[Peetwo]

Dear Lachie - Part II

Via PAIN_Net email chain:

Dear Lachlan,

I note that my (24/02/2018) email reply to you was neither acknowledged or responded to. In case this was due to being lost in the cyber-sphere; or caught up in Departmental spam/security filters etc. I again forward that email (with questions) for your reference.
Quote from your original correspondence:

Australia was assessed in October 2017 by ICAO auditors and while the results are yet to be made public it places Australia in the top 10 States for safety oversight compliance. 

Plus from correspondence from the Dept Secretary to the Senate RRAT Legislative Committee at additional budget Estimates: https://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/Estimates....pdf?la=en
 

Following on from my previous reply email (below), please note the following Senate RRAT Committee Hansard from a References inquiry ( see: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Bus...lAirRoutes ) public hearing held at Cloncurry, QLD on the 12 April 2018:

...ACTING CHAIR: This committee's bailiwick is to do with aviation. We are very alive to the issues around CASA, less so around the ATSB. Let's not flinch: they're not CASA's regulations; they're the government's regulations that are often recommended by CASA. We're aware of the current impacts on general aviation with new CASA regulations, the shortage of pilots and the maintenance issue with licensed aircraft maintenance engineers and the like. We as a committee have called for some figures—and I don't know if Ms Redden is in a position to update us. We want to look at comparisons with international standards. The FAA has done an audit on CASA in Australia. I understand it's going to be interesting reading. They're resisting publication of that at the moment. We're trying to muddle our way through getting that out into the open. So we're very alive, to the point where we have contemplated out loud whether we will hold an inquiry such as this into this regulatory environment—not just the operation of CASA but by extension the impact that that is having on general aviation...

Next there is a reference from a recent Aunty Pru forum post relevant to the PAIN Net inquiries: ref - http://www.auntypru.com/forum/showthread...29#pid8829

 And if people are under the misbelief that under the new CMA USOAP system that an ICAO audit no longer requires a proper summary audit report think again- refer to this ICAO powerpoint presentation link: 

From pg 9: 

---

 Phase 3 ― Validation and Report Production (Post-audit/ICVM) • ICAO forwards draft audit report to State. • State submits comments and Corrective Action Plans (CAPs). • Comments are incorporated into final audit report. • Final audit report is published on USOAP CMA Online Framework (OLF): http://www.icao.int/usoap.   

---

And pg 27-28:

IV. Timeline of Validation and Report Production Phase (Post Audit/ICVM)

Q/ The above would suggest that (a) there should now be an ICAO audit report available; and (b) that it is the intent of the Dept and the Government to make that audit report publicly available. Yet, unlike previous ICAO reports, a search of the Dept website would appear to indicate that report is still not publicly available. Could we please get an indication from the Dept when this report will become publicly available? 

Q/ Also from the Hansard extract (in bold), I am almost certain that the Acting Chair meant to say that ICAO had conducted an audit of CASA, the Department and the other aviation safety related agencies (ATSB, Airservices, AMSA etc.) and not the FAA. However in case the FAA has conducted an IASA audit of CASA, would it also be possible to get a published link for a copy of that report as well? 


Regards,

And Lachie's reply:

Dear P2,
 
Thank you for your correspondence.  In response to the first of your two questions, Australia has received the final report from ICAO regarding our assessment in October 2017.  It is not our understanding that the previous ICAO audit report was made public, however we are happy to share the current report.  The Department is currently identifying the appropriate part of our website and should have it online shortly, and we will let you know when it is live.
 
Regarding the issue of a possible audit by the FAA, I cannot speak for the Acting Chair, but I can confirm that there has not been a recent FAA International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) of CASA in recent years.  By way of background, while the FAA publishes IASA category ratings on their website, they do not publish or provide copies of assessment findings to third parties. 
 
Regards,

And my response:

Dear Lachlan,

Thank you for your prompt response and I look forward to reviewing the 2017 ICAO report when published on the Department website.

For your information please go to the following links for copies of the 2008 ICAO audit report, the 2004 ATSB ICAO audit report and the 1999 CASA ICAO audit report:

https://amroba.org.au/wp-content/uploads...rt2008.pdf

https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/2004/icao_audit/

https://cfapp.icao.int/fsix/AuditReps/in...999_en.pdf

Not so sure about the 2008 audit report but I believe the 2004 and 1999 reports were once available on the Dept website.

Finally, thank you very much for confirming that the FAA IASA have not conducted a recent audit of CASA.

Reference links for information related to the 2009 FAA IASA audit report of the CASA: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...ileaks.pdf & http://wikileaks.redfoxcenter.org/cable/...A1040.html

PAIN has confirmed, with a recent rejection of a FOI request for the November/December 2009 FAA IASA audit report, that the FAA are not in the habit of publishing their audit assessment findings to 3rd party stakeholders.

However given the passage of time and the significant industry financial contribution ( fuel levy - $89.9 million?) that was levied from industry to help rectify the deficiencies from that report; PAIN associates would still like to request from the Department (informally or formally through the FOI Act) copies of that report and relevant correspondence associated with the conduct of the FAA IASA audit. Therefore if you could facilitate that request, or provide contact details for your FOI office to process a formal FOI request, it would be greatly appreciated.

Kind regards,

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Lachie (finally) comes through - nearly? 

Finally Lachie has come through with his promise for the Dept to provide a copy of the 2017 ICAO audit report - see: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...t_full.pdf

However it would appear the report is still yet to receive a proper CAP ( https://soa.icao.int/usoap/USOAP%20Docum...02017..pdf ) for the State to address the identified deficiencies:

APP 1 - 2

ICVM Final Report — Australia March 2018 Analysis

Considering the overall results outlined in Figures 1 and 2, the information below has been developed to assist the State in prioritizing its remedial actions.

High Priorities:

LEG:

1) Review the processes, procedures and/or arrangements in place to ensure that all relevant State safety oversight and investigation authorities (particularly with respect to Annexes 3, 12 and 13 to the Chicago Convention) are involved, in a coordinated manner, in the processing of adopted Annex amendments, with a view to:

a) identifying all differences between the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)
and the State’s regulations and practices; and
b) determining any need to amend the State’s legislation.

2) Ensure a timely and consistent update of national regulations whenever amendments to
Annexes 1, 6 and 18 are received.

3) Ensure a consistent, thorough and documented review of the State’s enabling
airworthiness-related regulations and national standards subsequent to an Annex amendment or an amendment by the originating State/organization, if applicable, to decide on the next course of action.

4) Establish requirements regarding the documents to be carried on board, to include the journey logbook.

5) Establish requirements, based on scientific principles, knowledge and operational experience, for flight time, flight duty period, duty period and rest period limitations applicable for cabin crew.

