[Peetwo]

Them holes are aligning

Very disturbing report that perfectly highlights all the major problems with an aviation safety system that is totally rooted beyond redemption and will remain so while the current crop of inept, self-serving, ass-covering,  aviation safety bureaucrats is allowed to continue unabated covering up potentially embarrassing serious safety issues & occurrences...



Courtesy the Oz:

Near miss for planes carrying 18 people  

• by: Matthew Denholm
  
• From: The Australian
  
• September 17, 2015 12:00AM
  

Tasmania Correspondent
Hobart




Too close for comfort. Source: TheAustralian



An “unsafe” close encounter ­between two planes near Mount Hotham Airport in Victoria allegedly placed up to 18 lives at risk, fuelling demands for better use of radar at Australia’s regional airports.  

According to an incident ­report obtained by The Australian, two Beechcraft B200 King Air planes on private charters from different companies — one from Essendon in Melbourne and one from Bankstown in Sydney — were vertically within 300ft (90m) of each other on September 3.

It appeared the Essendon-based pilot, struggling with a faulty GPS in heavy morning cloud and poor weather, did not know where he was and reported being in vastly different locations, varying by up to 20 nautical miles, within a short period of time.
Radar traces of this plane, chartered from small Essendon-based operator Seidler Properties, show an apparently erratic path at times, and that the scheduled 38- minute flight took an hour and 27 minutes.

The Essendon plane came within one nautical mile (1.8km) of the other aircraft and eventually landed at Mount Hotham, in the Victorian Alps northeast of Melbourne, but only after what the report by the other pilot ­described as an “unsafe” approach from the “wrong direction”. There were three other aircraft also en route to the airport at the time.

The report, titled “breakdown of separation”, says passengers on the Essendon-based plane were so shaken they refused to return with the same pilot later that day, ­requiring another to be flown to Mount Hotham to pick them up.

In a report being investigated by the Australian Transport ­Safety Bureau, the pilot of the Bankstown-originating aircraft — a senior pilot at a major charter firm — describes the situation as “not safe”.

He suggests he is making the report not to attack the Essendon-based pilot, but rather to highlight an ongoing risk of tragedy in the absence of a safety back-up in cases of pilot error at uncontrolled regional airports.

“If this event did result in a midair collision, two aircraft would have been destroyed and 18 people would have been killed,” says the Bankstown-originating pilot in the report, sent to the ATSB two days ago.

“As a chief pilot, I am significantly concerned with the breakdown of (aircraft) separation caused by this incident. This is not a standard of operation that I would tolerate from my pilots and I do not accept that his event goes without investigation.

“Two high-performance aircraft with 300ft separation (vertic­ally), within one nautical mile of each other (horizontally), in IMC (instrument meteorological conditions), is not safe.”
The incident has further highlighted the lack of radar control of aircraft to low altitudes at ­regional airports in Australia, which The Australian has documented in the series of articles over the past two months.

In uncontrolled airspace, ­pilots must communicate with each other by radio to ensure they remain safely separated, with no support from an air traffic controller monitoring them on radar or providing co-ordination.

At Mount Hotham, radar-based separation of aircraft ends at 18,000ft, below which pilots must self-separate, despite radar being available to a far lower altit­ude.

Veteran aviator Dick Smith told The Australian the latest Mount Hotham incident highlighted the need to make full use of radar coverage at regional airports to improve safety.

“If they were using the existing radar for control at Mount Hotham, neither of these things (the ­alleged mid-air near collision and subsequent alleged dangerous ­approach) would have happened, because the controller would have told the pilot what was happening,” Mr Smith said.

He said it was particularly frustrating the existing radar was not being used to control aircraft to low altitude at Mount Hotham, given the deaths of three people in a crash there in 2005 and of six people in an accident at Benalla, about 150km from Mount Hotham, in 2004. He believed both crashes could have been averted had radar control close to ground level been provided.

“How many more frightening incidents like this before there are more unnecessary deaths?” Mr Smith said.

He said all that was needed to make use of existing radar for separation control to low altitudes at regional airports was for Airservic­es Australia to provide more training to controllers at its Melbourne and Brisbane radar centres.

Airservices insist the air traffic system is safe and that levels of control around the country are appropriate for local traffic volumes and types.

An ATSB spokesman said the latest Mount Hotham incidents were being investigated.
However, an official statement on the bureau’s website refers only to the “unstable approach” to the runway; not the earlier alleged close encounter. Seidler Properties suggested it was unaware of any investigation and declined to comment.

To think this 'serious incident' may have gone unreported 
How many other similarly serious occurrences have gone unreported (I personally know of a couple) because of fear of retribution or incriminating oneself.
MTF..P2
Tick..tick..tick..tick..
  

Update to ATSB investigation AO-2015-108.

Near-collision and Operational Event involving Beech Aircraft Corp. B200, VH-OWN and Beech Aircraft Corp. B200, VH LQR, Mount Hotham Victoria on 3 September 2015

 
Investigation number: AO-2015-108
Investigation status: Active
 

• Summary
  

Updated: 11 November 2015
At approximately 0830 Eastern Standard Time[1] on 3 September 2015, four low capacity twin engine turboprop aircraft flew towards Mount Hotham Airport, Victoria, as part of a passenger charter involving a number of different operators. On arrival at Mount Hotham the weather conditions were below that required for a visual approach. As a result, it was necessary for each aircraft to carry out a published Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) instrument approach, in order to navigate clear of cloud before landing (Figure 1).

Figure 1: GNSS instrument approach chart for Mount Hotham Airport 

Source: Airservices Australia

The first aircraft to arrive in the Mount Hotham area was Beech Aircraft Corp. B200 King Air, registered VH-OWN. The pilot of that aircraft commenced the GNSS approach from the south-east and, having descended below the specified altitude of 7,700 ft overhead initial approach fix HOTEC, experienced tracking difficulties approaching the intermediate fix HOTEI. In response, the pilot discontinued the approach and climbed the aircraft in a north-easterly direction (Figure 2). Having climbed back to the lowest safe altitude for that area, the pilot of VH-OWN commenced manoeuvring in the airspace above the Mount Hotham Airport as the other charter aircraft progressively arrived in the area and commenced the instrument approach.

Figure 2: VH-OWN partial radar tracking during the first approach
(Note: the climb back to the lowest safe altitude is not displayed)

Source: Airservices Australia, modified by the ATSB

The second aircraft arrived at Mount Hotham on the same track as VH-OWN. The pilot of that aircraft conducted the GNSS approach and landed on runway 29.

The third aircraft to commence the approach was another B200 King Air, registered VH-LQR, which tracked inbound from the north-east at 8,000 ft. During this time the pilot of VH-OWN continued manoeuvring in this area at 7,700 ft and the two aircraft passed in close proximity of each other with a vertical separation of approximately 300 ft.

The pilot of VH-OWN then conducted a second approach and experienced similar tracking difficulties. The pilot reported becoming visual and clear of cloud during the approach and continued to descend. VH-OWN was then observed to carry out significant manoeuvring while on short final to the runway before landing.

The airspace around Mount Hotham was designated as uncontrolled Class G airspace. Civilian radar coverage was unable to track all parts of the flight, and there was no control tower or certified air/ground radio service at the airport. Neither VH-OWN nor VH-LQR were fitted with airborne traffic avoidance equipment such as the Traffic Collision Avoidance System. The primary means of separation was the use of radio communication between the pilots and flight in accordance with the published instrument approach chart.

The investigation is continuing and will include examination of the:

• navigation and autopilot system fitted to VH-OWN
  
• recorded radio and radar data
  
• planning and conduct of the multiple aircraft charter operation
  
• air traffic services provided in the Mount Hotham area.
  

 

MTF..P2

[Peetwo]

Near-collision and Operational Event involving Beech Aircraft Corp. B200, VH-OWN and Beech Aircraft Corp. B200, VH LQR, Mount Hotham Victoria on 3 September 2015

 
Investigation number: AO-2015-108
Investigation status: Active
 

• Summary
  

Updated: 11 November 2015
At approximately 0830 Eastern Standard Time[1] on 3 September 2015, four low capacity twin engine turboprop aircraft flew towards Mount Hotham Airport, Victoria, as part of a passenger charter involving a number of different operators. On arrival at Mount Hotham the weather conditions were below that required for a visual approach. As a result, it was necessary for each aircraft to carry out a published Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) instrument approach, in order to navigate clear of cloud before landing (Figure 1).

Figure 1: GNSS instrument approach chart for Mount Hotham Airport 

Source: Airservices Australia

The first aircraft to arrive in the Mount Hotham area was Beech Aircraft Corp. B200 King Air, registered VH-OWN. The pilot of that aircraft commenced the GNSS approach from the south-east and, having descended below the specified altitude of 7,700 ft overhead initial approach fix HOTEC, experienced tracking difficulties approaching the intermediate fix HOTEI. In response, the pilot discontinued the approach and climbed the aircraft in a north-easterly direction (Figure 2). Having climbed back to the lowest safe altitude for that area, the pilot of VH-OWN commenced manoeuvring in the airspace above the Mount Hotham Airport as the other charter aircraft progressively arrived in the area and commenced the instrument approach.

Figure 2: VH-OWN partial radar tracking during the first approach
(Note: the climb back to the lowest safe altitude is not displayed)

Source: Airservices Australia, modified by the ATSB

The second aircraft arrived at Mount Hotham on the same track as VH-OWN. The pilot of that aircraft conducted the GNSS approach and landed on runway 29.

The third aircraft to commence the approach was another B200 King Air, registered VH-LQR, which tracked inbound from the north-east at 8,000 ft. During this time the pilot of VH-OWN continued manoeuvring in this area at 7,700 ft and the two aircraft passed in close proximity of each other with a vertical separation of approximately 300 ft.

The pilot of VH-OWN then conducted a second approach and experienced similar tracking difficulties. The pilot reported becoming visual and clear of cloud during the approach and continued to descend. VH-OWN was then observed to carry out significant manoeuvring while on short final to the runway before landing.

The airspace around Mount Hotham was designated as uncontrolled Class G airspace. Civilian radar coverage was unable to track all parts of the flight, and there was no control tower or certified air/ground radio service at the airport. Neither VH-OWN nor VH-LQR were fitted with airborne traffic avoidance equipment such as the Traffic Collision Avoidance System. The primary means of separation was the use of radio communication between the pilots and flight in accordance with the published instrument approach chart.

The investigation is continuing and will include examination of the:

• navigation and autopilot system fitted to VH-OWN
  
• recorded radio and radar data
  
• planning and conduct of the multiple aircraft charter operation
  
• air traffic services provided in the Mount Hotham area.
  

 

Also recently released by the ATSB (in a mad flurry of activity) was the Final Report into a LOS incident in Williamtown airspace on 19 Sept 2013. Anyway thought the ATCO fraternity would find this one interesting : 

[*]Final Report
[*]Safety Issue
Final Report
Download Final report
[PDF: 1.95MB]
 
 
Listen to this PDF
Alternate: [DOCX: 7.19MB]
 
On 19 September 2013, the pilot of a Beechcraft B300, registered VH-FIZ, was conducting calibration activities of ground-based navigation aids at Williamtown (Newcastle Airport), New South Wales.

During the calibration activities, the aircraft conducted a 7 NM (13.0 km) orbit around Williamtown. However, the Tower air traffic controller had intended the aircraft to hold south of Williamtown over land. At the same time, other aircraft were approaching Williamtown to land.

VH-FIZ tracked on the 7 NM arc towards, and then across the coast, on a converging path with a formation of four Boeing F/A18 aircraft that were on a visual approach to Williamtown. The formation flew directly below VH-FIZ with less than the required 1,000 ft separation.

