[ventus45]

"V" - next morning - 7th April 2017.

I was going to make additional comments in the post above yesterday, about the differences in mindset between glider and power pilots, and their importance, but restrained myself from doing so.

Low an behold, this morning, I awake, and I see on my twitter feed, that Flight Safety Australia has done it for me, only an hour or so ago !

Read this:  "No Second Chances"

Gliding_f.jpg Size: 286.98 KB  Downloads: 140

http://auntypru.com/forum/editpost.php?pid=6791#

[P7_TOM]

Sully - ‘The short answer is, based on my experience and looking out the window, I could tell by the altitude and the descent rate that neither [airport] was a viable option,’ he told the magazine.

I get so very tired (old age grumpiness) of people degrading the ‘skills’ that make a first class pilot. Many, have much to answer for:-

Fancy footwork—learning (again) the importance of rudder.

Watch a formula car go into a ‘skid’ at a mere 140 KpH: the fact that it occurred is enough to make the purist belch. And that (mind you) is only in one dimension, in perfect conditions, with a whole support team and computer analysis. The average crop-duster works in three dimensions; day or night, with obstacles and not too much in the way of ‘support’; at those speeds all day and at night too. Tackle a bush firestorm at dusk, on one engine , then talk about 'flying skills'.

The Colombian lapped Monza in his Williams FW36 with an incredible average speed of 262.242kph (162.950mph) during the first part of qualifying, but despite setting the record, couldn’t match his time later in the session and qualified second for the race behind Rubens Barrichello. (FFS).

A dreary 130 knots; in perfect conditions; try to nail down an ILS on a ‘bad night’; the auto pilot can do it – every time. But these days, how many would relish and tackle a hand flown ILS, in the rough? Some still do; they respond to the challenge, glorying in the fact over a quiet ale later, that they can actually ‘do it’. These are of the true to the blood instinct, naturals who have learned and developed not just the skill, but the knowledge and confidence in that ability be rightfully called ‘skilled’. They are interested and did not just study to pass the exam; but to learn their trade from their lessons and carried those lessons into their profession as the basics of learning the job.

Pilots – gudduns: are not ‘bus drivers. They are easy to spot; watch the ballet of hands and feet, supported by the sound, feel and rhythm of wind, rain, engine; all senses engaged and that elusive charm, hard won experience. They are not particularly nice people, the profession is essentially a ‘lone wolf’ one; relying on self rather than herd. See it all the time – the jaw comes out as the head lowers and all attention is focussed on one end; getting the aircraft and the load home – in one piece. Cardboard cut out, autopilot dependents need not apply – unless HR is hiring exactly that. Those who understand will smile quietly; those who do not will be left, forever wondering WTD “V” and myself are banging on about. But we know “V”: we know it exactly.

Enough from me; bad old school influence on young minds. TOM 4 Genius 0. I may yet visit the houseboat stable, find a comfy seat and make it 6-0.

[Gobbledock]

Tom;

I get so very tired (old age grumpiness) of people degrading the ‘skills’ that make a first class pilot. Many, have much to answer for:-

Gotta say Tom I really enjoyed your post. It connected with me perfectly for some reason. Pilots do indeed fly using myriads of procedures and processes, but more than one pilot has saved the day care of 'gut instinct'. You can't rely 100% on it, but it comes with time, age and experience. And it is an important skill in a pilots toolkit.

I once saw first hand a 35 year veteran Qantas Gingerbeer headsetting an aircraft during pushback. The Gingerbeer stopped the push and told the PIC he 'heard something that wasn't right'. Captain responded 'nothing has lit up on the panel mate'. As the PIC was saying that a master caution lit up on engine 2. From memory it was a generator. Point is - by all rights the Gingerbeer should have known second, the flight deck should have had an indicator and horn first, then the Gingerbeer informed. How did the Gingerbeer know? Gut instinct and a finely tuned ear. Only 35 years of experience and probably 25 of those on 737's and General Electrics had honed his skill and instinct. To this day I enjoy this story over an ale....

'Safety before schedule'

[Kharon]

At the pinnacle of MNC.

“A second helping of Pony Pooh pudding, Vicar?”

One of the many reasons aeronautical elephants are so well liked by Aunt Pru is their incredible memories. Some of the ‘mature’ beasts residing at the houseboat sanctuary have particularly good ones, each generation holding specific details of the events which occurred during their working lives. It is easy, for those who wish to do so, to go back into history and provide a detailed picture of ‘significant’ events and factual analysis of the lead up to and the aftermath of those events. If nothing else is proven, beyond reasonable doubt, it is, unequivocally, that history is indeed repeated, by those who will not learn from it.

Far be it from me to decry or belittle the tremendous efforts made by RAAA, TAAAF, AAAA and AMROBA; or to dampen their enthusiasm for ‘dialogue’ with the powers that be. These expert industry groups and the inestimable Senate committee have generated enough energy to sustain yet another serious (expensive) attempt at true reform. The parallels to be drawn from 20 years back are remarkable, there are other similar events stretching back even further, which reflect the endless cycle: the persistent demand for changes; and, most importantly for true reform of the regulator and the regulations. Many of the current generation of 25 to 45 y.o. industry participants will not see the pattern emerging, they were but pups during the  subject event. Lets take a step back 20 years, then, lets have a look at ‘current’ events.

There are no prizes for making an accurate prediction of where this is all going to finish up – again. That is no challenge at all. The challenge lays in making sure that the same old wool is not pulled over the new, keen eyes of the next generation which must live and make a career or business out of the industry known as ‘aviation’.  {P2 - Gold star}.


February 1997

Vigorous debates in Parliament regarding CASA Board placements by Transport Minister John Sharp, who continued his criticism of the CASA Board in response to the Wheelahan report and Kimpton inquiry.

Australian, 13, 15 and 17 February 1997.

Some excerpts of historical & parallel intrigue...
Quote:April 1996

CASA board members rejected calls for their resignations from the new Minister for Transport and Regional Development, the Hon John Sharp MP.

Australian, 20 April 1996, 10 July 1997.
________________________________________

6 June 1996

NSW Coroner John Gould handed down findings into the 1993 Monarch Airlines crash critical of the airline, the former CAA and the NSW Air Transport Council. The Minister (Mr John Sharp) foreshadowed a review and other actions to address the report's recommendations.

Canberra Times, 7 June 1996; Minister for Transport Media Statement, 6 June 1996 TR46/96
________________________________________

25 June 1996

The Minister for Transport and Regional Development, the Hon John Sharp MP announced reviews of the regulatory framework and role in an aviation safety ministerial statement. (Why does that sound so familiar.. )  He also introduced the Civil Aviation Amendment Bill 1996 to increase the CASA Board size from four to six people. While the Opposition supported the Bill, it questioned the motives.

House of Representatives, Debates, 25 June 1996, p. 2653
________________________________________

26 September 1996

The Minister for Transport and Regional Development announced an industry-based panel to oversee the CASA regulatory review headed by Ansett's Mr James Kimpton. The review produced recommendations that could be implemented in 1998, while reporting monthly. Industry consultations continued throughout.
(Hmm..."Let's do the timewarp again.."
- but wait it gets worse.. )
Minister for Transport Media Statement 20 and 26 September 1996, TR101 and 110/96.
________________________________________

October 1996

The (Staunton) Report of the Commissioner of the Commission of Inquiry into the Relations Between the CAA and Seaview Air was particularly scathing of CAA operations and identified a number of systemic problems. Recommendations included action against two CAA officers, and suggested mechanisms for responsibility, accountability and documentation. The minister urged changes to CASA and its management board positions. BASI undertook a separate investigation of the incident.

House of Representatives, Debates, 8 and 9 October 1996, p. 5046; Sydney Morning Herald and Australian 9 October (& worse.. )
________________________________________

10 October 1996

The CASA Board released a media statement in relation to certain findings of the Seaview inquiry and lamenting comments about it made by the minister in Parliament.

Australian, 12 October 1996; Sydney Morning Herald, 10 October 1996.
&..
________________________________________

30 October 1996

A large newspaper advertisement with 512 listed names published, later found to be sponsored by the Aircraft Owners' and Pilots' Association, requested the CASA board members to stand aside. It followed the publication of a letter by the CASA Chairman stating why the board should remain in full control despite Ministerial denigration. Meanwhile, CASA developed a program known as Airspace 2000 planned for introduction in 1998. The scheme aimed to achieve an ICAO standard with the use of systems safety, harmonisation and staged delivery.

Australian, 21, 23, 25 and 30 October 1996; Canberra Times, 23 and 31 October 1996.

&.. worse
________________________________________


3 November 1996

Falcon Airlines plane crashed into the sea off Cairns with the occupants safely reaching the shore. The subsequent report by David Wheelahan QC found a possible conflict of interest between CASA, the airline and Minister John Sharp. The Minister had sought an independent report after stating that a response from CASA was inadequate.

AAP, 18 February 1997; Canberra Times, 8 November 1996.
________________________________________

19 November 1996

Concerns expressed in the letter of resignation of the CASA Director of Aviation Medicine Dr Robert Liddell, caused the Minister to ask the Board to reconsider safety.

Minister for Transport, Media Statement TR152/96; Age, 27 November 1996.
________________________________________

5 December 1996

Government response to the Plane Safe report tabled by the Minister for Transport and Regional Development the Hon John Sharp MP. (Refer to 14 December 1995). It included a monthly CASA update on safety breaches. The Senate decided to investigate the purchase of Australia's new search and rescue equipment after faults were found.

Minister for Transport, Media Statement TR167/96; Australian, 6 and 9 December 1996; Age 6 December 1996.
________________________________________

February 1997

Vigorous debates in Parliament regarding CASA Board placements by Transport Minister John Sharp, who continued his criticism of the CASA Board in response to the Wheelahan report and Kimpton inquiry.

Australian, 13, 15 and 17 February 1997.