6) Establish requirements for human factors principles to be observed in the design and application of maintenance programmes.

7) Amend the State’s legislation to require the re-opening of an investigation if new and significant evidence becomes available.

ORG:

1) Include all required training in the training programmes established for the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA)’s airworthiness inspectors and engineers, and ensure the effective
implementation of such training, in particular during the on-the-job training (OJT).

2) Finalize the recruitment and training of additional investigators to ensure that the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) can meet its national and international obligations with respect to aircraft accident and incident investigations.

PEL:

None.

APP 1 - 3

High Priorities: (cont.)

OPS:

1) Establish and implement procedures to ensure that air operators develop instructions to preserve flight recorders to the extent possible, in the event that the aeroplane becomes involved in an accident or incident and to keep flight recorders and associated records in safe custody pending their disposition.

2) Establish a system to ensure that air operators implement and maintain requirements, in the operations manual, to establish flight time, flight duty period, duty period and rest period limitations for cabin crew.

3) Establish a system to ensure full compliance of air operator certificate (AOC) associated
operations specifications with the elements and the format/layout outlined in the relevant
provisions of Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention.

4) Establish and implement a system to ensure that procedures for the approval of operations specifications are fully defined and implemented.

5) With respect to the transport of dangerous goods by air, ensure that procedures for the
surveillance of authorized or non-authorized air operators, national and foreign operators are fully defined and implemented, and include regular and random inspections.

AIR:

Airworthiness Inspection:

1) Establish and implement procedures for the approval of leases among commercial air transport operators.

2) Review procedures/guidance for adequacy and, where possible, use standardized terminology to minimize misinterpretation.

Design Certification and Production:

None.

AIG:

Fully implement the ATSB’s action plan to ensure that all accident and incident investigation reports are completed within the established timelines.

ANS:

None.

AGA:

1) Ensure full implementation of Annex 14, Volume I requirements on Runway End Safety Areas (RESAs) at aerodromes.

2) Ensure full implementation of Annex 14, Volume I requirements for the provision of rescue and firefighting (RFF) services at aerodromes, which take into account the aerodrome location and the surrounding terrain.

APP 1 - 4

Other Priorities:

LEG:

1) Amend the State’s primary aviation legislation to include explicit provisions to recognize as valid personnel licences, certificates of airworthiness and radio station licences issued/renewed by the State of the Operator under an Article 83 bis agreement between two third-party States.

2) Ensure that the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) contains all significant differences, not only with the SARPs, Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS)-OPS and PANS-ATM, but also with all other PANS and the Regional Supplementary Procedures (SUPPS).

ORG:

Ensure that aerodrome inspectors are provided with training related to the regulation, acceptance and surveillance of the safety management system (SMS) which is customized to suit to specificities of aerodromes.

PEL:

None.

OPS:

None.

Airworthiness Inspection:

Clarify the procedures, including associated flowcharts, which describe the granting of the noise certificate.

Design Certification and Production:

1) Review the documentation published on CASA’s intranet to ensure that obsolete documents (in particular AEB Form 002) are not available to staff, in order to minimize inadvertent use.

2) Enhance the control of existing forms and checklists by including revision/issue control reference in addition to date of revision.

AIG:

None.

ANS:

None.

AGA:

Ensure that the State has a coordinated mechanism to ensure full and effective implementation of the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS) at aerodromes, including arrangements to prohibit any building developments which could create an obstacle to aircraft operations.

MTF...P2 

Ps Compliments to Dr Jane and the RRAT Committee Secretariat for their tireless efforts in ensuring the Dept kept their word on making public the 2017 ICAO audit report. 

Pps All we need now is the CAP - 

[Peetwo]

Lachie (finally) comes through - nearly? 

Finally Lachie has come through with his promise for the Dept to provide a copy of the 2017 ICAO audit report - see: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...t_full.pdf

And from the Dept website:

Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program
Listen to this page
A A A
The first stage of the program, launched in 1996, was voluntary. Its initial success led the 31st Session of the ICAO Assembly (October 1998) to endorse an enhanced program and provide the necessary funding. The Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) commenced on 1 January 1999, replacing the voluntary program. The basis of the ICAO audit was the degree to which the States complied with safety related Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and associated procedures laid down in three of the eighteen Annexes to the Chicago Convention: Annex 1 (Personnel Licensing), Annex 6 (Operation of Aircraft) and Annex 8 (Airworthiness of Aircraft). It was envisaged that ICAO would audit other annexes in future programs. Australia's first audit under this system took place 9–20 August 1999.

The 35th Session of the ICAO Assembly considered the proposal of the Council for the continuation and expansion of USOAP in 2005, and resolved that USOAP be expanded to cover the safety-related provisions in all safety-related Annexes (all Annexes with the exception of Annex 9 Facilitation and Annex 17 Security) and also to implement a comprehensive systems approach (CSA) for the conduct of safety oversight audits. The six-year cycle of USOAP CSA concluded at the end of 2010. In September 2007, the 36th Session of the Assembly directed the Council to examine different options for the continuation of the USOAP beyond 2010, including the feasibility of applying a new approach based on the concept of continuous monitoring.

The 37th Session of the Assembly agreed the best and most cost-effective option was the implementation of a continuous monitoring approach (CMA) and directed the Secretary-General of ICAO to begin to develop the methodology and tools required to implement a CMA, including the necessary detailed guidance to States. It also directed the Secretary-General of ICAO to provide a transition period to the CMA, in order to allow States and ICAO to gradually implement the different elements of the new approach. CMA came into effect 1 January 2013.
Under the USOAP CMA, Australia's most recent assessment was through an ICAO Coordinated Validation Mission (ICVM), which occurred 9–13 October 2017.

• Final Report Of The ICAO Coordinated Validation Mission In Australia PDF: 593 KB 
  

However it would appear the report is still yet to receive a proper CAP ( https://soa.icao.int/usoap/USOAP%20Docum...02017..pdf ) for the State to address the identified deficiencies:

APP 1 - 2

ICVM Final Report — Australia March 2018 Analysis

Considering the overall results outlined in Figures 1 and 2, the information below has been developed to assist the State in prioritizing its remedial actions.

High Priorities:

LEG:

1) Review the processes, procedures and/or arrangements in place to ensure that all relevant State safety oversight and investigation authorities (particularly with respect to Annexes 3, 12 and 13 to the Chicago Convention) are involved, in a coordinated manner, in the processing of adopted Annex amendments, with a view to:

a) identifying all differences between the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)
and the State’s regulations and practices; and
b) determining any need to amend the State’s legislation.

2) Ensure a timely and consistent update of national regulations whenever amendments to
Annexes 1, 6 and 18 are received.