What the ATSB found
The ATSB found that the applicability of a general requirement to conduct aviation risk assessments at Department of Defence aerodromes for complex, new, unusual or irregular activities was open to interpretation. This led to an absence of prior planning for the calibration activities, resulting in an air traffic control work-around on the day of the activities that did not address all related safety aspects. One work-around was that airspace over land usually controlled by Approach was transferred to the Tower. The resultant airspace controlled by the Tower was considerably larger than normal, resulting in the Tower controllers having difficulties visually monitoring the airspace and needing to rely on the surveillance display for situation awareness.

An instruction given to VH-FIZ to ‘orbit’ was insufficiently clear, resulting in the pilot misinterpreting it as permission to conduct a pre-planned 7 NM (13.0 km) orbit around Williamtown. As a result of the Tower controller’s assumption that VH-FIZ would remain in the area they intended, the aircraft was not adequately visually monitored by the controllers in the Tower, or monitored on radar by the Approach controller. This removed any chance of early detection of the impending aircraft conflict. When the Tower controller did detect the conflict, clear control instructions were not immediately given to either VH-FIZ or the F/A18s, leading to a loss of separation.

What's been done as a result
The Department of Defence took proactive action to improve the implementation of aviation risk management (AVRM) to ensure that AVRM plans developed for unusual or irregular operations, such as calibration operations, addressed staffing and traffic levels, coordination and workload.

Safety message
Although not guaranteeing the absence of aircraft separation incidents, prior planning for unusual or irregular operations can permit the development of robust air traffic control defences that address the specific hazards of that operation. Aircraft separation safety also relies on controllers issuing specific control instructions to all pilots, along with the provision of timely and relevant traffic information to pilots of aircraft identified to be in conflict.

Williamtown Visual Terminal Chart

Source: Airservices Australia

Download Final report
[PDF: 1.95MB]

Alternate: [DOCX: 7.19MB]
 
Safety analysis
Although the opportunity for Williamtown air traffic control (ATC) to undertake prior planning for the calibration operations had existed in the 24 working days between the initial notice and the activity, no such planning took place. Defence air traffic services stipulated that any complex, new, unusual or irregular activity required a risk assessment. However, as calibration flights occurred a number of times each year, the Williamtown ATC Flight Commander did not believe that such activity required the conduct of a risk assessment. In addition, although Williamtown ATC had in place a number of generic risk assessments and treatments for unusual situations, there were no risk assessment for increased traffic complexity such as that created by the calibration activities.

Prior planning and a risk assessment had the potential to identify the need to increase staffing in both the Tower and Approach areas, provide briefings for ATC personnel and the pilots of locally-based aircraft, and ensure controllers had a thorough understanding of the calibration run sheets prior to the activity commencing. Such prior planning would have incorporated strategic separation assurance considerations.

The Williamtown Approach controller released airspace to the Tower controller that was considerably larger than that normally controlled by the Tower. That resulted in both the Tower supervisor and the Tower controller having difficultly monitoring the airspace visually, and the need for the Tower controller, though not trained in the use of radar separation, to rely on the surveillance display for situation awareness as well as separation. In situations where the location of an aircraft is known (from a position report or from observing a surveillance display), a controller could quickly use the binoculars to locate an aircraft. However, to locate an aircraft at an unknown position, the controller would need to scan the sky, possibly with the assistance of binoculars. Although binoculars were available to the controllers, binoculars could potentially limit the controller’s view. Using binoculars would also have been time-consuming.

During the morning, there had been two additional controllers in the Tower cabin than normal. They were able to assist with monitoring VH-FIZ (FIZ), and a number of the controllers present had experience with the use of surveillance data for monitoring aircraft and providing separation instructions. At the time of the occurrence, only three controllers were in the Tower cabin. One was newly endorsed in Surface Movement control, without having undertaken training in the control of airborne aircraft. The other two controllers present were not trained in separating aircraft with surveillance data.

Williamtown Base Standing Instructions (Base SIs) and 453 Squadron Williamtown Flight Standing Instructions (ATC SIs) contained restrictions and requirements, for both controllers and locally-based military aircrew, to provide strategic separation assurance between arriving locally-based military aircraft and those within the airspace normally controlled by the Tower controller. These specifically required the local aircraft to remain clear of airspace under the Tower controller’s jurisdiction until issued with traffic information. The last minute planning conducted on the morning of the occurrence by two ATC supervisors, though well intentioned, resulted in less than optimal conditions.

These included procedures that negated the established strategic separation assurance documented in both Base and ATC SIs, increased traffic complexity, and the need for the Tower controller to rely on the surveillance display when the controller was not trained to use radar separation.

The run sheet provided to ATC for the calibration of the tactical air navigation system (TACAN) numbered each required run and included a note ‘The run numbers are to assist with Pilot/ATC communications, not to indicate the order in which the runs will be completed.’ Had the pilot of VHFIZ (FIZ) used the run number (Run 1A) in the request to conduct the 7 NM (13.0 km) orbit around Williamtown, the Tower controller may not have misinterpreted the pilot’s request with a request to hold south of Williamtown in an orbit – a standard holding manoeuvre that would essentially keep the aircraft in the same area.

However, as the only calibration runs requiring 3,100 ft were the 7 NM (13.0 km) orbits of the Williamtown TACAN, the Tower controller’s reported belief that the pilot of FIZ had asked for that altitude to prepare for the next run to runway 30, for which the run sheet indicated a commencement altitude of 1,500 ft, demonstrated that the controller was either not referring to the run sheet or did not understand the run sheet.

If the Tower controller had used run numbers on the data labels for silent coordination, the Approach controller would have had the opportunity to maintain situation awareness of calibration activities. Further, the use of run numbers would have provided cues to the Tower controller. In turn, the Tower controller may then have been more likely to use the numbers in communication with the pilot of FIZ, removing the opportunity for the pilot to misunderstand the controller’s approval to conduct an orbit.

Although prompted a number of times by the Tower supervisor, the Tower controller did not issue specific holding instructions to the pilot of FIZ. Specific holding instructions could have included ‘hold over land to the south of the field’ or to hold over a specific location. Such an instruction would have resulted in the pilot of FIZ questioning their understanding of the approval to conduct an orbit.

Once the pilot of FIZ commenced the 7 NM (13.0 km) orbit around Williamtown, in line with the pilot’s interpretation of the Tower controller’s response to the request, a loss of separation assurance (LOSA) existed between the calibration aircraft and the formation of four Boeing F/A18 aircraft (F18s) tracking for runway 30. Believing that FIZ was holding to the south in an orbit, the Tower controller did not visually monitor FIZ’s position. Instead, the Tower controller relied on the Surface Movement controller to do so while the Tower controller attended to other aircraft.

An opportunity to identify the loss of separation assurance at an earlier point was lost when the Approach controller did not identify that FIZ had crossed the coast, leaving the airspace released to the Tower controller. The Tower controller had not coordinated FIZ’s entry into airspace under the jurisdiction of the Approach controller. However, the Approach controller should have observed the calibrator entering and remaining in airspace under their jurisdiction. FIZ crossed the coast into the Approach controller’s airspace prior to the F18s passing overhead Williamtown and before they were issued with a visual approach. If FIZ had been identified in the Approach controller’s airspace at this stage, the F18s could have been held away to allow FIZ to complete the 7 NM (13.0 km) orbit of Williamtown, or the Tower controller could have been instructed to turn FIZ to re-establish the calibration aircraft over land. When the Approach controller did observe FIZ and realise the potential conflict with the F18s, they immediately contacted the Tower controller and asked that a safety alert be issued.

Once the Tower controller became aware of FIZ’s position to the south-east over water, clear and urgent information was not immediately provided to the pilot to ensure separation and avoidance with the F18s. As the closure speed between the calibration aircraft and the F18s was very high, the opportunity to provide timely control instructions and traffic information was lost when the controller asked the pilot of FIZ to confirm that the aircraft was holding to the south even though the controller had observed the aircraft tracking in a northerly direction south-east of Williamtown. The absence of clear control instructions to either the calibration aircraft or the formation of F18s resulted in a loss of separation (LOS) between aircraft that had not been provided traffic information in relation to the impending conflict. The absence of traffic information in sufficient time and in sufficient detail increased the risk posed by the LOS.

Findings
From the evidence available, the following findings are made with respect to the loss of separation between a Beechcraft B300, registered VHFIZ, and a formation of four Boeing F/A18 aircraft that occurred near Williamtown (Newcastle Airport), New South Wales on 19 September 2013. These findings should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual.

Safety issues, or system problems, are highlighted in bold to emphasise their importance. A safety issue is an event or condition that increases safety risk and (a) can reasonably be regarded as having the potential to adversely affect the safety of future operations, and (b) is a characteristic of an organisation or a system, rather than a characteristic of a specific individual, or characteristic of an operating environment at a specific point in time.
Contributing factors

• The applicability of a general requirement to conduct aviation risk assessments for complex, new, unusual or irregular activities was open to interpretation. [Safety issue]
  
• The absence of prior planning relating to the operation of the calibration aircraft resulted in a work-around that did not address all related safety aspects and negated the existing strategic separation assurance.
  
• The Williamtown Approach controller released airspace to the Tower controller that was considerably larger than that normally controlled by the Tower, resulting in both the Tower supervisor and the Tower controller having difficultly monitoring the airspace visually, and the need for the Tower controller, though not trained in the use of surveillance control, to rely on the surveillance display for separation.
  
• The absence of specific control instructions by the Tower controller to the pilot of VH-FIZ created an opportunity for the pilot to misunderstand the Tower controller's intent in relation to the pilot’s requested ‘orbit’.
  
• The Tower controller did not monitor the flight path of VH-FIZ due to an assumption the aircraft would remain in the area the controller had intended the aircraft to remain, leading to a loss of separation assurance.
  
• The Approach controller did not monitor their airspace sufficiently well to observe VH-FIZ crossing the coast into airspace under their jurisdiction, removing the chance for earlier detection of the loss of separation assurance.
  
• The Tower controller did not provide immediate and clear control instructions to either VH-FIZ or the formation of F18s once the conflict was detected, resulting in a loss of separation with the formation of Boeing F/A18 aircraft flying directly below VH-FIZ with less than 1,000 ft separation.
  
  
  Safety issues and actions
  The safety issue identified during this investigation is listed in the Findings and Safety issues and actions sections of this report. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) expects that all safety issues identified by the investigation should be addressed by the relevant organisation(s). In addressing those issues, the ATSB prefers to encourage relevant organisation(s) to proactively initiate safety action, rather than to issue formal safety recommendations or safety advisory notices.
  
  All of the directly involved parties were provided with a draft report and invited to provide submissions. As part of that process, each organisation was asked to communicate what safety actions, if any, they had carried out or were planning to carry out in relation to each safety issue relevant to their organisation.
  
  The initial public version of these safety issues and actions are repeated separately on the ATSB website to facilitate monitoring by interested parties. Where relevant the safety issues and actions will be updated on the ATSB website as information comes to hand.
  
  Absence of prior planning
  The applicability of a general requirement to conduct aviation risk assessments for complex, new, unusual or irregular activities was open to interpretation.
  Safety Issue No: AO-2013-160-SI-01
  
  

[*]

MTF...P2

Ps Since when was a B300 piston powered

Aircraft 2 details

Aircraft manufacturer:
Hawker Beechcraft Corporation
 
Aircraft model:
B300
 
Aircraft registration:
VH FIZ
 
Serial number:
FL 779
 
Type of operation:
Aerial Work
 
Sector:
Piston
 
Damage to aircraft:
Nil
 
 

[Kharon]

Test of system result – Fail.