Then finally in September 1997 John Sharp was given the bullet:
Quote:26 September 1997

CASA Director Mr Leroy Keith left after the Board passed a no-confidence motion in his management strategy. Chairman Justice William Fischer and member Dr Clare Pollock both resigned in protest at the Board's handling of the former Director. The New Minister for Transport and Regional Development, the Hon Mark Vaile MP, replaced Mr John Sharp.

Australian Financial Review, 26 September

P2 – “There is no doubt many critics of the tumultuous John Sharp period as the Minister responsible for aviation safety. However there is also IMO no doubt that Sharp understood his role as a Minister for the Crown and that he was in a dog fight with an entrenched bureaucracy operating solely in their own self-interest. Not in the interest of the travelling public nor for the betterment of Australian aviation safety standards”...

Sandy - Rex Deputy Chairman and Director of Rex Mr Sharp opens his defence of Rex with the modest statement that he's been "associated " with Rex for some time.

I believe President Trump is revisiting the question of retiring Government officials getting work with those private companies that were previously in the officer's area of jurisdiction. Personally I think they should not because there's no doubt its a grey area and our democracy should, like justice, be seen to be fair.

One may now see why the research done, the efforts made and even the threads in Aunt Pru’s knitting are, I believe, important. The total shambles which has emerged, unscathed from a history of total resistance to meaningful change. The  paying of lip service to demanded reform, the  premeditated connivance, with intent, to deceive the minister and the parliament; to thwart ICAO, denigrate the FAA and tell the Rev. that his report was merely ‘an opinion’ all symptoms chronic, all  a result of repeated history.

Yet our purblind minister is content to watch this expensive charade, this black pantomime repeat; believing, despite history and evidence, that all is rosy in the garden. Well It ain’t. Every fool in the Souk knows this. The question is, do we fall for it all over again?  Make no mistake; the machine is in action, working hard to confound, confuse and deflect. The snake oil salesmen are preparing their next advertising campaign to sell their dodgy lotions, potions and placebos. If we fail, this iteration, to achieve meaningful, tangible, demonstrable reform, in another 20 years the new entrants of today will have to fight this same battle, all over again.

"If men could learn from history, what lessons it might teach us! But passion and party blind our eyes, and the light which experience gives us is a lantern on the stern which shines only on the waves behind."  Samuel Taylor Coleridge.

Selah..

[Peetwo]

Is (ICAO) Thor armed with a hammer or a wet lettuce leaf -

According to Hoody's media minion (but not the twitter minion), ICAO 'Thor' is already here strolling the halls of the ATSB HQ...

Via the ATSB 'News' website:

Safety boost from Thor’s ICAO audit

Thor Thormodsson has spent the past eight years travelling the world undertaking safety oversight audits for the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).


The Continuous Monitoring Coordinator from ICAO’s Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme is a commercial and instrument-rated pilot. He believes his work makes a significant difference to safety, especially in nations with less sophisticated safety oversight.

“What we find is that in some of these countries there might be fewer resources devoted to aviation transport safety,” the former Iceland accident investigator said.

“This can manifest in, for example, a lack of training and documented procedures as well as less robust reporting culture around incidents.

“There is no doubt there are dedicated people working in these places but it is when we identify specific issues, and demonstrate how they can affect safety, that our work makes a difference.”

Based at ICAO headquarters in Montreal, and armed with a technical/business degree from the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in the US, Thor lives and breathes his auditing—to the point where he applies it to himself.

A keen footballer for many years before turning to distance running Thor, 53, was keen to take on a triathlon. A full body audit identified major flaws in his swimming.

“You really need to be competent in the freestyle which meant I needed to do a lot of work to get me through a 1500m swim in a Standard distance triathlon which also includes a 40km bike ride and a 10km run,” he said.

“I will put my training to the test in June when I do my first triathlon, back in Montreal.”
In the meantime Thor will complete his ICAO audit of the ATSB and schedule in several other audits, south and north of the equator.

He says his job has taken him to fascinating places, often with customs he feels ‘obligated’ to participate in. On a few occasions, this has resulted in headaches the morning after.

“On the whole, my job is highly rewarding,” he said. “It keeps me in touch with the outside world. I perform an audit, then go back to the country and see significant differences due to the audit findings and safety recommendations.”

Thor, who is on his first visit to Australia, hopes his personal audit will result in similarly positive outcomes in his first triathlon.

Naturally Thor can’t comment on the ATSB audit before it’s completed, but we can be sure it will be used only to further enhance aviation transport safety in Australia.

ICAO auditor Thor Thormodsson likes to keep fit with outdoor activities
 



Last update 11 April 2017 

Not sure why Hoody's media minion is drawing attention to the fact that 'ICAO Thor' is here auditing the ATSB..   However after a short background check, if the intention is to flatter and therefore placate the dude, nice try but I think the minion may have 'Buckley's or none'...
Excerpt from a Kathryns Report blog post : http://www.kathrynsreport.com/2014/01/ai...-body.html

On November 9, 2012, investigators of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) completed their probe into the crash which revealed that the incident occurred after the pilot lost control of the aircraft. The ICAO report also termed the CAA investigation report, available on its website, as incomplete and lacking vital information.

The reinvestigation, carried out by ICAO Technical Officer Dr Andre Dekok and Standards and Procedure Officer Thormodur Thormodsson, claimed the SIB was not an independent and impartial organization and could not investigate air crash incidents in a transparent manner. They had recommended that the SIB be turned into an independent entity to avoid misinformation and bureaucratic influences.

“At the ICAO’s headquarters in Montreal a few months back, we advised the ICAO to exert pressure on the Pakistani government to declare the SIB an independent entity,” Hamid said, adding that unless it became an autonomous body, the SIB would not be able to reveal errors of its parent organization (CAA).

 Hmm...shades of PelAir in that lot...  

P7 (snipe) - Not kidding. Should fit right in with the ‘match fit’ crowd; two quick outings with Hoody and Halfwit, he’ll be tho thor he cant pith; anywhere, anytime. Will he enter the ‘wool-pulling’ comp; or, just join in the knitting – Pel one, Kintair two for a nice woolly jumper? Anything but make ATSB ‘independent’ they’d all rather jump off the nearest bloody cliff first.

Yes; yes, two more here barkeep: I know, but I’m in good company when drinking alone. MTF.

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

PAIN/IOS WTD ATSB QRH -    

Not sure why Hoody's media minion is drawing attention to the fact that 'ICAO Thor' is here auditing the ATSB..   However after a short background check, if the intention is to flatter and therefore placate the dude, nice try but I think the minion may have 'Buckley's or none'...
Excerpt from a Kathryns Report blog post : http://www.kathrynsreport.com/2014/01/ai...-body.html

On November 9, 2012, investigators of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) completed their probe into the crash which revealed that the incident occurred after the pilot lost control of the aircraft. The ICAO report also termed the CAA investigation report, available on its website, as incomplete and lacking vital information.

The reinvestigation, carried out by ICAO Technical Officer Dr Andre Dekok and Standards and Procedure Officer Thormodur Thormodsson, claimed the SIB was not an independent and impartial organization and could not investigate air crash incidents in a transparent manner. They had recommended that the SIB be turned into an independent entity to avoid misinformation and bureaucratic influences.

“At the ICAO’s headquarters in Montreal a few months back, we advised the ICAO to exert pressure on the Pakistani government to declare the SIB an independent entity,” Hamid said, adding that unless it became an autonomous body, the SIB would not be able to reveal errors of its parent organization (CAA).

 Hmm...shades of PelAir in that lot...  

P7 (snipe) - Not kidding. Should fit right in with the ‘match fit’ crowd; two quick outings with Hoody and Halfwit, he’ll be tho thor he cant pith; anywhere, anytime. Will he enter the ‘wool-pulling’ comp; or, just join in the knitting – Pel one, Kintair two for a nice woolly jumper? Anything but make ATSB ‘independent’ they’d all rather jump off the nearest bloody cliff first.

Yes; yes, two more here barkeep: I know, but I’m in good company when drinking alone. MTF.

Some more helpful references for Herr Thor...

"K" on a WTD ATSB: re Essendon B200 accident investigation...

What’s wrong with these statements?

“Investigators unravel web of companies behind doomed Essendon Airport flight”.

"The question over who was responsible for the flight is still being investigated by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau."

Why FDS are the ATSB investigating legal responsibility, while the priority – determining the radical cause of the accident is still not known? The ‘legal’ ins and outs are CASA’s bailiwick and have sod all to do with the ATSB investigation into cause of accident. There is nothing in the ‘responsibility’ paper trail which will define or explain what occurred during the nine seconds of flight. It is understandable that ATSB would take a great deal of interest in the maintenance aspects, a very keen interest in reported ‘snags’, routine servicing and aircraft general airworthiness. But why waste ‘scarce resources’ investigating who was responsible for, who authorised and who paid for that maintenance; CASA should be able to furnish that information at the click of a mouse button. If they can’t then it is time to investigate CASA (again).

This passion for laying blame and seeking avenues to ‘prosecution’ before we even have a blind clue about the cause always clouds the accident investigation picture; there is always someone ‘in the gun’ before the dust has settled let alone the ‘cause’ is fully known. ATSB need to focus on that, not the intricate details of ‘responsibility’. That is what CASA is for, unless of course they are, once again, part of the causal chain.

Toot toot.

TSBC on a WTD ATSB: Peer review report

Recommendations
The TSB Review is making 14 recommendations to the ATSB in four main areas:

• Ensuring the consistent application of existing methodologies and processes
  
• Improving investigation methodologies and processes where they were found to have deficiencies
  
• Improving the oversight and governance of investigations
  
• Managing communications challenges more effectively.
  

