[Peetwo]

Contamination of Australia's Defence Force facilities and other Commonwealth, state and territory sites in Australia



On 30 November 2015, the Senate referred the following matter to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee for inquiry and report:

Contamination of Australian Defence Force facilities (Part A) reporting by 4 February 2016, and contamination of other sites using firefighting foams (Part B) reporting by 30 April 2016.

In terms of setting expectations, the committee emphasises that it is not in a position to resolve individual disputes or settle complaints regarding possible PFOS or PFOA contamination. Please note that all documents sent to the inquiry become committee documents on receipt, and are only made public following a decision of the committee. Material which is not relevant to the inquiry’s terms of reference or which reflects adversely on others may not be accepted or published by the committee. If you have any questions about your submission please contact the committee secretariat.
The closing date for submissions is 14 December 2015 for Part A and 5 February 2016 for Part B.

About this inquiry

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Update 06/12/15: Hansard transcript from last Thursday's hearing -
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee - 03/12/2015 - Contamination caused by firefighting foams at RAAF Base Williamtown and other sites
Perhaps a prelude to things to come, with 'Under BRAVO' section of the inquiry, from Senator Fawcett:

Senator FAWCETT: I would like to talk to about a whole-of-government picture on this. Clearly Defence have airfields, but there are also capital city and secondary airports around the country that use the same firefighting materials. Going back and having a look, for example, at the Hobart Airport master plan 2010-15—that was obviously issued at the start of that period—right back then, under their environmental strategy for the airport, they highlight that 'elevated levels of PFOS and PFOA concentrates were detected indicating groundwater at the site has been affected by the flushing of equipment'.

Likewise there are comments around Sydney and Kingsford Smith. Going back to around 2010, the New South Wales EPA had agreed—it says here, 'The state and the ACT have supported the proposed project of Airservices Australia and agreed a two-stage approval would be appropriate.' So clearly people were aware of this and looking at it. I am interested to understand what the relationship between Defence and Airservices Australia has been over the last five to 10 years as this problem has emerged. We will start there and then I will ask a few more questions.


Mr Grzeskowiak : We have been fairly closely engaged with Airservices Australia over a number of years, certainly in more recent times around the issues that we are discovering at Air Force bases. We know that Airservices Australia are also looking at issues at a range of civilian airports around the country. We were engaged with Airservices Australia some years ago, probably from the mid-2000s, around options for alternative firefighting foams, so we have had fairly long-term and cooperative engagement.

As you rightly point out, these firefighting foams—never mind the other products and materials that have used this chemical—would have been widely used by both military and civil airfield firefighters, plus the rural fire services, plus metropolitan fire services, plus probably at any industrial site that was processing hydrocarbons at a scale—refineries, large fuel storage depots, those sorts of things. So we know that the chemical has been used extensively worldwide for quite a long time, since certainly the early seventies, for firefighting and a range of other applications.

CHAIR: On that point though, you are the estate owner. Airservices may contract to provide appropriate firefighting services, but ultimately, if they move on, they leave the estate owner with the contaminant, and it is how that contaminant gets off your estate that is the real issue here.

Mr Grzeskowiak : For the Defence estate, that is correct, but there are a whole number of civil airfields that I have no relationship with in terms of ownership.

Senator FAWCETT: That is essentially my point. At the moment, because of the publicity and the impact around users at Williamtown and the decisions to shut down fishing industries, there is a lot of pressure and focus on Defence right now. What I am trying to flesh out is to make sure that we are not driving Defence to trigger a whole range of activities that might be duplicating what has already been underway by Airservices and ending up having a stovepipe departmental response as opposed to a whole-of-government response, because clearly this impacts all airfields around Australia, not just Defence airfields. So can you talk to me about what joint activities you have had in terms of understanding the scope of the problem, understanding the impact on people and on agriculture, aquaculture et cetera, and containment strategies?

Mr Grzeskowiak : There is in fact an interdepartmental committee that has been established for 10 or 11 months—that sort of order—that is looking at the broader problem of this. That committee is chaired by the Department of the Environment. Defence is a member of that committee, as is the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development—I think they are represented by Airservices, but I stand to be corrected on that—as well as the Department of Health and a few other departments. The committee is looking at the broader problem.

One of the issues that we faced during our understanding and learning about this problem is that there are no national standards in Australia for tolerance in the environment of levels of these chemicals. There are no health standards in Australia for tolerance of this chemical in drinking water at whatever level and there are no state or territory equivalent standards either. There are not many places in the world where those sorts of standards are in place. There are a few standards emerging in the US and the UK that we are aware of, and we are using them. It is clear that globally this is still an emerging contaminant that is not fully understood. In our work with Airservices, we would certainly be seeking not to duplicate research, and the sharing of information through the interdepartmental committee is ongoing...

MTF..P2
 

[P7_TOM]

Recommendation 9 – HERE.

2.299    The committee recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) and Australian aviation operators review the final findings of France's Bureau of Investigation and Analysis into Air France 447, including consideration of how it may apply in the Australian context. Subject to those findings, the committee may seek the approval of the Senate to conduct a further hearing in relation to the matter.

It seems an appropriate time to revisit the Senate recommendations; 2.229 in particular.

There are, to the PAIN associates three separate areas of concern which -, in the interests of closing the safety loop demand attention; neither the detail or construct is complex and may be simply stated.

The report recently published by Indonesia into the Air Asia accident highlights many glaring deficiencies in the current Australian beyond reason methodology.  It also draws attention to the lack of respect paid to ICAO tenets.  But most importantly the speed, accuracy and fearless diligence in; and probity of the accident report demonstrates that Indonesia at least has a focus on the wider implications of the causal chain.  Given the stated ‘accomplices’ in the accident are now of global concern and almost every safety agency is working toward resolution, the pathetic efforts of the ATSB to even acknowledge serious incidents, let alone investigate and provide timely report is an international embarrassment and disgrace.

Furthermore, the Indonesian regulator acknowledges a need to reform regulation and generally do things better; no rhetoric, no excuses, they have set their eyes on full ICAO accreditation; and, on current indications should achieve that goal.  Australian CASA is not only in denial but actively retrogressing.  Despite all efforts the regulator still will not acknowledge any culpability or participation in systematic failures leading to accident.

There are gaping holes in the safety nets; new regulation is directed to prosecution and blame, increasing the chance of conviction rather than addressing the ‘safety loop’. No doubt, as demonstrated, any ‘parallel’ investigation into any accident or event can be manipulated away from the core issues.  The overdue reports on several recent serious incidents will clearly demonstrate a reliance on company SMS to resolve the causal factors, exonerate CASA from all responsibility and, ensure that the free flow of information between the twinned agencies continues, unabated.

Senators; there are serious problems existing within all three safety agencies; each one blaming the other for those deficiencies: each one ensuring that there is no ‘splash-back’ on their copy book.  Meanwhile, the probability of a serious event, mathematically looms ever closer.  If any agency had an opportunity to close even one of the safety loops and failed to do so – another verdict of pilot error will not be tolerated.

Your government agencies are in denial, in disarray and dysfunctional.  Ask not for whom the bell tolls when next time the last line of defence fails.

Toot toot and Tick tock - as the boys say.

[Kharon]

Well said P7 the problems within each department are clearly apparent and well documented.  The loss of credibility tangible and the comparison between a second tier country and a supposed first tier country are stark and very real.  The Indonesians, like many others have grasped the nettle and have, with real determination, set out to achieve improvement.  This is done by acknowledging the short falls first, identifying where improvement may be made and then doing it.

There is no posturing or denial, no rhetoric to mask the fact that there are indeed some problematic areas which need improvement and there is a will to make it happen.  So much more refreshing than a constant stream of denial, sugar coated to make it palatable to government ears.  

Australia has been lucky, very lucky thus far; but when the unthinkable happens – and lady luck deserts; what will the world make of the much vaunted, sugar coated, rotten below the surface Australian system of denial, obfuscation and shift the blame game?  And what of the government which allowed the game to continue, despite the warning signs writ large.

Not too much I expect.

Toot toot.

[Kharon]

State Safety Programme (Draft).