Domestic tyranny leads to Sunday ramble – on Saturday; rumour, Thorny is whipping one up anyway.

Reading through the Mt. Hotham summary – the Sunday ramble mind notes that the entire system failed a stern test that day.  It is a classic demonstration of James Reason’s cheese.

Outside of the city, regional hub and FIFO aerodromes; it is unusual to have more than two or three aircraft inbound, under instrument conditions to the same destination – at about the same time.  I can wait for the ATSB timing marks – but the operators on this project were briefed and suitable ‘spacing’ was agreed – 15 minutes between individual aircraft is a number floating about, which seems reasonable.  That allows time for an instrument approach, missed approach, climb to safe height and to arrange traffic separation.  Other inbound aircraft would most certainly be listening for a transmission of details.  Not just for separation – but for conditions.  Aircraft 1 makes the approach – and is obliged to carry out the missed approach – other pilots would be on the alert – revised separation arranged and decisions made on the information provided; Busy? Yes.  Dangerous? not yet. Routine? Almost.

Would positive separation have been of value? – Of course it would.  Would TCAS have been of value?, again a resounding yes.  But are these enhancements a band-aid solution to the problems on display at Hotham.  Murphy’s law rules the skies; on this day it was an errant GPS.  Lets give that element some consideration; there you sit in the superb Be200, warm, comfortable, relaxed, setting up for an approach.  Auto pilot ticking over nicely, check list finished the GPS reassuring you that your blind descent at between 6-900 fpm down at about 280 kph forward will be conducted along a prescribed track at a safe height; safe as houses. Then at a critical time – something doesn’t make sense – the WTF moment.  Instrument approach depends on precise tracking, if the sole object relied on for this tracking does not indicate a ‘failure’ but throws up confusing data there is a great deal of conflict to deal with.  There are psychological barriers to by-pass, the first uncertainty, the second doubt, closely followed by a tumble of thoughts.  Where am I – really.  Where did the betrayal begin? Can I hit something, can I recover and continue, should I get out of dodge, can I even get out of Dodge?  Look at the track made from HOTEC the distinctive smell of uncertainty clearly apparent, but, HOTEI was reached, after a scramble. So the first of many questions arrives.

Any suspicion that the sole means of navigation i.e the GPS had gone AWOL can only promote one idea – fly a heading and climb.  The safest track from the identified HOTEI fix – 291˚- says the prayer book, 7700’ the safe height.  OK, ignore the GPS, stop fussing with it, power up, left turn, get on the radio, tell the incoming boys – Missed out – have a GPS problem – climbing to 7700 and departing for Mangalore.  The incoming stop descent, reshape track perhaps to avoid your path – job done, no one too worried.  So what created the spaghetti of wandering we see on the expanded tracking chart?  The inset picture (bottom right) tells quite a tale; 40 minutes worth of it.

Close proximity to the second aircraft is the major feature, but there are other factors like aircraft piling up behind, burning fuel, delayed and wondering whether to divert while old mate wanders about place, praying for cloud break and skipping about the occasional, partially seen mountains.  Russian roulette a comparatively safe pastime.  

So where to point the bone?

• Tick a box training?
  
• Loss of situational awareness?
  
• Bad manners and a dangerous mind set toward doing the job properly?
  
• Lack of a second GPS unit?
  
• Bad approach design?
  
• Lack of positive separation control?
  
• Lack of TCAS?
  

Perhaps we can take a holistic view and admit that there are some significant flaws within the entire system and we can all do a little better.

Two independent GPS units; retrain that pilot's mind –properly -for pities sake; provide at least procedural separation for IFR to minima; there now, three holes out of four closed.  Murphy has always held title to the fourth.

Solutions not blame; finger pointing and covering your own arse, at the expense of and to the detriment of others is no way to run an industry.  Are there problems? – clearly there are. Have we sensible, affordable, rational solutions? – clearly not.  But we’ll always have Part 61, writ by those who created the current system.  A system which in no small way contributed to what could have been a very nasty accident.  

Toot - End Sunday ramble - toot.

[P7_TOM]

Posting for “K” today – who is under orders - ‘be there’- or else.

SR continuum.

‘Procedural separation’ (Class E ala Dick) was a topic at a recent BRB indaba.  Thought the BRB vote may be of some interest.

The need for 24/7 blanket coverage was dismissed as not required – 100% against.  The need for a system which could be ‘on –standby’ when ‘alternates’ where required and ATC was aware of more than three aircraft scheduled to arrive within ‘alternate’ buffer periods found much support; 78% thought it ‘sound’, a further 14% thought it should be made to happen.  That naturally led to some debate.  I will try to summarise:-

The weather across the inland is for the most part benign and traffic sparse; the chances of multiple arrivals, within a narrow time frame, in IMC are slim.  There are the exceptions but in the main, ATC would not be frequently called upon to take a hand.

Along the coastal areas and over the hills, the weather can be fickle and occasionally brutal, the OCTA airports do carry a fair bit of traffic and two or three aircraft arriving within a narrow time band is probable – but not high frequency.  A busy period where the RPT is scheduled, a charter or two due about the same time – perhaps a trainer in the circuit; in reasonable weather it is not a problem – except for extended circuits or even a short hold to allow safe separation.  Inefficient? sure, and operationally costly but not a situation for risk mitigation – in the form of positive separation by ATC.  Unless the required triggers are in place; weather at alternate minima; more than two IFR aircraft scheduled within 30 minutes of each other, i.e. within the time needed for an approach – missed approach and sort out.  Close proximity aircraft in this situation are at a higher risk level – (A) misses out and decides to head to the alternate, (B) now aware of the weather decides not to mess about and also decides to divert; depending on height, position, speed and selected alternate; without good communication, there is a chance the two could get fairly close, particularly when the same alternate is used and track height needs to be changed; this is routinely resolved by flight crew, but add a third or fourth aircraft and the risk matrix alters.    

When we look at the Hotham event – YHOT can be ignored 364 out of 365 days a year; there simply is not a traffic problem – but when an event which requires multiple arrivals and departures within a close time frame is flagged and the weather demands an alternate, even with the most meticulous planning things can and do go wrong – in fact, you could bet money on Murphy to win the race.  

So, solutions.  Given the triggers present on that day, would it have been feasible for ATC to provide a watching brief and ‘positive control’ – as the traffic piled up behind the lowest aircraft.  Stack ‘em and release ‘em when the way was clear?  They can do that, standing on their heads, they could also ask the question ‘intentions?’  On the other hand, good communication from the aircraft having difficulties would have assisted in the short term; but a helping hand from someone who had the whole picture would have been of great value.

If we put aside the costing, liability, rules and an inflexible, hidebound, draconian ATC ‘responsibility’ system; how good would it be to have a friendly voice chiming in “ABC – instrument approaches in progress, hold at 10 thousand expect 15 minute delay.  “DEF -*-*-*-*-“.  Is it worth all the trouble for a couple of hours a year?, probably not.  Except for 300 small feet – not even 92 meters, which separated two aircraft with a closing speed of about 500 kph.  Allowing for maximum tolerable instrument error, and within tolerance flying +100 for the lower aircraft; they could have been a bit further apart or, much closer.  Either way, it’s only the difference between two or three heartbeats.  

Risk analysis puts the percentile chance of a reoccurrence off the chart; but, can it be allowed to happen a second time?  It’s the same thing as the Mildura fiasco, infinitesimal chances of those holes lining up – but they did; more chance of winning the lottery, but people do.  

Aye, ‘tis a puzzle.  No blame on ATC, nor the system, which whilst not efficient, performs design function and separates aircraft.  The pilots and actions could stand some scrutiny, but that would, without all the facts, be subjective.  I guess we just got lucky – one more time.

Just a Sunday twiddle – food for thought if you will.  

Toot – I’ll be there directly dear – toot.

[Peetwo]

Posting for “K” today – who is under orders - ‘be there’- or else.

SR continuum.

‘Procedural separation’ (Class E ala Dick) was a topic at a recent BRB indaba.  Thought the BRB vote may be of some interest.

The need for 24/7 blanket coverage was dismissed as not required – 100% against.  The need for a system which could be ‘on –standby’ when ‘alternates’ where required and ATC was aware of more than three aircraft scheduled to arrive within ‘alternate’ buffer periods found much support; 78% thought it ‘sound’, a further 14% thought it should be made to happen.  That naturally led to some debate.  I will try to summarise:-

The weather across the inland is for the most part benign and traffic sparse; the chances of multiple arrivals, within a narrow time frame, in IMC are slim.  There are the exceptions but in the main, ATC would not be frequently called upon to take a hand.

Along the coastal areas and over the hills, the weather can be fickle and occasionally brutal, the OCTA airports do carry a fair bit of traffic and two or three aircraft arriving within a narrow time band is probable – but not high frequency.  A busy period where the RPT is scheduled, a charter or two due about the same time – perhaps a trainer in the circuit; in reasonable weather it is not a problem – except for extended circuits or even a short hold to allow safe separation.  Inefficient? sure, and operationally costly but not a situation for risk mitigation – in the form of positive separation by ATC.  Unless the required triggers are in place; weather at alternate minima; more than two IFR aircraft scheduled within 30 minutes of each other, i.e. within the time needed for an approach – missed approach and sort out.  Close proximity aircraft in this situation are at a higher risk level – (A) misses out and decides to head to the alternate, (B) now aware of the weather decides not to mess about and also decides to divert; depending on height, position, speed and selected alternate; without good communication, there is a chance the two could get fairly close, particularly when the same alternate is used and track height needs to be changed; this is routinely resolved by flight crew, but add a third or fourth aircraft and the risk matrix alters.    

When we look at the Hotham event – YHOT can be ignored 364 out of 365 days a year; there simply is not a traffic problem – but when an event which requires multiple arrivals and departures within a close time frame is flagged and the weather demands an alternate, even with the most meticulous planning things can and do go wrong – in fact, you could bet money on Murphy to win the race.  

So, solutions.  Given the triggers present on that day, would it have been feasible for ATC to provide a watching brief and ‘positive control’ – as the traffic piled up behind the lowest aircraft.  Stack ‘em and release ‘em when the way was clear?  They can do that, standing on their heads, they could also ask the question ‘intentions?’  On the other hand, good communication from the aircraft having difficulties would have assisted in the short term; but a helping hand from someone who had the whole picture would have been of great value.

If we put aside the costing, liability, rules and an inflexible, hidebound, draconian ATC ‘responsibility’ system; how good would it be to have a friendly voice chiming in “ABC – instrument approaches in progress, hold at 10 thousand expect 15 minute delay.  “DEF -*-*-*-*-“.  Is it worth all the trouble for a couple of hours a year?, probably not.  Except for 300 small feet – not even 92 meters, which separated two aircraft with a closing speed of about 500 kph.  Allowing for maximum tolerable instrument error, and within tolerance flying +100 for the lower aircraft; they could have been a bit further apart or, much closer.  Either way, it’s only the difference between two or three heartbeats.  

Risk analysis puts the percentile chance of a reoccurrence off the chart; but, can it be allowed to happen a second time?  It’s the same thing as the Mildura fiasco, infinitesimal chances of those holes lining up – but they did; more chance of winning the lottery, but people do.  

Aye, ‘tis a puzzle.  No blame on ATC, nor the system, which whilst not efficient, performs design function and separates aircraft.  The pilots and actions could stand some scrutiny, but that would, without all the facts, be subjective.  I guess we just got lucky – one more time.

Just a Sunday twiddle – food for thought if you will.  