Recommendation #1: Given that the ATSB investigation methodology and analysis tools represent best practice and have been shown to produce very good results, the ATSB should continue efforts to ensure the consistent application and use of its methodology and tools.
Recommendation #2: The ATSB should consider adding mechanisms to its review process to ensure there is a response to each comment made by a reviewer, and that there is a second-level review to verify that the response addresses the comment adequately.
Recommendation #3: The ATSB should augment its DIP process to ensure the Commission is satisfied that each comment has been adequately addressed, and that a response describing actions taken by the ATSB is provided to the person who submitted it.
Recommendation #4: The ATSB should review its risk assessment methodology and the use of risk labels to ensure that risks are appropriately described, and that the use of the labels is not diverting attention away from mitigating the unsafe conditions identified in the investigation.
Recommendation #5: The ATSB should review its investigation schedules for the completion of various levels of investigation to ensure that realistic timelines are communicated to stakeholders.
Recommendation #6: The ATSB should take steps to ensure that a systematic, iterative, team approach to analysis is used in all investigations.
Recommendation #7: The ATSB should provide investigators with a specific tool to assist with the collection and analysis of data in the area of sleep-related fatigue.
Recommendation #8: The ATSB should review the quality assurance measures adopted by the new team leaders and incorporate them in SIQS to ensure that their continued use is not dependent on the initiative of specific individuals.
Recommendation #9: The ATSB should modify the Commission report review process so that the Commission sees the report at a point in the investigation when deficiencies can be addressed, and the Commission's feedback is clearly communicated to staff and systematically addressed.
Recommendation #10: The ATSB should undertake a review of the structure, role, and responsibilities of its Commission with a view to ensuring clearer accountability for timely and effective oversight of the ATSB's investigations and reports.
Recommendation #11: The ATSB should adjust the critical investigation review procedures to ensure that the process for making and documenting decisions about investigation scope and direction is clearly communicated and consistently applied.
Recommendation #12: The ATSB should take steps to ensure closure briefings are conducted for all investigations.
Recommendation #13: The ATSB should provide clear guidance to all investigators that emphasizes both the independence of ATSB investigations, regardless of any regulatory investigations or audits being conducted at the same time, and the importance of collecting data related to regulatory oversight as a matter of course.
Recommendation #14: The ATSB should implement a process to ensure that communications staff identify any issues or controversy that might arise when a report is released, and develop a suitable communications plan to address them.

Senate RRAT committee with a WTD ATSB: PelAir cover-up report

List of Recommendations

Recommendation 1

3.68      The committee recommends that the ATSB retrieve VH-NGA flight data recorders without further delay.

Recommendation 2

4.41      The committee recommends that the minister, in issuing a new Statement of Expectations to the ATSB, valid from 1 July 2013, make it clear that safety in aviation operations involving passengers (fare paying or those with no control over the flight they are on, e.g. air ambulance) is to be accorded equal priority irrespective of flight classification.

Recommendation 3

4.43      The committee recommends that the ATSB move away from its current approach of forecasting the probability of future events and focus on the analysis of factors which allowed the accident under investigation to occur. This would enable the industry to identify, assess and implement lessons relevant to their own operations.

Recommendation 4

4.69      The committee recommends that the ATSB be required to document investigative avenues that were explored and then discarded, providing detailed explanations as to why.

Recommendation 5

4.78      The committee recommends that the training offered by the ATSB across all investigator skills sets be benchmarked against other agencies by an independent body by, for example, inviting the NTSB or commissioning an industry body to conduct such a benchmarking exercise.

Recommendation 6

4.79      The committee recommends that, as far as available resources allow, ATSB investigators be given access to training provided by the agency's international counterparts. Where this does not occur, resultant gaps in training/competence must be advised to the minister and the Parliament.

Recommendation 7

4.87      The committee recommends that the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 be amended to require that the Chief Commissioner of the ATSB be able to demonstrate extensive aviation safety expertise and experience as a prerequisite for the selection process.

Recommendation 8

4.101      The committee recommends that an expert aviation safety panel be established to ensure quality control of ATSB investigation and reporting processes along the lines set out by the committee.

Recommendation 9

4.103      The committee recommends that the government develop a process by which the ATSB can request access to supplementary funding via the minister.

Recommendation 10

6.41      The committee recommends that the investigation be re-opened by the ATSB with a focus on organisational, oversight and broader systemic issues.

Recommendation 11

6.52      The committee recommends that CASA processes in relation to matters highlighted by this investigation be reviewed. This could involve an evaluation benchmarked against a credible peer (such as FAA or CAA) of regulation and audits with respect to: non-RPT passenger carrying operations; approach to audits; and training and standardisation of FOI across regional offices.

Recommendation 12

6.55      The committee recommends that CASA, in consultation with an Emergency Medical Services industry representative group (eg. Royal Flying Doctor Service, air ambulance operators, rotary wing rescue providers) consider the merit, form and standards of a new category of operations for Emergency Medical Services. The minister should require CASA to approve the industry plan unless there is a clear safety case not to. Scope for industry to assist as part of an audit team should also be investigated where standardisation is an issue. This should be completed within 12 months and the outcome reported publicly.

Recommendation 13

6.58      The committee recommends that a short inquiry be conducted by the Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport into the current status of aviation regulatory reform to assess the direction, progress and resources expended to date to ensure greater visibility of the processes.

Recommendation 14

7.15      The committee recommends that the ATSB-CASA Memorandum of Understanding be re-drafted to remove any ambiguity in relation to information that should be shared between the agencies in relation to aviation accident investigations, to require CASA to:
•advise the ATSB of the initiation of any action, audit or review as a result of an accident which the ATSB is investigating.
• provide the ATSB with the relevant review report as soon as it is available.

Recommendation 15

7.16      The committee recommends that all meetings between the ATSB and CASA, whether formal or informal, where particulars of a given investigation are being discussed be appropriately minuted.

Recommendation 16

8.35      The committee recommends that, where relevant, the ATSB include thorough human factors analysis and discussion in future investigation reports. Where human factors are not considered relevant, the ATSB should include a statement explaining why.

Recommendation 17

9.18      The committee recommends that the ATSB prepare and release publicly a list of all its identified safety issues and the actions which are being taken or have been taken to address them. The ATSB should indicate its progress in monitoring the actions every 6 months and report every 12 months to Parliament.

Recommendation 18

9.40      The committee recommends that where a safety action has not been completed before a report being issued that a recommendation should be made. If it has been completed the report should include details of the action, who was involved and how it was resolved.

Recommendation 19

9.42      The committee recommends that the ATSB review its process to track the implementation of recommendations or safety actions to ensure it is an effective closed loop system. This should be made public, and provided to the Senate Regional and Rural Affairs and Transport Committee prior to each Budget Estimates.

Recommendation 20

9.44      The committee recommends that where the consideration and implementation of an ATSB recommendation may be protracted, the requirement for regular updates (for example 6 monthly) should be included in the TSI Act.

Recommendation 21

9.45      The committee recommends that the government consider setting a time limit for agencies to implement or reject recommendations, beyond which ministerial oversight is required where the agencies concerned must report to the minister why the recommendation has not been implemented or that, with ministerial approval, it has been formally rejected.

Recommendation 22

9.77      The committee recommends that Airservices Australia discuss the safety case for providing a hazard alert service with Fijian and New Zealand ATC (and any other relevant jurisdictions) and encourage them to adopt this practice.

Recommendation 23

9.104      The committee recommends that the relevant agencies review whether any equipment or other changes can be made to improve the weather forecasting at Norfolk Island. The review would include whether the Unicom operator should be an approved meteorological observer.

Recommendation 24

9.106      The committee recommends that the relevant agencies investigate appropriate methods to ensure that information about the incidence of, and variable weather conditions at, Norfolk Island is available to assist flight crews and operators managing risk that may result from unforseen weather events.

Recommendation 25

9.108      The committee recommends that the Aeronautical Information Package (AIP) En Route Supplement Australia (ERSA) is updated to reflect the need for caution with regard to Norfolk Island forecasts where the actual conditions can change rapidly and vary from forecasts.

Recommendation 26

10.35      The committee recommends that in relation to mandatory and confidential reporting, the default position should be that no identifying details should be provided or disclosed. However, if there is a clear risk to safety then the ATSB, CASA and industry representatives should develop a process that contains appropriate checks and balances.

Rev Forsyth with a WTD ATSB: ASRR report

Just getting warmed up but there's a small selection of reading material for Herr Thor that IMO truly qualifies as independent and expert opinion of the ATSB. However if he wants a very informed, pragmatic and qualified take on the real issues with the current version of the ATSB, IMO Thor couldn't go past the inestimable Senator David Fawcett...

 

Of course Thor will not do any of that because he will be required to strictly adhere to some warm & fluffy agreed ToR...

However I wouldn't have thought that would stop certain elected parliamentary representatives from dropping Herr Thor a line to find out what exactly it is he is scoped to look into...


MTF...P2

[Gobbledock]

He of mighty hammer

Hmmmm, we will see. ICAO are happy to drop some hammer on non-westernised countries but tend to take the 'tick and flick wet lettuce approach' to the supposedly democratic Anglo-American led nations.

I don't want to kick Thor in the head, yet, but there are some very very obvious and glaring aberrations with Australian oversight, and the ATsB decline under Beaker and Hoody is more obvious than a boil on Miranda Kerr's chin. The way ICAO has allowed the MH370 debacle to be carried out is nothing short of woeful and leaves me with little to no confidence, sorry. I am yet to see any improvements to Government oversight in the past 20 years.

I guess Thor's back

Tick Tock Herr Thor. The results of your UN funded ollie jollie will either see you elevated to the IOS Hall of Fame wall, complete with plaque, picture and ceremonial toasts annually, or it will result in us sticking your giant hammer up your ass and demanding you never return.....

P.S If Hoody invites you out to late night cocktails, please exercise your risk management skills and be cautious.

'Safe ICAO hammer wielding mythical Gods for all'

[thorn bird]

Bit of a good Friday ramble but reading through all of the above, what I wonder is:-

1. Our regulator is hell bent on wiping out all forms of aviation beyond RPT or the military, who by their size, political power and financial resources are somewhat immune to the imposts of over regulation. For nefarious reasons we stakeholders at the bottom of the pile could never comprehend.

2. Our regulator like their regulations infested with inane concerns for legal liability, blinding them to practical, common sense solutions to risk management.

