45,000 feet the airways are separated, going towards Brisbane and to the right by about 10 miles, from the one coming the other way, and up at 45,000 feet where I fly it is very unlikely for anyone to be there anyway. But when you actually get down to below 8½ thousand feet, the statistics show that is where the mid-air collisions can happen and it is where you can run into a mountain. I then get told, as the pilot—and I am a single pilot when I fly the plane; I do not have a copilot to start writing down call signs—'Traffic is'. In the worst situation, I was given four other aircraft, because the Lismore approach happens to be mingled up with the approach to Ballina. I write down on my pad, 'Four planes', and then I change off onto the aerodrome frequency and I start calling these planes and trying to sort out where they are.


To an Aussie pilot, that is just normal; that is the way we do it. But if you are a pilot from another country you simply cannot believe that a leading aviation country in the world can have something that is so archaic. If we brought in some class E airspace, as planned 20 years ago, instead of the en route controller—it is not an additional controller—giving you traffic information on three or four aircraft the controller would look at his or her radar screen down to about 3,000 feet and below the radar screen they would look at their flight strips on the electronic display, and they would separate you. It is called procedural separation. They would say, 'Hold at 6,000 feet' or 'Do the approach', and they would say, 'I'm holding an aircraft on the ground to depart.'


What I find incredible is that after 20 years we have not gotten even one airport in. And I have said to people who are against it—because resistance to change is staggering—'Let's just try one; if it is going to require hundreds of extra controllers then we obviously cannot afford it.' But my advice is that it will not. To the pilots who say they do not need it I say that I think after flying in it for three or four months you will find that it is a fantastic system.."

[Peetwo]

TICK..TICK..TICK - What will it take?

From off the 'bump in the night' thread post #269

Next we had NX on those YMML incidents etc.

OK so that is OST's non-plussed, NFI on all these pesky, pain in the ass "GA issues" - with some input from the Witch Doctor stating the standard "small operators" don't signify mantra.

And this was the Harfwit - Creedy prepared - take on the same matters:

  

 


As much as the Dick Smith detractors will say that he is overdramatising issues for his own agenda -"..yada..yada.." - there is no denying that he is in a fairly unique situation when it comes to experiencing the highs & lows (pun partly intended ) of the day to day functioning, warts and all, of the Australian ATC/Airspace system.

The following is an example from the first part of Dick's appearance at the 18/08/15 ASA Performance hearing:

"..Compared with other countries, in Australia you are almost in complete silence all the time. I have said to the air traffic controllers, 'But couldn't you do a little bit more of a workload and actually give us an air traffic control service where we need it?' And quite a few of the controllers have said to me, 'Well, of course we can, but don't tell anyone I told you that'! I fly to Ballina from time to time, and you get this superb service from Bankstown's air traffic control; you just do what you are told. You get told to taxi out to the runway, and you ask for a clearance for take-off, and you take off, and the controller says 'Turn right to 120 degrees', and you meet the airway, and he or she says 'Turn left' and you follow the airway under air traffic control. The most amazing thing is that as you get to 8½ thousand feet, that is the only place on the whole trip where you can actually run into somebody. Up at 45,000 feet the airways are separated, going towards Brisbane and to the right by about 10 miles, from the one coming the other way, and up at 45,000 feet where I fly it is very unlikely for anyone to be there anyway. But when you actually get down to below 8½ thousand feet, the statistics show that is where the mid-air collisions can happen and it is where you can run into a mountain. I then get told, as the pilot—and I am a single pilot when I fly the plane; I do not have a copilot to start writing down call signs—'Traffic is'. In the worst situation, I was given four other aircraft, because the Lismore approach happens to be mingled up with the approach to Ballina. I write down on my pad, 'Four planes', and then I change off onto the aerodrome frequency and I start calling these planes and trying to sort out where they are.


To an Aussie pilot, that is just normal; that is the way we do it. But if you are a pilot from another country you simply cannot believe that a leading aviation country in the world can have something that is so archaic. If we brought in some class E airspace, as planned 20 years ago, instead of the en route controller—it is not an additional controller—giving you traffic information on three or four aircraft the controller would look at his or her radar screen down to about 3,000 feet and below the radar screen they would look at their flight strips on the electronic display, and they would separate you. It is called procedural separation. They would say, 'Hold at 6,000 feet' or 'Do the approach', and they would say, 'I'm holding an aircraft on the ground to depart.'


What I find incredible is that after 20 years we have not gotten even one airport in. And I have said to people who are against it—because resistance to change is staggering—'Let's just try one; if it is going to require hundreds of extra controllers then we obviously cannot afford it.' But my advice is that it will not. To the pilots who say they do not need it I say that I think after flying in it for three or four months you will find that it is a fantastic system.."

 

Now using Dick's example with the Ballina/Byron Gateway Airport & airspace, let's refer to a statement from local MP Mrs Elliott in yesterday's Hansard from the Federation Chamber:

Ballina is a very exciting, vibrant town. It has been experiencing growth, and part of the reason for that is the fact that it has a very busy airport which services the entire Ballina-Byron region. The future of Ballina's airport continues to look very promising, with much growth in tourism meaning record numbers of visitors and also an increase in capital to the local economy.

