[Peetwo]

Choppagirl: Dallas and Essendon - sound similar?

https://dfw.cbslocal.com/2019/07/01/addi...e-unknown/

North Texas Teens, Parents Among 10 Killed In Addison Plane Crash

UPDATED: July 1, 2019 2:04 PM

https://cbsloc.al/2Npf3VO

ADDISON (CBSDFW.COM) – John Paul II High School in Plano confirmed two students were among those killed in a plane crash at the Addison Municipal Airport.

Sophomore Alice Maritato and All Saints Catholic School 8th grader Dylan Maritato were on the plane when it when down. The teenager’s mother, Ornella Ellard, and stepfather, Brian Ellard, were also onboard and are included in the 10 people confirmed dead.

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigators returned to the scene early Monday morning.

The twin-engine Beechcraft King Air plane crashed into a private hangar just after 9:00 a.m. Sunday. Moments after the plane slammed into the building Air Traffic Control radioed, “Everybody just standby, we had a accident on the field… so expect not to go out anytime soon.”

Federal officials have confirmed two crew members and eight passengers were on the plane and all lost their lives. Witnesses say the plane had just taken off when it veered hard left and dropped its wing.

The plane burst into flames when it hit the hanger, sending thick black smoke billing into the air. Before nightfall on Sunday investigators were able to walk through the charred crash scene.
 


Officials are still trying to determine what caused the plane, that was headed from Addison to St. Petersburg Florida, to go down and say their focus today will be on trying to find perishable evidence. Experts say investigators will most likely start by looking at engine failure, pilot error and weight issues as possible causes of the crash.

In addition to identifying the dead, investigators are also gathering background information on those at the controls of the plane.

“We do not know the condition of the flight crew in terms of their prior experience,” explained National Transportation Safety Board Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg. “We don’t know if they’ve flown together or not. But that will definitely come out in the investigation. There will be a deep dive into the pilot’s background.”

It’s unclear what communication the plane had with air traffic controllers.

According to Landsberg, there was some initial confusion about the owner of plane because the craft had recently been sold and the tail number changed. Monday morning the plane’s former owner, “Planemasters” out of Chicago, confirmed that the plane was sold to Addison-based “EE Operations” and the new tail number was registered in April.



Damage to an airplane hangar after a plane crash killed 10 people at the Addison Municipal Airport. (credit: Chopper 11)

NTSB lead investigator Jennifer Rodi said investigators will be, “… looking into the man, the machine, and the environment. Man specifically; the flight crew onboard‚ their training, knowledge and experience as it applies to the aircraft and the operations.”

Early Monday afternoon CBS 11 News confirmed that all of the passengers on the plane were members of the Bent Tree Country Club in Dallas.

NTSB investigators are soliciting help from witnesses, looking for any photos or videos that might have been shot of the crash.

& also via CBS news national:

"I've never seen anything like that": Witness describes deadly Texas plane crash

Addison, Texas — New details are emerging about the victims of a small plane crash outside Dallas. All 10 people on board were killed Sunday morning when the plane crashed into a hangar just after takeoff.

Among the passengers who died was Alice Maritato, a sophomore in high school and her brother, middle school student Dylan Maritato. They were traveling with their mother, Ornella and step-father Brian Ellard, heading to St. Petersburg, Florida.

Investigators with the National Transportation Safety Board found the cockpit voice recorder late Sunday night.

Pilot David Snell witnessed the crash from a nearby hangar.

"Myself and my other pilot friend, we knew that the plane was not producing the type of takeoff power that it typically would by the sound, plus it wasn't climbing the way it typically would and it appeared a little tail low and we knew that airplane was in trouble," he said.

The twin-engine Beechcraft Super King was taking off at the north end of the airport. Witnesses said it lifted off the runway, reaching about 300 feet, when it began losing power and altitude. The plane then veered left and dropped its left wing, before slamming into the hangar. 

"All my years of flying I've never seen anything like that. But my thoughts are for the families, the people, the lives changed and there's nothing you can do about it," Snell said.

There is security video of the accident, but it's not expected to be released until the final report is released. A preliminary report could come out in a few weeks.

And the official NTSB update:

Obviously way to early to speculate but like Choppagirl I can see the similarities with the YMEN DFO accident. However I can also see some stark differences i.e Multi-crew aircraft, possibly operating under Part 91 etc..etc

There is also a notable difference in the professionalism and clinical handling of the initial phases of the AAI (reference the NTSB presser above).

IMO there are in fact more similarities to the Wichita B200 accident: see - The HVH YMEN DFO faery tale grows

 

Also it should be noted neither of the buildings were built alongside the active runways, nor were the buildings a massive shopping complex with the potential for on ground casualties in their thousands:



MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

GippsAero Airvan 8 skydiving crash Sweden - RIP 

Via Nine News digital:

Nine dead after plane full of parachutists crashes in Sweden


By Associated Press
8:14am Jul 15, 2019

Swedish officials said a small plane carrying parachutists crashed in northern Sweden soon after takeoff on Sunday, and all nine people on board were killed.

The accident took place a little after 2pm local time on Storsandskar island.

Swedish media quoted witnesses reporting that some of the parachutists were seen trying to jump off the plane just before the crash.

An image from a Twitter video by which captured the crash (Twitter)

Swedish airport authority Swedavia said the crashed aircraft was a GippsAero GA8 Airvan, an Australian-made single-engine plane popular with parachutists, that took off from Umea Airport.

The cause of the crash is not yet known.

"I can confirm that all those aboard the plane have died," Region Vasterbotten municipality spokeswoman Gabriella Bandling said.



A GippsAero GA8 Airvan, similar to the plane that crashed. (AAP)

One witness told Swedish broadcaster SVT she heard a loud noise from above before she saw the plane going straight down and crashing into the island.

Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Lofven expressed "great sadness" over the accident in a statement to Swedish news agency TT.

He sent condolences to the families of the victims and said the government would stay in close touch with officials probing the crash "as it is important to investigate the cause".

© Nine Digital Pty Ltd 2019

& via the Oz:

Aussies to help investigate deadly Swedish plane crash



Wreckage from the aircraft is seen in bush on Storsandskar Island outside Umea, Sweden, on Monday July 15, 2019. The Gipps Aero Airvan aircraft with nine parajumpers on board crashed with no survivors. Picture: Erik Abel/TT via AP

ROBYN IRONSIDE
AVIATION WRITER
@ironsider

4:55PM JULY 16, 2019
2 COMMENTS

Australian authorities will assist with a Swedish investigation into a plane crash that killed nine people, due to the involvement of a Victorian-made aircraft.

The single engine GippsAero GA-8 Airvan, popular with skydiving companies, was carrying eight parachutists and a pilot when it crashed shortly after takeoff from Umea Airport on Sunday.

Some of those on board were seen trying to leap from the plane just before the crash on Storsandskar Island, about two kilometres from Umea.

The cause of the crash has not been determined, and the Swedish Accident Investigation Authority has requested assistance from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau.

It is understood the ATSB will be an accredited representative to the investigation, and act as a conduit between the Swedish investigators and the Australian manufacturer, Gippsland Aeronautics.

The GA-8 has a sound safety record in Australia, operating fatality-free since 2008 when a plane crashed on the eastern side of the Napier Peninsula in the Northern Territory, killing the pilot. His body and the main wreckage of the aircraft were never found.

Since then, the ATSB has investigated 15 incidents and accidents involving the GippsAero GA-8 but none were found to be related to design issues.

Organisational development manager at GippsAero, Lloyd Clarke, said they stood ready to support the Swedish Government and Swedish authorities in their investigation.

“As yet no request has been made,” Mr Clarke said, adding that he was deeply saddened by the loss of lives.

Based in Victoria’s LaTrobe Valley, GippsAero is owned by Indian conglomerate Mahindra Aerospace.

The Australian arm employs 110 people and has produced about 260 GA-8 Airvans, 240 of which remain in operation around the world.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority is monitoring the investigation.

And finally the chilling footage of this tragic accident - from City News Toronto, via YouTube:

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

GippsAero Airvan 8 skydiving crash Sweden - RIP 

Via Nine News digital:

Nine dead after plane full of parachutists crashes in Sweden


By Associated Press
8:14am Jul 15, 2019

Swedish officials said a small plane carrying parachutists crashed in northern Sweden soon after takeoff on Sunday, and all nine people on board were killed.

The accident took place a little after 2pm local time on Storsandskar island.

Swedish media quoted witnesses reporting that some of the parachutists were seen trying to jump off the plane just before the crash.

An image from a Twitter video by which captured the crash (Twitter)

Swedish airport authority Swedavia said the crashed aircraft was a GippsAero GA8 Airvan, an Australian-made single-engine plane popular with parachutists, that took off from Umea Airport.

The cause of the crash is not yet known.

"I can confirm that all those aboard the plane have died," Region Vasterbotten municipality spokeswoman Gabriella Bandling said.



A GippsAero GA8 Airvan, similar to the plane that crashed. (AAP)

One witness told Swedish broadcaster SVT she heard a loud noise from above before she saw the plane going straight down and crashing into the island.

Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Lofven expressed "great sadness" over the accident in a statement to Swedish news agency TT.

He sent condolences to the families of the victims and said the government would stay in close touch with officials probing the crash "as it is important to investigate the cause".

© Nine Digital Pty Ltd 2019

& via the Oz:

Aussies to help investigate deadly Swedish plane crash



Wreckage from the aircraft is seen in bush on Storsandskar Island outside Umea, Sweden, on Monday July 15, 2019. The Gipps Aero Airvan aircraft with nine parajumpers on board crashed with no survivors. Picture: Erik Abel/TT via AP

ROBYN IRONSIDE
AVIATION WRITER
@ironsider

4:55PM JULY 16, 2019
2 COMMENTS

Australian authorities will assist with a Swedish investigation into a plane crash that killed nine people, due to the involvement of a Victorian-made aircraft.

The single engine GippsAero GA-8 Airvan, popular with skydiving companies, was carrying eight parachutists and a pilot when it crashed shortly after takeoff from Umea Airport on Sunday.

Some of those on board were seen trying to leap from the plane just before the crash on Storsandskar Island, about two kilometres from Umea.

The cause of the crash has not been determined, and the Swedish Accident Investigation Authority has requested assistance from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau.

It is understood the ATSB will be an accredited representative to the investigation, and act as a conduit between the Swedish investigators and the Australian manufacturer, Gippsland Aeronautics.

The GA-8 has a sound safety record in Australia, operating fatality-free since 2008 when a plane crashed on the eastern side of the Napier Peninsula in the Northern Territory, killing the pilot. His body and the main wreckage of the aircraft were never found.

Since then, the ATSB has investigated 15 incidents and accidents involving the GippsAero GA-8 but none were found to be related to design issues.

Organisational development manager at GippsAero, Lloyd Clarke, said they stood ready to support the Swedish Government and Swedish authorities in their investigation.

“As yet no request has been made,” Mr Clarke said, adding that he was deeply saddened by the loss of lives.

Based in Victoria’s LaTrobe Valley, GippsAero is owned by Indian conglomerate Mahindra Aerospace.

The Australian arm employs 110 people and has produced about 260 GA-8 Airvans, 240 of which remain in operation around the world.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority is monitoring the investigation.

And finally the chilling footage of this tragic accident - from City News Toronto, via YouTube:

Update Addison BE350 crash:

For different reasons here is some equally disturbing footage from last month's Addison airport plane crash... 

Closed-circuit cameras outside the airport capture the plane’s takeoff, but it never gets higher than the surrounding tree line. It’s on a crash course with a nearby hangar, caught on a clip that’s gut-wrenching to watch.

A dash camera rolling in the lot off Addison's Fire Station #1 picks up the roar of the engines. The plane starts to flips, and then it sparks, before crashing into the hangar in a huge fireball. 

The NTSB's initial report says in their last seconds, a crew member mentioned a problem with the aircraft’s left engine. That’s the first clue in explaining why the plane struggled to climb, then drifted, and why so many families lost people they loved.

The NTSB's investigation continues. 

Link: https://www.wfaa.com/article/news/local/...xp3JkWcIe8

Hmm...no comment needed on Addison but the GA8 Airvan on first appearances would appear indicate the aircraft had no elevator authority what so ever. Could it be a structural failure?   

MTF...P2 

[Kharon]

On P-Prune forum – HERE – some sensible commentary on the Swedish G8 accident has been posted. Thanks guys.

From the ‘Independent a little deeper coverage.

Sweden plane crash: Nine dead after aircraft carrying parachutists crashes into island

Nine people have been killed after the plane carrying them to carry out a parachute jump crashed into an island in eastern Sweden, local media reported on Sunday.

The plane left Umea airport shortly after 1.30pm, The Local reported, and sounded an alarm at 2.12pm, before crashing. Region Vasterbotten municipality spokeswoman Gabriella Bandling said: "I can confirm that all those aboard the plane have died".

Speaking to regional media, witnesses have claimed they could see parachutists attempting to jump out of the plane as it careened into the ground. Footage of the crash captured by a local 16-year-old showed the plane spiralling as it nosedived into Storsandskar, an island close to the airport.

Airport operators have claimed the plane was a GippsAero GA8 Airvan – a small aircraft popular with skydiving operations that is designed to carry eight people including the pilot. Local rescue service representative Conny Qvarfordt told local media “It's a parachute plane, and something seems to have happened just after take-off.”
 
https://www.pprune.org/accidents-close-c...st10518654

[Peetwo]

Ross Coulthart on Twitter today...

Ross Coulthart
‏
@rosscoulthart

Excellent PNG accident investigation report reveals Air Niugini pilots ignored 17 Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) alerts, causing their 737 to crash in Chuuk Lagoon Micronesia 28/9/18. And it was all on video. #ATSB #NTSB http://www.aic.gov.pg/pdf/FinRpts/2019/A...Report.pdf

And my reply...

Now that is how to do an AAI, with 17 useful safety recommendations and all inside of year as well. Our mob would be spending the next year and a half working out ways to not offend DIPs including the regulator while making sure of absolutely no comeback on the minister - FFS!

Plus media coverage so far:

Top stories


Air Niugini pilots ignored alerts as plane crashed into lagoon

The Australian·32 mins ago



Investigation shows pilot error to blame for fatal FSM crash

RNZ·4 hours ago

More for air niugini plane crash report

MTF...P2  

[Kharon]

Settled; and settled right.

Well done (again) PNG.

P2 – “Now that is how to do an AAI, with 17 useful safety recommendations and all inside of year as well.”

Indeed. Another example of a smart government agency, working with ‘modern’ rules in an open, honest manner to benefit the travelling public. No holds barred safety analysis, delivered promptly – with teeth – in the form of Safety Recommendations (SR).

I cannot imagine what the ATSB would have done with it; but looking at the Pel-Air, Mildura, Swan River, ATR and Essendon events, little is left to wonder at the pitiful results of any sensible comparison. Maybe it’s time government got serious about ‘real world’ safety instead of the artful, lip service charade we constantly see and cringe at.

Toot toot.

[Peetwo]

Settled; and settled right.

Well done (again) PNG.

P2 – “Now that is how to do an AAI, with 17 useful safety recommendations and all inside of year as well.”

Indeed. Another example of a smart government agency, working with ‘modern’ rules in an open, honest manner to benefit the travelling public. No holds barred safety analysis, delivered promptly – with teeth – in the form of Safety Recommendations (SR).

I cannot imagine what the ATSB would have done with it; but looking at the Pel-Air, Mildura, Swan River, ATR and Essendon events, little is left to wonder at the pitiful results of any sensible comparison. Maybe it’s time government got serious about ‘real world’ safety instead of the artful, lip service charade we constantly see and cringe at.

Toot toot.

Updated Oz article:

Air Niugini pilots ‘ignored 17 alerts’ in Micronesia crash



The final report on the fatal Air Niugini crash in Micronesia last year has delivered a damning ­assessment of the pilots’ performance, finding they ignored 17 warnings before impact.

One passenger was killed in the crash into Chuuk Lagoon on September 28, and the remaining 34 passengers and 12 crew members survived.

The Papua New Guinea Accident Investigation Commission delivered its final report yesterday, showing the Boeing 737-800 crashed into the water, 460m short of the runway at Chuuk International Airport.

No defects were found with the aircraft, but the flight crew failed on several fronts, most notably by losing situational awareness and not reacting to 14 aural and three visual alerts.

“The investigation determined that the flight crew’s level of compliance with the Air Niugini Standard Operating Procedures Manual was not at a standard that would promote safe aircraft operations,” the report said.

Despite having close to 20,000 hours of flying experience, the PNG captain appeared not to recognise “developing unsafe conditions” and continued to make an unstable approach to the runway rather than go around.

“The (Australian) co-pilot as the support/monitoring pilot was ineffective and was oblivious to the rapidly unfolding unsafe situation,” the report said.

“He did not recognise the significant unsafe conditions and therefore did not realise the need to challenge the pilot-in-­command and take control of the aircraft as required by the Air SOPM.”

As the 737 descended, a series of emergency ground proximity warning system alerts sounded followed by visual “pull up” ­messages.

The investigation found that, two seconds before impact, the co-pilot yelled “too low, too low” but it was too late.

“The continuation of the approach at an excessively high rate of descent resulted in the aircraft impacting the water 460m short of the runway,” the report said.

“Both pilots ignored the alerts and warnings and were unaware of the unsafe situation dev­eloping.”

AIC chief commissioner ­Hubert Namani said inattention or decreased vigilance was a contributor to accidents worldwide.

“Both pilots were fixated on cues associated with control inputs for the landing approach and subsequently were not situationally aware,” Mr Namani said.

The deceased passenger was found to not have been wearing a seatbelt when the plane hit the water, and died from his injuries a short time later. A series of safety actions was ordered as a result of the crash, all of which had been enacted by Air Niugini, Mr Namani said. They included correcting in-flight safety cards to show the correct location of life rafts.