3) Ensure a consistent, thorough and documented review of the State’s enabling
airworthiness-related regulations and national standards subsequent to an Annex amendment or an amendment by the originating State/organization, if applicable, to decide on the next course of action.

4) Establish requirements regarding the documents to be carried on board, to include the journey logbook.

5) Establish requirements, based on scientific principles, knowledge and operational experience, for flight time, flight duty period, duty period and rest period limitations applicable for cabin crew.

6) Establish requirements for human factors principles to be observed in the design and application of maintenance programmes.

7) Amend the State’s legislation to require the re-opening of an investigation if new and significant evidence becomes available.

ORG:

1) Include all required training in the training programmes established for the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA)’s airworthiness inspectors and engineers, and ensure the effective
implementation of such training, in particular during the on-the-job training (OJT).

2) Finalize the recruitment and training of additional investigators to ensure that the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) can meet its national and international obligations with respect to aircraft accident and incident investigations.

PEL:

None.

APP 1 - 3

High Priorities: (cont.)

OPS:

1) Establish and implement procedures to ensure that air operators develop instructions to preserve flight recorders to the extent possible, in the event that the aeroplane becomes involved in an accident or incident and to keep flight recorders and associated records in safe custody pending their disposition.

2) Establish a system to ensure that air operators implement and maintain requirements, in the operations manual, to establish flight time, flight duty period, duty period and rest period limitations for cabin crew.

3) Establish a system to ensure full compliance of air operator certificate (AOC) associated
operations specifications with the elements and the format/layout outlined in the relevant
provisions of Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention.

4) Establish and implement a system to ensure that procedures for the approval of operations specifications are fully defined and implemented.

5) With respect to the transport of dangerous goods by air, ensure that procedures for the
surveillance of authorized or non-authorized air operators, national and foreign operators are fully defined and implemented, and include regular and random inspections.

AIR:

Airworthiness Inspection:

1) Establish and implement procedures for the approval of leases among commercial air transport operators.

2) Review procedures/guidance for adequacy and, where possible, use standardized terminology to minimize misinterpretation.

Design Certification and Production:

None.

AIG:

Fully implement the ATSB’s action plan to ensure that all accident and incident investigation reports are completed within the established timelines.

ANS:

None.

AGA:

1) Ensure full implementation of Annex 14, Volume I requirements on Runway End Safety Areas (RESAs) at aerodromes.

2) Ensure full implementation of Annex 14, Volume I requirements for the provision of rescue and firefighting (RFF) services at aerodromes, which take into account the aerodrome location and the surrounding terrain.

APP 1 - 4

Other Priorities:

LEG:

1) Amend the State’s primary aviation legislation to include explicit provisions to recognize as valid personnel licences, certificates of airworthiness and radio station licences issued/renewed by the State of the Operator under an Article 83 bis agreement between two third-party States.

2) Ensure that the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) contains all significant differences, not only with the SARPs, Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS)-OPS and PANS-ATM, but also with all other PANS and the Regional Supplementary Procedures (SUPPS).

ORG:

Ensure that aerodrome inspectors are provided with training related to the regulation, acceptance and surveillance of the safety management system (SMS) which is customized to suit to specificities of aerodromes.

PEL:

None.

OPS:

None.

Airworthiness Inspection:

Clarify the procedures, including associated flowcharts, which describe the granting of the noise certificate.

Design Certification and Production:

1) Review the documentation published on CASA’s intranet to ensure that obsolete documents (in particular AEB Form 002) are not available to staff, in order to minimize inadvertent use.

2) Enhance the control of existing forms and checklists by including revision/issue control reference in addition to date of revision.

AIG:

None.

ANS:

None.

AGA:

Ensure that the State has a coordinated mechanism to ensure full and effective implementation of the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS) at aerodromes, including arrangements to prohibit any building developments which could create an obstacle to aircraft operations.

MTF...P2 

Ps Compliments to Dr Jane and the RRAT Committee Secretariat for their tireless efforts in ensuring the Dept kept their word on making public the 2017 ICAO audit report. 

Pps All we need now is the CAP - 

[Kharon]

ICAO flogs Australian oversight.

Severely, with a small, damp lettuce leaf. That’ll fix it all up, quick smart – right?

How about this for a thrashing:-

“Ensure that the State has a coordinated mechanism to ensure full and effective implementation of the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS) at aerodromes, including arrangements to prohibit any building developments which could create an obstacle to aircraft operations.”

Wow , tough stuff (not). The many posts on the 'Airports' forum will assist the casual reader in deciding if the punishment fits the crime. Search word - ESSENDON. 

But of course, no one bothers to read, let alone take our safety watchdogs to task; and so, the whole carefully worded confection will slowly find it’s way to the ‘shelf-ware’ section of the basement, to moulder away with all the other embarrassing documents. The time honoured system has never let the minister down. Softly, softly the damning paper work creeps away, while ICAO swans off to new engagements, trusting that the DoIT will make the suggested changes happen, sometime over the next decade or so; no rush….

You have to wonder why this innocuous, bland report has been kept out of the public purview, we did after all pay for it. Then there is the question of the CAN. But, for my money, the stellar performance of the Canberra back line takes the biscuit.

The 'who' authorized the building ‘ball’ goes into the Senate scrum – the Canberra back's get it and the speed at which the ball (and the responsibility) is passed along is truly breathtaking. It seems that no one is 'wholly’ responsible for parking a bloody great big building, full of ‘happy shoppers’ in harms way. The crowd watching begin the traditional chant “No, weren’t us” -  loud and long.......

BOLLOCKS; Mr Genuine Minister needs to pay close attention – the law suites are coming; soon as ATSB gets off it’s beam ends and actually does something that is not window dressing and prevarication. Murky knows who rewrote the ‘definitions’ and who flogged off the airports to developers; him and Beaker, up their eyebrows.

I hope the Yanks crucify ‘em – I’ll even help them. No matter, great audit, really helpful. iCAO ‘on –the-money’.

Toot – toot – one for luck – Toot.

[Gobbledock]

Of departmental enemas, stammering fools and giant headed monsters

‘K’;

”Murky knows who rewrote the ‘definitions’ and who flogged off the airports to developers; him and Beaker, up their eyebrows”.

Nothing to see here, move along. Beaker is enjoying the fruits of his semi-retirement and his huge superannuation nest egg filled to the bream over the decades by bludging off the taxpayer. Great timing to go and get your PHD. Phew.

Pumpkin Head is enjoying his new $800k role over at Community and Arts after receiving a new plumb role for being loyal to Turdball. Again, great timing for the giant headed former Infuckstructure department head and serial senate spin doctor.