Whilst we hear stories of many regional airports that are struggling financially, the Ballina airport pays for itself. In fact, it generates a small operating surplus of $1.3 million a year for the Ballina Shire Council. The Ballina airport has been growing at about 10 per cent year on year and indeed will challenge Gold Coast Airport as a domestic hub for southern Byron Shire and Ballina Shire. It had a record summer which saw 46,000 passengers in January alone, which is quite a lot for a regional airport. In fact, the Commonwealth Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics data last year highlighted that Ballina Byron Gateway Airport is among the fastest growing airports in Australia, and the airport has many great hopes for the future. There are plans to triple the size of its terminal building, a project costing $7.2 million.

Of course, the growth is driven by an ever-increasing number of holiday-makers to, of course, the best address in Australia, the North Coast of New South Wales. In fact, our local economy is sustained by our tourism growth, and the Ballina Byron Gateway Airport plays an important role in that.

Okay now reflect on the summary from ATSB investigation AO-2016-003:

In preparation for departure from Ballina/Byron Gateway Airport, New South Wales the crew of Airbus A320, registered VH-VQS, was in radio contact with the crew of two arriving aircraft. After establishing the intentions of the arriving aircraft, VH-VQS entered the runway and lined up. While holding prior to take-off, the crew of VH-VQS clarified their plan for maintaining altitude separation with the crew of one of the arriving aircraft. This delayed the departure of VH-VQS and resulted in the second arriving aircraft being closer to VH-VQS than anticipated as it commenced take-off. During the initial climb out, the crew of VH-VQS realised the second aircraft was closer than anticipated and reduced the rate of climb in response. After re-establishing the separation plan, the crew recommenced the climb and departed.

The investigation is continuing.

This incident may turn out to be a storm in a teacup, however the fact that the ATSB is actually investigating would seem to indicate there is a little more to it than the summary suggests??


MTF...P2

Ps  For an explanation for why it is that governments, CASA, ASA & the ATSB seemingly ignore all the signs of a future inevitable air disaster, go no further than the "V" post on 'discombobulation & 'AIOS' ("acquired institutionalised ostrichitis syndrome")

[Gobbledock]

Wodger will fix it

And now that Wodger Chambers is leaving CAsA and is going to work for ASA, perhaps he will fix all of ASA's problems??

[Peetwo]

Leopard & Spots - time for an RC 

Made a most disturbing discovery yesterday, first for some background read the first 8 posts from AP thread: Closing the safety loop - Coroners, ATSB & CASA

From the AAP news feed etc. many of the DIPs & witnesses to the Canley Vale tragic accident were under the impression that the Andrew Wilson coroners inquest was, for some reason, to be held separately at sometime in the future. 

Contrary to recommendation 2 from the Kathy Sheppard inquest Coroners findings, there was also several key witnesses that were quite prepared to give evidence and were awaiting to be called prior to the (presumed) Andrew Wilson inquest.

However yesterday I was reviewing the ATSB Canley Vale Final Report - AO-2010-043 - where I saw there was an additional bookmark, labelled 'Inquest', that I had not noticed before:

"..The Coroner made two recommendations, the first of which reflects a minor safety issue identified by the ATSB in its report:

Coroner’s Recommendation

That the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) finalise the guidance material for Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 5.23 Multi-engine Aeroplane Operations and Training such that the guidance material is completed and released as soon as possible. The coroner noted that the guidance material provides for multi‑engine aeroplane operations and training to support the flight standard in Appendix A of s.1.2 of the CAAP. This relates to engine failure in the cruise.

Safety message

This accident reinforces the importance when flying twin-engine aircraft with one engine shutdown that the optimal speed be selected, along with maximum continuous power on the operative engine, and that the aircraft’s performance should be verified prior to conducting a descent. Pilots should also use the appropriate PAN or MAYDAY phraseology when advising air traffic control of non-normal or emergency situations.

What has been done as a result

CASA has started a project to amend advisory material relating to multi-engine aircraft training and operations to include guidance information about engine problems encountered during the climb and cruise phases of flight. This amended guidance material will include information about aircraft handling, engine management, and decision making during these phases of flight. Updates on this work by CASA are available on the ATSB website

Inquests are separate to ATSB investigations
Coronial investigations are separate to ATSB investigations. In this matter the respective authorities are largely in accord as to the factors that contributed to the development of the accident involving VH-PGW.

The ATSB's report can be downloaded by clicking on the link: Final report
The Coroner's report can be obtained from the Coroner's Court of NSW. Contact details are available at: [/url][url=http://www.coroners.justice.nsw.gov.au/]www.coroners.justice.nsw.gov.au. Queries regarding the Coroner's findings should be directed to the NSW Coroner’s Court..