3. Is it time to swallow our pride and accept that the rest of the world is not necessarily wrong, anymore than we are not necessarily right? Accept that our regulator in their arrogance and ineptitude has embarked on a folly that has bought ruin to an industry and has achieved none of the aims set for it by government and squandered vast sums of public money on a myth for no appreciable return?

4. Is it time to embrace the best of the rest of the world while there is still a chance to prevent an industry from complete collapse?

From the time we get out of bed every facet of our daily life carries risks which we must choose to manage, or not as is our wont, its called freedom of choice.
Our bureaucrats have taken it upon themselves to attempt via the criminal code, in our industries case, to legislate common sense thus closing off any likelihood of liability falling on them or the government for every choice or action we. or they, may choose to take. We see this not just in our own industry, bureaucrats are meddling  in almost everything we do in our daily lives.

Speed - "One of the other signs of the rule of the regulator is the attempt to reverse the onus of proof so that the regulators can get convictions to send a clear message to the rest of the community. The Australian courts are a real impediment to regulators in this regard as they insist that no one is presumed to be guilty unless proved so. However, if an Act reverses the onus of proof a court can do nothing."

Trouble is, the more they meddle, the more the "unforeseen"consequences of their meddling needs to be addressed, creating a never ending cycle of action and reaction, creating ever mounting restriction and cost.

For aviation, overlaying all this is the self interests of all the parasitic industries that have sprung up to feed off the aviation industry as a result of bureaucratic meddling. The security Industry, big banks who control our major airports, development sharks who control our secondaries, the regulator itself who operate in their interest rather than the industry they regulate, unions, and the myriad of self interest groups within the industry itself, all creating cacophonous political noise that overwhelms the political classes ability to see the wood from the tree's.

This has allowed the regulator and its stable mates and minions to subtly position themselves outside the law, empower themselves to the point where they can even dismiss a minister who attempts to rein them in and open a conduit for their more senior managers to avail themselves to the trough of soft corruption.

The current arguments over what is "legal", what is not, what is "legal", against what is common sense, what is "legal" what makes no sense, all illustrates the confusion that exists within our Industry caused by regulatory malfeasance.

In 2009 Robin speed wrote a warning article "The rise and rise of the regulator". Courtesy Pro Aviation.


It is sobering when you finally realize, just how right he was.

[Peetwo]

Thor ToR & ICAO & IATA reoccurring theme -  


Reference:

Safety boost from Thor’s ICAO audit

Thor Thormodsson has spent the past eight years travelling the world undertaking safety oversight audits for the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

Excerpt from a Kathryns Report blog post : http://www.kathrynsreport.com/2014/01/ai...-body.html

On November 9, 2012, investigators of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) completed their probe into the crash which revealed that the incident occurred after the pilot lost control of the aircraft. The ICAO report also termed the CAA investigation report, available on its website, as incomplete and lacking vital information.

The reinvestigation, carried out by ICAO Technical Officer Dr Andre Dekok and Standards and Procedure Officer Thormodur Thormodsson, claimed the SIB was not an independent and impartial organization and could not investigate air crash incidents in a transparent manner. They had recommended that the SIB be turned into an independent entity to avoid misinformation and bureaucratic influences.

“At the ICAO’s headquarters in Montreal a few months back, we advised the ICAO to exert pressure on the Pakistani government to declare the SIB an independent entity,” Hamid said, adding that unless it became an autonomous body, the SIB would not be able to reveal errors of its parent organization (CAA).

Now I am not sure if there is a connection to the Australian ICAO audit but I do wonder whether the following article (via airport-technology.com), on IATA's call for renewal of international stakeholder aviation safety commitments, maybe reflected in Thor's ToR for his contribution to the Oz ICAO audit...

IATA urges stakeholders to reinforce aviation safety commitment

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The International Air Transport Association (IATA) has requested aviation safety stakeholders to strengthen their commitment to a safety framework based on global standards, cooperation and dialogue, and effective use of data.

IATA director general and CEO Alexandre de Juniac claimed that air accident investigation is a major area where greater cooperation on global standards is required.

Juniac said: “Safety is the top priority for all involved in aviation—and aviation is the safest form of long-distance travel.

“Last year there were over 40 million safe flights. That’s an achievement that we can all be proud of. And it was made possible by a framework that incorporates respect for global standards, cooperation and the value of data.”

"To learn from an accident, we need reports that are complete, accessible and timely."

A recent study has revealed that of the approximately 1,000 accidents that occurred over the last decade, accident reports for only 300 of them were available and of those many had scope for improvement.

Juniac added: “To learn from an accident, we need reports that are complete, accessible and timely.

"We also need states to fully respect the standards and processes enshrined in global agreements for participation in the investigation by all specified parties.”

Aviation safety can also be improved with proper communication between regulators and industry in order to ensure that industry experience and know-how is suitably incorporated into new regulations and standards.

The governments need to share adequate data, consult with industry, and support the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) as it frames a global aviation security plan.
According to Juniac, more information is also required to enhance safety regarding the use of drones around airports and their potential hazard to aviation.

  
Hmm...this is it the bit that should ring alarm bells (but probably won't - ) for the Murky Mandarin and his minions...
...“To learn from an accident, we need reports that are complete, accessible and timely.

"We also need states to fully respect the standards and processes enshrined in global agreements for participation in the investigation by all specified parties.”

Aviation safety can also be improved with proper communication between regulators and industry in order to ensure that industry experience and know-how is suitably incorporated into new regulations and standards...
Just saying...

MTF...P2

[Gobbledock]

The hammer wielding Thor;

...“To learn from an accident, we need reports that are complete, accessible and timely.

Well there is a 3/3 failure for the ATsB! And when dealing with Australia Thor needs to add 'honesty', 'transparency', 'factual', and 'not spun'.

Thor Thor Thor, you are dealing with Australian governmental dishonesty, coverups, obsfucation, 'protection' and incompetence. Ref; Willyleaks 2017 under the headings of Pumpkin Head, Mandarins, incompetence and pony pooh.

[Kharon]

Subtle, but crystal clear.

IATA urges stakeholders to reinforce aviation safety commitment

The International Air Transport Association (IATA) has requested aviation safety stakeholders to strengthen their commitment to a safety framework based on global standards, cooperation and dialogue, and effective use of data.

IATA claim over 400 ‘strategic’ partners and to represent 265 airlines (or) 83% of total airline traffic.

The call from IATA to reinforce safety commitment is significant, not only in relation to the national ‘safety program', but more directly to accident investigation. Thankfully, not many have been through an ‘accident’ process – from soup to nuts. In the end it always come down ‘insurance’ and liability. The court room battles are the stuff of legal legend and have made many fortunes for those who slug it out. There is one common factor amongst the 265 airlines represented by IATA – they all have it – insurance.

Big business – huge, massive beyond belief. With the indulgence of the ‘experts’ let’s take a layman’s look at what ‘insurance’ means. For ease of reference, think of a flow chart in the ops manual, say the one which relates to aerodrome lighting and alternate requirement. You go in at the top left; follow the lines through the decision boxes and pop out at the bottom with the answer. Insurance ‘risk’ matrix may be thought of in this way, the ‘risk’ is quantified and the premium required for insurance is determined by the ‘risk’ or the financial exposure to the insurer that risk presents.

Now, lets say there is a ‘pattern’ a trend if you will emerging, in, for example baggage doors on aircraft being left open at pushback. One incident will not upset the insurers risk assessment; shit happens right. However, once this has happened a few times, and several claims have been paid out, the small alarum bell in the risk assessors office rings. This fellah now wants to know what’s going on. When this ends in court the ‘official’ (read ATSB) report will be relied on. If that report says that the one person only was ignoring the company SOP, then the risk matrix is unruffled. If that report says that the company had a flawed procedure, which has been addressed and the risk of a repeat has been mitigated, then the risk matrix may ‘keep an eye’ to make sure of this, but the risk assessor is now wide awake. Then, one grim day an aircraft ploughs in due to a large door being left open; this rings the big bell. Preventable accident. The quality of the ‘official’ reports on previous incidents and the categorisation of the same are suddenly important. The insurer may, rightfully argue that the reporting had failed to identify an increased risk trend, passing it all off as a one company, one man aberration.

When the chips are down and there is big money on the table the probity, clarity and accuracy of ‘official’ reports becomes significant; this questions the ‘categorisation’ of incident. Had the first few incidents been categorised and analysed correctly, could the accident have been prevented? How is the risk assessor to evaluate the potential for a serious event against flawed, fluffy reports. Expand this to a world wide IATA level and you can see why there are little bells ringing in the big end of town.

Not that it matters, not in the long run; bulldoze the wreck, bury the dead, add few bucks to the cost of a ticket, a couple of legal companies make some more dough and the Earth continues to spin in its orbit. But you can see why IATA is calling for ‘reinforcement’ of safety commitment ; the big end of town need a reliable donkey to pin a tail on, government statements make this beast easy to identify. The fattest being the beast which will be sued for the recovery of claim monies.

Toot - apologies to the experts - toot.

[Peetwo]

ICAO Thor's ToR & CASA COO progress?  

Reference:

PAIN/IOS WTD ATSB QRH -    

...Just getting warmed up but there's a small selection of reading material for Herr Thor that IMO truly qualifies as independent and expert opinion of the ATSB. However if he wants a very informed, pragmatic and qualified take on the real issues with the current version of the ATSB, IMO Thor couldn't go past the inestimable Senator David Fawcett...

 

Of course Thor will not do any of that because he will be required to strictly adhere to some warm & fluffy agreed ToR...

Update to the above -

I have it on good authority that unlike the 2004 ICAO individual 'special request' audit of the ATSB - see HERE - the ICAO Thor audit is part of the combined ICAO USOAP CMA (continuous monitoring approach) audit of Australia. Therefore there are no specific ToR and the objectives of the audit are to review Australia's compliance and/or accepted notified differences to all ICAO SARPs. (Reference: Latest version of NDs - H158/16) 

Therefore there will be a number of ICAO Thor type pencil necks doing the rounds of M&M's department & minion agencies - hmm interesting times ahead...

 KC & AMROBA on ASRR R21 & R22.