Within hours of the DFO bingle the Fort Fumble shredders had smoke pouring out of them and the bowels of TRIM had received an enema and been emptied to ensure no signed paperwork could or would ever be found that might aportion blame, or heaven forebid, accountability.

As for ICAO, well they will never bite the hand that feeds them. The likes of Rudd, Gillard, Turdball and Stick Insect Bishop have been oiling he UN’s wheels for years with healthy, robust infusions of taxpayer money, and in return receiving AAA status and lavish trips to New York to hobnob with the rich, powerful, lobbyists who will ensure their post political life is well cared for. ICAO is just another branch of the despicable UN who are nothing short of being a bunch of self appointed, conceited, inept fucktards draining countries of their taxpayers money.

Expect justice over the Essendon crash? Keep dreaming.

Expect justice over the Pelair ditching? Keep dreaming.

Expect justice over the Lockhart River crash? Keep dreaming.

Expect justice over the MH370 crash? Keep dreaming.

Expect justice, honesty and transparency in any way, shape or form from any government, political party, bureaucracy or public servant? KEEP EFFING DREAMING

TICK TOCK

[Peetwo]

ICAO ICVM Australia FR CAP: Where the bloody hell is it? 

Ref: https://infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/i...t_full.pdf

Note the following text from the - FINAL REPORT OF THE ICAO COORDINATED VALIDATION MISSION IN AUSTRALIA (9 to 13 October 2017): 

5. FOLLOW-UP ACTION

5.1 In accordance with the MOU agreed to between Australia and ICAO, Australia replied in a letter dated 23 February 2018 that it had no comments on the draft report and also reiterated its commitment to develop its CAPs accordingly.

5.2 According to the MOU, the State undertakes to submit its updated CAPs directly on the USOAP CMA online framework (https://www.icao.int/usoap) within 45 days after receipt of this final report.

5.3 The CAPs should provide specific actions and estimated implementation dates, as well as a responsible office for taking action to correct the deficiencies identified in the findings. Further guidance on how to develop effective CAPs is outlined in the “Guidance for States on Developing Corrective Action Plans (CAPs)”, which can be found in the “CMA Library” of the online framework.

5.4 ICAO will provide Australia with feedback on the acceptability of the proposed updated CAPs. If any proposed corrective actions do not fully address the associated findings, the State will be notified accordingly.

5.5 If no CAP is submitted, ICAO will contact Australia to determine the reasons for not providing a CAP and report its findings to Council.

 
Considering that one of the significant findings of the ICAO ICVM audit team included this under the AGA (Annex 14):

AGA:

Ensure that the State has a coordinated mechanism to ensure full and effective implementation of the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS) at aerodromes, including arrangements to prohibit any building developments which could create an obstacle to aircraft operations.

   
Which highlighted a repeated ICAO significant identified safety issue from the 2008 ICAO USOAP audit of Australia:

---

 
This significant safety issue should have been proactively addressed by the supposedly fully compliant Australian Annex 19 SSP more than 6 years ago. This deficiency in the SSP was recently identified in a seriously delayed ATSB investigation: ref- http://www.auntypru.com/forum/thread-30-...ml#pid9476

ATSB finds no application of safety principles

The ATSB carried out an investigation four years later in 2013 into the procedures of these decision-making processes. This was done as a response to a REPCON report received in September 2012 (P2 comment - bizarrely the ATSB REPCON database doesn't appear to go back to 2012??) expressing concerns a proper safety case was not conducted on the proposal. The ATSB’s Final Report concluded that whilst the procedure was compliant with the Airports Act 1996 and the Regulations, it “did not require the application of risk management principles to the Department’s consideration”. This was highlighted as a safety issue.

IMO this not only highlights major deficiencies in Govt departmental and agency processes but also highlights serious flaws and lack of transparency of our supposedly fully ICAO compliant Annex 19 SSP...  ref: https://infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/s...ction.aspx


MTF...P2 

[P7_TOM]

Read - THIS– without throwing up.

There's more of the same following - the 'revised' Act- will be a masterpiece, but as Paul Phelen predicted two decades ago - Nothing will change.

This is political flummery, to baffle those who have their breakfast in front of the TV.  A sham which shames those who pay for it - 'those' being us.

Disgraceful.

[Kharon]

The legendary Paul D Phelan wrote and presented this report eighteen years ago. It is a masterful, accurate analysis of the situation between CASA and industry at the time. There are 104 pages detailing industry operational concerns and the long term effect of those concerns on safety.
 
In 2014, Phelan provided a submission to the Aviation Safety Regulation Review (ASRR). This, like the 2000 submission provided detailed, accurate, supportable information and analysis clearly identifying not only the increasingly fraught, tense relationship between the CASA and the industry, but the almost unbelievable mess the regulations have become. Once again, his forecasts have proven accurate.

Senator O’Sullivan has challenged industry to provide ‘proof’. I say let him stir his bones, find his reading glasses and spend an hour or so with Phelan. There is the only ‘proof’ he should ever need.
 
Has government failed aviation?
 
That boys and girls is a no brainer.
 
Will the government continue to fail aviation and ignore the blindingly obvious?

It certainly seems to be that answer will be in the affirmative – going on O’Sullivan’s less than impressive performance at Estimates and a wool blind minister who can't seem to tie his boot laces without 'expert' advice.
 
No matter; if you have an idle hour or two over the Christmas break; take some time to read Phelan. It may bring some clarity, although history clearly shows there is little hope of sanity.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2000 AD).

1. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s handling of its enforcement responsibilities has already seriously degraded Australia’s air safety climate by generating mounting mutual distrust and antipathy between industry and regulator. There is now more confrontation, and less mutual respect and cooperation, than has ever existed between the regulatory body and an industry which now considers itself to be under siege from its own regulator.

2. Every certificate holder is continually faced with the threat that it can be shut down almost at the whim of a single CASA decision maker through the continued exploitation of apparently unintended provisions of the Civil Aviation Act and Regulations – some would describe these as loopholes:

3. The confrontation has been worsened by gross and growing deficiencies in the delivery of regulatory services, which shackle the conduct of aviation businesses; and the fear that the apparent abuse of regulatory processes by CASA can shut them down immediately without recourse to due process.

4. At the centre of these problems appears to be the absence of effective management, training, defined and uniform policy, guidance, and prioritisation.

5. This has resulted in an appalling degradation of morale amongst operators, industry employees, and the diminishing number of individuals within CASA who still subscribe to the principles of fairness, due process, and the rule of law.

6. CASA has apparently elected to circumvent normal and available legal avenues, due process, natural justice and procedural fairness in pursuit of the policy goal of reducing the number of air operator certificate holders. This is demonstrated by the application and the apparent abuse of administrative procedures available to it under the Act, as an alternative to available remedies offered by proper investigation, legal process, and prosecution.