[Kharon]

FWIW - from the UK CAA re G8 accident in Sweden.

[Peetwo]

FWIW - from the UK CAA re G8 accident in Sweden.

From Fort Fumble's Gobson:

Australian GA8 aircraft operations temporarily suspended

Date of publication: 20 July 2019

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority has temporarily suspended the operations of GippsAero GA8 aircraft.

This follows a fatal GA8 aircraft accident on 14 July 2019 in Sweden during a skydiving flight. The accident happened near Umea in northern Sweden. None of the nine people on board the aircraft survived the accident.

The GA8 is manufactured in Australia by GippsAero, which is based in the Latrobe Valley.

CASA has temporarily suspended GA8 operations as a precautionary step pending the outcome of further investigation by Swedish and European authorities.

The temporary suspension will be for up to 15 days from midnight 20 July to midnight 03 August 2019 and affects all GA8 aircraft operating in Australia and all Australian registered GA8 aircraft operating overseas.

CASA has written to all Australian operators of GA8 aircraft advising them of the temporary suspension and reminding them of their obligation to comply with all applicable GA8 Airworthiness Directives issued by CASA.

CASA has also written to all National Aviation Authorities who have GA8 aircraft operating in their jurisdiction advising them that CASA has imposed a 15-day temporary operating suspension on these aircraft.

CASA has been working closely with the Swedish and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). In response to CASA temporarily suspending GA8 operations in Australia, EASA has issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive to European GA8 aircraft owners and operators to not operate the aeroplane except for ferry flights.

CASA has sent an airworthiness engineer to Sweden to observe the accident investigation and collect relevant safety information.

There are 63 GA8 aircraft registered in Australia out of a world-wide fleet of 228. The GA8 is a single engine high wing aeroplane with fixed tricycle landing gear. In Australia the GA8 is used in a range of operations including charter, aerial work and parachuting.

GippsAero hold a production certificate issued by CASA to manufacture the GA8 and is subject to regular surveillance and safety checks by CASA. The aircraft type was certified in 2000 by CASA for normal operations, which includes skydiving.

Media contact:
Peter Gibson
0419 296 446
peter.gibson@casa.gov.au

Ref: 6919

MTF...P2 

[Kharon]

Australian GA8 aircraft operations temporarily suspended:-

FYI - the Airworthiness team at CASA issued this - Directive -  which may be of interest. Makes sense of the universal grounding of the fleet.

"The AD sets out required remedial [b]action to replace certain GippsAero GA8 wing struts and wing strut fittings within specified timeframes in response to a manufacturing quality escape which resulted in wing strut fittings in the effective serial number range to be manufactured with incorrect grain orientation.Administered by: Infrastructure, Transport, Cities and Regional Development."[/b]

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

[Peetwo]

Air Nuigini Flight 73 - Update: Hero criticism & jumpseat vid...  


Via the Oz:

Crash hero pans PNG report’s failure to tackle ‘poor safety culture’



By Ironsider.

An Australian passenger lauded as a “hero” after the Air Niugini crash last year has criticised the final report as failing to address a poor safety culture at the airline.

Former Royal Australian Navy clearance diver Adam Milburn was praised by fellow passengers for playing a major role in evacuating the Boeing 737-800 following the crash into Chuuk Lagoon, northeast of Papua New Guinea, on September 28.

All but one passenger survived the crash, which was attributed to the pilots’ loss of situational awareness, and failure to respond to multiple safety alerts before ploughing the plane into the water, 480m short of the runway at Chuuk International Airport.

After reading the final report released last week by the PNG ­Accident Investigation Commission, Mr Milburn said he was “very disappointed in the actions of both pilots, and the failure to adhere to standard operating procedure … In my view, the captain is ultimately responsible for the safety of the aircraft and he failed in that duty with catastrophic consequences.

“I don’t believe the actions of the pilots were unique to this particular flight. My belief is that the airline didn’t have a robust safety, training and checking culture and as a result unprofessional behaviour by pilots went unaddressed.” Mr Milburn said the report’s reference to the pilots ignoring similar alerts on a previous flight suggested it was only a matter of “when” a crash would occur.

“The airline should be further held to account,” he said.

Air Niugini chief executive Alan Milne said the airline was continuing with an internal investigation into “what was in the ­pilots’ minds and what were the external factors … They’re ­extremely well trained professional pilots with plenty of hours, and they certainly didn’t (crash the plane) on purpose.”

Mr Milne said the days of putting a plane crash down to pilot error were in the past: “If the pilot made a mistake — why did he make a mistake? There are always human factors to consider.”

The two pilots, including one from Australia, remain stood down while the internal investigation continues.

Mr Milburn said it was not just the pilots that were of concern but the cabin crew as well. While the report found crew members followed procedure in evacuating the aircraft, he said that was not his recollection. “I think Air Niugini should be apologising personally to each passenger and the family of the deceased for its failure to provide adequate training and checking of its pilots,” he said.

“As long as Air Niugini is flying into Sydney, Brisbane and Cairns, Australians should be concerned by their poor safety record.”

Disturbing footage from PNG AIC on last moments until the final splash of flight 73...  

&/or

Comments off twitter...  Link: https://twitter.com/BenWhoTravels/status...0943634434

Ben 

Here is a video of a plane crash from the flight deck (Air Niugini Flight 73). Struggle to believe the pilots just wilfully descended through minimums and then ignored multiple G/S and sink rate warnings.

---

Captain Mark:

1/ The whole thing (including the accident report) screams a culture of ignoring EGPWS warnings, minimums, monitoring and basic piloting skills as well as normal instrument procedures which even inexperienced pilots would be aware of...

2/ There are so many clues to the developing dangerous situation that are dismissed and so many opportunities to prevent the accident. The complete loss of SA is easily observeable based on the multiple errors made. A totally avoidable accident..

3/ At the very, very least continuing an approach below minimums after visual contact with the runway has been lost is a huge red line crossed..

4/ For all the advantages the EGPWS offers, it gives no protection (no whoop,whoop pull up warning) in a situation like this for an unstable approach in the landing configuration

---

Ben

If this is real, my comments would be something along the lines of......this is unlikely the first time this had happened, and like many SOP breakdowns prior to accidents, was probably something that had become normal. Normalisation of deviance

---

Adam Aston

Incredible. How many rules, SOPs and just general common sense can we demolish on one approach?

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

On P-Prune forum – HERE – some sensible commentary on the Swedish G8 accident has been posted. Thanks guys.

From the ‘Independent a little deeper coverage.

Sweden plane crash: Nine dead after aircraft carrying parachutists crashes into island

Nine people have been killed after the plane carrying them to carry out a parachute jump crashed into an island in eastern Sweden, local media reported on Sunday.

The plane left Umea airport shortly after 1.30pm, The Local reported, and sounded an alarm at 2.12pm, before crashing. Region Vasterbotten municipality spokeswoman Gabriella Bandling said: "I can confirm that all those aboard the plane have died".

Speaking to regional media, witnesses have claimed they could see parachutists attempting to jump out of the plane as it careened into the ground. Footage of the crash captured by a local 16-year-old showed the plane spiralling as it nosedived into Storsandskar, an island close to the airport.

Airport operators have claimed the plane was a GippsAero GA8 Airvan – a small aircraft popular with skydiving operations that is designed to carry eight people including the pilot. Local rescue service representative Conny Qvarfordt told local media “It's a parachute plane, and something seems to have happened just after take-off.”
 
https://www.pprune.org/accidents-close-c...st10518654

Update: Fort Fumble repeal grounding instrument?

Via the UP:

Cinders - Instrument has now been repealed. https://www.pprune.org/pacific-general-a...st10527830

---

GippsAero GA8 return to air

Date of publication: 

25 July 2019 The Civil Aviation Safety Authority has lifted a temporary suspension of GippsAero GA8 aircraft operations.

The temporary suspension of GA8 aircraft flights was put in place as a safety precaution following a recent fatal parachuting accident in Sweden.

Based on the limited information available immediately after the accident the sixty-three GA8 aircraft in Australia were grounded, as well as a number operating overseas. The suspension was in effect for five days.

The precautionary suspension was triggered by initial information from the investigation into the Swedish accident which showed the accident aircraft had broken up in flight.

CASA has now received further information that there is no evidence to indicate a potential unsafe condition associated with the aircraft and as such the GA8 aircraft type can be safely allowed to return to normal operations.

A CASA airworthiness engineer is currently observing the accident investigation in Sweden and this has proved to be very beneficial.

CASA will continue to monitor the investigation into the GA8 accident and will take appropriate action should any related safety issues become apparent in the future.

A safety assurance review of Australian parachute operations will also be conducted over coming months.

The parachuting accident happened on 14 July 2019 near Umeå in northern Sweden. None of the nine people on board the aircraft survived the accident.

