[Kharon]

Thanks P2 - again.  Good article and photographs from the 'Tele', never enough of them is there, not complaining - just saying.

No one – “Australian Transport Safety Bureau¬ senior aviation investigator Rob Chopin said it was like trying to piece together a three-dimensional puzzle: “It’s about going back to ¬basics, keeping an open mind and going through the evidence.”

The picture of Rob Chopin squatting by the wreckage is poignant; gods love him, what a job.  What must be going through his mind – “what the hell happened, look at the mess”?  Lantana, flies, mosquitoes, leeches, snakes, pissing down rain, mud; whatever he is paid for his skill, knowledge and expertise is earned, every last penny.  You don’t need to question his dedication –men of this quality, even under a fool like Beaker keep on doing their jobs.

I like the high tech, state of the art pinch bar, it’s brand new – no expense spared in the pursuit of truth – handy for beating off snakes as well as persuading recalcitrant parts to separate.

Good man, tough job – wish him well and hope he can provide some answers.  Answers which may help prevent a repeat.  Bravo that man.

[Peetwo]

BTTF (Back to the future): The facts & only the facts -

QF72 not an accident but perhaps a 'serious incident' that should have rang a very large warning bell?? 

What are the facts?

Again and again and again — what are the facts? Shun wishful thinking, ignore divine revelation, forget what "the stars foretell," avoid opinion, care not what the neighbors think, never mind the unguessable "verdict of history" — what are the facts, and to how many decimal places?

You pilot always into an unknown future; facts are your single clue. Get the facts!
Robert Heinlein (1978)

Mathew Squair (blog) gave a analysis of 7 October 2008 flight QF 72 serious incident from a modern day cockpit ergonomics & engineering point of view:

People In glass cockpits

17/07/2009 — 2 Comments
 

QF72, glass cockpits, event buckets and implicit design assumptions

Reading the ATSB interim report on the QF72 in-flight accident one could easily overlook the statement, “…the crew reported that the (ECAM (1)) messages were constantly scrolling, and they could not effectively interact with the ECAM to action and/or clear the messages.” (ATSB report AO2008070). So during the QF 72 event the crews primary display (interface) with the aircraft was significantly degraded, the question is of course why? 

A quick background to the QF72 accident is that a series of ‘spike’ AoA errors, generated by an intermittent ADIRU fault, propagated through the flight management system causing a cascading series of equipment fault and aircraft flight warnings, and triggering the aircraft’s high alpha protection function. Obviously the failure of a primary display during such an event adds to crew workload and stress levels, not a desirable trait in the human machine interface of any aircraft. It’s also a safe bet that this behaviour was definitely not intended by the Airbus engineers. For a fuller description see my previous post here or the ATSB report referenced below.

To understand why this happened we need to firstly take a slight detour into the realms of cognitive engineering. Responding to a rapid sequence of events such as occurred during the QF72 accident requires the flight management system to interact asynchronously with the crew, especially for high priority events such as warnings and cautions. However humans are inherently limited in their ability to respond to multiple tasks, in fact as work load increases we reach a point at which our performance starts to fall away rapidly as we become situationally overloaded.

To deal with the problem of situational overload a queue or list of event data is created (sometimes termed an ‘event bucket’) with new events ‘pended’ into the queue to await crew disposition. Because flight displays are limited in physical size, such a list can also easily exceed the available display area (2). To address this physical display constraint an event list is normally managed in one of two ways, the first (apparently adopted by AirBus) is to append events to the list and automatically scroll the list to maintain a view of the last (or priority) set of events, the second is to maintain a static view of the messages and provide a crew initiated paging function.

The problem with a scrolling implementation is that if the crew are dividing their attention between competing activities it is disconcerting to say the least to look back and find that the events you were working on have disappeared from the display. This sort of scenario is normally greeted by comments such as, ‘where the $#@! has X gone…”.   Where the number of new events in the queue is increasing rapidly, as it was in this case, the update rate if unbounded can exceed the cognitive ability of the crew, leading to them missing events in the list.

In extreme circumstances the display can simply become unusable, as it did here, and crew will completely ignore it until after the incident is resolved and cockpit work load has dropped to a reasonable level. The problems introduced by scrolling event displays have been recognised for a number of years, and in fact led the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to preclude the use of scrolling alarm lists in US reactor alarm systems (O’Hara et al. 1994).

ECAM display layout

As the ECAM display layout above illustrates, ECAM messages are displayed in the lower  quarter of the E/WD display further reducing the available display area. AirBus engineers also provided an operational checklist to the crew which further reduces the number of events that can be displayed. The fairly obvious design assumption that emerges here is that multiple independent faults (3) were considered extremely unlikely and that therefore a display optimised towards a ‘single event –> single response’ has eventuated.

The A330 ECAM software also automatically prioritises ECAM messages and updates the display accordingly, again this is a reasonable ‘first things first’ approach to event management, but in a situation of rapidly arriving independent events this also meant that the display update rate was driven outside the ability of the crew to respond effectively.

Noting the implicit assumption embodied in the design of the ECAM interface it is unlikely (and I’m guessing here) that any specification of either a maximum display update rate or minimum hysteresis time constraints were placed on the ECAM  design. As a result the ECAM display was unable to provide meaningful data to the crew during the QF72 in-flight accident.

For those of you wondering what hysteresis has to do with anything, when designing an interface you need to remember that humans require a finite amount of time to identify that a displayed value or list item has changed, i.e. we have an in-built hysteresis in our response to changing circumstance. For example, if the software updates the event queue and sets a new event as the priority the crew could actually be responding to the previous event because they haven’t recognised the change. If a command, such as clearing the list item, arrives within this hysteresis time it may be advisable to hold the action and query the crew as to their intent.

The take-home
There are two key conclusions that can be drawn from this failure. The first is that fundamental design assumptions, such as fault hypotheses, can work their way through the entirety of a system with unexpected consequences if they prove false. The second is that any display should be designed to not exceed the cognitive limitations of the crew and these limits need to be explicitly specified.