7. CASA now says it intends to apply identical treatment to major air carriers, in order to be seen to be equitable in its application of what it perceives to be its regulatory functions. This will naturally have even more serious implications for Australia’s international reputation, with a demonstrably negative impact on the industry’s safety performance and image.

8. Declining to acknowledge the impropriety of its actions, CASA’s Office of Legal Counsel makes it clear that while Government allows it, CASA will continue to pursue its goals through the application of administrative decisions rather than through proper and available legal channels and the legal processes by which other regulatory bodies in Australia are bound.

9. This has resulted, in an unacceptable number of cases, of air operators (and significant employers) being forced out of business by the weight of their financial burdens, without CASA’s allegations against them ever having faced the scrutiny of a court or without according the victim the opportunity to face and cross-examine its accusers.

10. CASA is clearly acting contrary to legal advice it obtained from the Attorney General’s department which states that “there is a high risk of liability for defamation under current legislation.” CASA is now apparently defaming certificate holders by publishing unsubstantiated allegations against them. Its Office of Legal Counsel has asserted that he believes it has a government mandate to continue with this course of action.

11. The above tactics are apparently necessary because CASA, which has a dismal record in the investigation and prosecution of alleged rule breaking, has a fear that the use of normal legal processes would expose the inadequacy of its rule structure, and its investigation and surveillance procedures.

[Peetwo]

Save Aviation - CHART.



Reference: http://proaviation.com.au/trust-restoration-checklist/

The legendary Paul D Phelan wrote and presented this report eighteen years ago. It is a masterful, accurate analysis of the situation between CASA and industry at the time. There are 104 pages detailing industry operational concerns and the long term effect of those concerns on safety.
 
In 2014, Phelan provided a submission to the Aviation Safety Regulation Review (ASRR). This, like the 2000 submission provided detailed, accurate, supportable information and analysis clearly identifying not only the increasingly fraught, tense relationship between the CASA and the industry, but the almost unbelievable mess the regulations have become. Once again, his forecasts have proven accurate.

Senator O’Sullivan has challenged industry to provide ‘proof’. I say let him stir his bones, find his reading glasses and spend an hour or so with Phelan. There is the only ‘proof’ he should ever need.
 
Has government failed aviation?
 
That boys and girls is a no brainer.
 
Will the government continue to fail aviation and ignore the blindingly obvious?

It certainly seems to be that answer will be in the affirmative – going on O’Sullivan’s less than impressive performance at Estimates and a wool blind minister who can't seem to tie his boot laces without 'expert' advice.
 
No matter; if you have an idle hour or two over the Christmas break; take some time to read Phelan. It may bring some clarity, although history clearly shows there is little hope of sanity.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2000 AD).

1. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s handling of its enforcement responsibilities has already seriously degraded Australia’s air safety climate by generating mounting mutual distrust and antipathy between industry and regulator. There is now more confrontation, and less mutual respect and cooperation, than has ever existed between the regulatory body and an industry which now considers itself to be under siege from its own regulator.

2. Every certificate holder is continually faced with the threat that it can be shut down almost at the whim of a single CASA decision maker through the continued exploitation of apparently unintended provisions of the Civil Aviation Act and Regulations – some would describe these as loopholes:

3. The confrontation has been worsened by gross and growing deficiencies in the delivery of regulatory services, which shackle the conduct of aviation businesses; and the fear that the apparent abuse of regulatory processes by CASA can shut them down immediately without recourse to due process.

4. At the centre of these problems appears to be the absence of effective management, training, defined and uniform policy, guidance, and prioritisation.

5. This has resulted in an appalling degradation of morale amongst operators, industry employees, and the diminishing number of individuals within CASA who still subscribe to the principles of fairness, due process, and the rule of law.

6. CASA has apparently elected to circumvent normal and available legal avenues, due process, natural justice and procedural fairness in pursuit of the policy goal of reducing the number of air operator certificate holders. This is demonstrated by the application and the apparent abuse of administrative procedures available to it under the Act, as an alternative to available remedies offered by proper investigation, legal process, and prosecution.

7. CASA now says it intends to apply identical treatment to major air carriers, in order to be seen to be equitable in its application of what it perceives to be its regulatory functions. This will naturally have even more serious implications for Australia’s international reputation, with a demonstrably negative impact on the industry’s safety performance and image.

8. Declining to acknowledge the impropriety of its actions, CASA’s Office of Legal Counsel makes it clear that while Government allows it, CASA will continue to pursue its goals through the application of administrative decisions rather than through proper and available legal channels and the legal processes by which other regulatory bodies in Australia are bound.

9. This has resulted, in an unacceptable number of cases, of air operators (and significant employers) being forced out of business by the weight of their financial burdens, without CASA’s allegations against them ever having faced the scrutiny of a court or without according the victim the opportunity to face and cross-examine its accusers.

10. CASA is clearly acting contrary to legal advice it obtained from the Attorney General’s department which states that “there is a high risk of liability for defamation under current legislation.” CASA is now apparently defaming certificate holders by publishing unsubstantiated allegations against them. Its Office of Legal Counsel has asserted that he believes it has a government mandate to continue with this course of action.

11. The above tactics are apparently necessary because CASA, which has a dismal record in the investigation and prosecution of alleged rule breaking, has a fear that the use of normal legal processes would expose the inadequacy of its rule structure, and its investigation and surveillance procedures.

From Phelan's 2016 article:

..Readers might care to compare the CHART checklist with the charter letter from our most effective recent minister, John Anderson, to (then) incoming CASA CEO, Bruce Byron. The high-quality letter could easily have been drafted by somebody like Mr Shane Carmody, who rejoined the Department on April 1 as Deputy Secretary, Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, with what the Department describes as “broad overarching responsibilities in aviation.”...

Think about how ironic the above extract is when you consider the events that followed which ultimately led to Carmody Capers taking up the role as the latest Fuhrer of CASA...



MTF...P2  

[Kharon]

P. 17 and Coffee beyond.

I’ve posted the following on the MNC thread as it adds fuel to the small, but active fire under the vexed question of Australia’s lip service to ICAO compliance; across the spectrum.

The quotes below pretty much sum up the ‘guts’ of the Coffee report; which begins on page 17. The opening pages present the counter argument; I’ve tried to save the reader some time by ‘cherry-picking’ some statements which – IMO – summarise the ARFF position. However, the real gubbins is presented from page 13; there the real research and analysis begins.

I, or one of many would like to know how the ‘Coffee report’ was kept out of the light since 2016. I know ploughing through ‘reports’ is tedious and time consuming, but in this case, I believe that time is well spent. Our Senators could do well to read it through – then perhaps they may be able to ask the right questions from a position of knowing the answers; well all bar O’ Sofullofit who repeatedly tells us that ‘he’ knows those already. For those of us not gifted with such overwhelming precognitive talent – grab a coffee and start at page 14.

