[Kharon]

The great “I am”.

“Am is a verb. As the main verb, am is the singular first person form of "to be," which can be a linking verb. Examples of am as the main verb can be found in the sentences "I am"

Being a computer Luddite. I marvel at the many clever things these machines can effortlessly do, in seconds. For example, take any one of the 'Popinjay' rambles as he fronts the media; then in the printed versions try to count up how many times he says “I am, etc”. Start to finish, Granddaughter took 4 minutes to winnow an astounding number of times the bearded Popinjay draws attention to himself in the form of “I am”. Choc frog for whoever guesses nearest to the correct number. (Oh, then compare it to the NTSB directors count.  Don't bother, there is no competition there; Popinjay streets her 14 to 1.

Now, Clay had a righteous claim to that title; tested and proven in the school of hard knocks. But, far from providing righteous rulings on fatal accidents and real 'in-depth' analysis, let alone a knock-out punch on known aviation 'killers' we get this weak kneed twaddle, from Mr 'I am' doled out after long periods of time signifying 'por nada'.

Three fatal events - Broome 'operation', the 'Croc Egg' fiasco and (IMO) the Sea world debacle ALL  demand a seriously deep look into the way CASA have conducted their end of these fatal sagas. There are some serious holes in the CASA knitting, holes which ATSB should be highlighting, belting the crap out of 'em instead of 'gas-lighting' in the media.

It's BOLLOCKS!– a self protection scheme from which the only value for the money invested is to those within 'the system' – and the incumbent minister of course.

Toot (ever so slightly P'd off)– toot.

[Kharon]

Centaurus (legend) & Alea lacta est.

If you Google this famous quote, AI will provide a short blurb, explaining Caesar, the Rubicon and a civil war. The phrase crossing the Rubicon marks a 'PNR' (point of no return).

The Centaurus post on PP – HERE -: neatly targets a problem, a few decades old problem. A matter every pilot, since Pontius, has been obliged to 'manage'. Some system in the aircraft has decided to play at silly buggers. Without even referring to a log; a dozen or more memory items spring to mind. Murphy strikes again. Now Murphy don't give a fig for what you have strapped to your posterior; the location, the weather or any other damn thing. But Murphy always leaves open the options; “Are ya feeling lucky Punk: well, are ya?”

And that is the only question worth considering, sometimes. It is always your Rubicon to cross and therein lays the nub of the matter. There is not a driver (air-frame) on the planet who has not been faced with the 'options'. These are not the 'cut and dried' options like #2 donkey has decided to give up its ghost; or the main wheel tyres (tyre) has ripped etc; these are tales for the pub; it is the 'other' things which create the uncertainty phase. Go – don't go? Land at nearest suitable or plug on; etc. These are the decisions made on the regular by flight crew.

At home base with engineering available, apart from a delay while broken things are sorted, there is no problem for the flight crew. Airborne, with an MEL in support and a proper recording system, most of Murphy's work can be undone. Breakdown away from home with no engineering support and no MEL 'workaround' is where the dice get rolled. Yet we've all done it, at one time or another. Take a simple 'for instance' – go back as many decades as memory allows and remember the first 'heater' that ever packed in. The old fuel heaters never, not ever quit on a fine sunny day; middle of the night was a favorite. What to do? Apart from near freezing to death, if the weather was kind; you would plug on, probably fly it back to base and politely ask the engineer to sort the bloody thing out, emphasising the peril your future offspring were in. But what if the weather was awful, ice a distinct possibility with clear air only below the LSALT and more sectors to fly. Then what?  Much depends on what comes next.

What comes next depends, very much, on both pilot and operator. It is in fact the 'nub' of GA commercial operations. Primarily, this has little to do with the operator; it is a matter for the Chief Pilot or 'fleet manager' not the MD, the owner or even the operations manager; they may hold an 'opinion' but may not dictate solutions, they hold no remit to do so. So, lets say our PA31. C310. C402 with a busted heater pushes on to the destination, lands, rings Ops and is told to standby. Ops checks the contacts for an engineering outfit – no luck. Next call should be to schedule a crew and ship to get out early and complete the task; arrange accommodation etc. etc. Perfect. Anywhere near 'reality'? Well – that depends, don't it. There's a few questions left unanswered there.