Footnotes
1.   ECAM is the Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor that provides information on the status of the aircraft and its systems on two display units. The upper unit or engine/warning display (E/WD) presents information such as engine primary indications, fuel quantity information and slats/flap positions. It also presents warning or caution messages when a failure occurs, and memo messages when there are no failures. The lower or system display (SD) presents aircraft synoptic diagram and status messages (Spitzer, 2006). The lower ECAM display can be used to display overflow status messages, however incoming priority messages (Warnings, Cautions and Advisories relating to out of tolerance parameters) will automatically pre-empt the status display with system schematics associated to that priority message.
2.   During the Three Mile Island incident the event queue buffer became so full of events that the control room printer ran two and a half hours behind what was actually occuring.
3.   This is not the same as the situation of dependent system failures. In these circumstances if a fault occur that results in a cascade of other system faults, ECAM should identify the originating fault, and automatically present the operational checklist to the crew.

Further Reading
ATSB Transport Safety Report, Aviation Occurrence Investigation, AO-2008-070 Interim Factual Report on in-flight upset 154 km west of Learmonth, WA 7 October 2008, VH-QPA Airbus A330-303.

O’Hara, J., Brown, W., Higgins, J., & Stubler, W., Human Factors Engineering Guidelines for the Review of Advanced Alarm Systems (NUREG/CR-6105). Washington, D.C, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1994.

Spitzer, C.A., Digital Avionics Handbook, Second Edition, CRC Press, 2006

Excellent stuff.. - MTF..P2

[ventus45]

Tail Strike - Qantas 737-838 (VH-VZR)
          1st August 2014 - YSSY

https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5727742/ao..._final.pdf

ATSB:
Human Error - it happens - it is inevitable - crew must try harder not to make mistakes.

Matthew Squair:
"So how warranted is the ATSB’s narrative ?
Well my conclusion is that their focus is too narrow and as the counter narrative shows there are broader system level issues that they fail to address.
Consequently their conclusion as to the inadequacy of the FCOM procedure needs to be broadened to encompass the more general need for robust exception handling procedures.
They also overly focus on error recovery ignoring opportunities for error elimination at source, through the design of the systems interfaces.
Sometimes trying harder is not the required response, sometimes we actually have to change."

http://criticaluncertainties.com/2015/11...tribution/

Change ? !

ATSB ?
CASA ?

Cue Thesis:  "on the aerodynamics of oinkers ....... "



                            ATSB                        CASA

[Peetwo]

Embuggerance & hidden agendas??

Hey "V" love the happy snaps of Beaker & Oliver at the last Official RAeS shindig for the year:

 
 
[/url] Wed, 9 Dec 6:30 PM
[url=https://www.eventbrite.com.au/e/the-three-wise-monkeys-go-flying-tickets-19511150376] The Three Wise Monkeys Go Flying

555 George St, Sydney, NSW, 2000, AU

   
From heavies to ultra-lighties I caught this little belated snippet off the other Aunty the other day which rang a bell... :

CASA investigates Scone crash landing

Posted Fri at 6:09amFri 11 Dec 2015, 6:09am
Photo: The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) is investigating the forced landing in a field near Scone on November 11 2015. (Civil Aviation Safety Authority)


Air safety officials are investigating a plane crash landing in the Upper Hunter, after a mid-air engine failure.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) is investigating the forced landing in a field near Scone on November 11, 2015.

The plane had left Gunnedah and was on its way to Cessnock.

But, as it was in cruise control above the Upper Hunter, the engine began to vibrate and lose substantial power.

The pilot applied carburettor heat, fuel boost and full throttle, but power could not be restored.

CASA is investigating the circumstances surrounding the crash landing and mid-air engine failure.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau is providing technical assistance in the investigation.

 Ok so the ATSB reference should (but not always) mean that it is listed on the bureau investigation page, & yes here it is:

Technical assistance to CASA in the examination of the engine from a power loss event involving a Jabiru J160 aircraft, registered 19-7549 near Scone NSW on 11 November 2015

 
Investigation number: AE-2015-137
Investigation status: Active
 

• Summary
  
  

Summary
On 11 November 2015 a Jabiru J160 aircraft, registered 19-7549, with two people on board, departed Gunnedah for Cessnock, NSW. While in cruise, the engine began to vibrate and lose substantial power. The pilot applied carburettor heat, fuel boost and full throttle, but the engine power could not be restored. As a result, the pilot conducted a forced landing in a field near Scone. There were no injuries.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority is investigating the circumstances surrounding the engine power loss and has requested the technical assistance and oversight of the ATSB in conducting a detailed examination of the occurrence engine. To facilitate this assistance, the ATSB initiated an external investigation under the provisions of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003.
 
General details

Date:
11 Nov 2015
 
Investigation status:
Active
 
Time:
Unknown
 
Investigation type:
External Investigation
 
Location   (show map):
near Scone
 
Occurrence type:
Forced/precautionary landing
 
State:
NSW
 
Occurrence class:
Technical
 
Occurrence category:
Serious Incident
 
Report status:
Pending
 
Highest injury level:
None
 
Expected completion:
May 2016 
 
Aircraft details
Aircraft manufacturer:
Jabiru Aircraft Pty Ltd
 
Aircraft model:
J160
 
Aircraft registration:
19-7549
 
Serial number:
Unknown
 
Type of operation:
Private
 
Sector:
Piston
 
Damage to aircraft:
Nil
 
Departure point:
Gunnedah, NSW

Destination:
Cessnock, NSW 

 


Last update 19 November 2015

Okay so penny drops -  Jabiru aircraft, ATSB not required to investigate - RAAus domain and CASA would almost certainly be investigating because they have serious ongoing concerns about the rate of Jabiru aircraft power loss & in-flight engine failures.

Reference CASA FOI request : 

4 August 2015


F15/1676

Seeking access to documents containing data relating to the 46 reported engine failures in 2014 involving Jabiru powered aircraft. (1mb)

So perhaps this is a case of good proactive action implemented by the regulator...

However recent evidence & rumours within suggest there are bigger issues afoot that involve far more than Jabiru aircraft within the non-VH registered recreational aircraft fraternity...

Example: Got to wonder why the powers to be are going so hard at this silly (potential Darwin award recipient) bugger??

Reckless flying charge for pilot who ditched ultra-light plane in Bass Strait

Posted 9 Dec 2015, 7:37amWed 9 Dec 2015, 7:37am
Photo: Shayd Hector and Joel Nelson received cuts in the crash and were treated for hypothermia before flying home to Newcastle after the 2013 crash. (ABC)
Related Story: Two Newcastle men 'lucky to survive' ultralight crash

The pilot of an ultra-light aeroplane that ditched in Bass Strait off Tasmania's north-east coast two years ago has been charged with reckless flying.