Coffee P7 - 3.2.1 The ICAO standards.

The ICAO standard is that a certified aerodrome should have an appropriate rescue firefighting service, determined by the dimensions of the aeroplanes normally using the airport adjusted for their frequency of operations.

The standard specifies the minimum amount of extinguishing agent that an ARFF service needs to be capable of applying (in litres), and the rate it must be able to do so (litres per minute). This then implies the size and number of firefighting appliances that must be available to attend a crashed / burning aircraft.

They must be applying at least half the required extinguishing agent in 2 minutes of being told of the crash, with an absolute maximum of 3 minutes. This means services must be located at the airport.

The Australian civil aviation system is considerably at variance with the international standard. Australia gave an undertaking to review its non-compliance following an audit in 2008, yet the current review proposes to widen the extent of our non-compliance.

Empirical studies demonstrate better national aviation safety performance is associated with better compliance to ICAO standards.

Coffee P8/9 – Sect. 4. DIRD.

The report’s key proposal is to alter the threshold indicators for establishing ARFF services. It proposes to raise the current threshold of 350,000 passenger movements over the previous financial year to 500,000 per annum on a rolling month basis.

It also proposes a softening of this and the international flights criterion, so that neither automatically necessitates establishing ARFF services, but triggers a risk assessment process by CASA to determine the need for them.

P 11. Conclusion

The DIRD proposals constitute an intention to further diminish our compliance with ICAO standards, and lower aviation safety standards in Australia, rather than raise them as should be the function of aviation safety regulatory reform.

We cannot assume that aviation accidents will not happen nor ignore the consequences that will arise when they do.

We should value the safety legacy of the pioneers of our modern aviation services, and invest in protecting it, to preserve our international reputation for safe aviation.

In order to do this we need to make a clear determination to prioritise the safety of air passengers as so many industry spokespeople claim they do, and accept a degree of redundant resource provision, as there is no way to otherwise prepare for a rare catastrophic event. If we are not going to install ARFF protection throughout Australia’s 190 certified airports, we should mandate that the travelling public are made clearly aware of their absence.

Aye. Dry as sticks - but typifying the DIRD approach and CASA execution of their version of ICAO compliance. Why don't we just not bother paying to belong to ICAO - that expense alone would buy us all the fire engines we could possibly need - and change.

Toot - toot.

[Gobbledock]

The value of reports.....

Makes you wonder what, or if, there is any value to be garnished from any of the reports into our bureaucratic departments? For example;

COFFEE report (ARFFS) - shelved.

Forsythe report (CAsA) - shelved, dissed, ignored, poo pooed.

Chambers report (CAsA/ATSB/PelAir) - hidden, ignored, dismissed.

Numerous ANAO reports - shelved, watered down, accepted (but not acted upon), ignored

ICAO audits - ignored, spun, obsfucated, shelved.

Senate inquiry reports - too many to mention, all ignored, spun, obsfucated and shelved.

And one can only imagine what other internal and external departmental reports are commissioned and then quickly shelved or used as worm farm lining when the report recipient discovers a not-so-glowing endorsement of their alphabet soup agency.

Lots of work, lots of reports, lots of money spent commissioning said activities all for naught..... begs a few questions doesn’t it?

‘Pointless report writing for all’

[Peetwo]

P. 17 and Coffee beyond.

I’ve posted the following on the MNC thread as it adds fuel to the small, but active fire under the vexed question of Australia’s lip service to ICAO compliance; across the spectrum.

The quotes below pretty much sum up the ‘guts’ of the Coffee report; which begins on page 17. The opening pages present the counter argument; I’ve tried to save the reader some time by ‘cherry-picking’ some statements which – IMO – summarise the ARFF position. However, the real gubbins is presented from page 13; there the real research and analysis begins.

I, or one of many would like to know how the ‘Coffee report’ was kept out of the light since 2016. I know ploughing through ‘reports’ is tedious and time consuming, but in this case, I believe that time is well spent. Our Senators could do well to read it through – then perhaps they may be able to ask the right questions from a position of knowing the answers; well all bar O’ Sofullofit who repeatedly tells us that ‘he’ knows those already. For those of us not gifted with such overwhelming precognitive talent – grab a coffee and start at page 14.

Coffee P7 - 3.2.1 The ICAO standards.

The ICAO standard is that a certified aerodrome should have an appropriate rescue firefighting service, determined by the dimensions of the aeroplanes normally using the airport adjusted for their frequency of operations.

The standard specifies the minimum amount of extinguishing agent that an ARFF service needs to be capable of applying (in litres), and the rate it must be able to do so (litres per minute). This then implies the size and number of firefighting appliances that must be available to attend a crashed / burning aircraft.

They must be applying at least half the required extinguishing agent in 2 minutes of being told of the crash, with an absolute maximum of 3 minutes. This means services must be located at the airport.

The Australian civil aviation system is considerably at variance with the international standard. Australia gave an undertaking to review its non-compliance following an audit in 2008, yet the current review proposes to widen the extent of our non-compliance.

Empirical studies demonstrate better national aviation safety performance is associated with better compliance to ICAO standards.

Coffee P8/9 – Sect. 4. DIRD.

The report’s key proposal is to alter the threshold indicators for establishing ARFF services. It proposes to raise the current threshold of 350,000 passenger movements over the previous financial year to 500,000 per annum on a rolling month basis.

It also proposes a softening of this and the international flights criterion, so that neither automatically necessitates establishing ARFF services, but triggers a risk assessment process by CASA to determine the need for them.

P 11. Conclusion

The DIRD proposals constitute an intention to further diminish our compliance with ICAO standards, and lower aviation safety standards in Australia, rather than raise them as should be the function of aviation safety regulatory reform.

We cannot assume that aviation accidents will not happen nor ignore the consequences that will arise when they do.

We should value the safety legacy of the pioneers of our modern aviation services, and invest in protecting it, to preserve our international reputation for safe aviation.

In order to do this we need to make a clear determination to prioritise the safety of air passengers as so many industry spokespeople claim they do, and accept a degree of redundant resource provision, as there is no way to otherwise prepare for a rare catastrophic event. If we are not going to install ARFF protection throughout Australia’s 190 certified airports, we should mandate that the travelling public are made clearly aware of their absence.

Aye. Dry as sticks - but typifying the DIRD approach and CASA execution of their version of ICAO compliance. Why don't we just not bother paying to belong to ICAO - that expense alone would buy us all the fire engines we could possibly need - and change.

Toot - toot.

