Ops Manual dexterity.
The two events featured above, IMO – highlight a notable trend in the ATSB's background 'reporting' after the investigation. The 'need' for changes and amendments to the 'Operations Manual'.
This has featured in nearly all of the latest rounds of investigations to become almost a trend', alongside of some fairly 'basic' handling errors.
“A superior pilot uses his superior judgment to avoid situations which require the use of his superior skill.” (Borman).
A fair enough comment on the properly trained and disciplined pilot, but the 'training and discipline' element seems to be missing in some reported events. If the 'superior judgement' was not gained through superior training (include 'on-line) ; events like the G8 one above are almost inevitable. The part about 'avoiding' situations has very real implications; yet there is stark evidence that the ability to 'define and correct' is often 'lacking'. The G8 event a classic example; multiple opportunities to correct the approach path not taken; why? ATSB probably lack the time , resources and interest to take a long rearward look at the lead up to this event. That however is not the fault of the investigators. The 'radical' cause of this event can probably be backtracked to pre first solo, through to 'checked to line' with the public in the back.
We've probably all done it at one time or another – hot and high – albeit sometimes unavoidable; BUT, the first time, back in the beginning of training should begin to be the last time in routine operations. A briefing on where the 'mistake' began should be detailed, on the white board. Beginning with the selected 'top-of-descent' point, ending with the 'ways and means' available to correct the approach, circuit and landing. The 'ability' to modify the final stages of a flight (hot/high – low/slow etc.) is an essential part of the pilot's tool kit. So much for the 'formative years'.
Once junior has outgrown short pants and is signed on to do a 'grown-ups' job; there is a further 'training' regimen to close off. This begins with the 'Ops Manual' a.k.a. 'the Bible'. The modern version is full of stuff which will not affect the pilot as much as the operator. (I digress again). Part of 'the manual' is the Pilot Operating Manual' (POH) AND the company operating policy and techniques. These are 'important' elements, operationally and legally binding; should 'push come to shove': as it occasionally does. In short this 'stuff' must be beaten into the wooden head of the bright eyed junior warrior; (should they wish to become older warriors).
They say one cannot put an old head on young shoulders; one can (with persistence) teach 'em how to 'see' the impending stuff up; and,what to do if you have stuffed it all up. A junior commercial pilot, on a fine day, in a serviceable aircraft, in the country, getting 'out of shape' should never have had any reason to 'do' other than put a bit of power on, extend to circuit and return in good order to a routine approach and landing. This did not happen; ATSB reports the what, but to me, I'd want to know why. That could have gone horribly wrong; Murphy taking a day off is little excuse.
Whilst laudable amending 'the manuals', should not be necessary; if there were 'flaws' within then those should have been flagged early; the check to line should have identified any shortcoming in operating technique and corrected long before turning the pilot loose on the public. None of this is rocket science; been that way since Pontius went solo. The notion of 'blame' is redundant here; the name of the game is stopping those holes in those famous cheese slices to align. Ops Manual dexterity allowing.............
Right, I'll go back to my knitting now and sit quietly in a corner.
Toot – toot....
The two events featured above, IMO – highlight a notable trend in the ATSB's background 'reporting' after the investigation. The 'need' for changes and amendments to the 'Operations Manual'.
This has featured in nearly all of the latest rounds of investigations to become almost a trend', alongside of some fairly 'basic' handling errors.
“A superior pilot uses his superior judgment to avoid situations which require the use of his superior skill.” (Borman).
A fair enough comment on the properly trained and disciplined pilot, but the 'training and discipline' element seems to be missing in some reported events. If the 'superior judgement' was not gained through superior training (include 'on-line) ; events like the G8 one above are almost inevitable. The part about 'avoiding' situations has very real implications; yet there is stark evidence that the ability to 'define and correct' is often 'lacking'. The G8 event a classic example; multiple opportunities to correct the approach path not taken; why? ATSB probably lack the time , resources and interest to take a long rearward look at the lead up to this event. That however is not the fault of the investigators. The 'radical' cause of this event can probably be backtracked to pre first solo, through to 'checked to line' with the public in the back.
We've probably all done it at one time or another – hot and high – albeit sometimes unavoidable; BUT, the first time, back in the beginning of training should begin to be the last time in routine operations. A briefing on where the 'mistake' began should be detailed, on the white board. Beginning with the selected 'top-of-descent' point, ending with the 'ways and means' available to correct the approach, circuit and landing. The 'ability' to modify the final stages of a flight (hot/high – low/slow etc.) is an essential part of the pilot's tool kit. So much for the 'formative years'.
Once junior has outgrown short pants and is signed on to do a 'grown-ups' job; there is a further 'training' regimen to close off. This begins with the 'Ops Manual' a.k.a. 'the Bible'. The modern version is full of stuff which will not affect the pilot as much as the operator. (I digress again). Part of 'the manual' is the Pilot Operating Manual' (POH) AND the company operating policy and techniques. These are 'important' elements, operationally and legally binding; should 'push come to shove': as it occasionally does. In short this 'stuff' must be beaten into the wooden head of the bright eyed junior warrior; (should they wish to become older warriors).
They say one cannot put an old head on young shoulders; one can (with persistence) teach 'em how to 'see' the impending stuff up; and,what to do if you have stuffed it all up. A junior commercial pilot, on a fine day, in a serviceable aircraft, in the country, getting 'out of shape' should never have had any reason to 'do' other than put a bit of power on, extend to circuit and return in good order to a routine approach and landing. This did not happen; ATSB reports the what, but to me, I'd want to know why. That could have gone horribly wrong; Murphy taking a day off is little excuse.
Whilst laudable amending 'the manuals', should not be necessary; if there were 'flaws' within then those should have been flagged early; the check to line should have identified any shortcoming in operating technique and corrected long before turning the pilot loose on the public. None of this is rocket science; been that way since Pontius went solo. The notion of 'blame' is redundant here; the name of the game is stopping those holes in those famous cheese slices to align. Ops Manual dexterity allowing.............
Right, I'll go back to my knitting now and sit quietly in a corner.
Toot – toot....