1. Safety is the primary consideration of Australia’s aviation agencies and industry in the performance of their functions;

“Safety”: that dreadful word is trotted out, once again.  Mitigating or reducing the risk levels to the travelling public would be a more accurate, honest description.  Much has been written about and lip service paid to the myth of ‘safety’.  Is flying safer now than when the Wright brothers started – of course it is.  Can we make it 100% accident free? No, we cannot.  But can we reduce the percentage chances further?  We can indeed.  How?

Well, a good place to start is with ‘incidents’ which could, potentially, develop into accidents. Take the recent Jetstar ‘incidents’ as example, where incorrect weights were provided, it’s a simple example of how things can and do, on occasion, go wrong. No one died, but through error, the percentage risk factor increased.  That risk could have been mitigated had the crew been aware; the risk factor would have increased had any one of a number of things ‘gone wrong’.  The radical – root cause – of the increased risk factor must be eliminated if the ‘risk equation’ is to be returned to the ‘norm’.

I only bang on about this because it is the underpinning tenet of personal perceived ‘safety’ against a logical reduction in ‘increased’ risk factor.  The mystique of ‘air safety’ versus the cold clear logic of minimising those risk factors over which we have direct control.  So we need – IMO – in the interests of ‘safety’ to call it what it is and begin there; if we are to expend funds and have a return on that investment.

As I read through the SSP, two active thoughts must be beaten down; (i) Bollocks, the same old mantra, regurgitated; (ii) we have been trying for change now for almost three decades and neither the underpinning cynicism or determination to dilute and defer real change has altered.  So I must, reluctantly, for the sake of fairness, put these thoughts aside.  I shall try, however, the first statement in the mandarins missive sets my teeth on edge.  It stands word weasel perfect and philosophically flawed.

There is some talk of PAIN drafting a submission, this requires research and study.  There are over 40 pages to consider; the question, “is the game worth the candle” needs answering.  It is not a though we have never seen such rhetoric and lip service paid to the subject matter, or seen the intention wain and the platitudes increase. The Senate recommendations and the Forsyth review being the latest casualties. That is a historical , demonstrable fact.  However; as requested, I shall study the Draft State Safety Programme 2016. – HERE.  But, I expect the BRB indaba will make it all worthwhile – can’t wait for that.

Toot toot.

Exeunt stage left, mildly cursing all and sundry from P1 to P1066… .... ...

[Peetwo]

Well, a good place to start is with ‘incidents’ which could, potentially, develop into accidents. Take the recent Jetstar ‘incidents’ as example, where incorrect weights were provided, it’s a simple example of how things can and do, on occasion, go wrong. No one died, but through error, the percentage risk factor increased.  That risk could have been mitigated had the crew been aware; the risk factor would have increased had any one of a number of things ‘gone wrong’.  The radical – root cause – of the increased risk factor must be eliminated if the ‘risk equation’ is to be returned to the ‘norm’.

SSP?- Overdue & Obfuscated.    

Quote from this post - Turbulent times for Tiger country 

..Although the findings of the QZ8501 final report could be seen as a set back for the stated Indonesian effort above, it should also be recognised that the NTSC have proven their effectiveness as a properly independent & compliant State AAI (Annex 13). This integrity & independence is fundamental to the implementation of a proper ICAO Annex 19 SSP. Sadly the same cannot be said for our State AAI, the currently much maligned ATSB..

The parallels are stark, on the one hand we have a first class final report into Indonesia's second worst aviation disaster - see HERE - completed within a year. Then we get 2 related occurrences - same airline, same safety issue i.e. load control errors - classified as 'serious', which would have gone unnoticed, unreported on and possibly not investigated if not brought to the attention of Ben Sandilands from PlaneTalking.

What is worse is that the notification of the ATSB to investigate these incidents occurred over a month after the second incident (29 October), was supposedly first submitted. I say the second incident because the first incident does not appear to be recorded (even though classified as serious) on the ATSB Aviation occurrence database - see HERE.
{Note: It should also be noted - from that Excel spreadsheet - the 29 Oct 'serious incident' original record shows a zero in the 'ATSB Investigation' box}

Due to the attention drawn to these incidents - somewhat ironically - CASA have been forced to notify the intention for a 'parallel investigation'. Yet more than a week after this notification not a word; or at least transparency of possible enforcement; or management action plans to address the initial highlighted safety issues.

Now compare this to the NTSC QZ8501 investigation, quote from safety actions section of FR:

4.1 Aircraft operator

As a result of this accident, the aircraft operator informed the KNKT of safety actions that they had taken.

At meetings between the aircraft operator and the KNKT, the operator advised that the safety actions had been generated from the preliminary recommendations that were published by the KNKT in the Preliminary Report...

   
  'preliminary recommendations' - yes that's right the State AAI under Annex 13 can issue recommendations at anytime in the course of an investigation when significant safety issues are identified.
This fact has sadly been forgotten in the elongated (2.5 yrs so far -  ) Mildura fog 'serious incident' investigation, that had the potential to be Australia's worst ever air disaster.

Incidentally ATSB investigation AO-2013-100  was recently (discretely ) updated:

Updated: 25 November 2015

The draft investigation report is in the final stages of review by the ATSB Commission prior to it’s release to directly involved parties (DIP) for comment in December 2015. Feedback from those parties over the 28-day DIP period on the factual accuracy of the draft report will be considered for inclusion in the final report, which is anticipated to be released to the public in March 2016.

 
Spot the difference??- Not hard is it..

P9:

Exeunt stage left, mildly cursing all and sundry from P1 to P1066… .... ...

Ahh...Ferryman you love it -

[Kharon]

But, can we manage a SSP ?

It troubles me; all of it.  Before looking forward toward owning and operating a working SSP, we need to look backward at the current potential ‘accident from incident’ list, still unresolved; those which have recently occurred and wonder why someone in one of the ‘safety authorities’ has not rung every bloody alarum bell on the continent.

If I were CASA I would want to know why and take immediate, effective corrective action to ensure that none of the following ever had even a snowflakes chance at my work place of survival:-

Mildura: Qantas and Virgin, fog and some very shaky doings.  Are the crew qualified for low visibility landings? Is the aircraft equipped and certified for that situation; do the regulations allow that; if not why not?  But I would also like to know how the situation developed.  Can we find out, can we hell, has CASA addressed the situation and brought in countermeasures to prevent such an event occurring again?  Has ATSB provided a detailed breakdown of the causal chain and provided strong recommendations for change.  In short the answer is No, at least non that have been published.

Newcastle: how in the seven hells did the crew (both) line up with a ship loading dock, configure for a landing only to be saved by the ATCO.  I would like that situation clearly explained and some form of positive response from the CASA.  Have we seen one?  In short the answer is No, at least non that have been published.

Moranbah – playing at silly buggers with the high ground.  Response, ATSB recommendations – Nada, zip, nuttin.

Then of course there is the ATR flying around the country side after some serious damage had been inflicted and a mysterious situation where the elevator control channels had been split. Have we seen any form of response to this one?  In short the answer is No, at least not any published.

We have witnessed the Senate asking awkward questions about the tangled airspace issues and the consequences; a series of close calls created by the SHEED approach to Melbourne. 

Then there is the Jetstar loading and other systematic errors; all of which could have led to serious incident or accident.

Do we hear any news of CASA and ATSB setting about resolving what are clearly potential dangers to the travelling masses – NO, we do not.  But the silly buggers are wanting to play at cops and robbers, use Metadata and prosecute “criminal” offences through the courts based on “information received”.  This is not within a bulls roar of their ‘design function’ and a far cry from investigating then taking positive action to prevent potentially lethal incidents occurring. FCOL they cannot even resolve a no-brainer like licensing bloody pilots without creating a total shambles. 

Not only are we failing to get a return on our huge investment in “safety” but ATSB and CASA are far too busy with other matters to even bother about the timely resolution of potentially disastrous situations.  It’s not good enough is it Minister; not good enough by a long shot. 

You must ask – are the Australian safety agencies ‘mature’ enough to be part of a SSP?  The answer is a resounding, self evident NO.

Tick tock; tick tock.

[Gobbledock]

Ferryman;

"You must ask – are the Australian safety agencies ‘mature’ enough to be part of a SSP? The answer is a resounding, self evident NO".