The GA8 is manufactured in Australia by GippsAero, which is based in the Latrobe Valley. The GA8 is a single engine high wing aeroplane with fixed tricycle landing gear. In Australia the GA8 is used in a range of operations including charter, aerial work and parachuting.

And some comments:

Andy_RR

Could be the beginning of the end for GippsAero though. CASA has form when it comes to jerking industry's chain until it withers a la Jabiru/CAMit

Of course the winglets made in Port Melbs are also grounded so CASA should be feeling pleased with a job well done preventing any of this dangerous flying malarkey from taking place. Air safety starts and ends inside a locked hangar...

---

Horatio Leafblower

Personally I don't think 4 days suspension is the end of the world if the wing came off.

Asturias

There are a lot of business owners who would disagree with you. There was a great deal of evidence pointing to the cause, and a structural failure "just because" was not on the list. The grounding has caused incredible distress to the business owners and employees of the operators of these aircraft, not least because it was accompanied by so little information.
I asked CASA to eliminate what turned out to be the primary cause and their response was along the lines of "Of course we looked at that, you must think we're stupid, it was definitely something else". That our #1 theory has turned out to be the #1 cause says to me that the grounding was unnecessary and that there needs to be some jobs reviewed at Fort Fumble.

MTF...P2

[DogCharlieTree]

Settled; and settled right.

I cannot imagine what the ATSB would have done with it; but looking at the Pel-Air, Mildura, Swan River, ATR and Essendon events, little is left to wonder at the pitiful results of any sensible comparison. Maybe it’s time government got serious about ‘real world’ safety instead of the artful, lip service charade we constantly see and cringe at.

Please don't forget their (BASI's) incredible bumbling and incomplete report into VH-EDC, Botany Bay 1994.

In that they state:  Right engine  ‘With the exception of the propeller governor, no pre-existing abnormalities were found.’

Concerning the right hand engine which was recovered from the seabed some 9 weeks after the accident they state (but not in a document released to the public) that the spark plugs were cleaned, re-gapped and then tested (yes, in that order). Why wouldn’t they test them as they found them (appalling procedural error)?  Even after cleaning and resetting the gap, they still found eleven out of the twenty-eight to be unserviceable.
The poor old girl never had a chance.

[Peetwo]

Time to get international ICAO Annex 13 AAI back to Reason?   

(CAUTION: Long post following -   )

I note (with much bemusement, interest and quiet applause) that in the real world of aviation safety a cadre of SME's (subject matter experts), which include several very credible aviation MSM and social media commentators/journalists, are taking to task William Langewiesche’s much discussed NYT Magazine article - What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 Max?   

First from Christine Negroni:  

Irony of Pilot Laying Blame On Pilots in Boeing 737 Max Disasters

September 21, 2019 / 3 Comments



Full disclosure, I own and have read nearly every book ever written by William Langewiesche. He is a gifted writer with a stunning intellect and this is just an aside, he’s quite the looker. I have interviewed him twice but with his latest article in The New York Times Magazine, I think my crush is over.

In a lengthy piece just published, Langewiesche weaves the known facts of the two 737 Max disasters into a jumble of opinion, pilot-bashing and Western superiority.

Ostensibly, he is informing Times readers that not all pilots are Chuck Yeager and to justify the headline of the article, when it comes to What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 Max,  “an industry that puts unprepared pilots in the cockpit is just as guilty,” as Boeing is the conclusion...



....Langewiesche argues that the media has zeroed in on Boeing because it’s simple and easy and obscured the larger forces that “ultimately made these accidents possible.” But out of 14-thousand words, few are dedicated to systems and processes that put a deeply flawed airplane in the hands of pilots around the world. Nor does he talk to any of the pilots who would fly the Max or regulators around the world who must sign off on its future airworthiness.

Langeweishe is a pilot, a storm chaser, and a writer. But the assumptions he makes in this article and similar pilot-bashing treatise a few months ago in The Atlantic where concludes on the thinnest of threads that Malaysia 370 was intentionally flown into the Indian Ocean by the captain indicate he’s out of his area of expertise when it comes to reporting on safety investigations.

He characterizes the pilots’ actions as incompetent, sloppy and dumb, and says investigators are looking for cause and blame. In the world of air safety, those words are never used because they have no relationship to the goal; discovering what happened and why.

For a more nuanced look at the issues, see the excellent coverage by Dominick Gates and others at the Seattle Times along with the reporters covering the story in the business pages of The New York Times, Natalie Kitroff, and David Gelles . If those writers are in possession of pilot’s licenses, they are at least unburdened by the need to convince the world they were in the top fifty percent of their class and not among the inferiors who brought down the Max.

(P2 comment: Refer to the blog link for the full article)

And from Elan Head in the Medium: 

The limits of William Langewiesche’s ‘airmanship’

Elan Head

Sep 23 · 6 min read



There are a lot of bold pronouncements and sweeping generalizations in William Langewiesche’s much discussed New York Times Magazine article, “What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 Max?” There is, for example, his contention that Boeing at the corporate level is a “corrosive agent” that “dangerously distorts American society.” But also his argument that in the case of the 737 Max, Boeing’s habit of, say, “toying with nuclear annihilation” doesn’t really matter, because the aircraft itself was designed by engineers of “unquestionable if bland integrity.” And finally his conclusion that the two 737 Max crashes — which killed a total of 346 people and which, by the way, are still under investigation — can be summed up simply as “a textbook failure of airmanship.”

Other pilots and aviation writers have already challenged most of these generalizations. The claim that stood out to me was Langewiesche’s breezy assurance that “airmanship” — an “anachronistic” word, he grants — “is applied without prejudice to women as well as men.” I am sure that Langewiesche sincerely believes this. But in an industry in which barely seven percent of pilots are women, it is doubtful that any standard, let alone one as essential yet subjective as airmanship, is applied to women wholly without prejudice.

Neither is it applied evenly to men. Aviation has historically favored a certain type of man, from a certain type of background — a type of man, coincidentally, who looks a lot like William Langewiesche. Men who don’t conform to this stereotype (men, for example, of non-European descent) have to work that much harder to prove themselves as pilots, just as women do. I mention this not only because Langewiesche’s broad indictments of pilots in developing countries are deeply problematic, but because his blindness to his own privilege reflects his generally archaic way of thinking. “What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 Max?” is the last stand of an obstinate pilot who, resolutely ignoring both seven decades of human factors research and the questions raised by his own reporting, is determined to ascribe two complex tragedies to personal failings. It is an attitude that the rest of the aviation industry is, fortunately, starting to move beyond.

This is not to say that I take issue with Langewiesche’s definition of airmanship, fuzzy though it is. “Its full meaning is difficult to convey,” he writes. “It includes a visceral sense of navigation, an operational understanding of weather and weather information, the ability to form mental maps of traffic flows, fluency in the nuance of radio communications and, especially, a deep appreciation for the interplay between energy, inertia and wings.” My own expertise is with rotors, not wings, but yeah, that’s the general idea. And in my experience both as a primary flight instructor and as a chronicler of the industry — having had the opportunity to fly with some truly extraordinary pilots, all over the world — I can confirm that the essential qualities of airmanship can be found in male and female pilots of all races and nationalities, and equally not found in them, too.

But precisely because it is so fuzzy, the concept of “airmanship” is limited in its usefulness. A pilot who has a visceral sense of navigation and a deep appreciation for the interplay between energy, inertia and wings will not therefore automatically possess a nuanced understanding of complex aircraft systems — that’s what training is for. Training is partly a matter of initiative, but also a matter of opportunity. For example, it’s hard to understand something like the 737 Max’s Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System when the manufacturer does not mention that it exists, which Boeing initially did not.

Langewiesche contends that the training of pilots in Indonesia and other parts of the developing world is deficient at all levels: from the “production line” training of “checklist children” to the falsification of simulator time in type. These are not carefully documented claims, but assertions based on impressions and hearsay. Nevertheless, if true, they would seem to be systemic problems, calling for systemic solutions. Likewise for the other systemic problems that Langewiesche enumerates in his article: “the ossification of regulations and in many places their creeping irrelevance to operations; the corruption of government inspectors; the corruption of political leaders and the press; the pressure on mechanics, dispatchers and flight crews to keep unsafe airplanes in the air; the discouragement, fatigue and low wages of many airline employees; the willingness of bankers and insurers to underwrite bare-bones operations at whatever risk to the public; the cynicism of investors who insist on treating air travel as just another business opportunity; and finally the eagerness of the manufacturers to sell their airplanes to any airline without restraint.”

Yet Langewiesche does not, in the end, take a systemic view of the situation. Instead, after chastising the public for seeking a “simple answer” to the Max crashes in the narrative of “a poorly implemented system,” he finds his own simple answer in declaring that “incompetent” pilots were the deciding factor in both crashes. This intellectual leap — from acknowledging a host of potentially contributing factors to finally just straight up blaming the pilots — ought to be bewildering, but is instead all too familiar when viewed in historical context. Leveraging the pages of New York periodicals to shift blame onto pilots has been a thing since at least 1931, when Orville Wright contended in the New Yorker that aviation safety in that era of crude machinery and scanty infrastructure was simply “a matter of better pilot training.”