Let us begin with 'the heater' – and the aircraft's MR, log books and maintenance history. All good = Tick. Then lets chat with some of the aircrew regarding the heater; about now, anyone with airline or decent operator experience will have guessed. Charlie had problems with it eight months ago; Fred eventually got it going six months ago but it nearly cooked him; Peter mentioned it failed on him a month ago. Ops knew about this – but nothing on the MR reflects this knowledge. “Oh, we need a part and will fix it at the next 100 hourly” big smile – all good. BOLLOCKS it is......

The most vulnerable item in a GA charter outfit is the junior pilot, flying singles in hope of a twin; putting up with 'the way things are' to keep the log book filling up; praying for enough time to apply for a 'proper' job. Easily intimidated, silenced and dependent on gaining a 'good name' and reference for the next gig. Of all people these kids need, indeed must have, first class machinery to operate. I don't mean brand new with all the toys; but serviceable toys, to avoid the situation where their 'superior judgment and skill set' has not been developed or fostered enough to save 'em. Sending 'em off to fight a bear with a lolly-pop stick is just plain wrong. That first job and the lessons learned will form their approach to a real command, where they play for keeps, with more than a mere nine POB.

There is no need to 'coddle' 'em; they need an 'apprenticeship' and there is no better way to become a journeyman than through learning their trade, with guidance, through a season 'out-back' in the wet. It can be a tough school; but the experience will teach them the most powerful word a 'command' pilot can use – its easy to remember – “NO”. Or, for the more articulate “NO DUCKING WAY” but politely. That's what the big bucks are for; can't do that without learning when to say it; can't learn that being bullied into flying dodgy aircraft and not even CASA to complain to. They have ticked all their boxes; up to you to stay or go; they will not assist. Take a look at the 695 fatal event for a classic example. I could go on – older well maintained aircraft – fine. Solid reporting of defects, traceable fixes, great. Operational limitations due to lack of parts/maintenance; acceptable; Chief pilot guidance and advice priceless. Anything else brings Murphy into the game and he plays with loaded dice.  So, mind how you go...

Toot toot..

[Peetwo]

Beech Debonair VH-KZK crash site found, ATSB open investigation?? -   

Via ABC News:

Snowy Mountains plane crash not survivable, police say


Missing pilot David Stephens with his 1966 Beechcraft Debonair plan (Supplied: Lynda Leigh)

What's next?

Police will continue to investigate the wreckage today.

Police say the pilot of a plane that crashed in the New South Wales Snowy Mountains would not have survived the impact.

Authorities believe the pilot is Bega man David Stephens.

His plane was inspected before taking off from Wangaratta in Victoria on Tuesday afternoon.

The 74-year-old did not arrive at Moruya and an extensive land and air search began.

At about 4pm on Thursday a rescue helicopter located wreckage near the plane's last known location.

Riverina Police District Commander Superintendent Andrew Spliet said the crash was not a "survivable collision".

"You wouldn't recognise [the wreckage] it as an airplane … a fair bit of speed into the mountain range there, which has completely destroyed that aircraft," he said.

"It wouldn't be a survivable collision.

"There is quite a bit of wreckage from that impact."

Police investigators are attending the scene.

Courtesy of PJ's media minions...

Khancoban aircraft accident

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Date: 18/07/2025
Media Contact: media@atsb.gov.au

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has commenced a transport safety investigation into a collision with terrain accident east of Khancoban, in the New South Wales Snowy Mountains, involving a Beechcraft Debonair light aircraft. 

The aircraft was conducting a private flight from Wangaratta, Victoria to Moruya on the New South Wales south coast on Tuesday, and was reported missing when it failed to arrive at its destination. 

The ATSB commenced its investigation into the accident after an extensive aerial search located the aircraft wreckage on Thursday afternoon, in snow-covered mountainous terrain in the Kosciuszko National Park, east of Khancoban. 