K, you will like this. After ICAO pineappled CAsA back in 2008 our friends at Fort Fumble panicked as they didn't have a SSP. So CAsA ripped off a version of Indonesia's SSP and basically did a cut and paste and filled in the gaps! Yep, the very country CAsA was concerned about, and with good reason, had it's own SSP before Australia did. It gets better. The chick that worked on it was a Can'tberrian who knew SFA about almost anything aviation. She now works for one of our Australian 'large' operators in ground operations or some shite.
Aagh yes, another Dr Voodoo project of ridiculousness.

You won't read that in Hansard!!

P_666

[Kharon]

Australia’s DAFT State – safety? Programme.

And so, we begin our journey with a quote from the inestimable Gobbledock.

K, you will like this.

I do, appreciate it – very much.  But like it?   Well that will be for another time.

After ICAO pineappled CAsA back in 2008 our friends at Fort Fumble panicked as they didn't have a SSP. So; CAsA ripped off a version of Indonesia's SSP and basically did a cut and paste and filled in the gaps! (so, it was well Wodgered).

Yep, the very country CAsA was concerned about, and with good reason, had it's own SSP long before Australia did.

It gets better. The chick that worked on it was a Can'tberrian who knew SFA about almost anything aviation.

Probably the best idea ever; as anyone who is even peripherally exposed to matters aeronautical must take the loyalty test and lobotomy; before learning to ‘draw the long bow’; for it is indeed a skill.  This way, using a non combatant, no man may call ‘tainted’.  The fact it knew SFA about ‘operational safety’ - CASA style was a plus.  No matter; and so, to business.

The first question must be, are we building a chook shed or a faery tale?  If you are of the ‘faery tale’ mind set the you will be satisfied with pages of ‘buzz words’; a PC dialogue; and, a tent revival style of happy tambourines underpinning the happy clap trap doled out.  Not that that system doesn’t work, it works just fine - for the converted.

But; if your approach is a little more phlegmatic; or, even pragmatic, then you may have some reservations about throwing your two bob into the ‘collection’ plate.

Let me say that on a personal level, I can think of no finer thing than a cohesive, cross border, unilateral State Safety Programme (SSP).  It is a fine notion and had I not personally witnessed the fate of some twenty odd reforms, reviews and finger painted ‘reform’ programmes being quietly put on a stretcher and carted out of the building – I could weigh in behind it.  However.

This Daft SSP is a beautifully crafted document – when you know how to read it –that’s as it’s supposed to be.  Reading lesson one is, of course, the Chambers report, lesson two the Pel-Air inquiry and lesson three the Forsyth review; all recent.  The platitudes, buzz words and real purpose of the documents, if not fully understood can; and indeed does ‘relax’ the armchair reader into a stupor of acceptance.  The ‘experts’ are on the job and we can all relax.  Warning Will Robinson; warning.  So lets examine motive, performance and true, measurable progress.  Save you some time here; don’t’ bother – there ain’t none.

Page 1: -

Disclaimer

The material contained in this publication is made available on the understanding that the Commonwealth is not providing professional advice, and that users exercise their own skill and care with respect to its use, and seek independent advice if necessary

So be it

The Commonwealth makes no representations or warranties as to the contents or accuracy of the information contained in this publication. To the extent permitted by law, the Commonwealth disclaims liability to any person or organisation in respect of anything done, or omitted to be done, in reliance upon information contained in this publication. Etc.

There, off the hook by paragraph 2.  No matter, we shall continue, but is the reality of ‘gov speak’ revealed, stark naked, in front of the house lights, right there?  WTF the ‘coat of arms’ has to do with “State Safety” is beyond my peasant mentality.

Then we have the index – many don’t realise the importance of such a thing – but it creates a framework for the ‘edifice’; the bones of it all.  Most skip over such a thing – which, on first encounter, much as with a flight manual, is acceptable – until you really get into the aircraft. But when dealing with gummint employed word weasels; one must be careful, from title to end piece.  

For example – Index 1.1; calls up page five.  Australia’s Aviation Legislation is described on page four; which has sod all to do with the bloody awful Aviation Safety Regulation described on page five.  They should; alas.  There’s much more to be gleaned from the ‘index; try 1.2 on for size and nut out just who is responsible for what.  Save you some time – no one; not even the blessed coat of arms is responsible for sweet nuttin.  Selah.

On to the ‘statement’ - I like, from a ‘dichromatic’ standpoint, dot points 1 through to 10. Words ‘worked’ to exactly page size, start at 1 and finish, logically at point 10.  A masterpiece designed to prevent further reading.  I mean why bother – the one page ‘statement (which ain’t) say it all: T–il pas?

Once you have discovered the rock solid ‘core’ of aviation surety; need you read further?  The short answer is no, not if you value your time and will accept, quite happily, that all is well and this is just some rubber stamp exercise in box ticking.  It says so, in the introduction:-

Australia was one of the first countries in the world to have a State Safety Programme (SSP)
consistent with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) requirements.

It is good to get the ‘big ones’ out of the way first – first sentence, next paragraph does that – by the time you realise it is almost, but not quite fiction, your eye and brain are already focussed on skimming the rhetoric, looking for the ‘meat and potatoes’.  Folks, welcome to word weasel world, you just bought a ticket.

Aye well, tempus to fugit.   But as the esteemed P2 says: More to Follow?  Oh, You bet.

Toot – toot...

[Kharon]

Introduction (p.12).

Implementation of the SSP will be monitored by the Aviation Policy Group (APG) which brings together the agency heads of the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development (the Department), CASA, Airservices Australia (Airservices) and the Chief of Air Force on behalf of the Department of Defence (Defence). APG is chaired by the Secretary of the Department, which is the Department of State for aviation in Australia.

Aircraft systems work, mostly very well, but not always.  Where IMO the whole government ‘thing’ collapses is because there is no proper system in place – not one we would understand from a practical mans point of view.  Ok – we want the wheels to come up and obliging go down, on command; that is the design function.  So the electrical system talks to the hydraulics, pumps run, parts move and the wheels are effortlessly tucked away.  Sounds great and in theory that system should serve it’s working life seamlessly, but it doesn’t, does it.  ‘We’ need some form of indication system, to see where the wheels are, to see that the electrics are going their part and that the hydraulics are up to snuff – and that mind you is just for ‘routine’ operations.  You don’t see any of this in a government ‘system’.  We are expected, to accept, on blind faith that their system is fully operational 24/7.  So much for normal operations – but what about when things go South?

Back up, secondary systems are mandatory – Bayles law of probability is called into the game – what if the primary electrical channel fails, what if the hydraulic fluids disappears, what if the indicators fail?  And so our simple system blueprint must be discarded and the designers must think again.  This is where our SSP design has finished, a simple system, designed on a beer coaster; great idea but, without a system health indication, secondary power source or even a failsafe ‘manual’ system.  We have no way of knowing system status, no way of telling what’s gone wrong, no alternate system for recovery and no one to point at should the entire thing betray us.

The world and it’s wife has a slice of the SSP pie; too many cooks as they say, too many road blocks, sticking points and conflicted interests.  In short, another buggers muddle where glory is shared and blame passed about and out of the back door at light speed.  

IMO if the government were serious, they would appoint a benevolent despot to boss up the whole dog and pony show – same as in any big company – travel far enough up the corporate tree and you will find a donkey on which you pin a tale; someone’s got to be responsible.  Someone has to drive the project to completion and build the system safeguards required.  There should be a clearly defined pathway, with milestones and accountability.  Look at what happened to the SS Forsyth without a rudder and someone to steer.

The introduction is one of those cleverly crafted sobriquets which sound terrific until you realise the house is built on sand – there is no offer, promise or method for identifying a solid foundation to be found.

Finally, the SSP is consistent with the key policy principles outlined in ICAO’s Global Aviation Safety Plan and Global Air Navigation Plan.

Read that again, carefully.  What, in reality does it really say?

Click – page 14.

Wow, would ya look at all that legislation.   You could be forgiven for thinking these guys have really got their Acts together.  Oh dear.  La patrie continua

Toot toot.

[Kharon]

Elysium dreaming.

1.1 (p 14).

If you were playing poker, for serious money, how would you like the hand CASA have been dealt?  

Aviation safety regulation
The civil aviation safety legislative system is also comprised of a range of subordinate legislation, such as regulations and orders, which are supported by guidance material. To ensure the effectiveness of the oversight system, change proposals are developed in consultation with industry and other stakeholders and involve safety and cost benefit analysis.