As the aviation writer Christine Negroni has pointed out, Langewiesche is at great pains in his article to emphasize his own, above-average airmanship, as when he lists all of the many equipment failures that he has personally survived. (Lest you wonder about the adequacy of his preflight inspections, rest assured that the blame for these failures adhered solely to his employers; his own role was strictly heroic.) Heroic airmanship is something that every pilot should aspire to for purely selfish reasons — it may someday save their life — but too many pilots have, like Langewiesche, allowed this professional ideal to obscure the need for practical improvements in aircraft design and flight training. As a test pilot quoted in the article flippantly remarks, “we know as a fact that half of airline pilots graduated in the bottom half of their class,” yet Langewiesche’s solution is essentially to hold every pilot to the standard of the top one percent.

When Langewiesche’s article was published, the New York Times Magazine editor Michael Benoist tweeted, “At one point while working on this story William Langewiesche told me something like, ‘I think my whole life and all of my experience went into this thing.’” No doubt it did — along with all of the conventional wisdom and entrenched prejudices of an industry that has traditionally valued the opinions of men like Langewiesche above those of everyone else. After all, why should Langewiesche have to bother with facts or context — with actual reporting — when he can rely on his own indisputable authority as an above-average pilot?

The good news is that Langewiesche’s views are increasingly being seen as outdated, as the blowback to his article in the aviation community suggests. Rather than relying on a particular heroic type of pilot to save us, we now see safety as a systemic endeavor, demanding systemic improvements. Pilot training is part of this system, but so, too, are aircraft design, certification and maintenance. And the merits of this approach are self-evident. Even if, as Langewiesche implies, pilots of an earlier era had superior stick-and-rudder skills, they still crashed airliners at a rate that would be unacceptable today. Perhaps Langewiesche’s heroic pilot ideal never actually existed. Perhaps, even back then, half of all airline pilots graduated in the bottom half of their class.

If nothing else perhaps the cognitive bias on display in the Langewiesche article brings forward the debate that IMO we need to have. Especially in the insular world of Oz aviation safety administration where it is beyond all 'Reason' and somehow acceptable for our accredited ICAO Annex 13 AAI (aviation accident investigator - ATSB) to be the chief proponent of the 'blame game', if and when it suits a bloated self-serving, self-preserving aviation safety bureaucracy...

The good news in all of this diplomatic and political argy bargy surrounding the 737 MAX imbroglio, is that the (previously mentored by Alan Stray ) Indonesian NTSC will stand by the long held AAI principles of Annex 13 and report their findings, (without fear nor favour; or cognitive bias; or bureaucratic O&O) within the next couple of months...

From the WSJ, via the Oz:

Indonesia blames design, oversight lapses for fatal 737 MAX crash



Indonesian investigators have determined that design and oversight lapses played a central role in the fatal crash of a Boeing 737 MAX jet in October, according to people familiar with what is expected to be the first formal government finding that the design and US regulatory approval were flawed.

The draft conclusions, these people said, also identify a string of pilot errors and maintenance mistakes as causal factors in the fatal plunge of the Boeing Co. plane into the Java Sea, echoing a preliminary report from Indonesia last year.

Misfires of an automated flight-control feature called MCAS on the MAX fleet led to the nosedive of the Lion Air jet and a similar crash of an Ethiopian Airlines MAX shortly after takeoff from Addis Ababa in March. The two crashes took 346 lives, prompted the grounding of all 737 MAX planes and disrupted the global aviation industry.

Details of the Indonesian report, which haven’t been reported previously, are subject to change and further analysis. Indonesian investigators declined to comment, except to say the final document is likely come out in early November.

A Boeing spokesman said the plane maker continues to work with Indonesian authorities as they complete the report.

US air-crash investigators are preparing to announce a handful of separate safety recommendations, ranging from bolstering the manual flying skills of pilots to enhancing FAA vetting of new aircraft designs.

The US National Transportation Safety Board is expected around the end of the month to call for improvements to cockpit training and crew decision making, according to industry and government officials.

The goal is to ensure pilot proficiency when automated systems are malfunctioning or turned off, to help ensure appropriate responses to contradictory cockpit warnings such as those that occurred prior to the MAX crashes, the officials said. The board also is expected to emphasise the importance of setting priorities when executing emergency checklists.

In addition, the NTSB is expected to focus on potential changes to certification of new airliners. The board is poised to recommend re-evaluation of FAA procedures that give the industry authority to sign off on certain safety matters, the officials said. The aim is to make such approvals more transparent, with the goal of greater predictability and more-consistent federal oversight across various types of on-board systems.

Neither the US nor Indonesian recommendations will be binding on the FAA, though the agency already faces escalating congressional and public pressure to change certification procedures. More than half a dozen outside inquiries, including a Justice Department criminal probe and various blue-ribbon advisory panels, are delving into the FAA’s 2017 approval of MCAS. Earlier this month, a Senate appropriations subcommittee backed legislation that would require FAA officials to address recommendations from ongoing investigations and audits.

The FAA has said it welcomes the independent reviews, will carefully consider their results and doesn’t have a firm timetable for allowing MAX jets back in the air. Boeing has said it is collaborating with US and foreign officials to safely return the MAX to service.

Steve Dickson, the FAA’s new head, and top lieutenants are scheduled to meet Monday in Montreal with some four dozen foreign regulators to provide a closed-door update on anticipated fixes to the MAX’s flight-control software and computers.

The FAA is urging a core group of regulators -- from Canada, Australia, Brazil and New Zealand -- to approve the fixes around November, which would be roughly in tandem with informal US timelines. FAA leaders also are trying to persuade aviation authorities in Europe and other regions to follow by lifting their grounding orders shortly afterwards, according to US government and industry officials familiar with the deliberations.

But such co-ordination efforts are running into significant hurdles. Canadian aviation regulators have signalled to the FAA that they expect to require pilots to undergo simulator training before they can start flying the MAX, something the FAA is unlikely to mandate. It could take until March for Air Canada to phase the bulk of its MAX aircraft into regular schedules, according to a person briefed on the details, months later than projected for US operators.

In Europe, regulators previously said they won’t accept the FAA’s technical verifications of fixes and intend to perform their own certification analyses, possibly adding weeks or months to the timetable.

Meanwhile, FAA officials in recent weeks said that Boeing hasn’t provided all of the requested details laying out the description and safety assessments of the MAX’s redesigned flight-control system.

The latest version of Indonesia’s accident report has been shared with the FAA and NTSB for comment. US officials are expected to visit Indonesia around the end of this month to finalise the document. People familiar with the process said NTSB experts don’t appear to have major disagreements with the draft. Boeing and the FAA, on the other hand, are concerned the final report will unduly emphasise design and FAA certification missteps, some of these people said.

Unlike NTSB reports that identify the primary cause of accidents and then list contributing issues determined to be less significant, Indonesia is following a convention used by many foreign regulators of listing causal factors without ranking them. Instead, the report is expected to list more than 100 elements of the crash chronology, according to a person briefed on the details. Many of those points are likely to refer to missteps by pilots and mechanics initially revealed last year in Indonesia’s preliminary report.

Indonesian authorities now are asking for comments on the draft conclusions dealing with those missteps, as well as findings that investigators have determined constitute engineering shortcomings, including reliance on a sole sensor in the original design of MCAS, according to people familiar with the matter.

  MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Parallel hemispheres: Connecticut B17 crash? 

I have been watching and reading with much interest the unfolding tragic story of the B-17 crash at Bradley International Airport in Connecticut: 

WWII-era plane crashes in Connecticut

By Mike Hayes, Zoe Sottile, Meg Wagner and Veronica Rocha, CNN
Updated 0111 GMT (0911 HKT) October 3, 2019

 
Reference post from Alphabets:  

A matter of concern.

TOM called the meeting to order; the crew settled down. Item one is a matter of great concern. The needless head butting and hair pulling going on between RAA and AOPA. It is seen as counterproductive, destructive, divisive, irresponsible  and “bloody childish” (not my words). A solution is needed..

So, what to do? History and believe it or not, John Sharp (as Minister) provide the answer. Back in the day, when Sharp was in the hot seat and CASA still had some honourable, intelligent men working for them; a plan was made to accommodate all Part 149 outfits with a set of ‘standards’ which CASA generated and the Alphabet groups could administer. It was a fair and equitable solution; so much so that both Canada and the EASA adopted it, put in a level playing field, and have never been troubled again.

Perhaps it is time the Australian plan was adopted in Australia.

I need to do a bit of digging around and talk to some folk; to be sure the plan can work. If it all pans out, it will be up to the members of the individual groups to sit their ‘management’ down and tell ‘em to get behind it, unite and make it happen. I understand there is a letter to the minister on it’s way, outlining the plan. Ministerial credibility could be partially restored on his nod.

Let’s hope good sense prevails. More to follow as matters progress. Fingers crossed.

Toot – toot.