Toot – I’ll be there directly dear – toot.

Good twiddle "K" and if you spoke to any number of ATCOs probably very doable, however there is a major roadblock and it emanates very much from bureaucratic paranoia of admitted liability, coupled with government ignorance/naivety/deniablity of aviation safety matters - also called the 'mystique of aviation safety'.

The classic example is more than adequately highlighted in the TASWAM case - post above & quotes below - where the system designer believed their system was capable for procedural separation to the ground but government (i.e. CASA) never intended to certify the system to do this - UFB (reference Sir A correspondence bottom of the page)        

Raiders of the lost trough - Part II

While we were analysing & dissecting all the juicy moments from the Senate Estimates hearing the Secretariat was quietly getting on with business and updating the ROTLT (ASA performance inquiry) webpage with some additional info/AQON etc.

First there was an additional, very informative submission from a Mr Robert Hamilton- see here. His background, much like Mr Bennett, does IMO classify him as an 'expert witness' infinitely qualified to comment. Mr Hamilton's concerns:

MY CONCERNS

I make this submission because I am concerned:

• That too many recent comments about Airservices, air traffic control and air traffic controllers appear misinformed, uninformed, inappropriate and at times

misleading-I seek to provide history and context to the comments and correct the public record where appropriate and to the extent that I can.

• That Airservices has not accurately provided to the aviation industry and the Australian taxpayer specific details about how ADS-B will be used in Australian airspace, whether it will benefit Australian aviation and what the costs and benefits will be-I seek to ensure, to the extent that I can, that Australia recognises and maximises the benefits obtainable from introducing at significant expense a 4th generation air traffic services system.

• About the risk to air safety when history is disregarded in favour of short term narrow objectives-I seek to provide an accurate history of radar in Tasmania and show how public funds were easily spent for no public benefit.

• About Airservices public image problems-I seek to point out the consequences of Airservices’ inaccurate public statements and inability to respond to irresponsible and ignorant statements too readily provided by so called ‘experts’.

 
Of main interest to most, will be the RH analysis of the ADSB mandate introduction from paragraphs 10-20.

From page 5:

A dream or a plan?
 
11.It seems to me that this is Mr Smith’s question, and it’s a fair one. But permit me to widen its scope and ask: What’s in it for the entire industry, not just general aviation? Mandating a short period for equipment purchase and installation is a first step toward avoiding the issues of the past but it increases the front end costs to the industry. The danger, though, based on past experience, is that the industry will bear high initial costs for benefits that will arrive only slowly and will never be maximised.

12.The industry’s objective now is the same as it was previously: it will have the new equipment and it will want to maximise the benefits that it will bring. And once again, any benefits and the extent of any benefits can only be provided by and known to Airservices, for it is the Australian air traffic system manager and it appears the only organisation that seems to know what the benefits will be for Australian users. But does it?

13.My reading so far suggests that Airservices and CASA demonstrate some knowledge of what ADS-B can do generally, but Airservices has not revealed its capacities or limitations within Australian airspace, how it will be used, what the benefits will be and when any benefits will be realised. Airservices plan, to me, appears more visionary than detailed.

14.Permit me to provide 4 real world examples of my concern. For the last 45 years aircraft departing Sydney for Brisbane have flown a track to West Maitland then Casino then Brisbane, or it seems recently to Casino, then Coolangatta, then Brisbane. Will this new equipment enable pilots to routinely plan and ATC to routinely permit a normal flight track from 5 miles east of Sydney direct to an 8 or 10 mile final approach at Brisbane? If not, then where is the gain to industry?

15.Or, aircraft are landed 3 miles or 2 minutes apart at our major airports. Will this equipment improve on that and the chronic holding delays over Coolangatta? I doubt it and the result-no cost saving. Or, there used to be a separation standard for properly equipped aircraft of 10 miles either side of planned track. Will the new system permit a lesser standard? If not, then no gain to industry. And another example: basic radar separation is 5 miles plus tolerances, or sometimes 3 miles. Can this be bettered? If not, then no gain to industry.

16.Airservices needs to show what changes it intends, not what changes it believes are possible. And then it needs to accurately, reliably and in greater detail cost and report to industry and government on the savings that it intends to deliver and on what time period it intends these savings will occur.  

Airservices Australia's Brisbane tower. (Airservices)

 

Senator XENOPHON: So there has never been a circumstance where Airservices have said, 'We areconcerned about the safety aspects of this', but you have been overruled by government policy?

Sir Angus Houston: Not to my knowledge.

Senator XENOPHON: Could that be taken on notice. I might be surprised if there was.
Mr Harfield: We can take that on notice to find out. But not to my knowledge.

Answer:

In 2007, airspace regulatory function transferred to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
(CASA) reinforcing Airservices role as a service provider.

CASA makes the ultimate decision on issues of aviation safety as the responsible regulator.

In addition, Airservices works very closely and effectively with CASA and the Aviation
Policy Group, consisting of key aviation related agencies, to ensure effective inter-agency
coordination on strategic policy issues.

Hmm..beg to differ when you look at the historical context - paragraphs 1-9 - of the RH submission.

Next AQON 11:

Senator XENOPHON: In the case of the Adelaide TCU it has been put to me that the physical presence of the TCU in Adelaide is relevant. Unlike in Canberra and the Gold Coast, Adelaide Tower has no permanent air space, thus the TCU controls aircraft from the surface level up to 24½ thousand feet, and local knowledge is a big factor. Because of time constraints, could you take that assertion on notice and respond to it accordingly?

Mr Harfield: Yes, I can.

Answer:

The physical location of a Terminal Control Unit (TCU) is not relevant to the services provided.

Air traffic control towers predominantly provide visual control services as opposed to TCUs which provide surveillance-based services. The services provided by TCUs are delivered entirely by electronic means (predominantly radar) and are not dependent on controllers visually seeing the aircraft.

A core part of the training and assessment process for air traffic controllers is familiarity with the airspace that they control, including knowledge of relevant geography and local traffic patterns.

Hmm...interesting comments from the Hamilton submission which relate to the Adelaide TCU:

58.Mr Bennett’s expressed local concerns raise a more serious issue, however, and that is the national need for physical security of Airservices sites, high levels of communication system security, operational redundancy and failover.

59.Australia’s air traffic service is of national importance. It not only services air traffic from halfway across the Indian Ocean to halfway to Hawaii and halfway to New Zealand, but it also provides a highly adaptable nationwide surveillance and communications system of military standard operated by highly disciplined and operationally flexible personnel able to rapidly respond to serious and sometimes unusual national crises and local emergencies.

60.Airservices provides a vital national service to Australia that far exceeds ordinary air traffic control, and decisions relating to consolidation of units, protection of facilities, redundancy of service and the need for rapid failover involve issues of national security as well as system security. The extent of proposed consolidation suggests an increasing need for Airservices to particularly emphasise physical security at its Melbourne and Brisbane centres. Brisbane centre is of immediate concern as it seems vulnerable to any determined physical threat.

Finally Sir A had some 'clarification issues' from his appearance at the last hearing :

2. Correspondence from Sir Angus Houston, Chair, Airservices Australia to committee clarifying statements made at 9 September 2015 hearing, received 15 October 2015

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

SR continuum.

‘Procedural separation’ (Class E ala Dick) was a topic at a recent BRB indaba.  Thought the BRB vote may be of some interest.

The need for 24/7 blanket coverage was dismissed as not required – 100% against.  The need for a system which could be ‘on –standby’ when ‘alternates’ where required and ATC was aware of more than three aircraft scheduled to arrive within ‘alternate’ buffer periods found much support; 78% thought it ‘sound’, a further 14% thought it should be made to happen.  That naturally led to some debate.  I will try to summarise:-

The weather across the inland is for the most part benign and traffic sparse; the chances of multiple arrivals, within a narrow time frame, in IMC are slim.  There are the exceptions but in the main, ATC would not be frequently called upon to take a hand.

Along the coastal areas and over the hills, the weather can be fickle and occasionally brutal, the OCTA airports do carry a fair bit of traffic and two or three aircraft arriving within a narrow time band is probable – but not high frequency.  A busy period where the RPT is scheduled, a charter or two due about the same time – perhaps a trainer in the circuit; in reasonable weather it is not a problem – except for extended circuits or even a short hold to allow safe separation.  Inefficient? sure, and operationally costly but not a situation for risk mitigation – in the form of positive separation by ATC.

 Unless the required triggers are in place; weather at alternate minima; more than two IFR aircraft scheduled within 30 minutes of each other, i.e. within the time needed for an approach – missed approach and sort out.  Close proximity aircraft in this situation are at a higher risk level – (A) misses out and decides to head to the alternate, (B) now aware of the weather decides not to mess about and also decides to divert; depending on height, position, speed and selected alternate; without good communication, there is a chance the two could get fairly close, particularly when the same alternate is used and track height needs to be changed; this is routinely resolved by flight crew, but add a third or fourth aircraft and the risk matrix alters.    

When we look at the Hotham event – YHOT can be ignored 364 out of 365 days a year; there simply is not a traffic problem – but when an event which requires multiple arrivals and departures within a close time frame is flagged and the weather demands an alternate, even with the most meticulous planning things can and do go wrong – in fact, you could bet money on Murphy to win the race.  

So, solutions.  Given the triggers present on that day, would it have been feasible for ATC to provide a watching brief and ‘positive control’ – as the traffic piled up behind the lowest aircraft.  Stack ‘em and release ‘em when the way was clear?  They can do that, standing on their heads, they could also ask the question ‘intentions?’  On the other hand, good communication from the aircraft having difficulties would have assisted in the short term; but a helping hand from someone who had the whole picture would have been of great value.

If we put aside the costing, liability, rules and an inflexible, hidebound, draconian ATC ‘responsibility’ system; how good would it be to have a friendly voice chiming in “ABC – instrument approaches in progress, hold at 10 thousand expect 15 minute delay.  “DEF -*-*-*-*-“.  Is it worth all the trouble for a couple of hours a year?, probably not.  Except for 300 small feet – not even 92 meters, which separated two aircraft with a closing speed of about 500 kph.  Allowing for maximum tolerable instrument error, and within tolerance flying +100 for the lower aircraft; they could have been a bit further apart or, much closer.  Either way, it’s only the difference between two or three heartbeats.  

Risk analysis puts the percentile chance of a reoccurrence off the chart; but, can it be allowed to happen a second time?  It’s the same thing as the Mildura fiasco, infinitesimal chances of those holes lining up – but they did; more chance of winning the lottery, but people do.  

Aye, ‘tis a puzzle.  No blame on ATC, nor the system, which whilst not efficient, performs design function and separates aircraft.  The pilots and actions could stand some scrutiny, but that would, without all the facts, be subjective.  I guess we just got lucky – one more time.

Just a Sunday twiddle – food for thought if you will.  

Toot – I’ll be there directly dear – toot.

OAR review submission - perhaps?

Here's a thought perhaps the BRB proposal should be part of a submission to the OAR review? However "K" you'll have to get a wriggle on as they are only accepting 'constructive input' till Friday...

Here you go:

OAR Review – Consultation Communiqué

To significant parties with interests in the operations and functions of the Office of Airspace Regulation (OAR),

This is a request for your assistance in our consultation efforts.

In April 2015 the Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development (Infrastructure) issued a Statement of Expectations (SOE) for the Board of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority as a notice under Section 12A of the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (the Act). The SOE outlines in a formal and public way, the Minister’s expectations concerning the operations and performance of CASA, from 16 April 2015 to 30 June 2017. This Statement of Expectations serves as a notice of strategic direction to CASA under section 12A of the Act and commenced on 16 April 2015.