To a man on a galloping horse, the statements following the opening gambit would appear sound, logical and, indeed praiseworthy.  The untrammelled, open ended power framed within the legislation places CASA outside the law, control and accountability.  When a dash of cynical arrogance is mixed with a dollop of ignorance in an atmosphere made toxic by regulatory flatulence, the results are lethal. Estimates vary between 25 and 30 years of waiting for any meaningful reform of the regulations with a price tag estimate anywhere from 250 to 300 million dollars.  The proof required to demonstrate that the time, money and effort have been wasted is delivered in the new Parts 61 and 145 which may be considered the pinnacle of incompetence.  The rules do not work, are almost impossible to comply with, complex and designed solely for prosecution, not “safety”.  

In 1.2 – (Responsibilities and accountabilities) you note that ‘departments’ (agencies) are “responsible for managing civil aviation safety”.  It’s a funny little section in that when one tries to determine which ‘agency’ is going to manage the new SSP - (blank).  When the blether is cut away – you realise two things (i) this is simply a statement of who is managing aviation and; (ii) it has SFA to do with who is actually responsible for delivering the SSP; and, you got conned into believing it had.  Word weasel sleight of hand in three card Monte.

On toward P15, flow chart and blather – Click.

P 16, detailed escape route plans and the safest method of ducking the blame for anything provided in the elaborate safety for government plans. Stellar stuff, a first class demonstration of snakes and ladders, word weasel style.  

Click through to 19 after a word for word battle with the famous “Who’s on first” sketch.

Click – P20.  Whacko – the combined MOU gambling hell, cat house and opium den.  This, I shall read with care.

[Peetwo]

ICAO & State safety oversight.

To help explain why ICAO saw it necessary, after 30 odd years (since Annex 18), to introduce a whole new set of SARPs under Annex 19 (SSP), the following gives an excellent overview of State responsibilities in aviation safety oversight (reference from Skybrary, courtesy of Canadian Aviation SMS company, Baldwin Aviation.. ):

Safety Oversight

November 25, 2015

http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Safet...-276576741

Description

Safety Oversight forms the part of the safety regulatory process dedicated to ensuring that applicable safety regulatory requirements are met, and to the monitoring of the safe provision of services. Unless prescribed otherwise by international legislation, safety oversight in aviation is a national responsibility.

The Safety Regulatory Process

States bear a responsibility for the regulation of the safety of their national aviation systems and services. The overall process through which this responsibility is discharged contains four main elements:

•Rule Preparation - the drafting of national rules, including appropriate consultation;

•Rule Enactment - the passing of laws or other appropriate orders to give legal effect to the rules;

•Safety Oversight - the monitoring of safe service-provision including verifying compliance with the rules;

•Enforcement - taking appropriate action to deal with cases of non-compliance.

At the national level, these four functions may be exercised by one body, empowered by the national government. Alternatively, the separate functions may be distributed, or may not exist. For example, and depending on the severity of the case, responsibility for enforcement action (following non-compliance) can be passed to a legal body such as the national department of justice (or similar).

Increasingly in European civil aviation, rule preparation and enactment has been passed to European-level bodies such as the European Commission or the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). This has, in turn, led to the identification of national bodies for safety oversight.

The Scope of Safety Oversight

Given the main objectives of the safety oversight function, the generic components of a national safety oversight system may be summarised as:

•Monitoring of safety performance;

•Verifying compliance with applicable safety regulatory requirements;

•Safety regulatory auditing;

•Oversight of new or changed systems, operations, products or procedures;

•Publication of regulatory instructions or advisory material based on findings of oversight activities;

•Generation and maintenance of safety oversight records.

ICAO Action

The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) recognises national safety oversight responsibilities within States’ obligations under the Chicago Convention. ICAO has responded to the need to formalise arrangements for the establishment of national safety oversight systems, and to supplement these with regional arrangements to derive maximum safety benefit from collective action. Accordingly, to support these twin initiatives, ICAO has published:

•ICAO Doc 9734 Part A - The Establishment and Management of a State’s Safety Oversight System, and

•ICAO Doc 9734 Part B - The Establishment and Management of a Regional Safety Oversight System.

Both give comprehensive guidance information to support the development of safety oversight.

In addition, ICAO has established its Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme, with the aim of verifying, through formal audits, States’ safety oversight arrangements and capabilities. Audits cover all applicable regulations related to safety oversight by a State, as well as the procedures, the resourcing of functions and other implementing arrangements needed to implement the Eight Critical Elements (CE’s) of a State’s Safety Oversight System as defined in ICAO Document 9734-A. These elements may be summarised as:

•CE 1 - Primary Aviation Legislation

•CE 2 - Specific Operating Regulations

•CE3 - State Aviation System and Safety Oversight Functions

•CE4 - Qualified Technical Personnel and Training

•CE5 -Technical Guidance, Tools and Provision of Safety Critical Information

•CE6 - Licensing, Certification, Authorisation and Approval Obligations

•CE7- Surveillance Obligations

•CE8 - Resolution of Safety Concerns

The ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP): 2014:2016 calls for all States to have implemented effective safety oversight capabilities by the year 2017.

This requires all Member States to have the resources as well as the legal, regulatory and organizational structures necessary to fulfil their fundamental safety oversight obligations. These are required to ensure the issuance and oversight of approvals, authorizations and certification of aviation service providers, as well as personnel licensing, in accordance with relevant ICAO SARPs.

Safety Oversight in ATM

In Air Traffic Management (ATM), specific legal provision have been made at European level for the establishment of national safety oversight functions.

Regulation 1034/2011 - Safety Oversight in ATM and Air Navigation Services of 17 October 2011 on safety oversight function by competent authorities concerning air navigation services (ANS), air traffic flow management (ATFM), airspace management (ASM) for general air traffic and other network functions. The Regulation does not cover military operations and training.

This Regulation shall applies to the activities of competent authorities and qualified entities acting on their behalf regarding the safety oversight of ANS, ATFM, ASM and other network functions.

 As it can be seen, Annex 19 wasn't promulgated by ICAO on a whim, the SSP is a natural adjunct to support the ICAO principles of effective State safety oversight.


MTF...P2


   

[Kharon]

Drowning – not waving.

AMROBA : Some of the blame lies with an aviation Act that nobody wants to change because of the political situation in the Senate. Without doubt, CASA’s approach can be partially blamed on an ageing out of date Civil Aviation Act but CASA must also accept blame as it does not comply with the Act.

CASA has never promulgated "clear and concise civil aviation safety standards" under the Act because, in their mind, they would have trouble enforcing.

So they have created complicated and over regulated standards under the Regulations which have had the criminal code applied to the regulation.

There’s a very strong rumour floating about the place that Ken has been informed by ‘those who would know’ that there is not a cat in hells chance of the Act being changed.  Just isn’t going to happen.  This due the minister ignoring all calls for reform and taking the advice which best suits the powers that be.

We can’t know just yet just how much the Senators and the CASA board know about what is really occurring and happening, right now to industry; but there are some shockers coming down the pipeline which indicate a reversion to the stone age. Like:-

The regression to Australian design standards with quiet little amendments being quietly implemented.  Unique Australian mods which must be stripped out when the aircraft is returned (or sold) to an overseas operator.  Big bucks for CASA – approvals; bigger bucks for operators – modification on purchase – de modification for sale.

Unique Part B for the COM, serial number specific and a checklist to match – all need ‘acceptance’ or approval – more time and money.   This lunacy extends to the reissue of the AOC for each individual aircraft.  Buy two of the same aircraft; one with a lead acid battery and no ADF; the other with a Ni-cad and an ADF – two serial number specific Part B’s, two serial number specific checklists, then add the acceptance costs and the time delay to revenue generation the overall costs.  Crazy.  Do not forget to add the cost of a proficiency in each individual aircraft, for each pilot, twice a year to the cost.  Madness.

There’s lots of other prime examples, lets just hope that Boyd and his board can get a rope on the runaway, before it’s just too late – anytime from now would be great.

Toot toot.

[Peetwo]

Senate Inquiry: Airport & aviation security - What's the delay?

From Jamie Freed AFR article - Australian government should put domestic airport security in its sights:

In December 2014, a Senate inquiry into airport and aviation security was started to help determine if further measures were needed to enhance airport security and the safety of the travelling public, after a report by Seven Network found there had been 282 security breaches at Australian airports between January 2012 and April 2014. However, the initial reporting date for the inquiry of April 2015 has been postponed several times and is scheduled now for May 19, more than a year after submissions and testimony were given.