Shayd Hector of Tingira Heights in New South Wales is charged with the reckless operation of an aircraft, flying an aircraft without a licence, and consuming alcohol within eight hours of flying an aircraft.

The Commonwealth prosecutor alleges the offences took place at or near Bridport on October 28, 2013, endangering the life of Hector's passenger, Joel Nelson.

The pair were rescued from the sea near Waterhouse Island that afternoon after their ultra-light plane crashed into the sea.

After the crash, they described clinging to debris fearing they could be attacked by a shark.

Hector did not enter pleas and was ordered to return to the Launceston Magistrates Court in February

 
MTF...P2

[Kharon]

P2 – “Okay so penny drops -    Jabiru aircraft, ATSB not required to investigate - RAAus domain and CASA would almost certainly be investigating because they have serious ongoing concerns about the rate of Jabiru aircraft power loss & in-flight engine failures.”

If, and it’s a big if the CASA motivation for investigation is ‘pure’ then it’s a very good thing.  ATSB don’t deign to investigate the incident (another story) but CASA is rightly concerned and calls in the ATSB for ‘technical’ assistance.  Bravo. I think that if I were CASA, I too would like to get some clear data and solid facts on the incident. If there is a trend emerging, then the pattern needs to be broken before someone lobs into building.  If there is no trend, then with a clear conscience and a sense of job well done, CASA can file the investigation and forget about it.  

It’s a crying shame that, from habit, we look to ulterior, sinister motivation for the investigation; we shouldn’t; alas.  The word is that CASA want control and the investigation is targeting that objective rather than a safety outcome.

Negative thoughts to one side, it’s good to see positive, safety oriented action from the regulator.

Toot toot.

[Peetwo]

Example: Got to wonder why the powers to be are going so hard at this silly (potential Darwin award recipient) bugger??

Reckless flying charge for pilot who ditched ultra-light plane in Bass Strait

Posted 9 Dec 2015, 7:37amWed 9 Dec 2015, 7:37am
Photo: Shayd Hector and Joel Nelson received cuts in the crash and were treated for hypothermia before flying home to Newcastle after the 2013 crash. (ABC)
Related Story: Two Newcastle men 'lucky to survive' ultralight crash

The pilot of an ultra-light aeroplane that ditched in Bass Strait off Tasmania's north-east coast two years ago has been charged with reckless flying.

Shayd Hector of Tingira Heights in New South Wales is charged with the reckless operation of an aircraft, flying an aircraft without a licence, and consuming alcohol within eight hours of flying an aircraft.

The Commonwealth prosecutor alleges the offences took place at or near Bridport on October 28, 2013, endangering the life of Hector's passenger, Joel Nelson.

The pair were rescued from the sea near Waterhouse Island that afternoon after their ultra-light plane crashed into the sea.

After the crash, they described clinging to debris fearing they could be attacked by a shark.

Hector did not enter pleas and was ordered to return to the Launceston Magistrates Court in February

 

P9 - It’s a crying shame that, from habit, we look to ulterior, sinister motivation for the investigation; we shouldn’t; alas.  

We shouldn't but of course we always will, while past evidence of severe cases of embuggerance still lay bare and festering on the CASA ledger book.

Couple of quotes from off the UP on the above story - see HERE.  

LeadSled:

..Something like this won't preclude him from travelling anywhere. What a stupid thing to say...

Peterwhatever,

I suggest you acquaint (just for starters) yourself with entry conditions to the US. A charge under an aviation statute (not even a conviction) will bar you from entry.

Check your facts before you decide who or what is stupid.

Indeed, such is the interchange of information in this day and age, US Dept. of Justice and Homeland Security have extensive records of Australian courts proceedings. Ain't computer data matching wonderful.

Just one example, old mate of mine had a run-in with CASA over a maintenance issue, resulting in a conviction and a fine.

He found out what that meant when he tried to take his young family to Disneyland --- He was turned around at KLAX and on the next QF home.

A number of Australian pilots have had their careers seriously hit, because they cannot enter the US to do such as a Flight Safety course.

Doesn't even have to be an aviation matter ( although aviation matters are treated very harshly), a drink driving conviction can bar you from both the US and Canada.

No secret about any of this, so no reason for your ignorance.

Tootle pip!!

PS: As I understand this matter, it is already set for trial in the Supreme Court. A little beyond "tea and bikkies" with CASA

  
And from the man who brought us the term - embuggerance..

Sunfish:

The problem PeterC is that you are already a felon, you just haven't been charged or convicted yet.

CASA admitted as much when one of its senior legal persons declared pilots to be "uncaught criminals".

The situation arises because CASA regulations are deliberately written to be obtuse, contradictory and riddled with opportunities for selective, subjective, interpretation by CASA when it suits them in order to stitch you up, and the offences are criminal offences, not civil matters or misdemeanours.

….And there is little you can do to defend yourself because CASA has very, very deep pockets when if comes to legal fees, much deeper than your pockets can ever be.

I will guarantee you that a forensic examination of your flying career will demonstrate you have committed multiple felonies and that the only thing stopping CASA prosecuting you is a lack of self interest in seeing you removed from the industry.

There can be no meaningful, trusting relationship between industry and CASA, ever, in CASAs current form because its corporate structure dictates its corporate strategy.

There needs to be a total disconnect - separate organisations, between rule writing and enforcement for a start.

peterc005 always was a bit of a tosser..


MTF...P2  

[Kharon]

A two bob twiddle.

Cheers P2 – I went and had a peek at the UP thread, you seem to have scooped up the relevant comments.  “Reckless” is certainly heavy ordinance to be lobbing at this fellah.  Leadsled,  Sunny and CP as usual, the voices of sanity.  Did a bit of digging about, can’t guarantee the ‘facts’ but it seems that the pilot went to Melbourne – commercial – and admitted to purchasing one drink with lunch on the journey; which was just plain silly.  Well it was – if you are ‘dead-heading’ to duty the notion of a beer with lunch hardly ever enters your head, in fact having a beer when returning after a tour is, for me at least a rare event.  Too many stories of crew being accused by passengers of boozing – in uniform; technically off flight duty, but still on PR duty and too much hassle to get changed into civvies.  I digress.