This sub-page summary of the coroners findings vs the ATSB findings, sounded too final & conclusive. Which led me to the NSW Coroners Findings & Recommendations page, which is where I discovered this: 

Inquest into the death of Kathryn Anne SHEPPARD

Decision of Deputy State Coroner MacMahon on 14 August 2015

Catchwords: CORONIAL LAW, death following aircraft engine failure, section 81(1) findings, engagement of families of deceased with regulator, Recommendations made in accordance with section 82. 

Inquest into the death of Andrew Alan Thomas WILSON

Decision of Deputy State Coroner MacMahon on 14 August 2015

Which leads me to Kharon's post: A quiet, valuable achievement.

A quiet, valuable achievement.

K Sheppard   A Wilson.    At the Coroners inquest.

I don’t expect a head of steam would achieve very much; fury after the fact is  of little value.  But I am curious about the selection of witnesses to appear in this below the radar coroner’s inquiry.  I am also curious that the only published article we could find was a very crafty piece published in the AAP loop which reads as though young Wilson ‘killed’ Sheppard and that the inquest was all about one death, not two.  Considering the amount of press Hempel and others got, you could reasonably expect a little more coverage.  The only reason I can fathom is that very few people even knew the inquest was on.  Certainly several who had been advised that they were to be witness did not.  Gutted, gobsmacked and angry are some of the comments.  

No doubt it was all done legal and nice, the coroner really only to do his job and determine the cause of death, not too many facts needed for that – two killed in a crash: full stop.  CASA lift up the carpet, ATSB sweep the mess underneath; everyone off to lunch.  Nothing to see move along.

There was even a trite, mealy mouthed recommendation from the coroner:-

2. That CASA undertake public consultations in order to assist CASA in the development of a legislative proposal enabling CASA to compel the attendance of persons at compulsory sworn interviews to answer questions concerning specific aviation and safety measures where a reasonable suspicion exists that; a. a significant safety risk exists or existed in an aviation operation; and

b. evidence of a witness or witnesses likely to have knowledge of an aviation safety risk cannot be obtained in any other way.

Read that half a dozen times, carefully

"enabling CASA to compel the attendance of persons at compulsory sworn interviews to answer questions concerning specific aviation and safety measures where a reasonable suspicion exists that; a. a significant safety risk exists or existed in an aviation operation; etc."

Pure fiction. Had we been invited or even informed of the scheduled date, I and others would have very much liked to be there, if only just to listen to the ATSB/CASA discourse which prompted such a recommendation; I really would.  Must have been a work of art and with no dissention offered, a very easy piece to sell.

“to compel the attendance of persons at compulsory sworn interviews”

Does this imply that people did not turn up for interview; or, perhaps many witnesses were not summoned to interview; or, CASA did not bother to interview anyone?   Many had ATSB interviews, several provided empirical evidence, we can’t find any one witness (yet) who was informed of the inquest, let alone attended.

As I say, all neat and tidy, dry as dust and no skin off the watchdog’s arse.  If you thought the handling of Pel-Air was a clever bit of legerdemain, Canley Vale will blow your socks off: the ATSB report is a good place to start.  ATSB may well have written the ‘technical’ analysis, for what that’s worth, but the back end was pure malice aforethought and had little to do with the accident; just the politics of yet another predetermined result.

As the members of the Senate standing committee have been advised on several occasions; you think Pel-Air was a rum do? Brothers, you ain’t seen nothing yet.  Just take a peep under that plush, expensive carpet, then tell me what you see.  We cannot stop this from happening, perhaps you can.  But after the nett result on Pel-Air, we wonder.

It is a tale Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, Signifying nothing.

This ain’t good enough, not by a bloody long shot.

Selah.

UFB! Nope - TFB (Truly Duckin' Believable)



MTF..P2

[P7_TOM]

Kharon –

“RAAA and TAAAF are certainly trying and bringing back Forsyth is not a bad notion.  This is, in theory, a great idea.  But I agree with Hitch, there must be a datum.  Had there been a time line and a clear program for ‘reform’ then with a suitable yardstick, the Rev Forsyth may have had something to measure.  The other valid point is that so much time has gone by, so much window dressing has been draped that it’s bloody near impossible to determine just what, if anything has been done, in fact, not in faery land.  PAIN  has been ‘counting’ actions rather than words; what has actually been done toward reform.  Apart from the shuffling of deck chairs and a great deal of rhetoric, little tangible has emerged.  The score card shows nothing of benefit to industry, much done for the CASA self image, if you count bluff, bluster and pony-pooh.  But if you examine the underbelly i.e. what CASA have actually been doing, and have done behind the smiling façade, it is a sad, sorry tale.  Give Forsyth some legal powers and job; then perhaps things will change.”