P2 addition to the 'CofFEE report and beyond': 

For mine one of the more disturbing passages of the UNSW CofFEE reports starts from bottom of pg 24:

The divergence between the ICAO standards and those prescribed by Australia’s Civil
Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), are very clear. While criteria for establishing and
disestablishing ARFF services in Australia pay no heed to the size of aircraft accessing
Australia’s airports, the provisioning of ARFF capability at those airports where services are
established (according to passenger movement or international service criteria) do largely
apply the ICAO system of determining airport categories. They clearly indicate that airport
categories 1 - 5 are completely disregarded by the Australian regulatory authorities in relation
to ARFF provision.
 
In certifying 190 airports and requiring less than 15% of them to have an appropriate rescue
and firefighting capability that accords with Annexe 14 of the Chicago Convention, the
Australian civil aviation system is considerably at variance with the international standard.
The DIRD discussion paper asserts that there is nothing remarkable about this and that
Australia meets its compliance obligations by lodging a notification of ‘difference’ with the
standard.
 
Were this so acceptable, the finding of non-compliance in the 2008 ICAO Universal Safety
Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) that the CASA rules for ARFF establishment /
disestablishment does not cover all the aerodromes that have to be certified need not have
elicited this response from the Australian government:
 
Australia has filed a difference with ICAO which reflects the current regulatory
situation. However Australia is reviewing the regulatory requirements relating to RFF
as contained in Part 139H. Corrective action proposed: this issue will be considered as
part of the review of part 139H and any regulatory amendments necessary will be
implemented through the standard Australian regulatory process. Action office:
CASA. Estimated implementation date: By 31 December 2010 (ICAO, 2008:
Appendix 3.8.6).
 
The discussion paper offered by the government to frame the review that is currently being
undertaken, is not proposing to rectify Australia’s non-compliance but to exacerbate it. It is
relying on the fact that:

Ultimately ICAO has a significant lack of authority to enforce its own policies. It
relies on the assumption that the individual member states will do everything they can
to maintain the system the way it is designed (Spence et al., 2015: 3).
 
The government’s willingness to brazenly flout international standards in this important
international sphere is one thing, but we need to be clear that it is not just our international
reputation that is at stake. A recent empirical study into the relationship between a nation’s
compliance with ICAO standards and safety concluded:

Despite the size of a state, the wealth of a state, the number of commercial aviation
operations, or the number of total fatalities in a given period of time, the more
compliant a particular state is with international standards coincides with a reduction
in commercial airline fatalities. ICAO member states need to be informed of this
research and understand what the findings suggest. The member states should make
their best effort to ensure compliance with the international standards set forth by
ICAO because an associated improvement in safety should result in a reduction in
number of fatalities (Spence, et al., 2015: 7).
 
So while we have been fortunate in the low civil aviation accident rate in this country, it is a
dangerous expression of hubris among regulators to suggest that this justifies being less
compliant with the ICAO standard than we already are.

MTF? - Yes much...P2 

[Gobbledock]

ICAO, OR NOT TO ICAO. WHICH ONE SHALL IT BE?

P2, nice piece of investigative work mate. Isn’t it ironic that CAsA, who love to quote ICAO standards when it suits them, are happy to ‘pick and choose’ which ICAO SARP’s they will align themselves with? Ultimately CAsA are accountable for ASA, and in turn ARFFS. The ICAO standard, for all intents and purposes, is the one that should be complied with. Otherwise, why does Australia have a seat on the ICAO panel, why do our alphabet soup executive trough dwellers spend a couple of hundred thousand dollars each year attending ICAO conferences, summits, seminars, meetings, workshops and apple bobbing contests?

And why is that the Australian Government is pissing about with budgets, shaving manpower here and there at an airport, not wanting to spend on ARFF services which is a life saving PREVENTATIVE measure, when they give billions to other third world nations, a half billion to a Barrier Reef organisation, billions in wars and on armaments, and $50b on some antiquated Subs so as to save the arse of one Minister who is now retiring? Yet an extra person here and there and life saving infrastructure is skimped out on?

The whole scenario is a joke. The 20 year Infrastructure Head Murky MrDak has set Australian aviation back 20 years. No wonder he changed departments. Still influential, but in a different department.
Too little too late.

Tick Tock

[P7_TOM]

GD – “The 20 year Infrastructure Head Murky MrDak has set Australian aviation back 20 years.”

Ah; the Murky Machiavellian, once again, like Macbeth’s Banquo – the ghost which returns to haunt the feast. No one could deny the breath taking brilliance of some of the schemes executed, with remarkable precision by this man. In a way it is as well for the country that he worked for the government – for had he have chosen a more criminal path, the world would know, and probably applaud his talents as the concierge of crime; a modern day Moriarty.

It was I confess a treat to watch him ‘work’ a Senate Estimates panel. I will always regret that he batted for the wrong team. Had his talents been utilised toward making Australian aviation squeaky clean and best in the world; we would have had a stellar system – which worked. Alas. He was a worthy adversary and the lack of him on the front row is beginning to show. The RRAT committee even manage to score the odd run every now and again as the holes in the dykes appear. I barrack for the RRAT committee – but I do miss the MM, the Darth Vader of the dark side. But; every good yarn needs a villain, pity is we have no hero’s to combat the dark side.

While ‘the force’ is with you enjoy the moment. Me? I’m just plain ordinary thirsty.  I shall have another while I contemplate why ICAO allow this macabre pantomime to continue – surely they will get off of their collective beam ends soon. How much longer will they allow the Australian departments to not only take the Mickey Bliss – but make a standing joke of  the work they and the FAA try to do?

“Yes - please serious thinking requires lubrication.”

Afterthought – maybe if we got the Senate Committee legless – they’d get a better grip. But – can they marshal a darts team? That is the question.

[Peetwo]

ICAO Annex 14: Timeline of non-compliance.




Ref: App 1-8-06, pg 82 - https://amroba.org.au/wp-content/uploads...rt2008.pdf

P. 17 and Coffee beyond.

I’ve posted the following on the MNC thread as it adds fuel to the small, but active fire under the vexed question of Australia’s lip service to ICAO compliance; across the spectrum.

The quotes below pretty much sum up the ‘guts’ of the Coffee report; which begins on page 17. The opening pages present the counter argument; I’ve tried to save the reader some time by ‘cherry-picking’ some statements which – IMO – summarise the ARFF position. However, the real gubbins is presented from page 13; there the real research and analysis begins.

I, or one of many would like to know how the ‘Coffee report’ was kept out of the light since 2016. I know ploughing through ‘reports’ is tedious and time consuming, but in this case, I believe that time is well spent. Our Senators could do well to read it through – then perhaps they may be able to ask the right questions from a position of knowing the answers; well all bar O’ Sofullofit who repeatedly tells us that ‘he’ knows those already. For those of us not gifted with such overwhelming precognitive talent – grab a coffee and start at page 14.