Somewhat related I note that KC put out a paper that confronts the lack of progress on ASRR R21 & R22, while putting forward a suggested model that embraces the concepts and principles of an ICAO civil aviation system organisational structure:

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MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

A singular rap for the Mike Smith CV

Reference Avmassi: http://www.avmassi.com/about-us/our-team...smith.html

..Since leaving the Australian Civil Service, Mike has been engaged as a senior consultant by airlines and aviation regulators around the world, predominantly advising clients in the areas of regulatory reform, ICAO USOAP and FAA IASA compliance and the introduction of Safety Management Systems and risk based oversight principles into their organizations. Recent clients include the World Bank and the civil aviation administrations of Singapore, the UAE, Nigeria and Bahrain. Mike led the World Bank funded program that gained IASA category one status for Nigeria in 2010, allowing that country’s airlines to operate to the USA. Nigeria remains one of only six African nations to hold that status...

This is what the Mike Smith legacy has invoked in the aviation safety administration in Nigeria...

Aviation safety in Africa not negotiable

Opinion | 23 June 2017, 1:00pm

Victor Kgomoeswana

Unlike with schools, where a high failure rate of students can almost be equated to the inability of the teacher to teach, instead of the learners’ inability to learn, failure by airlines to meet certification of any civil aviation authority is a welcome sign.

Nigeria just earned my respect when 26 airlines abandoned the process to secure certification.

Aviation is a way of life, as flying cars and drones are encroaching on our airspace. Countries of the world face a rising probability of objects falling out of the sky, be they medical supplies being dropped in a controlled manner by drones - as we have seen in Rwanda - or planes crashing into a residential area.




The latter happened in Lagos on June 3 2012, when the engine of Dana Air Flight 992 failed and the plane slammed into a building, killing 153 people on board and 10 on the ground.

It was reassuring, therefore, to read a report in Daily Trust that at least “26 airlines have discontinued the process for the acquisition of the Air Operator Certificate over stringent conditions set by the Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA)”.

Not long after the crash in June 2012, Nigeria embarked on a campaign to align its aviation safety standards with global norms.

As Africa’s largest nation in terms of population and, depending on who counts or when, the size of the economy, Nigeria does not have the luxury to operate as an island. It is the hub of West Africa, making it the capital of an economic bloc of 15 states and more than 300 million people. Its proximity to London and most of Europe, the US and its oil industry, diversifying economy and vibrant culture of entrepreneurship can only signify pressure to satisfy an array of expectations - beyond Africa.

It was therefore not surprising that the NCAA, the National Airspace Management Agency (Nama) and every allied agency in the aviation industry had to act in concert to improve the image of Nigeria’s airlines, airports and safety standards. Every nation with an airline or airport worth its salt knows that to acquire a respectable implementation score under the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), it has to effectively implement measures across different areas.

These include legislation, accident investigation, organisation, licensing, airworthiness and air navigation services.

Unless the country in question is Eritrea, Haiti or Kyrgyzstan - all red-flagged by the ICAO - it has to maintain continuous monitoring and improvement. Although the ICAO is the global mother body of aviation, countries’ civil aviation authorities also strive for affirmation by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) of the US.

Known for its obsessive safety and security consciousness, the US through the FAA awarded Nigeria Level 3 State Safety Programme (SSP) in January. Although it admitted that it had implemented only 43.6% of the required SSP tasks, the NCAA proudly stated that “only two member states - Australia and Sri Lanka - had achieved full implementation of the SSP according to ICAO records”.

It added that Nigeria would like to achieve such excellence by the end of the year. As expected, airlines hoping to take to the skies of Nigeria can look forward to a steep ascent to accreditation. No wonder these 26 applicants abandoned their efforts; and that is good for Nigeria because they knew that the NCAA would not cut them any slack.

When boarding a plane, only 100% confidence in the ability of the pilot to take off and land safely is a minimum. Unless the airline is forced to comply 100% with the standards of its civil aviation authority, no safety is guaranteed.

This is an encouraging sign that aviation in Africa could be coming of age; paving the way for intra-Africa trade and true global integration. Anything less than stringent testing would not do.

Victor Kgomoeswana is the author of Africa is Open for Business and weekly columnist for Sunday Independent. Twitter Handle: @VictorAfrica.

Calling bollocks on this..
"...the NCAA proudly stated that “only two member states - Australia and Sri Lanka - had achieved full implementation of the SSP according to ICAO records”.


MTF...P2


Ps Come on ICAO the world deserves better than this 'tick-a-box' routine for compliance of ICAO Annex 19...

[Peetwo]

A blast from the UP past -

Mayday..mayday..mayday!

---

Top catch SIUYA at post #782 & #785….
“..SUMMARIES OF DISCUSSIONS

Topic 2.5: Implementing new safety management process

44. There was unanimous support for the establishment of a new Annex [19] to the Convention dedicated to safety management responsibilities and processes..”

Meanwhile, in Fort Fumble’s parallel universe, the middle management minions were busy enacting their MAP to roger DJ and the ATsB, while attempting to cover up their obvious shortcomings to properly oversight the PelAir operation.

Anyone else see the irony in the two universes?

List of Participants

AUSTRALIA

MCCORMICK J. CD
FARQUARSON T. ACD
TIEDE A.H.R. ANC
ALECK J. D
BOYD P. D
BROOKS L. D
DOHERTY J. D
EVANS P.K. D
MACAULEY K. D

Looking at all the participants from Oz, I also find it more than ‘passing strange’ that Beaker’s crew did not get a look in?? After all the principle body that is fundamental to a successful State SSP is it’s fully independent AAI.

Oh well perhaps bean counter Beaker’s budgetary constraints couldn’t stretch to paying a couple of economy class airfares to Montreal…

In regards to Annex 19 & in the context of the WLR panel report, unlike CAsA, hopefully the panel will have not missed the significance and importance that ICAO place on Annex 19 as the lynch pin that ties all the other ICAO SARPs together. This significance was certainly not missed by several of the submitters to the WLR, who have asked for the Govt to seriously consider reviewing/updating our version of the SSP (State Safety Program i.e. Annex 19).

Examples…

Sports Aircraft Association of Australia (SAAA) submission:

2) The Government review the State Safety Program (SSP)

a) The SSP concept as articulated in Annex 19 is the basis of how a State administers aviation oversight and reporting at the state level and internationally to ICAO.
b) Recommend the Government overhaul the SSP and use it to administer all aviation activities in Australia not as a spectator role it takes at present.

Australian Lawyers Alliance (ALA) submission:


5. In light of the Pel-Air and Transair air disasters, Australia should update its State Safety Program in recognition and reflection of Australia’s adherence to safety management standards set out in Annex 19 to the Chicago Convention which entered force on 14 November 2013, to assure the public of confidence in future regulator oversight and surveillance of operators.

It is worth reflecting on the ALA submission because the main author of their submission was Joseph Wheeler from Shine Lawyers. This bloke has a real handle on our obligations, as a signatory state, to the ICAO SARPs and in particular Annex 19. Couple of quotes from the ALA submission…

“…Despite Australia’s admirable domestic and international air safety record, and its respected place among International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) States, Australia does not occupy as high a place as it should in terms of international adherence to ICAO standards and recommended practices (SARPs) – the principal measure of a nation’s air safety oversight obligations…”

And from Part ‘5. Systemic oversight issues following Lockhart River crash in 2005’…

“…In the aftermath of the Lockhart River crash it is recognised that the broader trend worldwide towards risk assessment and management led to the development and approaches being implemented at the operational level by CASA. See for example, the publication “SMS for Aviation – A practical guide: Safety Management System Basics”.51

The ALA’s submission is that while there is now a proactive aviation atmosphere with respect to safety risk management for aviation service providers, as evidenced by CASA’s reliance on such principles in preparing its own responses to SARPs on fatigue risk management and drug and alcohol risk management in aviation, these principles should also not be forgotten in the broader context of the results which can eventuate in the absence of such principles in guiding surveillance or oversight of AOC holders (such as the crash at Lockhart River).

Thus, the ALA recommends and endorses updating of the Australian State Safety Program, as published on the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development’s website, as this was last considered in April 2012, well before the commencement of Annex 19.52 The benefit of this would be to demonstrate to the public the Government’s continuing adherence to regulatory oversight and surveillance at a national level and inspire confidence in smaller air operators to embrace safety risk management principles in the management of their aviation businesses…”

Joseph Wheeler has also produced some excellent articles, published on the Shine Lawyers blog site, on the MH370 search and accident investigation:

MH370 investigation: roles, responsibilities and rule changes
MH370 Preliminary Report released

But his latest article perhaps best highlights the essential role that ICAO play in governing how a signatory state must predictively act after a tragic air disaster has occurred.

MH370 search for answers and ICAO work to track airliners

One rule in Annex 13 is that countries which have a special interest in an accident by virtue of fatalities or serious injuries to its citizens are entitled to “have access to relevant factual information which [are] approved for public release by the State conducting the investigation, and information on the progress of the investigation”: Ch 5.27 at 5-8 – 5-9. While it has been argued that no-one knows better than accident investigators the importance of their role (to make aviation safer) we maintained (less than 2 weeks after the aircraft’s disappearance) that:

… passengers’ families need to be represented within investigations, both during the search phase and during the investigation phase. … It is only these people, with their human feelings and passionate concerns for answers (owing to their unique losses and experience), which can serve to remind investigators of the reason they are doing what they are doing – to prevent the suffering which has been caused to family members – not the lofty ambition of “making aviation safer” (a trite comment in the context of the shared global pain of those hoping with the families of MH370 passengers to get answers).

We do not depart from those views.

In this case the ICAO SARPs, along with international community, has helped remind the Malaysians of their obligations to the victims and their families of flight MH370.

Joseph Wheeler’s article also displays how all the ICAO SARPs are intrinsically linked. If you follow the JW Annex 13 reference (i.e. Ch 5.27):

5.27 A State which has a special interest in an accident by virtue of fatalities or serious injuries to its citizens shall be entitled to appoint an expert who shall be entitled to:
a) visit the scene of the accident;
b) have access to the relevant factual information which is approved for public release by the State conducting the investigation, and information on the progress of the investigation; and
c) receive a copy of the Final Report.