“Hitch mentions FOI’s and tales thereof.  It is a honest quest; but seriously, what chance is there that the Yaffa legal eagles will allow publication?   PAIN have on file some detailed reports (lots of) some of which beggar the imagination, until you get down in the weeds and test them; then a true picture emerges.  It ain’t a pretty picture but to get anyone to commit to a statement to writing and provide sworn testimony is mission impossible.  Ask anyone to write it, sign it and stand behind it; don’t get crushed in the rush to the exit.   Fear of retribution rules supreme – Why? Well there’s good reason.  Perhaps if the Rev wanted to measure anything that would be a good place to start – Would you be prepared to sign a statement?  Honourable intentions Hitch, commendable but wishful thinking and until the ‘fear and distrust’ is removed nothing will change.  The fact is that CASA have simply become more devious and a little more careful; but the bastardry continues and will continue until the known bad apples are rooted out and removed.  Chambers leaving was a good start, what about the remaining clan, still there working their evil”.  

The quotes above stem from a good article penned by ‘Hitch’ on Yaffa.   He asks how shall progress be measured?  It is a bloody good question.  The IOS believe actions speak louder than words.  If this 'off radar' action taken by CASA at the Canley Vale inquest is an indicator of progress then we need to have a serious look at how CASA operate now, despite all the smoke and mirrors.  The Coronial inquest took place with little or no indication to the DIP (of which there are many) and those who patiently sat through long interviews with the ATSB and CASA giving evidence or statement; only to never hear the result.  As “K” says; it’s all done, no doubt legal and proper, but CASA have had some serious skin in the game, as do some of the DIP’s, not any longer it seems.  

I, for one, should very much like to know what prompted the second coroner recommendation. CASA had no trouble rolling Airtex and Skymaster together, providing 'witness' and generally confusing the evidence to obtain a desired result at AAT hearing; none whatsoever.  But now they are to be viewed a separate entities; this confused the crap out of no less than Norton White and a classy Barrister.  Even when 30% of the ‘facts and evidence were abandoned by CASA , it was almost impossible to sort the wheat from the chaff.  Now it seems as though there was a shortage of witness coming forward and CASA now needs powers to compel those who would not come forward to speak up; short of witnesses? absolute Bollocks.   Bollocks; because both CASA and ATSB had witnesses out of the Wazzoo, all singing from the same hymn sheet. Many wished to be heard, none were invited - Why?  We know, don't we children; maybe it's time the Senate knew.

I agree with P2 nothing short of a RC or another Senate inquiry will place a full stop after the CASA machinations; there needs to be a serious, deadly serious inquiry into the way CASA treat industry.  The appeals for cooperation and lip service to cultural change have been flushed down the thunder box; courtesy of yet another seriously flawed report; long delays and disingenuous ‘facts’ being presented to a hapless coroner. 

This disgraceful behaviour has to stop.  How can the government or industry ever trust either ATSB or CASA to do the right thing when they continue to demonstrate, clearly and regularly that they have no intention whatsoever of changing?

Pel Air was just practice for the real thing; now then,  have Chester, Boyd, the board and the Senate committee got the balls to step up and actually stop this Mickey taking?  It’s becoming an international embarrassment.  Time to stop playing the game as scripted and take the gloves off.  

Ahem; GD it may be prudent to start stoking the boiler, I’ve seen this thunderous quiet before; it does not bode well.  Tread lightly though mate, quiet as a mouse.

[Gobbledock]

Tom, the Houseboat is ship shape. The engines are serviced, boiler room prepared, deck is scrubbed, brass is polished, Captain is in the wheelhouse and I'm wearing my white overalls and puffing on a Winnie Blue while eagerly awaiting a radio call.

Indeed it is the calm before the storm. Now, I know that the Canley Vale debacle has many stones yet to be upturned. Lives were lost, relatives of the deceased are shattered forever, and as with PelAir and Lockhart River, the puerile 'R'egulator has a hand in the root cause of all three accidents, yet it bullshits, lies, and weasels it's way out of any responsibility. CAsA is part of a crooked government system that is designed, built and managed in a way that ensures it always comes out squeaky clean while everyone else is coated in shit.

However, I am oh so certain that the Ferryman has a satchel that is filled with documents that could be sent at a moments notice. I am also certain that the Senators also have a satchel or two that they are sitting on, ready to be displayed at the right time. But what we need is a royal commission into the CAsA beast, a commission that will finally spill the contents of the rancid pond for all the world to see. Until that commission happens we will never see a resolution of the issues that have dragged on for decades and in fact morphed into the mess we have before us today. The IOS have held great concern for years that the ultimate cause for change will be a giant smoking hole. We still hope that won't be the catalyst, but the clock is still ticking...

TICK TOCK

[Peetwo]

Canley Vale & the Senate PelAir Inquiry - Joining dots, dashes & calling for resurrection of R10 & R11 NOW!   

Reference from - The noble Art - Embuggerance thread:

Embuggerance & investigative probity - In the Sleepy Hollow shelf-wared tales of embuggerance, there is one case, that of Airtex, that keeps on rearing its ugly, festering head.  Like the long trail of industry exemptions, the Airtex ET provides many puerile examples of CASA double standards in regulatory enforcement. How this - vindictive, hypocritical trail of nonsensical, big "R" embuggerance - all began is hard to define but it escalated not long after the fatal accident into Botany Bay of Metro VH-OZA and culminated with the tragic accident on 15 June 2010 of Skymaster (sister company) VH-PGW Mojave at Canley Vale.