Point 9 of the SOE states: - “implement the Government’s policy objectives in the Australian Airspace Policy Statement and review the operations and functions of the Office of Airspace Regulation (OAR) noting that the OAR commenced with the enactment of the Airspace Act 2007.”
A copy of the Australian Airspace Policy Statement 2015 (AAPS) can be viewed via this link.

The review and hence our consultation focus is centred within the following principle objectives:

• the operations and functions of the OAR
  

• the legislation and its appropriateness to enable the OAR to perform its operations and functions
  
• the structures and processes of the OAR
  
• the effectiveness of the OAR
  
• stakeholder management by the OAR
  
• the OAR’s implementation of the Government’s policy objectives in the AAPS (note that this will encompass the previous AAPS and the new AAPS which has not long come into effect).
  Whilst these are the principle areas of interest, the review team welcomes any constructive input; positive, neutral or negative. The input can be stated against the objectives or in free form and will have increased persuasiveness if coupled with detail, including evidence or examples. A list of more detailed questions is attached if you wish to use some or all of these to frame your responses.
  
  Our preferred form of reply and interaction is for an email to be sent to OAR@CASA.GOV.AU as the volume of input can be managed and the receipt and content confirmed. Please ensure you add ‘OAR review’ in the subject line of your response.
  
  All emails will elicit a response from the team and contributions will be attributed: anonymity will be considered if requested. Sometimes the response may only be an acknowledgement of receipt.
  
  Submissions are encouraged and will be accepted from any person or organisation. Whilst late responses may be considered, in order to have a timely review, the review team request that responses are sent as early as possible, but no later than COB on Friday November 20 2015.
  Please also note that OAR as part of its continual improvement efforts seeks feedback on airspace reform and airspace detail on a periodic basis. Those efforts are separate from, but may form an input into, this review.
  
  Thanks in advance for your input.
  
  John Flannery
  Team Lead
  OAR review team
  

 
Whoah??  ...there is some loaded questions under this heading - What is your view on OAR’s administration in accordance with the AAPS? Does the OAR..

E.g.

..21. consider the safety of Passenger Transport Services as the first priority?..


22. respond quickly to emerging changes in risk levels for passenger transport operations?

23. seek to deliver good safety outcomes to all aviation participants?..

..29. when conducting an aeronautical risk review do so in consultation with the public, industry and other government agencies? And in particular with close consultation with Airservices ?

30. make airspace determinations s in a transparent and timely manner considering risk mitigators and forecast future traffic levels?

31. use a risk review process that is consistent with contemporary published Australian Standards for Risk Management (eg the Common Risk Management Framework)?...

- especially when you consider the Hotham incident (above); or the seemingly numerous issues/incidents with YMML CTA; or the issues with Tassie (TASWAM) & Ballina airspace..etc.

Food for thought 


MTF?-Definitely..P2    

[Gobbledock]

FFS, ASA receive safety award. (And this article comes 
with a strong 'bucket' warning)

http://www.aviationbusiness.com.au/news/...obal-award

Harfwit chimes in;

“Through his participation in this group, Rob has led the development of procedures and aircraft separation minima for Performance Based Navigation systems as well as developed separation minima and aircraft height-keeping monitoring using Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast".

Not sure if 'aircraft separation' has really been a strong point of ASA in recent times? Nonetheless, it was a nice Ollie jollie to Montreal for a couple of the lads.

I expect CAsA to win the 'Model litigant' award next. Stay tuned for more pony pooh.....

[Peetwo]

Due process & Derivation? derivation - the action of obtaining something from a source or origin.

The following answer from the miniscule's office to a Parliamentary QIW, is probably no more than a carefully crafted, dismissive-missive, forwarded from Murky's personal keyboard. However in the context of the ASA performance inquiry & the subsequent referral for audit to the ANAO, I thought it worth putting on the PAIN record..

OneSKY Project

(Question No. 1490)

Mr Kelvin Thomson asked the Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development, in writing, on 7 September 2015:
(1) Will he consider putting the OneSky project on hold until Australian airspace is upgraded sufficiently to enable the OneSky system to be used effectively.

(2) Will he support the introduction of National Airspace System (NAS) reforms, based on the North American airspace system where all aircraft flying in cloud are in a minimum of Class E controlled airspace.

(3) Will he discuss with Airservices Australia, moving ahead with the NAS policy of increasing controlled airspace for instrument flight rule aircraft when in cloud.

(4) What is he doing to mitigate concerns that Airservices Australia is using 'commercial in confidence' to avoid disclosing information.

Mr Truss: The answer to the honourable member's question is as follows:
(1) OneSKY is a flexible air traffic management system, designed to adapt to current and future Australian airspace architecture.

(2) and (3) The Australian Government's Airspace Policy Statement provides for the adoption of proven international airspace systems, including the United States NAS, to be considered and implemented as appropriate for our conditions and level of traffic in Australia. Airspace classification and air traffic services requirements are determined by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, the aviation safety regulator, after undertaking a detailed risk assessment. All passenger flights in Australia are supported by continuous air traffic services throughout their entire flight.

(4) Airservices Australia is required to meet a range of legislative and parliamentary accountability requirements. I am unable to comment further without supporting information on the derivation of the concerns.

     
Hmm...on that reading the miniscule kind of has a foot on either side of the fence??


MTF...P2   

[Gobbledock]

The game of 'word wank'(well sort of)

P2;

"Hmm...on that reading the miniscule kind of has a foot on either side of the fence??"

It is certainly a carefully crafted response which had Murky's fingerprints all over it. It was non-committal, non-definitive and textbook obsfucation. Can you imagine an operator responding to a CAsA finding in such a non-committal 'I'm going to do SFA' manner? 

Miniscule with a foot on each side of the fence? Nah, Miniscule with both of his own feet up his own ass!!

[Kharon]

Obvious, odious obfuscation; or,

A) – “[designed] to adapt to current and future Australian airspace architecture.

Rubbish – it is designed – now they have to ‘adapt’ it to suit, just like TASWAM.

A) “[provides] for the adoption of proven international airspace systems, including the United States NAS, to be considered and implemented as appropriate for our conditions and level of traffic in Australia

Proving that it is designed – now they have to ‘adapt’ it to suit, just like TASWAM. Only this time it’s a big number duck up; the TAS experiment being so successful.

A) “[and] implemented as appropriate for our conditions and level of traffic in Australia. Airspace classification and air traffic services requirements are determined by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, the aviation safety regulator, after undertaking a detailed risk assessment. etc

So why are we paying the ASA ‘experts’ to assess and purchase a system which will depend on whether the CASA experts like it or not.  It’s a bloody nonsense – a repeat of the Tassy mess.  

I particularly like -

 “I am unable to comment further without supporting information on the derivation of the concerns.”

Derivation – “the action of obtaining something from a source or origin.”

So, tell us what you know and we’ll wriggle out of it, close the doors and protect our goose, the one that lays golden eggs.

The insult lays in the notion that everyone, except them, is as thick as two short planks.

- believable fairy tales.

Toot - toot.

[Peetwo]

Keeping it in the family?

From the No 1 member of the AEF (Airservices Executive Fanclub) Dougy... 

...And next week is Waypoint,  Airservices’ annual hosting of its customers in Canberra. It’s always informative and the interactions in and around it are always interesting to observe. It will another strong platform for acting CEO Jason Harfield to strengthen his claim for the full-time job. So far he’s done admirably at a string of official appearances. 

There was also this vomitus bit of news on Fort Fumble's favourite journo Creepy..

...Airservices has acquired the services of the guru of the Aviation Section of Friday’s Australian, Steve Creedy. So someone else will have to fill those (literally and figuratively) big shoes at the Oz. I’ll bet there’s a bit of a bun fight for the job underway, though scribe Lisa Allen seems to have the early running. Clearly Steve will be doing something with words at Airservices. Speechwriting perhaps?...

Hmm...wonder if the writing was already on the wall?? Here are Thorny & P7's thoughts on this development:

TB:  ..May interest a few out there that the CAsA resident glove puppet at the Australian Newspaper is departing the rag for his reward, an appointment with ASA no less. Well all those years of regurgitating CAsA spin had to lead somewhere...


 P7: 




This would be on account of his vast knowledge of providing ‘services’ to ASA; expertise and the like.  Just what Air services Australia needs; another clapped out sycophant.  Good call miniscule, glad to see you have a firm grip on the important things we really need to spend an outrageous amount of money on – nice one.

MTF..P2

[Gobbledock]

Of boot licking, sphincter cleaning corporate journo footstools......

It's hilarious how these arse kissing journos, Messrs Creepy and Dougy, are so far up Skidmore and Harfwits asses that the only thing you can see poking out is their toenails!!! So I simply must rebadge both Journos for the time being; Dougy becomes 'Toenails #1' and Creepy becomes 'Toenails #2'.

Toenails 1 said;

"It will another strong platform for acting CEO Jason Harfield to strengthen his claim for the full-time job"

I hope Harfwit gets the job. That's right, you heard correctly, Gobbles hopes the double chinned wannabe CEO actually gets the job! Why? Because ASA and the Miniscules department deserve it. They deserve every little bit of scrutiny that the IOS will be raising into the spotlight for the entire duration of the 3 long long years that Harfwwit will be at the helm. Imagine the screw ups, waste of money, bullshit decisions and utter nonsense that a gimp like Harfwit will bring into the spotlight?? Oh goodie, I can't wait! So much fun for the IOS, yes please. Old flappy hands Sir An(g)us will be beside himself! And I mean the Senators have already made it clear that they will be watching and monitoring ASA closely. Hope ol Murky and Farmboy are bracing themselves....

So while on the subject of tonguing  Bureaucrats already superbly clean anuses, Toenails 2 pokes his head up for a 5 minute breather and says;

"Airservices has acquired the services of the guru of the Aviation Section of Friday’s Australian, Steve Creedy. So someone else will have to fill those (literally and figuratively) big shoes at the Oz. I’ll bet there’s a bit of a bun fight for the job underway, though scribe Lisa Allen seems to have the early running. Clearly Steve will be doing something with words at Airservices. Speechwriting perhaps?"

'Guru' is a strong word to use Toenails 2. I mean Shane Warne was the guru of spin. Hugh Heffner is the guru of rooting 20 year old blondes with big, fake hooters. Peter Brock was the Holden guru of Mt Panorama. Those are definitions of 'guru' you moron.

No doubt more brown nosing to follow....

"Cleansed sphincters for all"

[Peetwo]

Keeping it in the family?

From the No 1 member of the AEF (Airservices Executive Fanclub) Dougy... 

...And next week is Waypoint,  Airservices’ annual hosting of its customers in Canberra. It’s always informative and the interactions in and around it are always interesting to observe. It will another strong platform for acting CEO Jason Harfield to strengthen his claim for the full-time job. So far he’s done admirably at a string of official appearances. 

There was also this vomitus bit of news on Fort Fumble's favourite journo Creepy..

...Airservices has acquired the services of the guru of the Aviation Section of Friday’s Australian, Steve Creedy. So someone else will have to fill those (literally and figuratively) big shoes at the Oz. I’ll bet there’s a bit of a bun fight for the job underway, though scribe Lisa Allen seems to have the early running. Clearly Steve will be doing something with words at Airservices. Speechwriting perhaps?...

Hmm...wonder if the writing was already on the wall?? Here are Thorny & P7's thoughts on this development:

TB:  ..May interest a few out there that the CAsA resident glove puppet at the Australian Newspaper is departing the rag for his reward, an appointment with ASA no less. Well all those years of regurgitating CAsA spin had to lead somewhere...