This will not preclude the State from also assisting in the identification of victims and in meetings with survivors from that State.

Note.— Guidance related to assistance to aircraft accident victims and their families is provided in the Guidance on Assistance to Aircraft Accident Victims and their Families (Circ 285).
Link for Circ 285 HERE & ICAO Annex 9, Chapter 8, Section (I) can be viewed HERE

yr right’s comments…

“…SMS what by any other name is basic common sense. Same as Human factors is. But oh gee we now all have to do it or we are all unsafe. Its these extras that at the end of the day don't really amount to anything but are costing industry heaps…”

“…At the end of the day ICAO whilst it sounds good…”

yr right is right that SMS & Annex 19 is yet another impost to industry stakeholders and is largely based on ‘common sense’. yr right is not right when it comes to ICAO and their SARPs.

Since the Chicago Convention 1944, the ICAO SARPs have been evolving and are produced from over a 110 years of collective (some tragically) international air safety lessons learnt. Those bothersome Human Factors experts may have had a large part in the writing and design of Annex 19, however their combined efforts are not just based on a whim. HF experts in aviation basically study why it is we humans continue to make fundamental errors while committing aviation. They also look at ways to lessen the occurrence & severity of these errors. Annex 19 is a reflection of HF expert research over a good 50 or so years.

That is why it is a total abomination that our numb nuts in CAsA and the Dept (there are Dept names in that list) have the audacity to spend untold millions of taxpayer monies going on junkets to Montreal to show, on paper at least, that we are an ICAO compliant State. But in reality we are merely paying lip service to the ‘Spirit & Intent’ of over 70 years of collective ICAO wisdom…

One can only hope that the ALA recommendation 5 features somewhere near the top of the list of WLR recommendations and the miniscule takes heed, hopefully sometime before Mr ICAO eventually comes knocking…

TICK bloody TOCK!

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

Blueprint for RRP harmonisation - i.e. Adopting NZed rule set.

In the course of doing some research/dot joining on M&M's department and aviation safety minion involvement in the ICAO APAC region, in particular PASO, I came across a long (over 800 pages - ) but fascinating ADB (Asian development bank) document:

Technical Assistance Consultant’s Report

This consultant’s report does not necessarily reflect the views of ADB or the Government concerned, and ADB and the Government cannot be held liable for its contents. (For project preparatory technical assistance: All the views expressed herein may not be incorporated into the proposed project’s design.

Project Number: 43429

February 2014

Regional: Institutional Strengthening for Aviation Regulation

(Financed by the ADB’s Technical Assistance Special Fund)

Now I am not suggesting that anyone would be remotely interested in reading the full TA consultant's report, however to get the gist of why I think this is an important report it is worth referring to certain chapters from volume 1:

References -

2. HARMONISATION OF AVIATION LAW Pg 12 - 34

New Zealand Law as Model Law

2.78 As noted above the global approach to civil aviation safety is highly dependent upon

all Chicago Convention contracting States giving effect to the provisions of the

Convention and the SARPs in their national law. This should mean that, regardless

of regional arrangements, a high degree of uniformity or harmonisation of law should

be achieved among all the contracting States. However as noted in the LTR the

correct implementation in national law of the key provisions of the Chicago

Convention and the many thousands of SARPs is an extremely challenging task.

The significance of the collaborative regional arrangements agreed in PICASST

therefore is that the parties to that treaty have agreed that New Zealdand aviation law

can be used as model law.

2.79 On analysis it can be seen that the objective of achieving harmonisation of aviation

law among PASO member States involves two levels. At one level the object is to

achieve harmonisation between the SARPs and national law; and at another more

practical level the PASO member States propose to harmonise their national law

among themselves based on New Zealand law. In other words, the practical

harmonisation exercise should achieve compliance with SARPs as well...

---

New Zealand Secondary Aviation Legislation

2.103 A feature of the New Zealand regulatory system is that there are very few statutory

regulations and orders (i.e. made by the Head of State) in favour of extensive civil

aviation rules (i.e. made by the Minister of Transport)...

2.107 The most significant body of secondary aviation legislation therefore consists of the

Civil Aviation Rules divided into numerous different parts based upon the same

subject matter part numbers used in the United States Federal Aviation Regulations.

The current list of New Zealand Civil Aviation Rules in force is as follows...

3. PRINCIPLES OF SAFETY REGULATION Pg 35 - 48

The Nature of Responsibility

3.6 The principles of civil aviation regulations have been tried and tested over a number

of years (as outlined above). Both the State and the operator have responsibilities

for the safe conduct of flight operations. The principles essentially rest on the nature

of responsibility:

• the State is responsible for setting national standards for the safety of civil

aviation (air navigation) and seeking compliance with those standards; and

• the operator is responsible for the safe conduct of its operation and to comply

with any regulations the State may promulgate.

3.7 Thus there is a division of responsibility between the State and the operator over

matters of civil aviation safety and operation and the public interest.

3.8 In carrying out its responsibilities under the Convention, New Zealand has enacted

specific legislation to provide for the development and promulgation of a code of rules

and recommended practices (that will be consistent with the Annexes to the Chicago

Convention).

Role of the Safety Regulator

3.9 In developing a code of rules for flight safety and security a State can adopt

provisions that will govern its role in the implementation of the rules. Thus a State

may adopt an active role in the implementation of the various rules or it can adopt a

passive role. The role a State, or civil aviation safety authority, adopts is crucial to

the development of a safe and orderly civil aviation system.

3.10 An active role is one where the State will promulgate, in some detail, the rules and

regulations which prescribe the standards for the safety of flight operations. But

regardless of the detail these rules and regulations can never, on their own, provide

the operator with comprehensive instructions on which to base an operation. But

more importantly, an active role is one where the State may adopt a high level of

functional supervision characterised by close surveillance and domination of the

conduct of operations along with the ongoing provision of support and advice

(perhaps on a day-to-day basis) to ensure operators remain within the rules

(prescribed operating standards).

3.11 A passive role is the other extreme. In a passive role the State would have limited,

even no involvement in the functional supervision of operations. Its role in this case

would be limited to investigatory action and the initiation of legal proceedings when

operators broke the rules. In this situation the interpretation and implementation of

civil aviation rules would rely on the competence of the operator and be left entirely to

the operator. With a passive role the State effectively relies on the threat of

enforcement action for compliance.

3.12 So, on the one hand it can be argued that an active role tends to be counter

productive for several reasons:

• too detailed rule making may stifle the development of civil aviation (since rule

making usually lags technical and operational development);

• too much detailed checking by civil aviation safety regulatory inspectors may tend

to dilute an operator’s responsibility for safety in its operation (and may not

necessarily lead to a high level of safety); and

• detailed and frequent inspections require resources proportional to the amount of

activity in civil aviation (and so vast State resources may be required).

3.13 On the other hand it can be argued that a passive role would lead to abuses in the

conduct of civil aviation and at the same time leave very limited means to detect such

abuses before an accident has occurred. A completely passive authority will have

difficulty in keeping up with technical and operational developments in aviation33.

Moreover, some operators do not have the capability to consistently interpret and

apply rules and standards correctly. So, with the lack of functional supervision, this

would mean that the State would not be able to assess whether rules and standards

are being complied with. The State, therefore, would be unable to properly exercise

the necessary preventive and corrective action and so be unable to fulfil its

responsibility.

3.14 Non compliance is immediately apparent under an active regulatory regime and more

difficult to identify in a passive regulatory environment. As a result the cost of

corrective action and enforcement under a passive regime is likely to be relatively

high because of the amount of investigatory effort needed in the light of limited or no

information that would be otherwise collected and available under an active regime.

3.15 From a different perspective it can be argued that an abundance of civil aviation rules

standards, orders and instructions would enable regulators to escape the need to

justify their decisions in cost-benefit terms. (This could be interpreted as a negative

and blunt view). Similarly, it could be argued that an abundance of rules standards

and other requirements would safeguard the public interest that would not otherwise

be protected. (This could be interpreted as a positive and reasoned view). The truth

of the matter is somewhere between these two arguments.

3.16 In many developed aviation countries there has been a trend in recent years to adopt

a role for State authorities that is active but system-orientated. This is based on the

fact that the operator has ultimate responsibility for the safety of its operation. By

system-orientated it is mean the authority relies more on the overall system safety of

an operation rather than detailed “nuts and bolts”. Thus more emphasis is placed on

the operators’ management capabilities (through quality and safety assurance) rather

than regulatory inspectors (through quality and safety control).

3.17 Whether a state adopts a more passive or more active role in the implementation of

its responsibilities for flight safety depends on a number of factors:

• the actual balance (or allocation) of responsibility between the State and the

operator (ie do operators truly accept and exercise responsibility for the safe

conduct of their operations or do operators expect the State to carry some or

most of this responsibility);

• the perceptions and expectations of operators (and perhaps, too, the public);

• the capability of the State;

• the capability of the operators;

• the State’s philosophical approach to public policy and management;

• the economic justification (cost-benefit) within the State’s resources;

• the degree to which the State wishes to promote, control or restrict civil aviation;

and

• the level of sophistication and maturity of the civil aviation industry itself.

3.18 ICAO guidance material states “that considerable merit exists in a balanced approach

to reflect the division of responsibility between the State and the operator. Here the

overall State regulatory system falls between the active and passive extremes” and in

line with the technological, economic, social and legal environment of the civil

aviation system. New Zealand has adopted a systems orientated approach that

appears to be less active overall than the above factors may otherwise suggest.

(This relatively passive role is probably more a result of limited public resources,

especially financial, than a deliberate public policy.)

3.19 The point is that the New Zealand civil aviation regulatory and safety oversight model

is based on a systems-orientated approach where the New Zealand civil aviation

administration has adopted a role that is between a passive and active one that is

influenced by the safety performance of the operators or participants. However, an

individual State may wish to adopt a more passive role and this is entirely a matter for

the State to decide.