In the fast-moving world of aviation security, much of the information presented to the inquiry is now dated. But, notably, an Australian Federal Police submission did raise concerns that although it is an offence to use a false identity on a domestic flight, police have no authority to demand identification until after the event or unless another offence is being committed...

...If Australia wants to close gaps in its domestic airport security it is important the report by the inquiry examining such issues does not continue to be postponed.

I must admit to switching off somewhat with this inquiry, because it seemed to be missing the point that the whole aviation security system needed to be audited from the top down. It is a basket case and achieves very little in effective aviation security while placing significant impost on industry where it can least afford it and where it is quite obviously overkill.

However there is no excuse for this inquiry (with one public hearing February 2015) to have its reporting date deferred for over a year, the original reporting was supposed to be 26 April 2015...

Airport and aviation security


On 4 December 2014, the Senate moved that the following matters be referred to the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee for inquiry and report by 26 April 2015.

Airport and aviation security.

Submissions should be received by 16 January 2015. The reporting date is 26 April 2015. On 26 March 2015, the Senate granted an extension of time for reporting until 21 May 2015. On 14 May 2015, the Senate granted an extension of time for reporting until 12 August 2015. On 12 August 2015, the Senate granted an extension of time for reporting until 9 September 2015. On 9 September 2015, the Senate granted an extension of time for reporting until 2 December 2015. On 12 November 2015, the Senate granted an extension of time for reporting until 19 May 2016.

---

Committee Secretariat contact:
Committee Secretary
Senate Standing Committees on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport
PO Box 6100
Parliament House
Canberra ACT 2600

Phone: +61 2 6277 3511
Fax: +61 2 6277 5811
rrat.sen@aph.gov.au

I would suggest that this inquiry for whatever reason has placed the Department, the Minister & the Committee in somewhat of a dilemma - I wonder why?

While in this inquiry I confess to having missed some excellent evidence given at the one and only public hearing from the RAAA, so in an effort to redeem myself (& maybe provide a clue to where the dilemma may lie), here is most of the Hansard from the RAAA session:

EAVES, Mr Stuart, General Manager Safety, Security and Quality Assurance, Regional Aviation Association of Australia TYRRELL, Mr Paul, Chief Executive Officer, Regional Aviation Association of Australia

[11:19]

...CHAIR: I invite you to make a brief opening statement.

Mr Tyrrell : Thank you. It will be brief. The RAAA and it members support a robust risk based, cost-efficient security environment. We do not have any problems on that front. We would like to see—and the committee has discussed this—benchmarking with other countries just to make sure that we are not out on a limb. As you are probably aware, regional aviation, while it has a high turnover, has fairly slim profit margins. We are somewhat 'customers' of the security environment and so we try to keep things as cost efficient as possible while, at the same time, keeping our passengers safe. The last comment is more an economic one. In the last two years, we have lost four longstanding regional airlines. I am not blaming security but I am just pointing out the environment we live in.

CHAIR: You are have financial pressures. That is what we are talking about?

Mr Tyrrell : Yes. That is correct.

CHAIR: It is not as though they have won Lotto and just taken off for the Whitsundays.

Mr Tyrrell : Not at all, Senator.

CHAIR: In your opening statement you said that you would like to see Australia benchmarking with other countries.

Mr Tyrrell : Yes.

CHAIR: As a bit of a preamble, I have had the pleasure of visiting New Guinea, where I was not allowed on a domestic flight from Mount Hagen to Port Moresby because my suitcase was a little bit big, but I was allowed to take the stone axe that I was given and the arrows that I had bought to support the local economy. But in America they make you take off your thongs. I like to travel with thongs because I don't know what I might smuggle in in a half-inch piece of rubber! Anyway, that is fine. We have heard about New York and how tight security is there. I am not going to belittle the argument, but I really dread flying domestic around America because they are really, really stringent. What countries do you reckon we should benchmark against and in what areas?

Mr Tyrrell : It is more a general point. I take the personal things you have experienced, Senator. You mentioned the USA and the UK. These are large complex industry environments, with complex security arrangements. My argument is that we should not try and exceed these areas. If we can learn from them, great. If we can benchmark against them, that is terrific, as long as we do not come up with peculiar or particular arrangements, unless they are necessary. There may be Australian situations that call for it. I am saying: in general, are we benchmarking and do our arrangements have consistency with the rest of the world? Maybe it is a question for OTS rather than this committee.

CHAIR: Sure. That is fine. I now take what you are saying. It was said earlier that security can be a show. It can be put out there where it looks like a lot of things are being done and maybe the perception could be a little different. You just mentioned that four regional airlines have gone belly up. I should not use that terminology, should I? Unfortunately, they have shut their doors because of cost imposts. So it is not just a case of a reaction of: 'Crikey, let's tighten it all and let's follow what America does.' That is where you are coming from.

Mr Tyrrell : That is true. I have written about this a little bit. Perceptions are sometimes reality in security. From our side of the fence, we feel that maybe in the past security has gone up with alacrity; it is very quick to go up. People get very busy. As customers of those security guidelines, we have to respond. But if the security environment changes, like it diminishes, our perception is that maybe it is glacial in bringing some of the arrangements down. It is more perception rather than science. I just share that with you.

CHAIR: I will put you in the spotlight. If you cannot or do not want to answer, I fully understand. Where do you think the excesses in the security regime are in our regional airports?

Mr Tyrrell : 'Excess' is an interesting word. Maybe where we would have a debate—

CHAIR: I am talking about costs. If sense—God help us using that word between government departments!—were to prevail and it were not just a case of rushing out there and saying, 'Let's do this because it looks good'. If we were actually consulting with stakeholders and benchmarking and bringing in the experts, and not those that can see a quick quid if they get called in to write a new program, could you give us some examples of where, lately, it has just been financial overkill?

Mr Tyrrell : I will probably get my colleague to help here, too. There are two I would probably mention. One is at the minor end, where you have commercial operations and private operations on an airfield—say at Wagga. You all have to have an ASIC card if you are commercial or private. Also, some of the smaller GA people have to have an ASIC.
This is a cost to them. They live in a different part of the airfield and they have to pay for an ASIC. They have to have certain arrangements in place. Maybe in those instances we could allow the bigger commercial operations to have the full security environment and the smaller operators—the private and commercial—a lesser security environment. I am sure OTS have some ideas on the details of that. That is an opening point.

The second has been going for years. Checked-bag screening and passenger screening, some years ago, was lowered from a maximum takeoff weight of 30,000 kilo aircraft to 20,000 kilo aircraft. It was brought in fairly quickly and was based, apparently, on scientific research. We pressed and pressed to try to get an explanation of what this science was, because they are quite different aircraft—as you would appreciate—from 30,000 kilos to 20,000 kilos. So, by lowering the maximum takeoff weight you captured smaller aircraft. There was a hike—economies of scale—and the costs went up. All we were simply asking was: what were the major threats that caused the policy change? That was never explained to us.

CHAIR: I know you said that you wanted to go to Mr Eaves to help out too, but just on this: who made that decision?

Mr Tyrrell : I believe it was OTS at the time—the people running OTS some years ago.

CHAIR: Sure. I thought that could be the answer, but I just wanted to test it. Did the industry—you guys and other stakeholders—actually have the opportunity to comment? I know you said that you asked but you did not receive. Do they ever come to you and say, 'Look guys, what do you reckon? You're the ones that do it. This is what we've got; here's the scientific research.' Or is it just typical: 'Bang! This is what you cop'?

Mr Tyrrell : We had four meetings on this. What was explained to us was that this was research done, I believe, by RMIT. I might be corrected there. We asked to see the research. Some of it was classified; we understand that. We were given a summary in a briefing. There were holes in the argument and they just basically said, 'There's the research, there's the change. Live with it.' That was, kind of, where it went.

CHAIR: That is a common trend, no matter what area of expertise we all work in. Mr Eaves, did you want to add something?

Mr Eaves : As Paul just discussed, as an airline, we are the end user of the security product. Obviously, the intelligence and OTS mandate the requirements and provide the intelligence that the airports—as was discussed earlier—are doing the security screening for. Ultimately, the airline is the last line of defence. So we really are relying on OTS.