There seems to be some confusion about ‘certificate’ validity; was the BFR (or whatever) time expired?  If so, then was it an oversight or a deliberate act?  Does it really matter? Just as you won’t die when a medical expires at midnight the out of date BFR as it relates to ‘ability’ is moot – unless there was intent to flout the system.  No doubt the legal eagles will have argument along those lines.  Does ‘strict liability’ apply to the association rules?

There is also an argument that the aircraft was always maintained within the prescribed ’25 nm' radius of action allowed; that life jackets were provided and worn although not a ‘legal’ requirement, which, if true, may go some way towards defending against ‘reckless’.

So, reckless or adventurous?  Sailing around the world in a small boat; climbing big mountains; riding a push bike too fast; all the silly things young men have done, do and will continue to do, hopefully loosing their sense of immortality before their lives.

It all comes down to ‘perspective’; but being criminally reckless weighed against being young, dumb and full of it seems to me (without all the facts) a little OTT.  It’s not as though you can legislate against the foolhardy doing their thing, no more than you can prevent crime with law.  That only eases prosecution, after the fact.  

Toot toot.

[Peetwo]

Spare a thought for young Ryan Campbell  

Courtesy the Oz overnight:

Young pilot fights for life after Queensland plane crash

• Jessica Grewal
  
• The Australian
  
• December 29, 2015 12:00AM
  

1 dead, 1 injured in vintage plane crash0:54

One person was killed and another seriously injured when a vintage plane crashed in a paddock north of the Gold Coast this morning. Courtesy: Richard Gosling

• December 28th 2015
  
• 19 hours ago
  
• /video/video.news.com.au/News/[img=0x0]http://pixel.tcog.cp1.news.com.au/track/news/content/v1/origin:video_integrator.djMzBzeTrkV8bb7MgHCAGm67Xtp70eSY?t_product=video&t_template=../video/player[/img]
  

He was the youngest pilot to fly around the world but last night Ryan Campbell was facing a bigger challenge: battling critical ­injuries suffered in a Queensland plane crash that claimed the life of his passenger yesterday.

The record-breaking pilot, who at 19 inspired a generation when he flew around the world in 70 days, was flying a vintage yellow Tiger Moth when it plummeted to the ground near Norwell, about 30km north of Surfers Paradise.

His 58-year-old passenger, Gary Turnbull of Coutts Crossing in northern NSW, died at the scene.

Early investigations suggested the plane got into trouble soon after takeoff from the rural airstrip, crashing within view of the Tiger Moth Joy Rides hangar, where Mr Turnbull’s daughter was reportedly waiting.

Emergency Services confirmed the young pilot phoned 000 from the cockpit. “The aircraft had ­landed in a tall grass area close to a tree line, the patient was entrapped by legs and hanging outside the aircraft,” a Queensland Ambulance spokeswoman said. He was trapped for almost an hour before being flown to Brisbane’s Princess Alexandra Hospital.

A picture of the 21-year-old Mr Campbell flying the Tiger Moth over the Gold Coast, where he ­recently moved, was posted just a week ago on his Facebook page.
As the news spread last night, friends and fans from his home town of Merimbula on the NSW south coast and beyond took to ­social media to wish him well.

Australian Air League Albion Park, based at Wollongong, where he started and finished his epic journey in 2013, posted: “Wishing Ryan Campbell a speedy and complete recovery. Our thoughts and prayers go out to you, your family and the others involved in the crash”.

It’s the second time tragedy has befallen the joy-ride company in as many years. Pilot Alex “Jimmy” Rae and a French tourist were killed when the restored Tiger Moth they had taken off in from the Norwell airstrip crashed in waters off South Stradbroke Island in ­December 2013. An Australian Transport Safety Bureau report found rods joining the wings to the plane were faulty. The company was eventually sold and began ­operating again earlier this year.

Queensland Police Senior Sergeant Greg Brake told the ABC he did not know whether yesterday’s crash occurred during “a paid-for joy flight or something else”.

A spokesman for Civil Aviation Safety Authority confirmed it had been alerted to yesterday’s crash and would await further information from the bureau before “making any judgments about whether we look at it further”.

Tiger Moth Joy Rides did not respond to requests for comment.

Repeating the words of the Albion Park AAL...
“Wishing Ryan Campbell a speedy and complete recovery.."
...and condolences to Mr Gary Turnbull's family & friends RIP.
P2

[Kharon]

There’s not much news about Ryan’s recovery progress; anyone heard how the youngster is doing?

Speculation - Just looking at the paddock, gee whiz, it looks (at least in the photograph) to be as rough as the proverbial badgers whot’s it.  Tough job, lots of wind, probably wind shadows and shear, rough paddock forced landing would be bad enough, but in a very light aircraft – Even if the aircraft speed was back to ‘safe slow’ even a small bounce in 20 kts of head wind (quartering crosswind a nightmare) would have the aircraft in a difficult place – even with a donkey to do the heavy lifting.

Sad day for everyone concerned.

Add my condolences to those who lost a loved one and hopes for a speedy, full recovery for the pilot.

[Peetwo]

P9 - Speculation - Just looking at the paddock, gee whiz, it looks (at least in the photograph) to be as rough as the proverbial badgers whot’s it. Tough job, lots of wind, probably wind shadows and shear, rough paddock forced landing would be bad enough, but in a very light aircraft – Even if the aircraft speed was back to ‘safe slow’ even a small bounce in 20 kts of head wind (quartering crosswind a nightmare) would have the aircraft in a difficult place – even with a donkey to do the heavy lifting.

Noticed the thread on the UP got shutdown, probably a good thing as it was becoming way to speculative & OTT without a shred of fact/evidence coming out of the relevant authorities.
There was a media update which could have been a candidate for the 'bad' in the 'Tick, flick & publish'  thread... However there was some more photos which reinforces the "K" speculation, so here is the article courtesy the Gold Coast Bulletin:

The future of Tiger Moth Joy Rides looks uncertain after fatal crash

January 4, 2016 1:00am
Lexie Cartwright Gold Coast Bulletin

The future of Tiger Moth Joyrides at Pimpama is uncertain after a fatal crash. Pic by Richard Gosling

THE future of Tiger Moth Joy Rides on the Gold Coast is up in the air as the owner of the Pimpama company suspends services until further notice.