Either way the Airtex case now sits as a benchmark of the extreme lengths of enforcement persecution that CASA deployed throughout the McCormick years.   
 
Another Airtex 'point of comparison'.

Conduct of training not in accordance with operator
and regulatory requirements.

Significant safety issue

The pilot’s Metro III endorsement training was not conducted in accordance with
the operator’s operations manual and Civil Aviation Safety Authority regulationsgoverning training and checking requirements, with the result that the pilot’scompetence and ultimately, safety of the operation cannot be assured.

Action by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority

On 10 July 2008, Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) officers met with the aircraft operator to discuss the results of the June 2008 risk-based audit. As a result of those meetings, on 11 July 2008 CASA imposed the following conditions on the air operator’s certificate:

• no passenger carrying charter or aerial work operations were to be conducted whilst the then chief pilot held that position, with such operations only to resume upon CASA approval of a new chief pilot.

• the operator was required to develop multi-crew procedures in order to crew Metro aircraft with two qualified pilots when carrying passengers, with those procedures to be in place prior to such operations.

• by 18 July 2008, the operator was required to implement a system that printed pilot flight and duty time records to ensure a permanent record is kept.

• by 25 July 2008, the operator was to implement a confidential reporting system to provide the chief executive officer (CEO) with information relating to poor operational standards or hazards and risks within their operations.

• by 31 July 2008, the operator duplicate, via a secure back-up process, all computerised operator records and keeps these back-ups in a secure place

• by 31 August 2008, the operator was to employ an appropriately-qualified independent auditor that was acceptable to CASA. The auditor was required to conduct comprehensive quality and aviation safety systems audits on a 6-monthly schedule, and provide CASA with a copy of each audit report within 3 weeks of the completion of the audit

• by 30 September 2008, the operator was required to develop a comprehensive, company-wide safety management system that was fully supported by the CEO

• by 30 September 2008, the operator was to review and where required, amended the operations manual, any amendments were to be submitted to CASA for acceptance.

Action by the aircraft operator

In response to the issues that were identified in CASA’s risk-based audit of June 2008, on 30 July 2008 the operator advised CASA of the following actions to rectify those issues:

• the operations manual was being rewritten to:

– bring the operator’s training and checking into line with the regulations and address multi-crew operations

– ensure that base and line checks accurately reflected the operator’s procedures and testing requirements by reference to specific test-content forms

– include the requirement for all inducted pilots to complete ‘wet drill’ training on the use of life jackets and life rafts. The results of that training would be recorded and renewed annually

– ensure the review of ground course theory examinations and that they were corrected to 100% knowledge of the subject

– ensure the completion of formal ground courses and that the training and syllabuses were documented

– ensure that pilots undertook pressurisation endorsement with a minimum training criteria

• several pilots were being retrained as required to meet the operator’s endorsement training requirements

• the operator’s computer-based flight and duty time records were password protected and a monthly copy of each crew member’s record would be printed out and placed on the individual’s file

• flight crews had been informed about the importance of accurately completing paperwork

• the head of training and checking had resigned and a new individual had been approved by CASA

• one pilot who had been identified as not having sufficient in command under supervision hours had been recertified.

Subsequently, on 17 September 2008, the operator provided an amended operations manual to CASA for review. That included amendments to Part C of the manual.

On 16 December 2008, CASA issued a new Air Operators Certificate to the operator.

ATSB assessment of CASA and operator action

The ATSB is satisfied that in combination, the action taken by CASA, and response to the CASA action by the aircraft operator, adequately addresses the safety issue.

Now again I am not being critical of the outcome, on the contrary it is a perfect example of how the system is supposed to work, the ATSB identifies significant safety issues with the AOC holders operations, which implicate CASA through some lack of oversight issues.

CASA (much like with PelAir) puts in place requirements they feel need to be addressed before granting the company an AOC renewal.

The company embraces & proactively addresses these requirements and even further to the CASA expectations puts in place a SMS to help identify & mitigate any future safety issues.

The trouble for Airtex was that Wodger (backed by McComic) then came on the scene and finally they were done by association with Skymaster & the Canley Vale tragedy. 

A passage from the Senate PelAir Inquiry report (Chapter 6) that is very relevant to the ATSB whitewashed Canley Vale accident report and subsequent 'nothing to see here' Coroners Inquest:

Comparison with another ATSB report


6.32      Although it was drawn to the attention of the committee very late in the inquiry, the committee notes some similarities regarding the treatment of organisational and regulatory issues with the ATSB's report on 'Collision with terrain - Piper PA-31P-350, VH-PGW, 6 km NW of Bankstown Airport, NSW, 15 June 2010' or the ‘Canley Vale report’.


6.33      Also a medical flight, VH-PGW crashed while the pilot was trying to make an emergency landing after an engine failure. Tragically, both the pilot and the nurse on board lost their lives.