CHAIR: Okay; sure. This is the cracker question—here we go! If these imposts of security are placed on you as the end user, do you have the ability to flow that on to the airlines so that it is the travelling public that pays? Is it that simple?

Mr Tyrrell : That is correct. It is that simple. I am not saying that they pass on every cent. As you know, we are very sensitive to price. The airline might have to wear a little bit. For regionals it just hurts them a bit more.

CHAIR: You said there were four regional airlines. Could any regional airports that you know of seriously get to the stage where they ask whether it is worth opening if any more of these imposts come upon you, without the opportunity to have the input and to check the scientific research?

Mr Tyrrell : It sounds a simple question but it is actually quite complex. We are particularly worried about barriers to entry. You asked a question about current airlines. Regionals, as always, are the canary in the cage in terms of the economics. We are really concerned. We want new players to come into the environment.

CHAIR: Sure.

Mr Tyrrell : I have to say it would probably be quite frightening for someone to have a crack now, with the current security environment. I am not saying that they would not—

CHAIR: You mean an airline?

Mr Tyrrell : Yes, that is what I am talking about...

..Senator BACK: Sure. I also support that, and I want to come to that question. Obviously we are always measuring risk against opportunity and risk against benefit. Am I being unduly optimistic when I think about airports like Mt Gambier in South Australia, our own Esperance, Albany, Geraldton and Kalgoorlie even? Is there a risk commensurate with the cost now? Everyone knows each other. The likelihood of somebody wanting to create a maleficence is not high and the number of people on these aircraft is so small when we think about the risk if something did happen out of Geraldton or out of Esperance or Albany. I can accept in major metropolitan airports all of the risks. I can accept even the notion that a suitcase might start out at Wagga and end up in Sydney on its way to Los Angeles. But this does create regional employment. You go through a scanning in Esperance airport and you count eight, 10 or 12 people where previously there were not eight, 10 or 12 people carrying out this role. Are we over the top? Indeed, if it is driving regional airlines out of existence or from servicing these small regional airports, where is the benefit to the community? Is there a more pessimistic and realistic view I am not seeing?

Mr Tyrrell : Are you referring to your concern about security being raised at certain airports?

Senator BACK: Yes, I am. I am concerned that we have gone over the top.

Mr Tyrrell : I would just reflect again on that change from 30,000 to 20,000—which, as you say, creates employment, because we have to check the bags and we have to check the passengers. That is a significant cost. The Regional Aviation Association has not been able to determine from government sources what the level of risk was and what benefit we have gained. Unfortunately, I am answering you question with a question, because I do not have the answer.

Senator BACK: Before I go to Mr Eaves: the reality is that at a city airport, as we know, you have flights coming in all the time, so the percentage of time that these people are actually surveying passengers or luggage is high. At the Esperance airport, where Skywest or Virgin fly in twice a day at the maximum and the airport is 25 or 30 kilometres out of town, the time and cost taken for those people to turn up to oversight those passengers and then go back seems to me to be an absolute overkill.

Mr Tyrrell : I will let Stuart speak of course, but in general we feel there has been some overkill on the point that I raised. Again, we are the end users here. We are not open to the intelligence that is given to the government. They get intelligence and they develop their security measures. The trouble is, we are only part of that conversation.

Senator BACK: Sure.

Mr Tyrrell : It is just our observation that in certain instances it has gone too far.

Mr Eaves : All I can add is that if we are talking about decreasing that limit from 20,000 to other aircraft, for the requirement to do mandatory airport screening, using the scenario of the airline that I work for—they operate Metroliner III and 23 aircraft, 19-passenger configuration—if you were to introduce screening for that type of aircraft, you would capture the items that you ideally would not want on an aircraft; however, going that next step, there is not actually a flight deck door on an aircraft of that size. The regulatory requirements in Australia are for a reinforced cockpit door on an aircraft of 30 passenger seats or above. So if someone had sinister intentions and wanted to take over control of an aircraft security screening would not stop that, because someone could quite simply overpower a pilot to achieve that objective.

CHAIR: Senator Xenophon?

Senator XENOPHON: Thank you for your evidence. Essentially, you are saying that the trigger, or the maximum take-off weight, should go back from 20,000 to 30,000—from 20 to 30 tonnes.

Mr Tyrrell : We are asking, 'Why not?'

Senator XENOPHON: We have a situation now that if it is presumably, say, a Saab, that would be under 30,000?

Mr Tyrrell : Yes, it is. It is under 20,000.

Senator XENOPHON: Okay. It might be a Dash8. You will have different aircraft with different security screening requirements.

Mr Tyrrell : Given that you are drilling into this particular issue, the 20,000 actually splits a fuselage grouping. If it does not bore the committee: the Dash300s were just under 20,000, operated by Qantas, and the Fokker50 was just over 20,000, operated by people like Alliance and Skippers. They got divided down the middle. We asked, not so much 'This is unfair commercially'; we just asked, 'Hang on—why don't you make it 19; or, if you are going to do it, put it somewhere that makes sense.' We are still grappling with what the security issue is here.

Senator XENOPHON: In terms of Mr Seymour's stories, have you seen those or read the transcripts of those?

Mr Tyrrell : Not in detail, but I know some of it.

Senator XENOPHON: That was, in my view, the trigger for this inquiry. Can you at least comment in respect of those? I think it largely relates, not to regional airports, but to metropolitan, capital city airports. Are you able to comment? It does seem disturbing that there are things like box cutters, tasers and even a firearm that apparently got onto an aircraft.

Mr Tyrrell : I think any thinking person is a fan of sound security at major airports. Major airports, big aircraft, lots of people—you want a robust system. If something has got through—and I do not want to criticise them—it needs to be looked at. What went wrong?

Senator XENOPHON: Can we just go to the issue of cost. One of the other witnesses said that if the costs are too great in terms of security screening, that could affect the viability of regional carriers. Can you give a ballpark figure of what the additional cost would be per passenger per flight if, for instance, there were security screening applied to all aircraft of 30 passengers or more?

Mr Tyrrell : I would like to take it on notice, if I could?

Senator XENOPHON: If you could. It is just that I was quite alarmed to hear that the issue of viability of regional carriers could be affected by virtue of additional screening.

But, in context, I think that if passengers know that one or two dollars of their fare—three dollars of their fare—per sector might relate to enhanced security measures then I think that people may cop that.

Mr Tyrrell : It is the cup-of-coffee argument. I respect that security will not bring down an airline on its own, but we have many discussions with many—

CHAIR: Red ties being worn by the pilots nearly did!

Senator XENOPHON: Right—

CHAIR: I am having a real dig there at Qantas!

Mr Tyrrell : Yes, I know.

CHAIR: The management, not the staff!

Mr Tyrrell : It is a cumulative effect, Senator, but I will take your question on notice.

Senator XENOPHON: Sure. With incidents, how does the reporting method work? There is a dispute as to whether as a result of the FOI request by the Seven Network, there has now been a lessening of voluntary reporting. The airports say, 'No,' effectively, but that they will look into that. The deputy secretary of the department said that there was a lessening of reporting. How does it actually work, if there is a security concern at one of the regional airports? How does that filter through the system for the department to know about it?

Mr Eaves : Through a safety management system, all staff—from ground handlers through to flight crew—have the opportunity to, and are encouraged to, report any security concerns.

Senator XENOPHON: And where does that go to the department?
Mr Eaves : That would go into the security department of each airline, which would then pass that information on to the OTS.

Senator XENOPHON: Okay. So, any report under the safety management system would find its way back to the department eventually?

Mr Eaves : Correct.

Senator XENOPHON: Right. And would your association know how many safety concerns are listed? They would not just be security concerns—there might be a maintenance issue or whatever.

Mr Eaves : Correct. The safety management system can categorise everything into maintenance, flight operations and security, so we have a separate security category.

Senator XENOPHON: Okay, so there is a separate security category. Are you able to provide us on notice—and you may want to consider whether you want to have it in camera or not—the number of security concerns that have been reported under the safety management systems for regional carriers?

Mr Eaves : I can take that on notice. I could only answer that on behalf of the airline that I work for.

Mr Tyrrell : I could take it on notice on behalf of the association.

Senator XENOPHON: Yes, that is fine. And, again, if there is some sensitivity you may want to ask that it be put in camera.

Mr Tyrrell : I probably will ask that.