 P7: 




This would be on account of his vast knowledge of providing ‘services’ to ASA; expertise and the like.  Just what Air services Australia needs; another clapped out sycophant.  Good call miniscule, glad to see you have a firm grip on the important things we really need to spend an outrageous amount of money on – nice one.

Getting match fit..

Here they are Harfy, Hoodlum & Dougy with a bit of male bonding in FNQ...

....err whoops, wrong Dougy apparently

Oh well Dougy can possibly add to his ASA Fan-club photo album - err maybe

Good news for the ASA Exec Futures (Trough) Fund 
On the subject of glowing loaded endorsements for Harwit's loaded pitch for the top job, it would seem that under his leadership (fiefdom) that the ASA Execs have been able to schmooze over the previously highly critical Public Works Committee.. :

Mr PERRETT (Moreton) (16:13): On behalf the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, I present report No. 9 of 2015, Referrals made August 2015.

Report made a parliamentary paper in accordance with standing order 39(e).

Mr PERRETT: ...The next two projects are for Airservices Australia. This committee has previously reported that existing air traffic management systems used by Airservices and Defence will be replaced by a combined Civil-Military Air Traffic System. This new system is being implemented as part of the OneSKY Australia Program. Both projects I am reporting on today are concerned with upgrading current facilities to support the new combined system into the future. The first project involves refurbishing control towers in Brisbane and Cairns. These towers were built in 1987 and 1990 respectively and have reached the end of their useful life. The proposed works will extend this by at least 15 years by treating corrosion, upgrading mechanical systems and modernising the internal fit-out. The works will also prepare the towers for the installation of new technology, known as the Integrated Tower Automation Suite. This technology will eventually be integrated with the combined Civil-Military Air Traffic System. Works are expected to be completed by late 2016 in Cairns and mid-2017 in Brisbane.

The committee received a briefing from Airservices and conducted hearings on 16 October. During the briefing, the committee saw photographs of ageing infrastructure. At the public hearing, Airservices noted lessons learned from similar projects, specifically around maintaining air traffic services while the works progress and managing expectations of building occupants. Separately, the works are expected to cost $9.98 million for Brisbane and $13.95 million for Cairns, with a combined total of $23.9 million. At the public hearing, Airservices explained that the higher cost for Cairns is due to the presence of a two-storey building at the base of the control tower. This building requires upgrading and forms part of the scope for the Cairns project. The committee is satisfied that the project has merit in terms of need, scope and cost and recommends that it proceed.

The second project for Airservices concerns constructing additional buildings at air traffic service centres in Melbourne and Brisbane. The proposed works will provide extra operations and training facilities. This will allow the existing air traffic system and the new combined system to run in tandem for four years. Once the combined civil-military system is fully operational it will replace the current system and existing facilities may be repurposed. Works are expected to be completed by the end of 2017, ready for the combined system to be introduced in 2018. The project is expected to cost $107 million.
The committee received a briefing from Airservices and conducted hearings in Canberra on 16 October—we did not go to Cairns, as I had hoped. During the public hearing, Airservices noted that running both systems concurrently will allow staff to become confident with the combined civil-military system before switching over to the new system. During the transition, the two systems will also provide back-up, should one system be unable to meet requirements; thereby reducing the risk of disruption to air traffic services. Airservices also told the committee that the proposed new facilities would have their own power and water supply, providing for reliable and independent operation 24 hours a day.

Given the number of capital works projects in progress, the committee sought and received assurances from Airservices that it had sufficient resources and expertise to manage them all. The committee is satisfied that the project has merit in terms of need, scope and cost and recommends that it proceed. I commend this report to the House.

"Safe trough-feeding for some"


MTF..P2  

 

[Gobbledock]

Bureaucratic incest - a game the whole department can play

Don't worry P2. Just because Halfwit can get some CAPEX projects over the line doesn't make him 'special'. After all, he doesn't run a private enterprise in which accountability and responsibility comes into play. He runs a monopoly who can spend what they want when they want because the bucket never runs dry - the taxpayer keeps topping it up! My effing Grandkids could run a business like that FFS, piece of piss.

P.S Nice photo. No togas? The next photo in the series probably has them wearing spandex and playing nude leapfrog!

"Safe extracurricular sports for all"

[Peetwo]

Bureaucratic incest - a game the whole department can play

Don't worry P2. Just because Halfwit can get some CAPEX projects over the line doesn't make him 'special'. After all, he doesn't run a private enterprise in which accountability and responsibility comes into play. He runs a monopoly who can spend what they want when they want because the bucket never runs dry - the taxpayer keeps topping it up! My effing Grandkids could run a business like that FFS, piece of piss.

P.S Nice photo. No togas? The next photo in the series probably has them wearing spandex and playing nude leapfrog!

"Safe extracurricular sports for all"

Talking about the 'Public Works Committee', apparently they've been tasked to look into the defence side of the infrastructure required for the $410+ million OneSky project. 

Quote from Senate Estimates thread post - Well done (the other) Aunty

 

New civil-military air traffic system to improve airspace management

A system that will enhance how Australian airspace is managed, enabling a new level of operational and cost efficiency, will be investigated at a public hearing tomorrow.

The Public Works Committee is conducting a hearing into new and upgraded infrastructure, proposed to support the introduction of a new air traffic management system at several Defence bases across Australia.

The works are required to support a new civil-military air traffic management system which has been developed by the Department of Defence and Airservices Australia.

Defence’s submission states that the proposed works will deliver training, support and maintenance facilities associated with the new air traffic management system. Additionally, the works will upgrade air traffic control towers and airfield systems facilities that were constructed in the 1960s and are no longer fit for purpose.

The Department of Defence will provide evidence on the proposed works at the public hearing and the Hunter Water Corporation will provide evidence regarding management of contamination at RAAF Base Williamtown.

The project is expected to cost $409.9 million (excluding GST).

Full details on the project are available on the committee’s website: www.aph.gov.au/pwc

Public Hearing Venue: Committee Room 2R2, Parliament House, Canberra

Date: Friday, 27 November 2015

Time: 11.45 am – 1.15 pm

Members of the public are welcome to attend.

NB the Public Works Committee is neither involved in the tendering process nor the awarding of contracts. Enquiries on those matters should be addressed to the Department of Defence.

 
And here is the link & ToR for that PWC inquiry -

AIR5431 Phases 2 and 3 Air Traffic Management and Control System Facilities and Australian Defence Force Air Traffic Control Complex Infrastructure


On Wednesday, 16 September 2015 the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Finance, The Hon Michael McCormack MP, asked the Committee to inquire into and report on the AIR5431 Phases 2 and 3 Air Traffic Management and Control System Facilities and Australian Defence Force Air Traffic Control Complex Infrastructure Project.

The Committee invites interested persons and organisations to make submissions addressing the terms of reference by Thursday, 22 October 2015. Online submissions can be made on this page.

 There are 2 submissions (other than the Defence submission):

2 Hunter Water Corporation (PDF 1513 KB) 

2.1 Supplementary to submission 2 (PDF 1400 KB) 


3 NSW Environment Protection Authority (PDF 1883 KB)

Reading those submissions one wonders how long it will be before the MSM & public realises that the RAAF Williamtown environmental contamination crisis, could be the tip of a very large iceberg...

Interesting that the Finance Department Parliamentary Secretary requested the PWC inquiry less than a week after the last ASA performance inquiry hearing on the 9th of September..


MTF..P2

[Peetwo]

Waving the OAR - Government vs CASA policy??

Referring to my previous post - Raiders of the lost trough - Part II - & in particular the bizarre obfuscation by Sir A in answering QON 8 from the 9 Sept 2015 Senate Inquiry hearing:

[quote pid='2446' dateline='1445203065']

Airservices Australia's Brisbane tower. (Airservices)

 

Senator XENOPHON: So there has never been a circumstance where Airservices have said, 'We are concerned about the safety aspects of this', but you have been overruled by government policy?

Sir Angus Houston: Not to my knowledge.

Senator XENOPHON: Could that be taken on notice. I might be surprised if there was.
Mr Harfield: We can take that on notice to find out. But not to my knowledge.

Answer:

In 2007, airspace regulatory function transferred to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) reinforcing Airservices role as a service provider.

CASA makes the ultimate decision on issues of aviation safety as the responsible regulator.

In addition, Airservices works very closely and effectively with CASA and the Aviation Policy Group, consisting of key aviation related agencies, to ensure effective inter-agency coordination on strategic policy issues.

[/quote]
I think I may now have some insight to the obvious - Sir A & Harfwit - non-answer to Senator Nick's QON #8...

First of all NX made a simple mistake in asking the question as being 'overruled by government policy.'  Government would never have a overruling policy on any matter remotely to do with aviation safety, that is the sole domain of CASA. So the question should have been - 

"So there has never been a circumstance where Airservices have said, 'We are concerned about the safety aspects of this', but you have been overruled by CASA policy?"

If asked like that the resulting AQON may well have been much more informative - though somehow I doubt it.

However recently in the course of reviewing old ASA AQON - see here - from the Senate PelAir inquiry, we may have stumbled across at least one instance where CASA policy overruled the air safety risk concerns of Airservices...   

A journey, through the Swiss cheese - Part II

To continue P6 in the above post said:

...allowing the operation to continue with almost 20 potentially serious ‘events’ on record.  Many operations have been closed down for much less.  To this day, the errors have not been acknowledged, there is no effective remedy in place for rehabilitation, nor is there any intent to correct the gross negligence.  No apology, no corrections.  Just another pilot crucified...

   
The 'almost 20' incidents to which he refers were on the record in the ASA answer to QON for PelAir inquiry public hearing on the 19 Nov 2012 - Answers to questions taken on notice on 19 November 2012, in Canberra; (PDF 9401KB):

8. HANSARD, PG 9

Senator FAWCETT: Could you take on notice whether you passed on to Pel-Air the
concerns about their Westwind aircraft.

Mr Harfield: Yes.

Answer:

In the period five years before the Norfolk Island accident (2004 to 2009) Airservices

reported to both CASA and the ATSB, 19 safety incidents that were known to Airservices involving VH-NGA.

In July 2005, VH-NGA was involved in a safety incident during a flight from Nowra to
Darwin whereby the aircraft was unable to maintain it’s assigned level in RVSM airspace
and another aircraft was therefore required to change its altitude in order to maintain
the separation standard. Pel-Air was informed about this incident under a standing
Letter of Agreement.

Also in the period, VH-NGA was involved in 18 other safety incidents – 16 were pilot or
aircraft attributable (2 engine failure, 2 fuel dumps, 1 Loss of Separation, 3 incorrect
time and position reporting, 8 pilot errors) and two were air traffic control attributable
information display errors. Pel-Air was also informed about the details of these
incidents under the Letter of Agreement.

And the overruling policy from CASA in regards to the 19 recorded previous incidents involving the accident aircraft VH-NGA - "..who gives a rat's arse, we're nailing the pilot.."

Which makes you wonder about the veracity of the ASA answer to QON 9:

9. HANSARD, PG 11

Senator FAWCETT: So if we asked you to take on notice how many such
recommendations over the last five or 10 years you have made to CASA and how many
have been actioned and closed out, you should be able to come back and tell us that?

Mr Harfield: That is correct.

Senator FAWCETT: Could you do that, please.

Mr Harfield: Yes.

 Which was answered with this now typical non-answer:

Answer:

Since 2007, Airservices has made 110 recommendations to CASA for changes to the AIP
all of which have been actioned.
Refer to Attachment 2 (Airservices recommendations are identified as “Internal”).