---

Mike Borgelt  Sandy Reith • 3 days ago

Bravo Sandy! I'm pleased that someone else gets it.

Of course there should be no split. The concept of these self administering organisations was pioneered by the failed organisational model of the GFA with its long declining and geriatric membership.

All Australian aircraft should be VH registered and all pilots be required to hold at minimum a Recreational Pilot's Licence, not some mickey mouse "certificate" from some private organisation which has "trained" pilots with instructors who may have as few as 100 hours total aeronautical experience...

...Instead we have CASA's Part 149 abomination which requires people to pay private monopolies even if the person already holds a RPL or higher qualification and appropriate ratings, tailwheel, glider etc. resulting in much higher costs and multiple periodic flight reviews. Part 149 has consumed many thousands of man hours at CASA and the private bodies and many of these people are not paid for their efforts.

Long bow perhaps but? 

The tragic last flight of the B-17 was part of a Collings Foundation Wings for Freedom tour:

"..The Collings Foundation is a private non-profit educational foundation located in Stow, Massachusetts, founded in 1979 by Robert F. Collings and Caroline Collings with a mission dedicated to the preservation and public display of transportation-related history, namely automobile and aviation history..."

Not that there should be any inference/comparison with our Australian Warbirds Association but IMO there are some passing strange parallels when you consider the ongoing Angel Flight imbroglio, the RAAus v AOPA bunfight and the CASA Iron Ring creation of Part 149...  

In the States there is no requirement for a Part 149, apparently the regulatory side of things is incorporated (as MB suggests above) into the normal pilot licensing and aircraft registration rule set. These types of operations fall under either FAR Part 91 or Part 135 - end of.

However that doesn't mean that this tragic occurrence will not lead to an inevitable review/scrutiny of the safety risk mitigation deployed by these types of not for profit operations, highlighted perhaps by the following Christine Negroni article/blog:

   

Warbird Operators Worry After B-17 Crash As Senator Calls for Closer Scrutiny

October 3, 2019 



Having survived combat and oftentimes years of neglect, flying warbirds in America and their owners may be headed into a new battle. Triggered by Wednesday’s fatal crash of the Collings Foundation B-17 Nine-O-Nine at Bradley International Airport, Connecticut Senator Richard Blumenthal says more scrutiny is needed for passenger flights on historic aircraft.

Seven people were killed and six others on the airplane injured along with two people on the ground when the Nine-O-Nine crashed shortly after takeoff. The Flying Fortress was to make a 30-minute fly-around the area during the foundation’s Wings of Freedom Tour that started earlier in the week.



Responding to a question about whether the B-17s should be grounded,  Sen. Blumenthal was non-commital but suggested it might be time for a second look at warbird flights for the general public.


“There is a need for scrutiny and oversight if these planes are going to continue to fly,” he said. “This is not the first.”
A history of the Nine-Oh-Nine on the website warbirdregistry.org shows that shortly after the foundation acquired it, it had a crash landing in Pennsylvania in 1987. It was repaired and restored by 1991 and flew uneventfully until a landing gear collapsed causing damage to the airplane in 1995.

But the last accident (involving a different B-17) in which passengers were injured was in June 2011. After hosting heritage flights in Aurora, Illinois, a Flying Fortress owned by the Liberty Foundation was moving to Indianapolis when a fire erupted on one of the engines. In the emergency landing, one of the seven people on board was hurt. The plane was destroyed.
Organizations big enough and with sufficient funds to restore, maintain and operate warbirds include the Liberty Foundation and Collings, along with the Experimental Aircraft Association, the Commemorative Air Force and Erickson Aircraft Collection and others.

The goal of organizations like these is to share the cold, noisy, turbulent experience of wartime pilots – many of whom knew when they took off they might not return.

“The crews were 18-year-old young men. If you made it to 25 in a B-17 they called you ‘gramps’, you were one of the old guys,” said Dick Knapinski a spokesman for the EAA which sells flights on its own B-17, the Aluminum Overcast. “That’s why these groups take these airplanes out and spend thousands of thousands of dollars to preserve and maintain them and fly them to places, so we can tell the story.”

Operators of historic aircraft can operate under a number of different FAA regulations. Some under Part 91 for general aviation, others, like EAA, under part 135.

Then there are the rules that apply to “limited category aircraft.” When I asked to see the regulations that apply to the operation of surplus military aircraft, the FAA sent me a 192-page document. Under these rules, operators may be prohibited from selling flights and so they offer them in exchange for a donation. But suffice to say that sorting through the maze of regulations is not for the faint of heart.



Among aviation enthusiasts, Blumenthal’s comment is worrying. Heritage flights generate interest and revenue. A quick search told me that the Collings Foundation had $8 million in revenue and $7 million in expenses in 2015.


“The Collings Foundation is a major operator of warbirds and they make appearances at air shows around the country,” said Dean Alexander, former superintendent of the Dayton Aviation Heritage National Historical Park. “They sell rides on historic airplanes as a way of raising money to keep their operations going.”


Still, historic aircraft and specifically combat aircraft served a far different purpose than airliners do. A century of commercial air travel brings with it improvements in survivability that are not to be found on warbirds.


“In an inflight fire with an aluminum airplane, it doesn’t take long to burn through,” Jerry O’Neill, a member of the safety committee with the International Council of Air Shows told me when I spoke with him about the B-17 crash.


“The rule is to get it down no matter where you put it down, whether you make a runway or a field because if the wing comes off you’re toast anyway.”


Whether passengers on heritage flights appreciate the difference in safety, I can’t say, so I turned to Mark Dombroff, an aviation attorney formerly with the FAA for his opinion.

“Common sense should tell anybody that gets on an airplane that’s been restored from the ground up that it’s not the same as getting on an airliner that takes you from point A to point B. They cannot have the expectation of the same level of safety.”

Hmm...it will be interesting to watch the NTSB investigation unfold and what recommendations they eventually come out with. However, unlike the ATSB with the Angel Flight Mount Gambier accident report, I strongly suspect they won't be pulling any punches, or providing topcover for the FAA, while laying all blame at the feet of the Collings Foundation...  


MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

B17 crash update - 5/10/19: NTSB prelim investigation underway.

Via the NTSB:

And via Christine Negroni:

---

Most Experienced B-17 Pilot in Command of Plane that Crashed

October 4, 2019 / Share your comments...



The 75-year old California pilot in command of the B-17 Nine-O-Nine that crashed in Connecticut on Wednesday was the highest time pilot on that model aircraft in America with 73-hundred hours, according to the National Transportation Safety Board. Ernest McCauley, 75, of Long Beach, California was also the safety officer of the Collings Foundation, which owned the airplane since 1986 and operated it as part of its Wings of Freedom Tour.

Jennifer Homendy, the NTSB board member at the scene told reporters “a lot has been accomplished” during the investigators’ first full day at the scene at Bradley International Airport outside of Hartford. “We’ve requested a lot of documents, inspection and maintenance records for the propellers, airframe and engines,” she said. “Tomorrow we document and move the wreckage.”



McCauley and Michael Foster, the co-pilot from Jacksonville, Florida had just taken off with 10 passengers aboard when they reported engine trouble and circled to return back to the airport. The airplane hit the ground 1000 feet short of the runway threshold, Homendy said, before coming to rest atop a deicing shed.


The investigation into the factors that contributed to the loss of the four-engine, WW2-era bomber is certain to include more than just what happened and why.



Connecticut Senator Richard Blumenthal, a member of the Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee has asked the board to include in its probe, an analysis of the rules that allow nonprofit organizations like Collings to take passengers up on historic aircraft.



“There seems to be a gray area under the law relating to the oversight and scrutiny of these vintage planes that are flown by nonprofit foundations,” the Senator told me.



Blumenthal is referring to the fact that operators of vintage airplanes aka limited category special airworthiness certificate holders – and there are dozens of them in the United States – can either fly under Part 91 as general aviation or under Part 135 rules which allow fare-paying passengers with stricter requirements.


“How robust in practice are the oversight and scrutiny provisions that apply to them? That’s one question that’s both legal and factual,” Blumenthal said. “I’ve asked them to make these issues part of the investigation and recommendations they eventually make and I’m going to be doing my own investigation into both the legal adequacy of current regulations and the practical effectual adequacy of them.”



Blumenthal’s comments caused a commotion among many in the aviation community. Some suggested the Senator was seeking to ground the airplane. But Blumenthal says that’s not his intention.


“Let me emphasize, I am not advocating that these planes be grounded only that they be made safe, properly inspected and upgraded when necessary.”



At the Thursday evening press conference, Homendy made it clear that investigators are already trying to quantify the scope of safety events on the B-17 and other bombers still in operation.



“The NTSB has investigated 21 accidents involving WW2 era bombers. Three were B-17Gs but that does not include this accident”, Homendy said. “Of the 21, that resulted in 23 fatalities and one injury.”



Meanwhile, the names of the people who died in the accident were released. Besides the pilots mentioned above, the others were identified as: David Broderick and James Roberts of Massachusetts and Gary Mazzone, Robert Riddell and Robert Rubner of Connecticut.