The fatal crash last Monday, which killed Coutts Crossing train driver Gary Turnbull, 58, and injured world record breaking pilot Ryan Campbell, 21, destroyed the only warbird owned by Paul Bennet, of Paul Bennet Airshows.

TIGER MOTH FLIGHT WAS GIFT FOR CHRISTMAS

• 
  Gary Turnbull was killed when a Tiger Moth plane crashed at Pimpama. Photo: Facebook.
  

Pilot Ryan Campbell (left) in the Tiger Moth. He is recovering in hospital.

The future of the joy rides business is uncertain. Pic by Richard Gosling



Mr Bennet refunded bookings scheduled for the summer holidays and said the most professional thing to do at the moment was nothing, out of respect for the deceased.

“I have no answers,” he said.

“We’ve refunded all the bookings, there was no issue with doing that at all.

“It’s just still a bit raw. I need to have a think about everything.

“A lot of what we end up doing will depend on what the findings are.

“It’s just too early to tell, an accident has happened and we need to put business decisions on hold to make a proper decision.

“Out of respect for the passenger the best thing we can do right now is nothing.”

There were reports pilot Mr Campbell, who is still recovering in Princess Alexandra Hospital, said the crash was a result of an engine failure but that is yet to be confirmed.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau are investigating the incident and will pass their findings onto the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, who then decide whether the pilot is fit enough to keep his license.

Mr Campbell had wanted to be a pilot since he was six-years-old and has a family background in aviation.

“It’s too early to make judgments on that (licensing),” a CASA spokesman said.

“Once information is gathered we will assess what went wrong and if there are safety implications that need to be addressed, we will address them accordingly.”

Tiger Moth Joy Rides only relaunched in May after the business was taken over by Mr Bennet following a fatal crash in December 2013 that claimed the life of young Frenchwoman Taissia Umenc and pilot Alex “Jimmy” Rae.

An investigation into that has not been finalised, although an initial report found the left wing had failed soon after commencing an acrobatic manoeuvre off South Stradbroke Island.

Former owner Geoff Stillman, who decided to sell the business after not quite bouncing back from the fatal crash two years ago, was not available for comment.

P2 comment: Certainly looks more like a CFIT that has gone awry once contacting some very rugged looking terra firma, it basically looks like it has pancaked into the paddock, of course that is purely speculative   

Anyway here is the latest off the ATSB investigation page:

Investigation number: AO-2015-150

Investigation status: Active
 

• Summary
  

Summary

During the conduct of the flight with a pilot and passenger the aircraft collided with terrain. The passenger was fatally injured and the pilot received serious injuries.
A team of three investigators with expertise in aircraft maintenance, operations and human performance deployed to the accident site on 28 December 2015. Completion of the on-site phase of the investigation has been delayed due to the presence of asbestos within the engine compartment of the aircraft. Following specialist assessment and removal of the asbestos, it is expected that examination of the aircraft will be completed within the next few days.
 
General details
Date:
28 Dec 2015
 
Investigation status:
Active
 
Time:
09:30 EST
 
Investigation type:
Occurrence Investigation
 
Location   (show map):
near Pimpama Airstrip
 
Occurrence type:
Collision with terrain
 
State:
QLD

 
Occurrence category:
Accident
 
Report status:
Pending
 
Highest injury level:
Fatal
 
Expected completion:
Nov 2016
 
 
Aircraft details

Aircraft manufacturer:
de Havilland Aircraft Pty Ltd
 
Aircraft model:
DH-82A
 
Aircraft registration:
VH-UZB
 
Serial number:
291
 
Type of operation:
General Aviation-Unknown
 
Sector:
Piston
 
Damage to aircraft:
Destroyed
 


Last update 05 January 2016

 


MTF..P2

[Kharon]

Well!.  In an effort to glean further information on the pilot’s recovery, made a couple of calls, alas, no additional news on that front.  However, one thing led to another and discussion about the paddock and conditions raised some very interesting points.

My speculative notion that this was a ‘simple’ engine out problem – to forced landing on rough ground in tricky wind conditions, a skip and loss of control due wind gust or ground feature is not correct.  We must now wait for the ATSB, seems there’s a little more to follow.

The winds that day were 35 kts with gusts >40 occasionally 50; so the question why was the aircraft even out of the hanger is being asked – from an operational POV.

There are some serious questions being asked about mandated ‘qualification’ and experience on type.

There also appears to be some serious ‘legal’ issues focussing around CASA changes to various ‘controls’ which could – repeat – could be problematic in the ‘category’ and operating regimes of Warbirds (as I understand it).  Too early to tell just yet, but, prima facie at least, seems CASA have a couple of very curly questions to answer on exploited loop holes and grey areas.  MFT is the best I can manage on that topic.  Patience – working on it and it is a can of worms.

The CASA response is going to be interesting, as is the ATSB report.  I was curious as to why UP closed the thread, it was no sillier than the normal, run of the mill stuff; until you back track to the point where the thread was de-railed.  I wondered why then, not any longer… ..

Toot - MTF – toot.

[Peetwo]

Very interesting "K", will this be another job for Mr Wodger (ALIU) White, the parallel investigation man or is he too busy wrapping up the Jetstar cover-up??   

My Curiosity Bump: Well while we are waiting ( & knowing the official DIPs & AAI involved we could be waiting for quite some time... ) here is an old report (that without fear nor favour, with no wasted dialogue & within very few pages, cuts directly to the chase), that is of particular relevance right now: Aviation Safety Investigation Report - 198201430

Circumstances:

The purpose of the flight was to convey the three passengers to Casino for business. Messrs Parkinson and Curran travelled on the aircraft from Cessnock to Scone earlier in the morning, where Mr Turnbull joined the flight to Casino.

Prior to departing Scone the pilot telephoned Sydney Operational Control Centre Briefing Office and submitted a flight plan which indicated that the flight would be conducted in accordance with Visual Flight Rules (VFR) and proceed via Upper Bowman and Taree at 7000 feet above mean sea level (amsl) to Port Macquarie and then Casino. The pilot also indicated when submitting the flight plan that no radio navigation aids were fitted to the aircraft. The pilot then received a briefing on the weather conditions that could be expected along the route to be flown. The winds were given as generally southerly at about twenty knots with the cloud as scattered stratus between 1000 and 2500 feet and areas of broken strato-cumulus between 2000 and 6000 feet amsl.