Investigators are working closely with the NSW Police to gather available evidence, including imagery of the accident site and any aircraft components containing recorded data that can be retrieved and recovered to the ATSB’s technical facilities in Canberra for download and analysis. 

Investigators are also collecting relevant recorded information including ADS-B flight tracking data, weather information, and pilot and aircraft maintenance records. 

The ATSB will provide a substantive update on the progress of the investigation when it releases a preliminary report, which will detail factual information established in the investigation’s evidence gathering phase, in about two months.  

The investigation’s findings will be contained in a final report to be released at the conclusion of the investigation.

That report will also detail the ATSB’s analysis of the evidence to support those findings.    

However, should a critical safety issue be identified during the investigation, the ATSB will immediately notify relevant parties so safety action can be taken. [/size]

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

Loss of control and collision with terrain involving Cirrus SR22, VH-MSF, near Gundaroo, New South Wales, on 6 October 2023

Popinjay to the rescue, via media minions:

Gundaroo Cirrus light aircraft accident final report published



The Australian Transport Safety Bureau has published the final report from its investigation into an accident involving a Cirrus SR22 light aircraft near Gundaroo, north of Canberra, which fatally injured four people.

The four-seat, single-engine aircraft had taken off from Canberra Airport on 6 October 2023 with a pilot and three passengers on board, for a planned flight to Armidale, NSW, operating under instrument flight rules.

About 12 minutes after take-off, the aircraft aerodynamically stalled and departed from controlled flight. It then entered a high vertical descent which developed into a spin, before impacting the ground.

The aircraft came to rest in an open field adjacent to a farm dam wall and was consumed by a post‑impact fire.

ATSB Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell said extensive damage from the collision and post‑impact fire limited the ATSB’s ability to determine the circumstances preceding the accident.

“The lack of available evidence made this investigation extremely challenging and, unfortunately – particularly given the tragic loss of four lives – limited the findings the ATSB could make,” Mr Mitchell said.

Flight data showed that, at about 8,000 ft, the aircraft began to deviate from its track, with heading, altitude and airspeed deviations. Then, when approaching 10,000 ft, the aircraft’s climb rate increased significantly and its airspeed decreased, resulting in the aerodynamic stall and departure from controlled flight.

The investigation found no evidence of any recovery actions being conducted after the aircraft stalled, and that the ballistic recovery parachute – an emergency parachute that when activated by the pilot supports and lowers the aircraft to the ground – was not deployed.

Additionally, no radio broadcasts were heard from the pilot during the accident sequence, or to indicate any issues prior to the stall.

“The ATSB considered several scenarios to establish the reason for the deviations in flight track, the subsequent stall, the absence of any recovery actions, and the non-deployment of the aircraft’s parachute system,” Mr Mitchell said.

“These included in-flight icing, pilot incapacitation, and technical issues with the aircraft, but the lack of available evidence could not definitively support or dismiss any of these hypotheses.”

The investigation report notes it was likely the aircraft, which was not fitted with an anti-icing system and was prohibited from operating in icing conditions, had encountered icing conditions prior to the stall.

Moderate icing conditions were forecast along the aircraft’s flight path from 7,000 ft to 10,000 ft when in cloud.

But the ATSB was unable to determine if these conditions were sufficient to have adversely affected the aircraft’s performance and/or handling, and icing would not prevent the deployment of the aircraft’s parachute system.

Meanwhile, an independent forensic pathologist did not identify any underlying medical conditions, natural disease or toxicological abnormalities that could have led to an incapacitation event. However, the report notes that medical incapacitation can result for reasons that may not be detectable. 

Finally, to the extent possible, an inspection of the remaining aircraft structure and flight controls did not identify any pre-accident anomalies.

“Unfortunately, due in part to the significant post-impact fire limiting the collection of evidence, the circumstances preceding the stall and this tragic accident could not be conclusively determined,” Mr Mitchell said.

Read the final report: Loss of control and collision with terrain involving Cirrus SR22, VH-MSF, near Gundaroo, New South Wales, on 6 October 2023

Publication Date 16/10/2025

MTF...P2