  
Mostly those 'internal' recommendations are something, nothing and hardly anything like the serious reported incidents on VH-NGA, which should have at least led to ASA recommending CASA have a close look at the PelAir Westwind operation...   

CASA: "Nothing to see here, move along..& next time mind your own business!"


MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

Up OARs - Part II   




According to Hitch in last week's weekly wrap the CASA OAR have stealthily & cynically white-anted the effective historical conduit with industry i.e the RAPACs - : The Last Minute Hitch: 27 November 2015

Who's heard of RAPACs? These are the Regional Airspace Procedures and Advisory Committees, and there is one in your state. What they do is advise the Office of Airspace Regulation (OAR) on matters of airspace usage in the local areas. RAPACs are a way of getting the users heard in the OAR, but now it seems the OAR no longer wants to listen. What they've done is attempt to redefine the RAPACs to limit them to safety issues. That conveniently silences them over things like radio frequencies ... coincidentally (or not) a current topic being shuttle-cocked between Canberra and the aviation community. Happliy, CASA has announced a review of the OAR and the way it functions. Needless to say, those pesky RAPACs have made an inconvenience of themselves in their submission. If anyone in the aviation community wants to do the same, the details of the review and how to submit are on the CASA website.

P666 - "..Very very crafty, not surprising or unexpected, but very sly and typical of high level government manipulation and silencing techniques. That's why you have people like Sir An(g)us and Dr Voodoo and Pumpkin head in their respective roles....turds.."
Surprisingly the soon to be ASA spin-meister Creepy has more on this story; plus some heavily sceptical commentary from industry stakeholder reps, on Skidmore's latest spin & bulldust rhetoric on the CASA executive restructure etc... : 

Regional airline groups furious over CASA reforms

• Steve Creedy
  
• The Australian
  
• December 4, 2015 12:00AM
  
  

Regional members are worried that aircraft operating into uncharted airports will need to use the VHF area frequency, Picture: Mitch Bear

The aviation regulator came under renewed attack this week as members of regional airspace councils revealed they had written to Deputy Prime Minister Warren Truss to express their anger at the lack of consultation by the authority’s Office of Airspace Review.

The letter, signed by the members or conveners of Regional Airspace and Procedures Advisory Committees (RAPACs) around Australia, came as some industry groups expressed scepticism about a restructuring announcement last week by Civil Aviation Safety Authority boss Mark Skidmore.

Noting they were members of industry’s longest established consultative forums, RAPAC representatives signing the letter said they had sent it because they did not believe a critical response submitted directly to the OAR “would ever see the light of day’’.

The RAPACs are particularly concerned about changes that mean aircraft operating into uncharted airports where there is no discrete common traffic advisory frequency must now use the VHF area frequency also used by en-route air traffic controllers to talk to airlines flying at high levels.

They worry about the potential added frequency congestion and jamming on the area VHF due to broadcasts from a large number of non-charted aerodromes underneath commercial aircraft flight paths and have also expressed concerns about procedures under the amendment.

The letter accused the OAR of attempting to frustrate attempts to discuss the issue at some state ­RAPACs and of trying to limit the influence of the consultative groups. It said the concerns of RAPAC members remained ­unaddressed.

“Over the last 18 months a serious gulf of mistrust has developed between the RAPACs and management of the OAR due firstly, to a reluctance by OAR management to consult with stakeholders and, secondly, an attempt, regarded by many as deceitful, to limit the scope of the RAPACs,’’ it said.

“Lack of consultation for at least the past 15 months the RAPACs have made many attempts to convey to CASA through the OAR, their concerns about three unintended consequences of a change in communications in G airspace via Aeronautical Information Package amendment number 75 which was made, apparently, without any stakeholder consultation.’’

The relationship further deteriorated in August when CASA was accused of trying to revise the RAPAC terms of reference without prior notice to members.

The letter said an email sent to 11 industry conveners allowed just 16 days for comment and claimed that the role of the groups would be unchanged.

“This immediately raised suspicion and, on close inspection, it was discovered that the above statement was incorrect and that proposal, in fact, had changed the RAPAC role considerably,’’ it said. “In summary therefore, it would be difficult to imagine a management less suited to an open constructive and effective stakeholder relationship than the current leadership of the OAR.’’

The RAPAC concerns come as CASA is heading towards a restructure and is grappling with rising anger about the need to fix flawed regulatory reforms. It also faces criticism about the pace at which it has adopted recommendations by the Aviation Safety Regulation Review chaired by industry veteran David Forsyth.

The restructure is due to take place by the middle of next year and will collapse six existing operational groups into three under the broader headings of stakeholder engagement, aviation and sustainability.

In addition to the restructure, Mr Skidmore recently announced the appointment of a 26-member task force to work fulltime on addressing problems with rule changes and set up an advisory panel, due to meet on December 16, representing key aviation groups.
The restructure announcement was cautiously welcomed by industry but there was criticism about the lack of detail.

Australian Helicopter Industry Association president Peter Crook said the association welcomed the restructure “subject to there being tangible and workable outcomes’’. The AHIA has told members to withdraw applications for new training credentials under the new system until problems are fixed.

“Because of the slow pace of the Regulatory Reform process, confidence in CASA is at a very low level,’’ Mr Crook said. “Over the past two years the AHIA and other Associations, individually and collectively via The Australian Aviation Associations Forum, have identified the major issues and concerns of the industry. We have given reasons why these concerns exist and offered potential solutions. Little or no action has been taken on these suggestions.’’ - Yep Pete, Skidmore is all talk no action.

Mr Crook said the Part 61 taskforce needed to act quickly and issues addressed as a matter of urgency. Another critic of CASA reform, The Aerial Application Association of Australia, also welcomed the restructure as a good idea but noted CASA’s problems continued.

“Poor execution — including Friday’s announcement that included no detail — poor planning and seeking to fix problems that don’t exist by imposing costs that can’t be afforded are not the way forward,’’ AAAA chief executive Phil Hurst said. “CASA continues to confuse words with actions.’’ - CF 4 Phil QOTW

Mr Hurst questioned how the Part 61 taskforce would differ from previous ineffectual efforts to fix the disputed rules and said the industry needed urgent exemptions before Christmas. There was also no movement on “discredited” flight and duty times rules or any effort to fix the damage caused to maintenance training in Aust­ralia, which he said had contributed to the closure of three apprenticeship training organisations.

“The great danger CASA is now facing — board, senior management and staff — is that a restructure will become code for delay and that the few Forsyth report recommendations being half-heartedly ticked off will be allowed to wither on the vine,’’ he said. “CASA needs real energy, leadership and action more now than ever before in recent years.” - CF 4 Phil for stating the obvious 

Several aviation organisations are preparing for the next federal election and Mr Truss on Wednesday released an update of the government’s response to the Forsyth review in which he urged industry to work with CASA.

A CASA spokesman said issues raised at RAPACs that did not ­directly relate to airspace or airways procedures were always directed to the relevant areas in the authority for review and approp­riate action. He said RAPACs were informed of the results but many issues were referred to other forums to get the view of the broader aviation community. - code for 'up yours'

The spokesman also signalled that Mr Skidmore would start a review of all CASA’s consultative mechanisms to ensure they were effective and efficient. - code for 'up yours'

In defence of plane spotters, a.k.a. ‘anoraks’
Ben Sandilands | Apr 24, 2010 11:46AM |


Schiphol Airport spotters, Amsterdam

Rumourmill: The following is from Dougy the former Editor of Aviation Business & now (judging from his new column title - Observation Deck) resident Planespotter  

..CASA’s Mark Skidmore has been quick off the mark to add some substance to the reorganisation of the regulator that he announced last week. Cheryl Allman has been appointed from within the organisation to head up the Stakeholder Engagement division, one of six direct reports to the DAS under the new structure...

So Oliver, with official Iron Ring & Murky Mandarin sanction, has made his first 'Captain's pick for the Magnificent Six...  

In some ways I can understand OST's appointment of Ms Allman, she is probably the only Executive member who remembers how to snap off a proper salute..

However given the current breakdown between industry stakeholders (i.e. the RAPACs) & the CASA OAR, I would have thought it is not a particularly good look to appoint the now former OAR executive manager to the Stakeholder Engagement Division - UFB but typical IR & MM cynicism..

MTF...P2   

Ps Also from ASA's No1 fan with a Harfwit 'match fit' update.. :

Waypoint this year is all about the ‘Transformation of Airservices’. Acting CEO Jason Harfield has talked before this about getting the ANSP ‘match fit’ and he repeated the message this morning; adding that the ‘window of opportunity is small’.

There’s a strong sense that Airservices is pretty much through the turbulence of the last few months and looking forward again with confidence. That’s reassuring because, aside from everything else, the big, ambitious and expensive OneSKY program needs appropriate focus. - Keep dreaming Dougy

   

[Kharon]

Halfwit – “Waypoint this year is all about the ‘Transformation of Airservices’.

Oh BOLLOCKS – it’s a tea party, a back slapper where the current idiot tries to do a Peter Sellars take off of McMillan – anyone who heard the speech and could stomach the utter rubbish spouted (several could not; and, many muttered Bullshit) could barley keep their expensive meals down.  The bit about industry not minding the costs but should appreciate more the service provided, started a rush for the buckets.  Match fit tiger teams and every little bit of the word weasels art were ploughed into the ridiculous speech. 

Ye gods above – and they want to allow this chump to manage a multi billion dollar program.  UFB.

There’s a strong sense that Airservices is pretty much through the turbulence of the last few months and looking forward again with confidence.

What a crock – fair dinkum; ASA is in serious trouble; with much more to follow.  There is still an audit to contemplate, the knowledge both Senate and industry have about the risible behaviour of the ASA management, the information from the ATCO which shows that any idea of improvement was plagiarised for credit or shit-canned.  Halfwit tolerated courage badges and the rorts, without saying a word and watched as ASA went slowly, but inevitably down the tubes, hoping for the top job, by default.  Dougy Anorak Nonstarter should hang his head in shame for writing that paragraph.  It’s despicable.

That’s reassuring because, aside from everything else, the big, ambitious and expensive OneSKY program needs appropriate focus.

It’s not only the Halfwit who needs a career change.

Toot – Strewth – Toot.

[Gobbledock]

ASA - The tautological empire of incompetence

I agree with Kharon, NOTHING has changed at ASA in recent months. Their definition of match fit is being fit to slap each other about with a piece of wet lettuce while holding hands.

Harfwit;

"There’s a strong sense that Airservices is pretty much through the turbulence of the last few months and looking forward again with confidence".

In between hurls of spew into a large volume of buckets the crowd just screamed out 'BOLLOCKS BOLLOCKS BOLLOCKS'. Harfwit's rhetoric is because he desperately wants the CEO gig. In fact he would 'swim up a river of shit with his mouth open just to open mouth kiss the last executive who licked the Miniscules ass' to get that job, he is that eager and desperate. But only a brave and stupid Miniscule (Truss meets that criteria) would give him the job over an external piece of much needed fresh blood. No, if 'young Jason' is anointed there will be anarchy on the streets. He doesn't have his peoples confidence, or industry's.

Furthermore, there has been a history of foolish decisions, appointments and actions at ASA in just the last few years - Herr Russell, Frau Staib, Harfwit, Sir Anus Houston, fraud, incompetence, dodgy contracts, bullying, airpsace issues, TIBA, poor morale, waste of money, and the list goes on. So to say that 'all is now well' is like Charlie Sheen saying 'all I have is a bad cough'.
The mechanics behind the scenes of the ASA mess - Pumpkin Head (again) and the Miniscule of the day (again) are nothing short of incompetent and useless nimrods. What a shamozzle.