At 0740 hours the pilot advised Sydney Flight Service (FS), by radio, that the aircraft had departed Scone at 0733 and was climbing to 7000 feet. At 0809 the pilot reported the aircraft's position at Upper Bowman, cruising at 7000 feet and estimating Taree at 0829.

Twelve minutes later the pilot of another aircraft also bound for Taree contacted VHUDX and asked the pilot to confirm the aircraft altitude as 7000 feet. The pilot of VH-UDX replied that his aircraft was at 6500 feet on descent to 5000 feet and that he had run into a bit of "murk". When questioned further by the other pilot and Sydney FS the pilot reported VH-UDX was at 6000 feet in cloud and requested the visibility at lower altitudes.

The pilot was advised that the cloud base at Williamtown was 3000 feet and he then reported that he intended to back track to Scone. The pilot was then requested to activate the transponder fitted to the aircraft and VH-UDX was subsequently identified by radar 18 nautical miles south-west of Taree at 0828 hours.

The pilot was advised of this position and reported his heading, which indicated the aircraft was tracking towards Scone. During the next few minutes Sydney FS obtained information from the pilot relating to fuel endurance; estimate for Scone; altitude and cloud conditions.

The last communication received from the aircraft was at 0838 when the pilot acknowledged an instruction to call Williamtown Approach (for radar assistance).

Further communication attempts were unsuccessful. At about 0840, residents of Gloucester heard the sound of an aircraft engine, apparently at high power, moving from the west to the north of the town. They could not see the aircraft. At the time there was dense cloud overhead, base about 800 feet above ground level (elevation 350 feet amsl), with drizzle. The aircraft appeared suddenly, descending steeply from the base of the cloud. The nose rose momentarily then the left mainplane folded back against the fuselage, separated and dropped away. The empennage separated from the fuselage.

The fuselage with the right wing attached struck the ground in a park on the western edge of the town. The left wing, empennage and some other debris landed several hundred metres to the north east of the main wreckage.


Subsequent investigation did not reveal any pre-existing fault with the aircraft that could have contributed to the accident. The weather conditions that were encountered by the pilot were substantially as forecast and relayed to the pilot during the pre-flight briefing.

Significant Factors:

1. The pilot did not hold an instrument rating.
2. The pilot continued VFR flight into adverse weather conditions.
3. The pilot probably experienced spatial disorientation while flying in cloud, resulting in loss of control of the aircraft.
4. The design strength limit of the aircraft was exceeded, probably after the pilot saw the ground and attempted to take corrective action to avoid impact.

  
Notice no wild unsubstantiated speculation, just the facts and the expertly deduced reasons for what would have been a horrific last few seconds before impact...P2 RIP

  

[Kharon]

Good catch P2 and a fine example of what the CASA subsidiary ATSB are not producing. Cut, dried and factual, the report defines a perennial problem which has claimed many lives: VFR into IMC; whether by accident or intent, the temptation of scud running or a chancing a gap between two hills, any number of situations can and do bring about the tragic results. On the positive side – the family would have appreciated that the BASI ? understood the need for a factual, timely report. The report may not lessen the pain of loss, but at least the reasoning provided a full stop to speculation; small mercy, but at a time like that anything which provides the slightest support is needed. What a shame it is that these days the delay is infinite and the reasons are not only unclear, but carry the rank smell of ‘manipulation’.

Perhaps, someone, somewhere could take us back to the ‘good old days’.

Aye well – FWIW, I hope the family concerned have fully recovered and the report was of some small assistance

Selah

[ventus45]

Very interesting "K", will this be another job for Mr Wodger (ALIU) White, the parallel investigation man or is he too busy wrapping up the Jetstar cover-up??   

My Curiosity Bump: Well while we are waiting ( & knowing the official DIPs & AAI involved we could be waiting for quite some time... ) here is an old report (that without fear nor favour, with no wasted dialogue & within very few pages, cuts directly to the chase), that is of particular relevance right now: Aviation Safety Investigation Report - 198201430

Circumstances:

The purpose of the flight was to convey the three passengers to Casino for business. Messrs Parkinson and Curran travelled on the aircraft from Cessnock to Scone earlier in the morning, where Mr Turnbull joined the flight to Casino.

Prior to departing Scone the pilot telephoned Sydney Operational Control Centre Briefing Office and submitted a flight plan which indicated that the flight would be conducted in accordance with Visual Flight Rules (VFR) and proceed via Upper Bowman and Taree at 7000 feet above mean sea level (amsl) to Port Macquarie and then Casino. The pilot also indicated when submitting the flight plan that no radio navigation aids were fitted to the aircraft. The pilot then received a briefing on the weather conditions that could be expected along the route to be flown. The winds were given as generally southerly at about twenty knots with the cloud as scattered stratus between 1000 and 2500 feet and areas of broken strato-cumulus between 2000 and 6000 feet amsl.

At 0740 hours the pilot advised Sydney Flight Service (FS), by radio, that the aircraft had departed Scone at 0733 and was climbing to 7000 feet. At 0809 the pilot reported the aircraft's position at Upper Bowman, cruising at 7000 feet and estimating Taree at 0829.

Twelve minutes later the pilot of another aircraft also bound for Taree contacted VHUDX and asked the pilot to confirm the aircraft altitude as 7000 feet. The pilot of VH-UDX replied that his aircraft was at 6500 feet on descent to 5000 feet and that he had run into a bit of "murk". When questioned further by the other pilot and Sydney FS the pilot reported VH-UDX was at 6000 feet in cloud and requested the visibility at lower altitudes.

The pilot was advised that the cloud base at Williamtown was 3000 feet and he then reported that he intended to back track to Scone. The pilot was then requested to activate the transponder fitted to the aircraft and VH-UDX was subsequently identified by radar 18 nautical miles south-west of Taree at 0828 hours.

The pilot was advised of this position and reported his heading, which indicated the aircraft was tracking towards Scone. During the next few minutes Sydney FS obtained information from the pilot relating to fuel endurance; estimate for Scone; altitude and cloud conditions.

The last communication received from the aircraft was at 0838 when the pilot acknowledged an instruction to call Williamtown Approach (for radar assistance).

Further communication attempts were unsuccessful. At about 0840, residents of Gloucester heard the sound of an aircraft engine, apparently at high power, moving from the west to the north of the town. They could not see the aircraft. At the time there was dense cloud overhead, base about 800 feet above ground level (elevation 350 feet amsl), with drizzle. The aircraft appeared suddenly, descending steeply from the base of the cloud. The nose rose momentarily then the left mainplane folded back against the fuselage, separated and dropped away. The empennage separated from the fuselage.