6.34      The ATSB report discusses significant issues within the operator (Skymaster, owned by Avtex), some of which were recognised by CASA prior to the accident. The report also acknowledges that CASA did not detect that the pilot in question, and a number of other pilots, did not receive appropriate training from Avtex.


6.35      However, the ATSB then excuses this lack of oversight by stating that this non-detection by CASA was ‘probably due to the two companies having separate Air Operator’s Certificates, with different CASA inspectors being assigned to the surveillance of each company’[44]

6.36      The Special Audit conducted by CASA of Skymaster following the accident in June 2010 revealed a large number of safety deficiencies in the systems and work practices in place, including issues with training and checking. The committee notes that in August 2010 CASA cancelled Skymaster’s AOC, based on a serious and imminent risk to air safety if operations continued. This decision was upheld by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT).[45] The committee also notes that CASA had issued Avtex with a show cause notice on 28 May 2010, just over a fortnight prior to the accident.


6.37      While the committee acknowledges it has not had the opportunity consider this report, or the transcript of the AAT hearing, in detail, it would like to express concern about the following matters, given what the committee now knows about the Pel-Air incident:

• while the incident occurred in June 2010, the ATSB only issued its final report on 20 December 2012, some two and a half years later. This is a similar timeframe to the Pel-Air report, which is discussed in Chapter 3;
  
  
  
• the ATSB concluded that ‘it was unlikely that any deficiencies in the pilot’s PA-31 endorsement training contributed to the accident’,[46] despite acknowledging in its report that the pilot had not received training in mid-flight engine failure. The committee notes that the ATSB reports engine surging led to the pilot’s actions, which resulted in the crash[47];
  
  
  
• the ATSB also concluded that ‘no organisational or systemic issue was identified in respect of CASA’s surveillance that might adversely affect the future safety of aviation operations’[48]. This is despite the fact that a post-incident Special Audit by CASA led to a suspension of Skymaster’s AOC because of a ‘serious and imminent risk to air safety’ [AATA 61, point 5]; and
  
  
  
• the ATSB excused CASA’s lack of oversight on the basis that the companies had two separate AOCs and therefore CASA investigators may not have been aware that Avtex owned Skymaster[49]. However, during the AAT review, CASA justified the cancellation of Avtex’s AOC due to CASA’s opinion that ‘because of the close relationship between Avtex and Skymaster, and the joint resources shared by those companies, if Avtex continued its operations under its AOC, that would also result in a serious and imminent risk to air safety’ [AATA 61, point 5].
  
  
  

6.38      The committee considers that this report, and the associated evidence from the AAT review, could point to a disturbing trend where the ATSB disregards or excuses CASA failures. It appears, from the publicly available material, that there are significant similarities between this and the Pel-Air report. The committee is of the view that the establishment of the independent panel (recommendation 8) should play a vital role in ensuring no such reporting trend continues...



Recommendation 10


6.41      The committee recommends that the investigation be re-opened by the ATSB with a focus on organisational, oversight and broader systemic issues.


6.42      The committee is concerned that the ATSB report ATSB's report on 'Collision with terrain - Piper PA-31P-350, VH-PGW, 6 km NW of Bankstown Airport, NSW, 15 June 2010' could demonstrate a trend where organisational and regulatory factors are not considered appropriately or in sufficient detail by the ATSB, despite post-accident investigations by CASA indicating there were significant deficiencies with the operator and appearing to indicate insufficient oversight by CASA. As highlighted in Chapter 5, the committee is also concerned about ATSB attempts to predict future risk for operators. The ATSB should analyse why the accident happened but operators are best placed to assess how the lessons may affect their current and future operations.

 
This was the Murky Mandarin (& his minions - including the former miniscule ) non-committal response to R10:  



Fortunately the former miniscule (to his credit), after the TSBC peer review, had an epiphany a put pressure on the ATSB to re-open the PelAir investigation.

However after the whitewash/obfuscation (as identified by the Senate Committee above, & which apparently included both the TSBC & the NSW Coroners Court) by the bureau providing, yet again, top cover for CASA with the Canley Vale tragedy; we suggest that R10 should be invoked for the re-opening of the ATSB VH-PGW investigation.

6.50      The Chambers Report highlighted surveillance deficiencies which concern the committee.


6.51      The committee believes that CASA processes in relation to matters highlighted by this investigation be reviewed. This could involve an evaluation benchmarked against a credible peer (such as FAA or CAA) of regulation and audits with respect to:

• non-RPT [regular public transport] passenger carrying operations;
  
• approach to audits (eg. the need to evaluate line aircrew for effectiveness of Safety Management System (SMS) not just elements of SMS itself); and
  
• training and standardisation of FOI [Flying Operations Inspector] across regional offices.
  
  

Recommendation 11
6.52      The committee recommends that CASA processes in relation to matters highlighted by this investigation be reviewed. This could involve an evaluation benchmarked against a credible peer (such as FAA or CAA) of regulation and audits with respect to: non-RPT passenger carrying operations; approach to audits; and training and standardisation of FOI across regional offices.