Everything is good Jason, everyone match fit? Ha ha ha. Clown.

TICK TOCK

[Peetwo]

ASA - She'll be right mate??

A passing strange and somewhat contradictory Jetstar incident in one of their 'plastic, fantastic' B787 jets will be investigated by the ATSB:

Airspeed fluctuations involving Boeing 787, VH-VKE, NW of Darwin, Northern Territory on 21 December 2015
 
Investigation number: AO-2015-149
Investigation status: Active
 

• Summary
  
  

Summary
The ATSB is investigating an incident involving a Jetstar Boeing 787, near Darwin, Northern Territory on 21 December 2015.

During cruise, the crew reported difficulty maintaining assigned altitude followed by faulty flight instruments. A fuel dump was conducted before diverting to Darwin. The aircraft landed safely.

As part of the investigation, ATSB technical specialists will examine data from the aircraft’s flight data recorders to determine the factors that contributed to the airspeed fluctuations.
 
General details

Date:
21 Dec 2015
 
Investigation status:
Active
 
Time:
15:23 CST
 
Investigation type:
Occurrence Investigation
 
Location   (show map):
463 km north west of Darwin
 
Occurrence type:
Avionics/flight instruments
 
State:NT
 
Occurrence category:
[b]Serious Incident[/b]
 
Report status:
Pending
 
Highest injury level:
None
 
Expected completion:
Dec 2016 
 
Aircraft details

Aircraft manufacturer:
The Boeing Company
 
Aircraft model:
787-8
 
Aircraft registration:
VH-VKE
 
Serial number:
36230
 
Operator:
Jetstar Airways
 
Type of operation:
Air Transport High Capacity
 
Sector:
Jet
 
Damage to aircraft:
Nil
 
Departure point:
Melbourne, Vic.
Destination:
Singapore

 


Last update 22 December 2015

  
Planetalking subsequently reported on this and drew attention to the obvious anomalies so far reported by the ATSB:

ATSB rates Jetstar Darwin diversion as ‘serious’

Ben Sandilands | Dec 23, 2015 11:01AM |

No speed or altitude problems for this Jetstar 787

That puzzling diversion of a Jetstar 787-8 on its way from Melbourne to Singapore to Darwin on Monday 21 December has been rated as a ‘serious’ incident by the ATSB, which the safety investigator defines as one that could have led to a crash.

The 335 seat jet was met by emergency response vehicles, and transfers to Darwin hotels for those on board, pending completion of their journeys.

Shortly afterwards Jetstar said that the diversion was a “precaution” following a fault in one of three airspeed indicators being noticed by the pilots.

Today the ATSB puts it this way:

During cruise, the crew reported difficulty maintaining assigned altitude followed by faulty flight instruments. A fuel dump was conducted before diverting to Darwin. The aircraft landed safely.
As part of the investigation, ATSB technical specialists will examine data from the aircraft’s flight data recorders to determine the factors that contributed to the airspeed fluctuations.

Difficulty maintaining an assigned altitude is a compelling reason for not continuing a flight, and especially one through the increasingly crowded airspace over Indonesia in the latter stages of the flight to Singapore.

The early reports of the diversion were puzzling in that passenger accounts varied, with news reports variously claiming that there was an ‘icing’ problem mentioned by the crew or ‘storm’ issues, in what are often very bumpy skies at this time of the year over Australia’s Top End.

So what has this got to do with ASA? Well probably not much, except one of Ben's regular blog contributors provided an interesting link to a Flight Global article on other recorded passing strange anomalies with the B787 & ADSB State ATC systems:

Two ATC agencies 'blacklist' 787 over position-data flaw

• 10 December, 2015
  
• BY: Stephen Trimble
  
• Washington DC
  
  

Most of the Boeing 787s delivered to date contain a software defect that, in at least five identified aircraft, have erroneously reported their location to controllers, prompting two air traffic management agencies to put the Dreamliner on a “blacklist” for certain services.

Although it denies the software defect creates a safety hazard, Boeing says a service bulletin with instructions for operators to correct the position reporting error will be released “imminently”.

The retrofits are expected to be installed across the fleet through 2016, but Boeing has no control over if or when an operator chooses to implement a voluntary service bulletin, the company says. New 787s delivered from Boeing’s assembly lines are already equipped with software that corrects the original defect.

The issue came to light last December at an ICAO working group focused on automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) transponders.

ICAO has since chronicled the problem in a series of reports from last February to late November, which are posted online but have so far been unreported.

The 787 software problem drove Canada’s air traffic control organisation Nav Canada last year to “blacklist” all 71 787s that were then using the country’s airspace. The blacklisting means the 787s are not allowed to use reduced separation procedures offered to other aircraft equipped with ADS-B.

Airservices Australia considered a similar limitation for the 787 fleet last year because of the same software problem, but the consequences would have been more severe. Unlike Canada, Australia mandates that all aircraft above 29,000ft must have ADS-B transponders.

A blacklisted aircraft would be treated the same as one that is not equipped with ADS-B, forcing 787 operators such as Jetstar to remain below 29,000ft while in Australian airspace.

Ultimately, Airservices Australia decided to accept the “risk” of allowing 787s to operate in ADS-B-mandated airspace with standard separation distances, ICAO’s reports show.

Airservices Australia also notified controllers about the existence of the software problem.

Finally, the agency blacklisted the 787 on surface management systems at three airports – Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney. But the airport restriction was only intended to raise awareness about the issue, as other airport position monitoring systems can pinpoint the 787’s location on the surface.

Nav Canada first detected a problem on 1 July 2014 when controllers noticed a 787 appearing to deviate up to 38nm (70km) from its planned track. The controllers alerted the crew by radio, but the pilots insisted their instruments showed they were still on course. Suddenly, however, the 787 “was observed jumping back to the flight plan route” on the controller’s screens, according to ICAO documents.

Around four months later, Airservices Australia noticed a similar problem when a Jetstar 787 appeared to deviate “significantly” off-track, then suddenly “jump” back to the planned route on a controller’s screen, the ICAO documents say.

Both agencies launched separate investigations before discovering they had witnessed the same problem while attending a December 2014 meeting of the ICAO ADS-B working group. They would later learn the same problem had been recorded in other airspace jurisdictions, including in Singapore.

At that point, Boeing was contacted to join the investigation. The company eventually traced the root cause back to the 787’s packet-based data transfer system, which was passing the aircraft’s position information from the integrated surveillance system to the ADS-B transponder, according to ICAO documents.

In rare cases, after passing a planned turn upon crossing a waypoint, the data packets that arrived at the transponder would contain either the aircraft’s latitude or longitude, but not both. In those cases, the ADS-B transponder’s software would extrapolate the 787’s position based on the previous flight track before it made a planned turn at a waypoint. It would continue reporting the aircraft erroneously on the incorrect track until it received a data packet containing both the latitude and the longitude of the aircraft.

“It is important to understand that this is not a safety concern,” Boeing says. “Existing systems such as radar provide the necessary positional data to [air traffic control] that allow the continued safe operation of the fleet.”

Airservices Australia reported to ICAO in November that it could still consider imposing a blacklist label on the 787, meaning the agency could restrict the aircraft to operate below 29,000ft. Airservices Australia said it would base its decision on how quickly 787 operators to implement Boeing’s service bulletin to retrofit the in-service fleet.

Boeing says the software update will "restore full ADS-B functionality". In the meantime, it says, the fleet "continues to operate safely with standard separations”.

    
Hmm...this generalisation from Boeing is somewhat of a concern when you consider our situation in Australia:

“It is important to understand that this is not a safety concern,” Boeing says. “Existing systems such as radar provide the necessary positional data to [air traffic control] that allow the continued safe operation of the fleet.”

It is also a concern when you consider the highlighted 'bad press' the ASA ADSB stand alone system had been receiving from Dick Smith & the Oz until recent times.

This potentially creates a huge conflict of interest between all directly interested parties i.e. ASA, CASA, the ATSB & all B787 operators operating in and out of Australia.

Now there may or may not be a connection between the anomalies experienced on the Jetstar incident and the multiple incidents tracked to a Boeing/ADSB software glitch, but if there was it would not be a good look for ASA not to have instigated a blacklist at the same time as their counterparts Nav Canada.


REPCON: AR201500084 

On another, potentially embarrassing, ASA related matter the above REPCON was recently made public:

Reporter's concern

The reporter expressed a safety concern regarding the knowledge of air traffic controllers on the rules relating to broadcasts on the area frequency made by pilots approaching an aerodrome which is not marked on a map – AIP ENR 1.1 44.1.1 ©

The reporter advised that general aviation pilots are being advised incorrectly by controllers not to make calls on the area frequency when they are making a broadcast that they are inbound or overflying an aerodrome which is not marked on a map.  As this is coming from a perceived authority it is very confusing for general aviation pilots.

Reporter comment: It is apparent that generally ATS are not aware that broadcasts relating to non-charted aerodromes are now required to be made on the area VHF frequency.  Perhaps ATS should be made aware of the potential disruption to ATS communications when this practice becomes widespread as it certainly will when the pilot community become fully aware of the requirement.

Operator's response (Operator 1)

When the rules governing pilot broadcasts for airports not marked on maps were introduced in 2014, Airservices ensured that the standard change notification and awareness processes were followed.

Subsequently, to reinforce knowledge of the change amongst controllers, the issue was included as a focus area for Check and Standards Supervisor (CSS) as part of Focus Area Issue 5 in November 2014 and again in Issue 6 in March 2015.

Airservices also confirms that controllers are taught to expect aircraft to broadcast where applicable on the CTAF and/or Area frequency as part of Phase 2 of the enroute course in relation to Class G operations. Broadcasts, as a risk mitigation in Class G operations, is emphasised and trainees are taught to expect to hear broadcasts during training.

In reviewing the reported concern, Airservices will release further educational material to ensure that controllers are aware of their requirements. Airservices can provide the ATSB with this educational material following publication upon request.

Hmm...joining dots here but is there a connection here with the current highlighted feud (see Up OARs - Part II) between the CASA OAR & the RAPACs? Well when you go onto the regulator's response, I would say there is a strong possibility (note part in bold):

Regulator's response (Regulator 1)

CASA has reviewed the REPCON and notes the Airservices response and training and education provided to Air Traffic Controllers (ATC).

CASA also notes that there is no incident data from either ATSB or Airservices identifying or substantiating with evidence, a safety issue. CASA will continue to provide educational material on radio procedures outside controlled airspace to industry, and will continue to monitor radio procedures outside controlled airspace. If a safety issue is identified and substantiated with evidence CASA will act appropriately.

As part of the education and communication process, CASA has included material in the revised Visual Flight Rules Guide, hardcopy and online, placed articles on www.fsa.com and included where possible on all relevant safety promotion material e.g. OnTrack. CASA also intends to distribute additional ATC frequency awareness material to flying training schools, aero clubs, sport aviation organisations, and individuals in the near future.

 Since when has Fort Fumble let substantiated evidence get in the way of persecuting a minority IOS stakeholder? - UFB!

Finally the ATSB finish off the REPCON with this:

ATSB comment

Airservices Australia have advised that since our previous response dated 21 October 2015, Airservices has promulgated further educational material to ensure that controllers are aware of their requirements in relation to VFR aircraft broadcasting on area VHF.

Information provided to air traffic controllers:

What a bizarre state of affairs, we've got two of the three stooges tiptoeing around the third stooge (the Bear with a sore head - the CASA OAR), to help implement a backward VFR pilot broadcasting requirement, that is potentially creating a safety risk by congesting (clogging up) the individual ATCO's operational frequency (Area VHF frequency) - UFB!


MTF..P2