The fuselage with the right wing attached struck the ground in a park on the western edge of the town. The left wing, empennage and some other debris landed several hundred metres to the north east of the main wreckage.


Subsequent investigation did not reveal any pre-existing fault with the aircraft that could have contributed to the accident. The weather conditions that were encountered by the pilot were substantially as forecast and relayed to the pilot during the pre-flight briefing.

Significant Factors:

1. The pilot did not hold an instrument rating.
2. The pilot continued VFR flight into adverse weather conditions.
3. The pilot probably experienced spatial disorientation while flying in cloud, resulting in loss of control of the aircraft.
4. The design strength limit of the aircraft was exceeded, probably after the pilot saw the ground and attempted to take corrective action to avoid impact.

  
Notice no wild unsubstantiated speculation, just the facts and the expertly deduced reasons for what would have been a horrific last few seconds before impact...P2 RIP

  

I remember that one. 

Those of us who have "fallen" out of cloud - NEVER forget it.

My incident - was a few years before - on the 26th January 1978, at Leeton NSW.
I "eventually" wrote it up on newsgroup "ausaviation" - 25th July 2002 - only one day short of twenty four and a half years after the event.

The same factors were present.


The weather conditions that were encountered by the pilot were substantially as forecast and relayed to the pilot during the pre-flight briefing.
Yep


Significant Factors:

1. The pilot did not hold an instrument rating.
Yep

2. The pilot continued VFR flight into adverse weather conditions.
Yep (but not intentionally - honest mer'lud !!)

3. The pilot probably experienced spatial disorientation while flying in cloud, resulting in loss of control of the aircraft.
Yep - In Spades - You bet-cha !!

4. The design strength limit of the aircraft was exceeded, probably after the pilot saw the ground and attempted to take corrective action to avoid impact.
Not relevant in my instance.  Fortunately, the "aircraft" has airbrakes (which were used !) and is aerobatic, and is "slow", and the "incident pilot"  had plenty of height and time for a "normal-ish ?" recovery, although the pucker-factor was tending to FSD.


On re-reading it - after all these years - there is more that could be added - but .....
I might do that - some day .......

Anyway, here is the original link.
Fasten and snub full-harness, secure all loose objects, and hang on for a wild ride !!
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/aus.avia...DJFVG5LCEJ

[P7_TOM]

V45 – Tim Tam.

Good yarn, well told ‘V’, the key to the TT box is on it’s way to you.  I even read and enjoyed all the comments made.  Lessons taught passed on over a cold refresher, friends made and kept over shared laughs and ‘commentary’.  I might add that some of the best I ever had the pleasure of working with started in gliders.

It all sounds strangely like that old thing, we used to have – open, fearless admission of error, then taking in and passing on the lesson learnt - and the flack, as part of the game.  Called aviating - wasn’t it?

..

[ventus45]

It all sounds strangely like that old thing, we used to have – open, fearless admission of error, then taking in and passing on the lesson learnt - and the flack, as part of the game.  Called aviating - wasn’t it ?

Alas it was, indeed it was, once-upon-a-time, way back then.
Not in today's sterile "strict liability" legal climate though.

That week on the Leeton Summer Camp was quite a time for me - good and bad.
The "fall-out" from that incident is another tale, a "part B" if you like.
For another time - perhaps - no - bugger it - the legal types would probably go into salivation overdrive, even now !

To put things in context.

There used to be a regular column in the old Flying Magazines of the 50's, 60's and 70's, usually with a title like "I learned about flying from that ..." or similar.

There were many good "don't get caught out like I did" take-away lessons - free (for the price of the magazine) in those old magazines.

Nothing like them today, not anything like the "warts-and-all" honesty of the old days - that's for sure.

The "hangar flying" in the pub at the end of the day was also a "gold mine" for the fledgelings - if they listened !! 

Some of "the best anechdotes" only came out after three or four schooners !   (My instructor - Bert - was a Resches Pilsener man - "on tap" back then, not today !)

None of this happens today though, not to the same degree.
For starters, you can't drink & drive.
But the greater risk, is someone with an axe, may well see you as a handy "oil-stone".

Forewarned was once forearmed, but not today.  All the stuff that's NOT "in the books" has been discredited, discounted, and discarded, to the peril of the modern day fledgelings.

I wonder, indeed I worry. 

As incident after incident occurs, it seems to me at least, that more and more fatals are falling into the "simple" disaster box, that should never have happened, which leads one to think that "basic safety and airmanship" is in fact "regressing", which then poses the question - WHY ?.

I would therefore like to ask the CASA Legal Department, and indeed the on-again-off-again- Bearded-one, something along the lines of the following:-

"How many young fledgling pilots today, are dying (correction - becoming fatally injured) because they are NOT getting the SAFETY AND AIRMANSHIP BENEFITS of the "anechdotes" from the venerable old buzzards, simply because, in your rampantly "strict liability" regime, the legal risks to said buzzards, of "owning-up", and/or "speaking-up" are too high, thus INHIBITING THEM from "passing-on" the "lessons" of their "experiences", and thus, how many of the fatal-injury accidents over the last ten years, could reasonably be expected to have been avoided, if the young fledgling pilots had been able to absorb the lessons of those "experiences" in a truly (joke ?) "open and frank" telling of the relevant "tales" - warts and all ?"

I doubt if anything like that has been factored into all their supposedly all-singing-all-dancing-fancy "risk assessment models", let alone what those "factors" might be, and god-forbid any realistic "cost-benifit" analysis !

Perhaps Zeno, of Heff, or Dave-F, could ask them that question, next time they "have-a-chat", in the grass roofed house ?

[Gobbledock]

How embarrassing. Wodger Wabbit and Richard the nudist leading the CASA charge! One of them is an ex bag chucker cum sociopath and the other one a complete pain in the ass and self taught investigator that doesn't fly.

Bollocks

[Kharon]

A Friday night ramble.