This was Murky's, again spin-n-bulldust, response to R11:



Bizarrely M&M seems to be comfortable with the idea of allowing ICAO, through the USAP-CMP audit process, to rule on whether CASA meets NAA best practice in regulatory oversight & enforcement. Therefore, in light of the Canley Vale whitewash, we call on the Senators to pressure the government to invite the FAA to audit CASA & the Australian SSP - ASAP


MTF..P2  

[Kharon]

A Sunday ramble – Part 1, (the long version).

It was my intention to draft a pleasant Sunday ramble through the dark woods which surround Sleepy Hollow.  But the Canley Vale matter has been so very poorly dealt with; and IMO, needs either a Royal, Judicial or Senate inquiry leading to a royal commission.  It is a disgraceful affair, by any measure and following so closely on the heels of the Pel-Air debacle/report, which shamed us all, it sets precedents which cannot continue, unchecked.  Anyway, FWIW read the P2 data above and then come for a walk on the dark side.  Ready?– right then, "Steam On GD".

The ‘Ollow as it’s known is a dark, dangerous place, not really suitable for picnics with the little uns.  Things happen; but, if you can avoid the deep dark dells, then a stroll through the surrounding woods are; or can be enjoyable, provided the Purdy ‘over and under’ is handy and your dogs know their business.  Today's ramble, sans canine support, takes us deep into the dark, dank, sinister woods surrounding the ‘Ollow itself.  

We shall take the time honoured pathway and start at the beginning.  First there is the incredibly steep up hill slope to get to the canyons rim; once there, AOC nirvana seems secure, the tough part is over.  Then there comes the gently sloping plateau, things look good and we bowl along merrily, ignorant of what awaits us.  The descent into the actual ‘Ollow.

Now then children, you all know my job and where I work; and, if you think that’s tough wait until I tell thee what occurs on that treacherous descent.   First lesson; you must not presume that ‘you’, personally, are a target of choice for the denizens of this deep dark place.  You are not.  You are just another tasty morsel delivered ready for the feast.  Those who have come in peace and abject compliance are tolerated.  But those with delusions of rights, those who actually dare think they have a right to exist, will be picked off long before they reach the tower of Babble, where the big beasts live in obscene luxury and decadence.  

There are a vast array of ‘treatments’ available.  If, for example, you have carved up an innocent cake with a Minister; you will be given the de-luxe service, where nothing is too much trouble and annoying details are made to vanish (by the palace vizier) at no great monetary cost. There is always a cost though, ain’t there?  And so, for those on ‘soft ride’ packages, small annoyances, like ATSB reports can be arranged so that there is the minimum of fall out.  Take the latest Pel-Air go around; the audit was neatly and swiftly laid to rest, the report massaged to suit and there was even a handy scapegoat.  The management of this wonderful atrocity was entrusted to a non qualified (aeronautically) manager with top cover from the home office.  It was one of Sleepy Hollows finest moments; aircraft lost, passengers recovered, no big deal, even the CVR unit was left to disintegrate in the still, warm, not too deep waters off Norfolk Island.  No point to recovering them; the die was cast  (Alea iacta est) – pilot error.  The safety report was doctored to suit and the cake was cut, shared amongst the mates.  It was, as I say, a fine effort by all concerned, there was even scope and time to plagiarise 'write' a powerful, although private report on the matter.  That report of it ‘self, was a master stoke.  It achieved (in some circles) fortune and glory for the author; it neatly skewered the qualified ‘drones’ while appearing to be the answer to a pagans prayer. A definitive discourse of all that the CASA fellahin had got wrong; drafted by the saviour of ‘aviation safety’.  Top secret of course, alas, despite strenuous redaction, the author could not prevent his name appearing on the top of the first page.

Even so; let us forgive this atrocity for the nonce.  Let us focus on the benefits this audit and report provided for aviation safety.  Well of course, the pilot ‘dunnit’; gross negligence verdict assured and embuggerance to follow for the rest of his days.  It shows just how effective a safety guru the manager in charge was; a Senate inquiry, independent report and a peer review all nugatory, thanks to the work of one man.  The company got off Scot free, not a blot on a very messy copy-book.  CASA even hired the incumbent chief pilot, so ‘delighted’ were they with him.   Bravo..

Conversely, this treatment is not available to the general hoi-polloi, the riff-raff, who don’t have connections to seats of power beneath the grand viziers of Sleepy Hollow.  No Sir.  Under the same safe hand as managed Pel-Air we find the airtex case file: and a complete reversal of form.  NCN by the ream, fact, circumstances and ‘evidence’ provided, as and when required.  Made by the mile, cut off as needed.  It matters not that fact had little to do with that which has been preordained.  In fact; ‘facts’ can be distorted, manipulated and bent to suit.  Airtex was; as a case in point, worthy of mention, for many reasons.  One being the incumbent head pooh-bah needed a juxta position from the soft, fluffy, friendly treatment Pel-Air received; a balance if you like; a Ying and Yang if it pleases.  From between way too soft through to way too harsh, balances the scales.