Senator XENOPHON: Okay, thank you.

CHAIR: Mr Tyrrell, are there any different levels of security in regional airports where there is mining? What I am trying to allude to is the mining area, where explosives could be used. I know of Kalgoorlie, for example—I will not try to speak about other areas of Australia. Are there different levels, or are they the same system?

Mr Tyrrell : You are not talking about FIFO? You are talking—

CHAIR: FIFO own their own airstrips.

Mr Tyrrell : That is right, they do own the field. You are talking about—

CHAIR: Yes, regional.

Mr Tyrrell : As far as I know—and I am not an airport expert—we at the airlines follow the guidelines that the airport lays out for us. They have their government guidelines, and sometimes they have their own peculiar ones. But, mostly, they stick to the guidelines and we follow those.

CHAIR: Yes, okay. No further questions for Mr Tyrrell and Mr Eaves? No? Thank you very much for your time, gentlemen.

Mr Tyrrell : Thank you very much.

   
MTF..P2

[Gobbledock]

The whole security regulatory process is flawed and is utter bullshit. OTS are a joke. Regulations ranging from thongs being a risk to baby bottles and LAGS is lunacy. Let's be adults here - you have body scanning, ETD and a host of other invasive and flawed processes which the bureaucrats focus on. Yet any assclown who owns one of the thousands of SAMS 'unaccounted' for worldwide could pull up in their 10 foot tinny on the bay in Brisbane, Melbourne or Sydney, just hundreds of feet away from a widebody aircraft, and pick it out of the sky!

More bureaucratic wankery.

[Greedy]

The whole security regulatory process is flawed and is utter bullshit. OTS are a joke. Regulations ranging from thongs being a risk to baby bottles and LAGS is lunacy. Let's be adults here - you have body scanning, ETD and a host of other invasive and flawed processes which the bureaucrats focus on. Yet any assclown who owns one of the thousands of SAMS 'unaccounted' for worldwide could pull up in their 10 foot tinny on the bay in Brisbane, Melbourne or Sydney, just hundreds of feet away from a widebody aircraft, and pick it out of the sky!

More bureaucratic wankery.

More than wankery Gobbledock a multi million dollar industry designed to profit a few at the expense of the general public. Not above the OTS to tell some whoppers to protect their fiefdom either.

[Gobbledock]

The Greedy one said;

"More than wankery Gobbledock a multi million dollar industry designed to profit a few at the expense of the general public. Not above the OTS to tell some whoppers to protect their fiefdom either".

True true my friend. So here is a good one that you won't see written in the OTS archives. An extremely reliable source informed me that several years ago at a North Queensland airport when body scanning was introduced, during testing a Glock made it through on someone's body undetected. The machine was working fine and it was obvious that the system could be compromised and wasn't fool proof. A comprehensive report was sent to OTS who buried the issue. Nobody wanted Albo the great white whale (and we all remember the photo of Albo in the body scanner) to be embarrassed that the system was shite, especially after all the hype and hooplah that Albo and his masters and minions had publicly promulgated.

Governments are all about smoke and mirrors and bullshit. Politicians are the biggest crooks that walk this planet. Trust them not and view everything they do, say and promote as being wrong, deceptive, ulterior motivated or corrupt.

[P7_TOM]

Can someone please explain why a half assed outfit CASA feel, or even believe there is a need for this level of data mining - invasion of privacy comes to mind.  WTH has anyone’s private life to with an air safety REGULATOR.  ASIO, Police, national security agencies – fine; no problem.   But most in aviation have already been 'vetted' - ASIC ring any bells?

It’s a disgusting request from a despicable department which consistently ignores the large issues and thrives on making much of the minutiae of individual lives.  Duck ‘em; let ‘em get a warrant; or, better yet, let the agencies qualified to investigate do the job:  properly.  Under the national rules, not Joe Rules.  

Steve Easton – HERE - courtesy of:-

[Peetwo]

Can someone please explain why a half assed outfit CASA feel, or even believe there is a need for this level of data mining - invasion of privacy comes to mind.  WTH has anyone’s private life to with an air safety REGULATOR.  ASIO, Police, national security agencies – fine; no problem.   But most in aviation have already been 'vetted' - ASIC ring any bells?

It’s a disgusting request from a despicable department which consistently ignores the large issues and thrives on making much of the minutiae of individual lives.  Duck ‘em; let ‘em get a warrant; or, better yet, let the agencies qualified to investigate do the job:  properly.  Under the national rules, not Joe Rules.  

Steve Easton – HERE - courtesy of:-

Follow up to the above today..

Sixty-one agencies want access to Aussie metadata

By Allie Coyne on Jan 18, 2016 1:07PM


FOI reveals list of those vying for citizen info.

The federal government has revealed the names of 57 agencies that are pushing to access the data collected on Australian citizens through the government's data retention regime.

A total of 61 agencies have requested access to the telecommunications non-content data, a freedom of information request revealed.

Four agency names were redacted, as it would be "contrary to the public interest" to release them, according to the Attorney-General's Department.

The 61 agencies have asked to be named as "criminal enforcement agencies" under the TIA Act, a designation which is required to be able to access the retained data.

The agencies in question include federal bodies like the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Clean Energy Regulator, the Tax Office, the National Measurement Institute, the Australian Financial Security Authority and the departments of Agriculture, Defence, Environment, Health, Human Services, Social Services and Foreign Affairs and Trade.

The list also includes state bodies such as the Bankstown City Council, Racing NSW and Racing Queensland, Greyhound Racing Victoria, the Victorian arm of the RSPCA, the Victorian Taxi Services Commission, and numerous state government departments.
Australia's data retention laws went live in October.

The scheme requires telecommunications providers to store certain customer data like personal details, billing information, IP addresses, location and traffic data, and upload and download volumes, among other things.

Approved government agencies can access the historical data without a warrant.

At launch, 21 government agencies were allowed to access the data. That list included the AFP, state police forces and anti-corruption commissions, and Border Force, as well as regulators like the Crime Commissions, the ACLEI and the ACCC.

The government had cut down on the amount of agencies able to ask telcos for data in the lead up to the introduction of the scheme, which had previously numbered around 80.
Previously the list had included the likes of local councils, environmental bodies and the RSPCA, which were removed after privacy and civil rights advocates questioned why such bodies needed access to the data.

Corporate regulator ASIC was one of those taken off the list and applied to be put back on.

The Attorney-General of the day has the power to allow an agency onto the list.


Read more: http://www.itnews.com.au/News/Article.aspx?id=413770#ixzz3xYymwuky

 
&.. an update to the original ZDNet article..

61 agencies after warrantless access to Australian telecommunications metadata

Australia Post, the RSPCA of Victoria, and the Victorian Taxi Services Commission are among 61 agencies in Australia seeking warrantless access to metadata stored by telcos.


By Chris Duckett | January 18, 2016 -- 01:57 GMT (12:57 AEDT) |

The names of 57 agencies that are seeking to gain access to telecommunications metadata stored on Australian residents without a warrant have been released under a Freedom of Information (FOI) request.

The names of four agencies have been redacted, with the Attorney-General's Department (AGD) previously saying that disclosing the names of these agencies would be contrary to the public interest.

The FOI request originally asked for correspondence from organisations seeking to gain access to stored telecommunications metadata. The department denied this request on practical grounds, stating that 2,661 pages spread across 288 documents were related to such a request, and that 45 third parties needed to be consulted before the information could be released.

Eventually, the request was narrowed down to merely a list of agencies looking to be declared as an enforcement agency as defined under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act.

"Agencies objected to disclosure on the basis that it would compromise the trust they place in the Commonwealth," AGD said last week. "During consultation, these four agencies clearly indicated that disclosure of this information would damage the relationship between the department and the relevant agencies, and could affect any future cooperation with the department."