Perhaps, maybe, this lack is the true ‘mystique’ of aviation safety, which the law dependent denizens of Sleepy Hollow just don’t get; because they were never ‘told’.  There are some blokes worth the time and effort to ‘bring along’ and that effort is always rewarded.  You can spot ‘em a mile off and even if you have never seen, let alone flown with the fellah (or fellahinny) by the time you pull up at the holding point; you know – this is one to keep.  And so the slow, often painful process of investment begins; usually ‘in the pub’ between first beers and dinner.  (Q) Well, where did it go wrong? – (A) – usually a critique of the actual ‘stuff up’, simple in nature “we’ll I let it get too high and fast on final and with the breeze as it was Blah, blah, blah. Etc.  Next round, you patiently explain that the ‘stuff up’ actually started at the briefing – before TOD, where Blah, blah, blah. Etc was overlooked.   Things like the inversion and the bumps below it being tackled at full whack, rather than taking a more gentle approach, which, a thinking man would have anticipated: the speed/ROD being arranged slightly before ‘the encounter’ or better yet, the descent planned, anticipating to accommodate just such an event.  

Then there is the loss of “I learned about flying from that” and similar published in the legendry, much mourned, missed and lamented ‘Safety Digest’.  The discussion, argument, casual education and tales that publication generated are uncountable.  The benefits simply not quantifiable.

The ‘booze bus’ may, quite rightly (IMO), claim to have prevented many a boozy night around the BBQ, where tall tales and true were welded into legend and Old Wives Tales were forged into both myth and legend; even if patently untrue – they formed a base from which truth and knowledge could be gained, a start point, or foundation if you will, from which the sprog could begin to build a unique and very personal tool bag; that of experience, both shared an acquired.  There’s much more than todays NOTAM and latest Met in a pilots Nav-bag, it’s where the stored knowledge, factual, mythical and imagined is kept, for the once in a career time where an anecdote or ‘pearl’ can actually ‘save the day’.  

If I’ve mentioned this before; skip this part.  Once, not too long ago I was presented with a made up TAFOR.  “Do you need to carry alternate ?” was the question.  “Well” say I, where’s the area forecast and MSL chart?”  “What for? says my interrogator, “assume that that TAF is valid for todays flight and your ETA is scheduled for XYZ0 z”.  Oh ho thinks I, so I carefully ‘read’ the missive and scratched my poor wooden head for the ‘legal’ rights of it.  There was a small window between something coming off and something coming on, which, had I been bang on ETA would, technically, allow me to depart without an alternate being carried.  “Well” say’s I “it’s debatable, but theoretically, although there is no legal requirement; operationally, and, without all the data, only a fool would not acknowledge and plan for an acceptable alternate”.  “Then you would fail my test” says this worthy.  I let it slide then, he happy with his ‘win’; me, comfortable with the secret knowledge of bygone days and tales (all true) of weather reports being akin to the pronouncements of ‘Gypsy Rose’ the fortune teller.  Quite apart from that, I had the benefit (as had many others) of real met briefing, from a qualified, experienced man who actually took the time to explain the vagaries of forecasting and how to beat the odds; (hint) he could also pick race day winners on any track in the country.  RIP mate.

This desperate need to be legal; in compliance with ‘black letter law’ creates many more problems than it solves.  Had that TAF been wrong – in the right direction – I may have carried a little more weight than strictly required; however, had my timing been out or the forecast wrong - in the wrong direction - then I would have happily sailed through to the next port, knowing I could make it.  By the way – this doyen failed, totally and utterly to grasp the subtle difference between my sighting ‘acceptable’ and ‘suitable’ alternates (for technical’ planning) so I just ambled off, bemused, looking for a coffee.      

I guess I’m just trying, in my usual, clumsy fashion to point out that the currently ‘in vogue’ slavish reliance on black letter compliance, whilst disregarding hard won ‘common’ or garden, experienced sense has the potential to kill you – legally of course.  It is the bastion of those who have never been inducted into the genuine, grass roots ‘mystique’ of real air safety or understood how to translate myth, legend and knowledge into a practical, working anthology of ‘aviation’.  Those who believe strict compliance will, if they actually did ever have to fly to earn a living, find that rigid compliance will keep them, technically and legally safe, whilst clinically dead, all for wont of ‘understanding’.

Aye well – enough of my ramblings.  All your fault “V”, enjoy the TT’s.

Sponsored by the IOS. Happily aided and abetted by one (or was it two) Arthur Guinness Esq… ..

[ventus45]

V45 – Tim Tam.

Good yarn, well told ‘V’, the key to the TT box is on it’s way to you.  I even read and enjoyed all the comments made.  Lessons taught passed on over a cold refresher, friends made and kept over shared laughs and ‘commentary’.  I might add that some of the best I ever had the pleasure of working with started in gliders.

It all sounds strangely like that old thing, we used to have – open, fearless admission of error, then taking in and passing on the lesson learnt - and the flack, as part of the game.  Called aviating - wasn’t it?

..

Key arrived by courier.
1st packet of TT's consumed already !

https://www.dropbox.com/s/q9oaa88oeklrem...1.jpg?dl=0

[ventus45]

A Friday night ramble.

..............................

I guess I’m just trying, in my usual, clumsy fashion to point out that the currently ‘in vogue’ slavish reliance on black letter compliance, whilst disregarding hard won ‘common’ or garden, experienced sense has the potential to kill you – legally of course.  It is the bastion of those who have never been inducted into the genuine, grass roots ‘mystique’ of real air safety or understood how to translate myth, legend and knowledge into a practical, working anthology of ‘aviation’.  Those who believe strict compliance will, if they actually did ever have to fly to earn a living, find that rigid compliance will keep them, technically and legally safe, whilst clinically dead, all for wont of ‘understanding’.

Aye well – enough of my ramblings.  All your fault “V”, enjoy the TT’s.

Sponsored by the IOS. Happily aided and abetted by one (or was it two) Arthur Guinness Esq… ..

Unfortunately, "Compliance" is the "buzz-word" in vogue these days, virtually across the board.  Just go to ANY so-called "competency based training" course, in ANY industry today.  Labour's "training guarantee" policy of years ago, created a "training" industry, which sprouts ninety percent legalistic compliance bullshit to scare the plebs, and ten percent defective advice for on the job.

"The law is the law.
Only unto the law, and for the practicioners of the law, is the law.
Any resemblence to truth or justice, let alone common sense,
is purely coincidental, and entirely unintentional,
as per the disclaimers at the ends of the movies,
and deliberately so."

Better that one may die, legally - than survive, illegally.
Sad, but true.