For those not familiar, here’s the background.  Airtex lost a Metro and pilot one night.  There was much speculation about the cause, although little was provided by way of support for any one particular theory.  ATSB finally decided, despite expert advice and demonstration that their theory was the right one.  

The practical demonstration also included other failure scenarios, and the various warning lights that could not have gone unnoticed.

As far as I am concerned, this demonstration conclusively proves that one ATSB scenario, that the Right Essential DC bus was not powered, and the static inverter selector switch was selected to this unpowered bus.

In none of the scenarios could the warnings have gone unnoticed. The notion that enough double bulb indicators all had blown bulbs, such that all visual warnings were absent is not credible, the statistical probability (even without an engineering reliability analysis) is too unlikely.

The ATSB dustcart followed along behind the Lord mayors parade.  The manager of ‘Bankstown’ at the time (Botany Bay) was a reasonable fellah.  There had been some questionable reports and there was some evidence of things not being done according to Hoyle. So, rather than shut down the operation some fairly hefty ‘directives’ were attached as conditions to the Airtex AOC (see P2 above), tough but not onerous, if Airtex played the game. One of the top weight conditions was a complete rewrite of the check and training system (which was bloody awful) and a conversion to multi crew operations, which for Metro aircraft is, IMO a first class idea.  So, they set to work and by the September 09, a new chief pilot and support crew were in place; big tick and Airtex staggered into the real world.  Compliments were offered, independent audits were passed, even a couple of CASA audits were passed without too many problems.  The future looked reasonable.

Here we must pause and examine time lines : Pel-Air happened in November 2009 and by Christmas 2010 the audit and reports were pretty much done and dusted, there was some pushing and shoving but, to all intents and purposes; the dissenters had been ousted and Wodger was pinching penning his secret report for either McConvict or fat Terry.  There had to be a balance struck and a show to convince the world that CASA had acted in good faith with Pel Air; one soft audit deserves a tough one to follow up with; just to maintain the legend of the big R.

The Airtex boss about the new year decided that despite the conditions being gradually removed from the AOC, he wanted the last four gone; now – now.  Against advice, he wrote a letter demanding the immediate withdrawal of the remaining conditions.  That poked a wet noodle up the tiger's arse and an audit was declared.  Due to past bad blood, remnants of a couple of shouting matches, the edict “shut ‘em down” was issued.  

What happened next is truly mind bending.  Many senior, qualified aeronautical and legal experts have been asked to make comment (or even sense) of the ‘bizarre’ audit conducted in Feb. 2010; all have failed to produce a rational explanation.  Whichever way you cut it up, always the same result and verdict.  Bastardry on a grand scale.

For those still with us at the end of this introduction, there is more to follow, next we shall take a look at a potted version of some very strange happenings and the lead up to the Canley Vale tragedy.   I’m not deliberately stretching the story out; but it’s complex and to do it any sort of rough justice; it needs some explanation and background.

Here endeth the Sunday ramble – Part 1.

Now, where’s the Ale?  I have great need of quiet reflection with a pint or two for company.

Selah.

[Gobbledock]

Well said Kharon

Now, where’s the Ale? I have great need of quiet reflection with a pint or two for company.

Two pints on their way Master, as well as a bowl of cool water for the dogs. Cheers

[thorn bird]

Hardly a ramble shipmate, there was once a sign above an infamous german factory

"Work shall set you free" which turned out to be a monstrous lie.

Some people also say "Truth shall set you free" which also is a monstrous lie, because CAsA simply do NOT tell the truth.

Your ramble illustrates just what a national disgrace CAsA has been allowed to become.

Simplistically, the Airtex debacle was fomented by a psychotic lunatic at the top, who much as in the shutdown of Tiger airways was desperate to show what big Kahoonas he had and executed by a sociopathic acolyte with a pathological hatred for the CEO of Avtex.

The collateral damage these two scumbags caused to a lot of very innocent people can never be recovered nor the considerable public money spent by the protagonist to prosecute this travesty and the personal fortune of the victim attempting to defend themselves.

The industry is poorer, the pursuit of safety is poorer, the country is poorer.

Given the treatment of PEL air the whole notion of a fair go given the lie by CAsA's unconscionable behaviour. One could be forgiven the notion that CAsA's actions are governed by the size of the political donations.

Karma? Pel air losing the defence contract? or someone turned up with a better deal for the politicians. What is very clear a bomb was put under CAsA to fast track their paperwork.
Skidmark looking after his RAAF mates??, maybe, but somewhere, as with so many things, I suspect the hand of a Murky mandarin.

One ray of sunshine.

At least the rabbit has vacated his warren, one hopes if there are any white hats left in Sydney region they can repair the toxic environment he left behind. Bit of a waste of time but, there's very little industry left to regulate.

Maybe Wodger has been looking with envy at ASA and the possibilities for mayhem available to him in that dysfunctional organisation, he was running out of victims in NSW region, what he hadn't managed to shutdown is struggling, strangled by the straight jacket of Part 61.