---

RIP -

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

B-17 prelim report released??

"..Hmm...it will be interesting to watch the NTSB investigation unfold and what recommendations they eventually come out with. However, unlike the ATSB with the Angel Flight Mount Gambier accident report, I strongly suspect they won't be pulling any punches, or providing topcover for the FAA, while laying all blame at the feet of the Collings Foundation..."

 

Been a bit busy so I am a little bit late in getting this out but less than 2 weeks after the tragic crash of the B-17 at Bradley International Airport Connecticut. the NTSB have released their prelim report...

..On October 2, 2019, at 0953 eastern daylight time, a Boeing B-17G, N93012, owned and
operated by the Collings Foundation, was destroyed during a precautionary landing and
subsequent runway excursion at Bradley International Airport (BDL), Windsor Locks,
Connecticut. The commercial pilot, airline transport pilot, and five passengers were fatally
injured. The flight mechanic/loadmaster and four passengers were seriously injured, while one
passenger and one person on the ground incurred minor injuries. The local commercial
sightseeing flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations
Part 91, in accordance with a Living History Flight Experience exemption granted by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area
and no flight plan was filed for the flight, which departed BDL at 0947.

On the morning of the accident flight, an airport lineman at BDL assisted the loadmaster as he
added 160 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel to the accident airplane. The lineman stated that the
accident airplane was the first to be fueled with 100LL fuel that day.

According to preliminary air traffic control (ATC) data provided by the FAA, shortly after
takeoff, at 0950, one of the pilots reported to ATC that he wanted to return to the airport. At
that time, the airplane was about 500 ft above ground level (agl) on the right crosswind leg of
the airport traffic pattern for runway 6. The approach controller verified the request and asked
if the pilot required any assistance, to which he replied no. The controller then asked for the
reason for the return to the airport, and the pilot replied that the airplane had a "rough mag"
on the No. 4 engine. The controller then instructed the pilot to fly a right downwind leg for
runway 6 and confirmed that the flight needed an immediate landing. He subsequently
cancelled the approach of another airplane and advised the pilot to proceed however necessary
to runway 6. The approach controller instructed the pilot to contact the tower controller, which
he did.

The tower controller reported that the wind was calm and cleared the flight to land on runway
6. The pilot acknowledged the landing clearance; at that time, the airplane was about 300 ft agl
on a midfield right downwind leg for runway 6. The tower controller asked about the airplane's
progress to the runway and the pilot replied that they were "getting there" and on the right
downwind leg. No further communications were received from the accident airplane. Witness
statements and airport surveillance video confirmed that the airplane struck approach lights
about 1,000 ft prior to the runway, then contacted the ground about 500 ft prior to the runway
before reaching runway 6. It then veered right off the runway before colliding with vehicles and
a deicing fluid tank about 1,100 ft right of the center of the runway threshold.

The wreckage came to rest upright and the majority of the cabin, cockpit, and right wing were
consumed by postimpact fire. The landing gear was extended and measurement of the left and
right wing flap jackscrews corresponded to a flaps retracted setting. The flap remained
attached to the right wing and the aileron was consumed by fire. The flap and aileron remained
attached to the left wing and a section of flap was consumed by fire. The empennage, elevator,
and rudder remained intact. Control continuity was confirmed from the elevator, rudder,
elevator trim, and rudder trim from each respective control surface to the area in the cabin
consumed by fire, and then forward to the cockpit controls. Elevator trim and rudder trim
cables were pulled during impact and their preimpact position on their respective drum at the
control surfaces could not be determined. The left wing aileron trim tab remained intact and its
pushrod was connected but bent. The left aileron bellcrank separated from the wing, but the
aileron cables remained attached to it and the aileron cable remained attached in cockpit.

The Nos. 1 and 2 engines remained partially attached to the left wing and all three propeller
blades remained attached to each engine. One propeller blade attached to engine No. 1
exhibited an 8-inch tip separation; the separated section traveled about 700 ft before coming to
rest near an airport building. Another propeller blade on the No. 1 engine exhibited chordwise
scratching and leading edge gouging. The third propeller blade was bent aft. The No. 2 engine
propeller blades exhibited leading edge gouges and chordwise scratches.

The No. 3 engine was recovered from the top of the deicing tank. One blade was impact
damaged and near the feather position. The other two blades appeared in a position between
low pitch and feather. One propeller blade exhibited a 5-inch tip separation and the separated
tip sections were recovered from 100 ft and 700 ft from the main wreckage. The No. 4 engine
was recovered from the deice building. All three propeller blades on the No. 4 engine appeared
in the feather position.

The wreckage was retained for further examination.

A fuel sample was able to be recovered from one of the No 3. engine's two fuel tanks. The
recovered sample had a visual appearance and smell consistent with 100LL aviation fuel and
was absent of debris or water contamination. Following the accident, the fuel truck used to
service the airplane was quarantined and subsequent testing revealed no anomalies of the
truck's equipment or fuel supply. Additionally, none of the airplanes serviced with fuel from
the truck before or after the accident airplane, including another airplane operated by the
Collings Foundation, reported any anomalies.

The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land,
airplane multiengine land, instrument airplane, and held a type rating for the B-17. In addition,
he held a mechanic certificate with airframe and powerplant ratings. His most recent FAA
second-class medical certificate was issued on January 9, 2019. At that time, he reported a total
flight experience of 14,500 hours.

The co-pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine
land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane, with type ratings for B-737, B-757,
B-767, DC-10, and LR-Jet. In addition, he held a flight engineer certificate as well as a flight
instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine and instrument airplane. His most
recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on January 8, 2019. At that time, he
reported a total flight experience of 22,000 hours.

The airplane was manufactured in 1944, issued a limited airworthiness certificate in 1994, and
equipped with passenger seats in 1995. It was powered by four Wright R-1820-97, 1,200-
horsepower engines, each equipped with a three-blade, constant-speed Hamilton Standard
propeller. The airplane was maintained under an airworthiness inspection program, which
incorporated an annual inspection, and 25-hour, 50-hour, 75-hour, and 100-hour progressive
inspections. Review of maintenance records revealed that the airplane's most recent annual
inspection was completed on January 16, 2019. At that time, the airframe had accumulated
about 11,120 total hours of operation. Engine Nos. 1, 2, and 3 had 0 hours since major overhaul
at that time. Engine No. 4 had 838.2 hours since major overhaul at that time. The airplane's
most recent progressive inspection, which was the 100-hour inspection, was completed on
September 23, 2019. At that time, the airplane had been operated about 268 hours since the
annual inspection.

The recorded weather at BDL at 0951 included calm wind; 10 statute miles visibility; few
clouds at 11,000 ft; few clouds at 14,000 ft; broken clouds at 18,000 ft; temperature 23°C; dew
point 19°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.81 inches of mercury.

Hmm...not a hint of topcover or political correctness inside of any of that bare bones summary.

Here is a link for the Mount Gambier accident - see https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/inv...-2017-069/ and click on prelim report - note that at that point of the investigation the ATSB was already 2+ weeks behind and they hadn't even gathered the pilot's details or the wx information etc..etc?? But they had already established a possible causal link and bias with the charity Angel Flight's charter/purpose for being:

Several components and documentation were removed from the accident site for further examination by the ATSB.

The investigation is continuing and will include examination of the following:

- recovered components and available electronic data
- aircraft maintenance documentation
- weather conditions
- pilot qualifications and experience
- coordination and planning of the charity flight
- the use of private flights for the transfer of passengers for non-emergency medical reasons
- similar occurrences.

BRB verdict: Round 1 overwhelmingly to the NTSB...

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Indons release LionAir 737 MAX report inside of a year - 

The Alan Stray mentored NTSC have done themselves proud conducting, without fear nor favour, a comprehensive AAI and producing a final report inside of year of the tragic crash of LionAir Flight 610 (see HERE). 

The following is a basic summary courtesy of FLYING mag USA:

---

   
NTSC Issues Final Report on Last Fall’s Lion Air Accident

Report includes more than eight dozen findings.
By Rob Mark

Boeing’s 737-8 Max remains grounded one year after the crash of Lion Air 610.[i]Boeing[/i]

Aviators understand that aircraft accidents seldom occur because of a single misstep in the human or technological chain. They usually occur when a flight crew is overwhelmed by multiple human or technological failures within a short time span.

The Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi of Indonesia, also known as the National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC), issued its final report of the crash of Lion Air flight 610, a Boeing 737 Max, published almost one year to the date after the October 29, 2018, accident. The NTSC identified more than just a few factors that combined to bring the aircraft down in the Java Sea with the loss of all 189 people aboard.

With news coverage of the Max over the past year, it would be easy to point to the well-documented institutional failures at both Boeing and the FAA to explain what happened, but when the NTSC report is tied together with the NTSB report last month that detailed lapses in judgement at Boeing as the Max was developed, the report becomes even more damning. The NTSC also looked closely at the role of Lion Air personnel in the accident.