The full list of agencies is as follows:

1. Australian Financial Security Authority
   
2. Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency
   
3. Australian Postal Corporation
   
4. Australian Taxation Office
   
5. Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre
   
6. Civil Aviation Safety Authority
   
7. Clean Energy Regulator
   
8. Department of Agriculture
   
9. Department of Defence
   
10. Department of the Environment
    
11. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
    
12. Department of Health
    
13. Department of Human Services
    
14. Department of Social Services
    
15. Fair Work Building and Construction
    
16. National Measurement Institute
    
17. ACT Revenue Office
    
18. Access Canberra (Department of Treasury and Economic Development)
    
19. Bankstown City Council
    
20. Consumer Affairs - Victoria
    
21. Consumer, Building and Occupational Services - Tasmania
    
22. Consumer and Business Services - SA
    
23. [redacted]
    
24. [redacted]
    
25. Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry - Queensland
    
26. Department of Commerce - WA
    
27. Department of Corrective Services - WA
    
28. Department of Environment and Heritage Protection - Queensland
    
29. Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and Resources - Victoria
    
30. Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning - Victoria
    
31. Department of Environment Regulation - WA
    
32. Department of Fisheries - WA
    
33. Department of Justice and Regulation (Consumer Affairs) - Victoria
    
34. Department of Justice and Regulation (Sheriff of Victoria)
    
35. Department of Mines and Petroleum - WA
    
36. [redacted]
    
37. Department of Primary Industries (Fisheries) - NSW
    
38. Environment Protection Authority - SA
    
39. Greyhound Racing Victoria
    
40. Harness Racing New South Wales
    
41. Health Care Complaints Commission - NSW
    
42. Legal Services Board - Victoria
    
43. NSW Environment Protection Authority
    
44. NSW Fair Trading
    
45. Office of Environment and Heritage - NSW
    
46. Office of Fair Trading - Queensland
    
47. Office of State Revenue - NSW
    
48. Office of State Revenue - Queensland
    
49. Office of the Racing Integrity Commissioner - Vic
    
50. Primary Industries and Regions South Australia
    
51. Queensland Building and Construction Commission
    
52. Racing and Wagering Western Australia
    
53. Racing NSW
    
54. Racing Queensland
    
55. Roads and Maritime Service NSW
    
56. Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) - Victoria
    
57. State Revenue Office - Victoria
    
58. Taxi Services Commission - Victoria
    
59. [redacted]
    
60. Revenue SA
    
61. Victorian WorkSafe Authority
    

The Australian data-retention laws allow the nation's approved law-enforcement agencies to warrantlessly access two years' worth of customers' call records, location information, IP addresses, billing information, and other data stored by telcos.
 
Also contained within the FOI documents was a list of agencies that previously had access to telecommunications data. The list was sorted alphabetically along with redactions in place.

1. Access Canberra (Department of Treasury and Economic Development)
   
2. ACT Revenue Office
   
3. Australian Financial Security Authority
   
4. [redacted]
   
5. Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency
   
6. Australian Postal Corporation
   
7. Australian Taxation Office
   
8. Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre
   
9. Bankstown City Council
   
10. [redacted]
    
11. [redacted]
    
12. [redacted]
    
13. Civil Aviation Safety Authority
    
14. Clean Energy Regulator
    
15. [redacted]
    
16. [redacted]
    
17. Consumer and Business Services - SA
    
18. Consumer, Building and Occupational Services
    
19. [redacted]
    
20. [redacted]
    
21. Department of Agriculture
    
22. Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (Queensland)
    
23. Department of Commerce - WA
    
24. Department of Corrective Services - WA
    
25. Department of Defence
    
26. Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and Resources (Fisheries) - Victoria
    
27. Department of Environment and Heritage Protection - Queensland
    
28. Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning - Victoria
    
29. Department of Fisheries - WA
    
30. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
    
31. Department of Health
    
32. Department of Human Services
    
33. Department of Mines and Petroleum - WA
    
34. [redacted]
    
35. Department of Primary Industries (Fisheries) - NSW
    
36. Department of Social Services
    
37. Department of the Environment
    
38. [redacted]
    
39. [redacted]
    
40. [redacted]
    
41. Environment Protection Authority - SA
    
42. Fair Work Building and Construction
    
43. Greyhound Racing Victoria
    
44. Harness Racing New South Wales
    
45. [redacted]
    
46. Health Care Complaints Commission - NSW
    
47. Legal Services Board - Victoria
    
48. [redacted]
    
49. National Measurement Institute
    
50. NSW Environment Protection Authority
    
51. NSW Fair Trading
    
52. [redacted]
    
53. Office of Environment and Heritage - NSW
    
54. Office of Fair Trading - Queensland
    
55. [redacted]
    
56. Office of State Revenue - NSW
    
57. Office of State Revenue - Queensland
    
58. Office of the Racing Integrity Commissioner - Vic
    
59. [redacted]
    
60. [redacted]
    
61. Primary Industries and Regions South Australia
    
62. Queensland Building and Construction Commission
    
63. Racing and Wagering Western Australia
    
64. Racing NSW
    
65. Racing Queensland
    
66. Roads and Maritime Service NSW
    
67. [redacted]
    
68. Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) - Victoria
    
69. [redacted]
    
70. [redacted]
    
71. State Revenue Office - Victoria
    
72. [redacted]
    
73. [redacted]
    
74. Taxi Services Commission - Victoria
    
75. [redacted]
    
76. [redacted]
    
77. [redacted]
    
78. Victorian WorkSafe Authority
    
79. [redacted]
    

[/url]
Of those listed, it appears that South Australia's Consumer and Business Services is the only agency to not reapply for access.

During 2015, [url=http://www.zdnet.com/article/government-obtained-4000-telco-interception-warrants-for-fy15/]3,926 telecommunications interception warrants were issued, a 2 percent fall from the year prior, and 365,728 authorisations for the disclosure of historical telecommunications data were made by agencies.

Of the agencies and departments given access to existing information or documents to enforce a criminal law over the 12-month period, and not included on either list released by AGD, or known to be an enforcement agency already, are: the Australian Fisheries Management Authority; the Department of the Environment; SA Consumer and Business Services; Corrective Services NSW; the WA Department of Environmental Regulation; Corrections Victoria; RSPCA Queensland; RSPCA Tasmania; The Hills Shire Council; the Vic Transport Accident Commission; and Workcover NSW.

A similar request was made by privacy advocate Geordie Guy, for which the department requested a fee of $424 to complete the request. A fee that Guy was able to raise through crowdfunding.

On appeal from ZDNet on its separate request, the department reduced the charges by 75 percent and said the release of such documents was in the public interest as it would provide background on how the metadata legislation is operating.

So much for trust & 'just culture', couple the above with this post - Public Servant Whistle-blowers & the piddling PIDs? and you soon get the real picture about what's going on at Fort Fumble -


MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

 Additional Senate Estimates Program - Next Monday




Curiously still waiting on the AQONs from Supp Estimates:

Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development


[b]Questions on notice index: (PDF 718KB)
[/b]
Answers are due 4 December 2015.

NIL

Tabled Documents

View File

1.) Document titled 'Tasmania funding comparison:: 14-15 May Budget vs 15-16 May Budget. Tabled by Mr Mike Mrdak, Secretary, Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development.

(PDF 80KB)

2.) Document titled 'Major Container Shipping Ports and Container Ship Dimensions'. Tabled by Senator Alex Gallacher.

(PDF 976KB)


[b]Additional information and clarification of evidence
[/b]
View File - NIL

 

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

AQONs are finally out...

1-12
Corporate Services Division

(PDF 193KB)
04/02/2016

13-72
Infrastructure Investment Division
(PDF 1530KB)
04/02/2016

73-75
Australian Rail Track Corporation
(PDF 72KB)
04/02/2016

76-77
Infrastructure Australia
(PDF 37KB)
04/02/2016

78-89
Airservices Australia
(PDF 145KB)
04/02/2016

90-103
Civil Aviation Safety Authority
(PDF 162KB)
04/02/2016

104-111
Aviation and Airports Division
(PDF 184KB)
04/02/2016

112-120
Australian Transport Safety Bureau
(PDF 2929KB)
04/02/2016

121-124
Office of Transport Security Division
(PDF 44KB)
04/02/2016

125-126
Australian Maritime Safety Authority
(PDF 35KB)
04/02/2016

127-135
Policy and Research Division
(PDF 6568KB)
04/02/2016

136-146
Surface Transport Policy Division
(PDF 160KB)
04/02/2016

147-151
Local Government and Territories Division
(PDF 100KB)
04/02/2016

152-153
Western Sydney Unit Division
(PDF 34KB)
04/02/2016

154-158
National Capital Authority
(PDF 122KB)
04/02/2016

159-161
National Transport Commission
(PDF 38KB)
04/02/2016

 
Fill your boots - there are some sidewinders in that lot..
MTF...P2