3.20 Prior to the establishment of PASO it would be fair to say that possibly apart from Fiji

most Forum Pacific Countries had adopted by default a passive role in the regulation

of civil aviation safety – this was simply because they lacked the capacity to do

otherwise.

The New Zealand Regulatory Model

3.21 Safety in any civil aviation system is dependent on a system of rules and statutory

requirements that reflect the State’s international obligations, domestic laws, the

state of development of its aviation system and public expectations. The legal

framework is underpinned by a set of principles that can be regarded as together

constituting a safety “philosophy”. In New Zealand’s case, that philosophy has its

origins in the Swedavia-McGregor Report of 198834, tempered by experience since

then.

3.22 A key principle of civil aviation safety regulation in New Zealand is that individuals

and operators are expected to act responsibly without excessive regulatory

intervention. For its part, CAANZ has an obligation to be fair, consistent and timely in

the performance of regulatory functions and to ensure that its interventions are well

informed and effective. Neither the CAANZ nor the industry has all the information

and expertise needed to bring about safety improvements and must collaborate to

achieve safety objectives without compromising the role of the CAANZ in protecting

the public interest.

3.23 The CAANZ has found that the assumption of a responsible industry must be

regularly tested and a regulatory approach maintained that is flexible enough to

address a wide spectrum of performance levels and safety attitudes. As noted

above, at one extreme the regulator can be so involved in detail matters that it can

stifle operations. At the other extreme it can be too “stand back” with little or no

involvement in operational matters, responding only when things go wrong. The

ideal lies between those two extremes.

3.24 In general, operators must establish and follow a safety management system which

sets out how they intend to discharge their responsibilities. The safety management

system becomes the basis for entry into, and operation within, the aviation system.

Operators must also provide training and supervision for their employees and

sufficient resources to ensure compliance with relevant safety standards. Individuals

exercising privileges in terms of an aviation document must be “fit and proper” to

exercise those privileges. These provisions remain the cornerstone of the safety

regulatory approach followed in New Zealand.

3.25 The Director of Civil Aviation has the core responsibility of exercising control over

entry into the aviation system, monitoring performance and enforcing compliance

with the Civil Aviation Act and rules made under that Act. Without hindering the

Director’s responsibility to exercise discretion and judgement in individual cases,

these powers and functions are exercised within a consistent policy framework that is

understood by the aviation community. The Director uses objective decision tools for

determining the action to be taken in response to safety failure...

---

3.55 However, the important point for present purposes is to distinguish between the

institution which employs all the required administrative and technical staff and the

individual statutory officers who exercise specific regulatory powers conferred upon

them by the States’ primary and secondary aviation legislation. In particular, the

States’ primary aviation legislation needs to be very clear about the roles and

responsibilities of the various individuals and institutions comprising the States’ total

aviation system.

3.56 For example, the New Zealand Civil Aviation Act begins with a long title that states it

is an Act “to establish rules of operation and divisions of responsibility within the New

Zealand civil aviation system in order to promote aviation safety”. Further analysis of

the Act reveals that it apportions functions, duties, powers and responsibilities as

appropriate to all those involved in the aviation system.

3.57 The Minister is given responsibility for the State’s international obligations and

making civil aviation rules to implement the ICAO SARPs; a Civil Aviation Authority is

established to appoint a Director of Civil Aviation and to exercise governance

responsibilities over funding and staffing resources required to regulate aviation; the

Director of Civil Aviation is the person who exercises specific statutory power as an

independent safety regulator (i.e. independently of the Minister and the Civil Aviation

Authority); and all persons wishing to participate in the civil aviation system are

required to hold the appropriate aviation documents and carry out their activities

safely and in accordance with the safety standards prescribed in the Civil Aviation

Rules.

3.58 In the case of the New Zealand model (and the States which have established similar

arrangements) it is therefore crucial that there should be no role confusion. The

Minister takes political responsibility for the safety oversight of the civil aviation

system, is responsible for the State’s treaty obligations, makes civil aviation rules and

develops the State’s aviation policy. The Civil Aviation Authority is established to

exercise governance responsibilities over the resources required for safety regulation

and oversight of the civil aviation system (including monitoring the Director’s prudent

management of all expenditure), but at the same time respecting the Director’s

independent statutory role as the safety regulator.

---

Purpose of a Civil Aviation Authority

3.67 In the New Zealand Model the objective or purpose of the civil aviation authority is to

“undertake its safety, security and other functions in a way that contributes to the aim

of achieving an integrated, safe, responsive, and sustainable transport system”.42

The Civil Aviation Act was amended in 2004 to align the purpose or objective of the

Civil Aviation Authority with the 2002 New Zealand Transport Strategy, which mainly

focused on land transport. At the time this amendment was adopted there was

aviation industry apprehension as to the advisability of such a change while in some

quarters there was alarm that the amendment was politically motivated.43 Prior to

this amendment the ‘principal function’ of the New Zealand civil aviation authority was

to “undertake activities that promote safety in civil aviation at reasonable cost”.44

3.68 It is up to each State to determine the purpose of its civil aviation authority (and civil

aviation administration). It is proposed that the purpose of a civil aviation authority is

simply:

To promote safety in civil aviation at reasonable cost for the benefit of the

people of <the particular State>.

3.69 Thus the purpose of a civil aviation authority is to administer civil aviation safety

legislation and carry out specific functions relating to the regulation of aviation safety

for the benefit of the people of its own country. And to be carried out in an effective

and efficient manner where the value of the cost to the nation is measured against

the value of the resulting benefit to the nation.

3.70 The benefit of improved safety in civil aviation is not necessarily confined to an

individual nation – there are consequential regional benefits too. For example, all

people flying into and out of and within a particular Pacific Island country benefits

from improved civil aviation safety. This has direct benefits to economic, social and

political development..etc.

8. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Pg 114 - 123

Harmonisation of Aviation Law

8.22 At the international level the Chicago Convention together with the numerous SARPs

contained in the 19 Annexes to the Convention provide the basis for a high level of

uniformity of law or “harmonisation” at the national level.

8.23 Implementation of this harmonised law at the national level however is very

challenging. The member States have therefore all agreed to use New Zealand

aviation law as model law. This is being done by the member States progressively

enacting statutes based on the New Zealand aviation statutes and also adopting the

New Zealand Civil Aviation Rules.

8.24 Using New Zealand law as model law involves making numerous assumptions. Two

key assumptions are that New Zealand will keep its aviation law up to date and

compliant with the SARPs; and that the member States will also continue to keep

their aviation law up to date.

8.25 It is recommended that the PASO member States, through PASO, develop a close

working relationship with the New Zealand aviation law-making organisations namely

the Ministry of Transport and CAANZ in order to be able to sustain a high level of

harmonisation on a long term basis. PASO will require specialist legal resources to

fulfil this role for the member States.

Principles of Safety Regulation

8.26 Although the SARPs strictly only apply to international civil aviation, in practice all

States apply them to both international and domestic civil aviation. It would be

impractical to have two codes.

8.27 Each State has a choice whether to adopt an active role or a passive role in the

supervision of its aviation industry. An approach that is too active can stifle

innovation and discourage operator responsibility. An approach that is too passive

may not detect systemic failure until an accident occurs.

8.28 In practice, a balanced approach is required which is a feature of the New Zealand

regulatory model. New Zealand has a reasonably active risk-based approach

influenced by the safety performance of the participants in the industry. A balanced

approach reflects an appropriate division of responsibility between the State regulator

and the industry participants.

8.29 A key principle of safety regulation in New Zealand is that individuals and

organisations are expected to act responsibly without excessive regulatory

intervention. This cannot be assumed however. The regulatory approach must

address a wide spectrum of performance levels and safety attitudes. In general, the

larger the aircraft the higher the safety standards that apply.

8.30 The Director of Civil Aviation has the core responsibility for exercising control over

entry into the civil aviation system, monitoring performance and enforcing compliance

with the law. The exercise of discretion and judgement in individual cases is made

within a consistent policy framework.

8.31 The Director can employ active intervention strategies to correct non-compliances

ranging from support and advice, closer monitoring, imposition of conditions,

enforcement action or ultimately revoking aviation documents.

8.32 Entry control, surveillance, enforcement and exit control is supplemented by

information gathering and analysis in order to monitor effectiveness, potential

systemic problems, future risk assessment and determining appropriate strategies

and interventions.

8.33 The CAANZ safety oversight system manages all the required data and decisionmaking

through an intranet that has replaced the need to maintain hard copy

controlled manuals.

8.34 The intranet system enables compilation of accurate risk profiling and compliance

history for each aviation document holder. Audit frequency, scope and sample size

are determined by the assessed risk level and safety performance of operators, both

collectively and individually.

8.35 This risk profiling enables the effective deployment of appropriate surveillance tools

such as routine audits, special purpose audits, investigations and spot checks.

8.36 A systems-based approach is taken to non-compliances detected upon audit so that

corrective action is taken, not just in response to the individual non-compliance but

also to the system’s deficiency or error that contributed to the non-compliance. The

status of audit findings and corrective actions are tracked by the CAANZ intranet data

available to all operational staff.

8.37 It is recommended that the PASO member States move progressively from a work

programme of routine cyclical oversight inspections to a more active systems and

safety risk-based approach based on the New Zealand oversight model.

8.38 To implement the New Zealand oversight model the States’ safety regulator must

have: appropriate policy; the support of their Minister; the support of the industry; and

adequate funding.

8.39 At a practical level the States must also have access to individuals with knowledge,

skill and experience, effective ICT and reliable safety information and data. These

should be available through PASO.

8.40 The effectiveness of the State safety oversight system also involves ensuring the

States’ institutional arrangements are appropriate. The most critical one is the

separation of aviation provider functions from the States’ regulatory functions.

8.41 It is also important to distinguish between the institution which employs all the

required administrative and technical staff and the individual statutory officer (the

Director of Civil Aviation) who exercises specific regulatory powers conferred by the

States’ primary aviation legislation.