The NTSC’s 322-page accident report looks at the now infamous Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System on the 737 Max as the primary culprit, but with a host of contributing issues. The MCAS software was, for instance, actually triggered by faulty data being fed from a misaligned angle of attack indicator installed just before the accident flight by Lion Air maintenance, handled by Batam Aero Technic and a repair facility, Xtra Aerospace LLC.

The pilots of flight 610 were also faulted in the report. During the takeoff roll, the 737’s digital flight data recorder indicated a 21-degree difference between the captain’s and the first officer’s angle of attack (AoA) indicator, that the crew failed to notice. They also did not notice that the captain’s PFD showed a pitch attitude of -1 degree while the FO’s showed +13. Another weak spot was coordination between the two Lion Air pilots immediately after takeoff. The first officer tried to communicate with the captain early on but received no response. A few moments later the captain did not receive a response from the FO as he gave him instructions to try and manage the emergency. In the crew’s defense, the cockpit was inundated with a dozen, often conflicting, warnings.


The NTSC also called out the crew who flew the Boeing just prior to the accident flight. They were aware of a number of warnings they failed to mention after they landed in Jakarta. Nowhere did they mention, for example, that the Boeing’s stick shaker had activated on the earlier flight, something that might have spurred maintenance crews to further investigate the airplane before it was re-dispatched. During takeoff as flight 610, the stick shaker activated just as the captain lifted the nosewheel off the runway.

The NTSC analysis is divided into three distinct categories; findings, contributing factors and safety recommendations. “Findings are statements of all significant conditions, events or circumstances in the accident sequence,” the report said. “The findings are significant steps in the accident sequence, but are not always causal. Some findings point out the conditions that pre-existed the accident sequence, but are usually essential to the understanding of the occurrence, usually in chronological order.” The NTSC included 89 findings in this accident report.

Contributing factors are defined as actions, omissions, events, conditions, or a combination thereof, which, if eliminated, avoided or absent, would have reduced the probability of the accident or incident occurring—or mitigated the severity of the consequences of the accident or incident. The NTSC identified nine contributing factors and some 25 safety recommendations.


A few of the more prominent findings include the questions about why the failure of an MCAS functional test early in the program did not trigger a more intensive review by Boeing engineers, or why Boeing was able to certify MCAS by assuming that any well-trained flight crew would easily be able to identify and correct a runaway trim issue. Another question was why during Boeing’s functional hazard testing, the simulator test had never considered a scenario in which the MCAS activation allowed the stabilizer movement to reach the maximum MCAS limit of 2.5 degrees. A further question was why, in the event of MCAS activation with manual electric trim inputs by the flight crew, the MCAS function would reset, which would lead to subsequent MCAS activations. There are dozens more questions that Boeing will need to answer in the coming months.

Lion Air too offered some final comments to the NTSC’s report. “In its Final Report, the KNKT identified numerous design flaws in the Boeing 737-8 Max aircraft, Boeing’s failure to implement and conduct necessary operational safeguards and safety analyses during its design and development of MCAS, and the inadequate approval process that enabled Boeing to self-certify MCAS without appropriate oversight. The KNKT also found that Boeing failed to correct a known software error that inhibited the “AoA Disagree” alert from displaying on the pilots’ PFD, which would have alerted Lion Air that the left AoA sensor, which was feeding the incorrect data that activated the MCAS AND (nose down) commands, was malfunctioning.”

Coincidentally, the NTSC report was published just as Boeing CEO Denis Muilenburg is preparing to testify on the Hill about his company's involvement in creating the 737 Max. Although the document is novel-length, the NTSC's final accident report of Lion Air 610 represents a solid training opportunity for any pilot and is certainly worth the few hours it demands to digest the findings.

---

Could you ever imagine the Hooded Canary's mob coming out with a final report into such a complex politically and diplomatically fuelled AAI inside of a year? FDS it took the ATSB nearly three years to produce their 'famed' FR into flight QF 32 and who can forget the infamous over 5 year VARA ATR accident PC'd/topcover report, which saw a ATR 72 flog around for another 5 days and 13 sectors with a bent tail...

Top job NTSC...

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Boeing 737 MAX Congressional Hearings - 

Via the Flight Safety Foundation...

---

Flight Safety Foundation Responds to Latest 737 MAX Hearings
by FSF Communications Staff | October 29, 2019
Alexandria, Virginia — In a statement released today in response to the latest congressional hearing involving the Boeing 737 MAX grounding, Flight Safety Foundation President and CEO Dr. Hassan Shahidi said: “We commend Congress, the Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing, and the many airworthiness and accident investigation authorities for their rigorous review of these terrible tragedies. One thing is clear: The wonder of human flight can never be risk free, as those involved in designing, manufacturing, certifying, flying, and maintaining increasingly sophisticated aircraft cannot eliminate the prospect of human error. What we can and must do is apply lessons learned from these accidents and the resulting investigations and technical reviews to ensure the world’s safest form of transportation becomes even safer. What we cannot do is make airworthiness decisions based on politics or speculation, nor undermine the carefully built system of strong oversight, prudent delegation and reciprocal recognition in certification.”

###

About Flight Safety Foundation
Flight Safety Foundation is an independent, nonprofit, international organization engaged in research, education, advocacy and communications to improve aviation safety. The Foundation’s mission is to connect, influence and lead global aviation safety.
Media Contact:
Frank Jackman
Vice President, Communications
+1 703.739.6700, ext. 116
jackman@flightsafety.org

---

Media links about the hearings:

Documents show Boeing pushed to limit pilot training for 737 Max[/url]


Boeing Employees Flagged Concerns About 737 MAX 

From C Negroni Flying Lessons blog:
No Proof of Muilenburg’s Claim Boeing’s Self-Certification Makes Skies Safer

October 30, 2019

Among the many claims made by Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg that does not pass the smell test is the one he made on Tuesday, asserting that America’s broken process for certifying the airliners is in fact, enhancing air safety. Boeing has attained never-before-levels of autonomy in self-certifying the airworthiness of its designs after lobbying Congress for that authority and in fact, actually helping to write the new laws, according to The New York Times.  “The creation of the delegate authority has enhanced safety,” Muilenburg told members of the Senate’s Commerce Committee on Tuesday. “There has been a 90 percent improvement in safety, a portion of… Read More…

&..

Boeing Practiced in Hiding Information from Investigators

October 29, 2019

Boeing’s decision to keep from investigators text messages from 2016 in which a 737 Max test pilot, Mark Forkner, worried that there were egregious problems with the airplane’s flight control system prompted the Administrator of the Federal Aviation  Administration two weeks ago to demand answers from Boeing. In a letter to Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg, Steve Dickson wrote that he expected an immediate explanation. Likely, members of the Senate Commerce Committee will make a similar demand of Muilenburg when he testifies on Tuesday. To be clear, however, this is not the first time that Boeing purposefully withheld information that would have been useful to investigators…. Read More…

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MTF...P2 

[thorn bird]

Aviation safety investigations & reports
Technical assistance to the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines – Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board investigation of an accident involving a Beechcraft King Air 350, registered RP-C2298, about 41 km south of Manila, Philippines, 01 September 2019

Investigation number:
AE-2019-054
Status: Active  Investigation in progress
Phase: Evidence collection Read more information on this investigation phase
TAB - SUMMARY
Summary
On 1 September 2019, a Beechcraft King Air 350 aircraft registered RP-C2296, on an aeromedical flight from Dipolog Airport to Manila collided with terrain at Brgy. Pansol, Calamba, Laguna, Philippines about 41 km south of Manila. All of the 9 occupants received fatal injuries.

The Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines – Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board (AAIIB) requested assistance from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) to download the aircraft’s cockpit voice recorder (CVR).

To facilitate this support and to provide the appropriate protections for the CVR information, the ATSB appointed an accredited representative in accordance with paragraph 5.23 of ICAO Annex 13 and commenced an investigation under the Australian Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003.

The Philippines AAIIB is responsible for the investigation and release of the investigation report regarding this accident. Any enquiries regarding the investigation should be addressed to the Philippines Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board at the contact details listed below:

Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board

Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines

Email: aaiib@caap.gov.ph

Web: www.caap.gov.ph
General details

General details
Date: 01 September 2019 Investigation status: Active
Investigation level: Defined - click for an explanation of investigation levels
Location: Brgy. Pansol, Calamba, Laguna, about 41 km south of Manila, Philippines Investigation phase: Evidence collection
State: International Occurrence type: Collision with terrain
Occurrence category: Accident
Report status: Pending Highest injury level: Fatal
Aircraft details

Aircraft details
Aircraft manufacturer Beech Aircraft Corp
Aircraft model B300 (King Air 350)
Aircraft registration RP-C2296
Serial number FL-196
Operator Lionair
Type of operation Medical Transport
Sector Turboprop
Damage to aircraft Destroyed
Departure point Dipolog Airport, Philippines
Destination Manila, Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Philippines

The ATSB asked for assistance??? what were they thinking?? Should wrap it up in three years or so with a conclusion the pilot Dunnit.