8.42 The States’ primary aviation legislation needs to correctly apportion functions, duties,

powers and responsibilities between all those involved in the aviation system. There

should be no confusion. In particular the Director must at all times be able to

exercise independent statutory power in accordance with law, fairly and reasonably...

P2 comment - IMO this comprehensive ADB report provides a perfect blueprint to design a regulatory framework that would fully support transitioning to and regionally harmonising with the NZ system of civil aviation safety administration and laws. The economic mutual benefits in trade and tourism alone, I believe would far outweigh the nearly half a billion dollars the Australian government has invested so far on the 30+ year RRP. Which is still years from completion and has largely created an unusable, unreadable, outdated, cumbersome set of regulations that no-one else in the world is interested in adopting...

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

CASA: How about we leave it to the experts?  

This actually seems like a pretty smart move by Comardy Capers? Via IATA.org:

Australia and IATA agree safety audit MoU

10 July 2017

IATA Operational Safety Audit will be used in assessing authorization of foreign registered aircraft into, out of and within Australia



Australia’s Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) will now use the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) as a tool to complement their oversight of non-Australian registered airlines operating to and from Australia.

CASA will use IOSA following the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with IATA.

Australia is the first country in the Asia-Pacific region to use IOSA as part of its safety oversight of airlines

IOSA is an evaluation system designed to assess the operational management and control systems of an airline.

Under the MoU, CASA will use information from the IOSA Audit Reports in assessing authorization of foreign registered aircraft into, out of and within Australia.

CASA’s use of IOSA will help reduce the number of audits foreign airlines need to undergo in order to operate to/from Australia—while maintaining a high level of safety oversight through adhering to the global standards and recommended practices which are the basis of IOSA.

Australia is the first country in the Asia-Pacific region to use IOSA as part of its safety oversight of airlines.

However could this be just another just another bureaucratic Fat Cat/Iron Ring 'trough' protecting exercise by CASA...  
MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

CASA: How about we leave it to the experts?  

This actually seems like a pretty smart move by Comardy Capers? Via IATA.org:

Australia and IATA agree safety audit MoU

10 July 2017

IATA Operational Safety Audit will be used in assessing authorization of foreign registered aircraft into, out of and within Australia



Australia’s Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) will now use the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) as a tool to complement their oversight of non-Australian registered airlines operating to and from Australia.

CASA will use IOSA following the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with IATA.

Australia is the first country in the Asia-Pacific region to use IOSA as part of its safety oversight of airlines

IOSA is an evaluation system designed to assess the operational management and control systems of an airline.

Under the MoU, CASA will use information from the IOSA Audit Reports in assessing authorization of foreign registered aircraft into, out of and within Australia.

CASA’s use of IOSA will help reduce the number of audits foreign airlines need to undergo in order to operate to/from Australia—while maintaining a high level of safety oversight through adhering to the global standards and recommended practices which are the basis of IOSA.

Australia is the first country in the Asia-Pacific region to use IOSA as part of its safety oversight of airlines.

However could this be just another just another bureaucratic Fat Cat/Iron Ring 'trough' protecting exercise by CASA...   

Via IATA:

More

.@CASABriefing to use IOSA to complement oversight of non-Australian #airlines: http://ow.ly/fony30dxkzx 

Hmm...can almost visualise the Dr Hoodoo hand coming from behind up into the CC Muppet at the table...
MTF...P2

[Kharon]

A long, long read.

P2 – “Now I am not suggesting that anyone would be remotely interested in reading the full TA consultant's report, however to get the gist of why I think this is an important report it is worth referring to certain chapters from volume 1:”

I must say, its a ‘dry’ read and there is a lot of it. That said, I left it on the desk, thought I’d just cherry pick my way through, to get a ‘sense’ of where it was heading. Like many in depth studies, there are patches which will send you to sleep and others where the temptation to throw the thing out is overwhelming. There is also a temptation to be selective and support the parts which ring the bells.

However, the time invested has been justified. IMO, instead of another round of ministerial WOFTAM, spent negotiating another series of meaningless ‘changes’, which, in time, will take us right back to where we are now: there should be a concerted effort to study the document and mount a discussion on how best to adopt the principals espoused. What is provided in the report makes eminently good sense; it also makes bloody good sense to ‘harmonise’ with the region and provide a conduit to the rest of the grown up world.

Reading is not a difficult thing to learn – comprehension however is; but nowhere near as difficult as getting a government to ‘see the light’, get off it’s arse and sort out this unholy mess we call the ‘aviation regulatory system’. The ADB plan may not be perfect; but compared to what we have at the present……..

Aye well, I’ll put it in the library, next to the other abandoned good ideas and await an equally intelligent alternative from the minister. Must remember not to hold my breath waiting for that; could be a long wait.

Toot toot.

[Peetwo]

Australia again obfuscates ICAO GANP/GASP -

Minister_NFI_Chester once again defers to the MOAS and the self-serving, self-preserving bureaucracy, with the signing of the NATM (national air traffic management) plan...   
(Warning: Bucket will be required) 

National Air Traffic Management Plan released
Media Release
DC217/2017
21 July 2017

• Plan sets out Australia's key air traffic management (ATM) challenges, priorities, initiatives and governance arrangements
  
• Supports the Government's decision to establish a Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS) test-bed project.
  

The national Air Traffic Management plan provides guidance to Australia's aviation agencies and industry on how Australia's ATM system will respond to the air traffic challenges.

Minister for Infrastructure and Transport Darren Chester welcomed today's release of the plan and said it would provide a blueprint for future initiatives that would continue Australia's strong aviation safety record.

“The plan recognises that air traffic management is advancing in technology and Australia will be implementing a state of the art, national ATM system,” Mr Chester said.

Mr Chester said the plan supports the Australian Government's recent decision to invest in the Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS) test-bed project.

“SBAS has potential application in all transport industry sectors across Australia,” Mr Chester said. “In aviation, SBAS can be used to increase the accuracy of aircraft and air traffic management operations providing potential safety, efficiency and environmental benefits in capital city and regional locations.

“The new ATM Plan complements Australia's updated State Safety Programme released in 2016 by outlining priorities and initiatives which will not only enhance aviation safety but also improve aircraft efficiency, capacity, and environmental performance.

“In finalising the plan, we have taken into account agency and industry feedback.

“The plan is also consistent with the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) Global Air Navigation Plan and the Global Aviation Safety Plan—the two key international planning documents for aviation.”

The plan is available online at: https://infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/a...ement_plan

Coupled with the usual M&M motherhood ("puke" ) statements and weasel words there is hidden some much bigger issues, that the moribund minister in his ignorance and rush to preserve his own shiny bum, should be made aware of.

“The new ATM Plan complements Australia's updated State Safety Programme released in 2016 by outlining priorities and initiatives which will not only enhance aviation safety but also improve aircraft efficiency, capacity, and environmental performance..."

Throughout the pages of this thread it has been highlighted many times that M&M's SSP is nothing more than a word weasel confection, that serves little purpose other than to placate ICAO and promote the fictional idea that Australia is warmly embracing the GASP and the principles of ICAO Annex 19.

Much like the lip service we pay to the ICAO SARPs (with at one time over 400 notified differences), our compliance/adherence to the principles of Annex 19 is laughable when you begin to review how many significant safety issues or applicable AAI reports are not being reported or forwarded via the ICAO ADREP/ECCAIRS system (more on this with 'evidence based' facts in due course - .

However the importance of the latest government released NATM plan should not be lost by the miniscule acceding oversight of the ATM plan to M&M and his minions.

Quotes from Joseph Wheeler, via the Drone Wars Inquiry BrisVegas hearing: 

Mr Wheeler : ...Fourthly, I would urge the committee to recommend as a minimum that CASA be charged in an appropriately binding way to prioritise the resolution of the drone legislative challenge. I suggest before the next 2018 update by the minister of Australia's airspace policy statement that that be done. This legislative policy statement is a reflection of our priorities and commitments on airspace management as a member of the international aviation community. Section 11A of the Civil Aviation Act requires CASA to exercise its powers consistent with that statement. The latest iteration was made after the consultation for the September rollbacks on CASA part 101, relaxing drone laws, but does not reflect any prioritisation of integrating unmanned aircraft systems safely or sustainably into Australian airspace.

I would suggest that this is where Mr Carmody's recent commitment—made in a comment to a newspaper a few days ago—'to make drone users part of the wider aviation community' should be recorded. Right now the statement says as its first government policy objective:

The Government considers the safety of passenger transport services as the first priority in airspace administration and CASA should respond quickly to emerging changes in risk levels for passenger transport operations.

Whether or not that policy has changed, I strongly believe that that commitment to the safety of fare-paying passengers in this country needs to be demonstrated strongly through tighter laws regulating drones, which represent the quintessential emerging change in risk levels for air travel in Australia.

---

Mr Wheeler : Yes. I would say that is correct. I think it portrays a fact that this needs to be something that is beyond CASA's remit. CASA will always argue that their functions are set out in this act—the Civil Aviation Act—narrowly defined and that they are headed pre-eminently by safety. It is all well and good, but, as we have just discussed, this traverses more areas than safety and requires the thoughts of other people and some government direction, which is lacking at this time. That is also why I mention the Australia Airspace Policy Statement, which CASA has to be directed by. It is one of the means by which the government can say, 'This is what you need to do. This is our government policy objective. You need to assist us with fulfilling it.

     
Opportunity again missed by this government and this inept NFI miniscule to read CASA the riot act...
MTF...P2

[thorn bird]

"Australia is the first country in the Asia-Pacific region to use IOSA as part of its safety oversight of airlines".

P2, couldn't figure out why this tickled the old "passing strange" gene, other than why CAsA would promote another parasitic entity with a place at the trough along with all the others sucking the life blood out of the industry.

Been scratching the itch for a few days before the light bulb went "Bing" and an hypothesis began to form.

Given the flogging CAsA has received over their oversight and audits over the past few years, think Pell Air, Airtex, Lockhart and given the manic imperative to absolve themselves of any liability for anything.

Is this proposal the beginning of subtly devolving oversight to a third party?