Coffee P7 - 3.2.1 The ICAO standards.

The ICAO standard is that a certified aerodrome should have an appropriate rescue firefighting service, determined by the dimensions of the aeroplanes normally using the airport adjusted for their frequency of operations.

The standard specifies the minimum amount of extinguishing agent that an ARFF service needs to be capable of applying (in litres), and the rate it must be able to do so (litres per minute). This then implies the size and number of firefighting appliances that must be available to attend a crashed / burning aircraft.

They must be applying at least half the required extinguishing agent in 2 minutes of being told of the crash, with an absolute maximum of 3 minutes. This means services must be located at the airport.

The Australian civil aviation system is considerably at variance with the international standard. Australia gave an undertaking to review its non-compliance following an audit in 2008, yet the current review proposes to widen the extent of our non-compliance.

Empirical studies demonstrate better national aviation safety performance is associated with better compliance to ICAO standards.

Coffee P8/9 – Sect. 4. DIRD.

The report’s key proposal is to alter the threshold indicators for establishing ARFF services. It proposes to raise the current threshold of 350,000 passenger movements over the previous financial year to 500,000 per annum on a rolling month basis.

It also proposes a softening of this and the international flights criterion, so that neither automatically necessitates establishing ARFF services, but triggers a risk assessment process by CASA to determine the need for them.

P 11. Conclusion

The DIRD proposals constitute an intention to further diminish our compliance with ICAO standards, and lower aviation safety standards in Australia, rather than raise them as should be the function of aviation safety regulatory reform.

We cannot assume that aviation accidents will not happen nor ignore the consequences that will arise when they do.

We should value the safety legacy of the pioneers of our modern aviation services, and invest in protecting it, to preserve our international reputation for safe aviation.

In order to do this we need to make a clear determination to prioritise the safety of air passengers as so many industry spokespeople claim they do, and accept a degree of redundant resource provision, as there is no way to otherwise prepare for a rare catastrophic event. If we are not going to install ARFF protection throughout Australia’s 190 certified airports, we should mandate that the travelling public are made clearly aware of their absence.

Aye. Dry as sticks - but typifying the DIRD approach and CASA execution of their version of ICAO compliance. Why don't we just not bother paying to belong to ICAO - that expense alone would buy us all the fire engines we could possibly need - and change.

Toot - toot.

P2 addition to the 'CofFEE report and beyond': 

For mine one of the more disturbing passages of the UNSW CofFEE reports starts from bottom of pg 24:

The divergence between the ICAO standards and those prescribed by Australia’s Civil
Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), are very clear. While criteria for establishing and
disestablishing ARFF services in Australia pay no heed to the size of aircraft accessing
Australia’s airports, the provisioning of ARFF capability at those airports where services are
established (according to passenger movement or international service criteria) do largely
apply the ICAO system of determining airport categories. They clearly indicate that airport
categories 1 - 5 are completely disregarded by the Australian regulatory authorities in relation
to ARFF provision.
 
In certifying 190 airports and requiring less than 15% of them to have an appropriate rescue
and firefighting capability that accords with Annexe 14 of the Chicago Convention, the
Australian civil aviation system is considerably at variance with the international standard.
The DIRD discussion paper asserts that there is nothing remarkable about this and that
Australia meets its compliance obligations by lodging a notification of ‘difference’ with the
standard.
 
Were this so acceptable, the finding of non-compliance in the 2008 ICAO Universal Safety
Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) that the CASA rules for ARFF establishment /
disestablishment does not cover all the aerodromes that have to be certified need not have
elicited this response from the Australian government:
 
Australia has filed a difference with ICAO which reflects the current regulatory
situation. However Australia is reviewing the regulatory requirements relating to RFF
as contained in Part 139H. Corrective action proposed: this issue will be considered as
part of the review of part 139H and any regulatory amendments necessary will be
implemented through the standard Australian regulatory process. Action office:
CASA. Estimated implementation date: By 31 December 2010 (ICAO, 2008:
Appendix 3.8.6).
 
The discussion paper offered by the government to frame the review that is currently being
undertaken, is not proposing to rectify Australia’s non-compliance but to exacerbate it. It is
relying on the fact that:

Ultimately ICAO has a significant lack of authority to enforce its own policies. It
relies on the assumption that the individual member states will do everything they can
to maintain the system the way it is designed (Spence et al., 2015: 3).
 
The government’s willingness to brazenly flout international standards in this important
international sphere is one thing, but we need to be clear that it is not just our international
reputation that is at stake. A recent empirical study into the relationship between a nation’s
compliance with ICAO standards and safety concluded:

Despite the size of a state, the wealth of a state, the number of commercial aviation
operations, or the number of total fatalities in a given period of time, the more
compliant a particular state is with international standards coincides with a reduction
in commercial airline fatalities. ICAO member states need to be informed of this
research and understand what the findings suggest. The member states should make
their best effort to ensure compliance with the international standards set forth by
ICAO because an associated improvement in safety should result in a reduction in
number of fatalities (Spence, et al., 2015: 7).
 
So while we have been fortunate in the low civil aviation accident rate in this country, it is a
dangerous expression of hubris among regulators to suggest that this justifies being less
compliant with the ICAO standard than we already are.

To add to the academic (UNSW coffee crew) and professional (UFU) observations, empirical evidence, collated facts etc..etc I first refer to the Appendix 1 & 3 of the 2008 ICAO USOAP report (link provided), that deals with the relevant findings in relation to ICAO Annex 14:

---

---

---

The notified difference, that despite industry concerns (most notably AUSALPA), that still to this day covers off on the non-compliance with the ICAO standard for RESA, can be referenced on page 9 para 3.5.3 & 3.5.4 here: http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/aip/..._Vol_1.pdf

---

---

---

Notified difference reference: pg 37 - http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/aip/..._Vol_1.pdf

And coming back to the DFO accident:

---

---

It is also worth noting that from the March 2018 ICAO CVM audit report, apparently ICAO still have concerns about the non-compliances of an original ICAO signatory State with certain parts of Annex 14: ref - https://infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/i...t_full.pdf
[url=https://infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/international/files/Australia_ICVM_Final_Report_full.pdf][/url]

AGA: 1) Ensure full implementation of Annex 14, Volume I requirements on Runway End Safety Areas (RESAs) at aerodromes.

2) Ensure full implementation of Annex 14, Volume I requirements for the provision of rescue and firefighting (RFF) services at aerodromes, which take into account the aerodrome location and the surrounding terrain. 

---

AGA: Ensure that the State has a coordinated mechanism to ensure full and effective implementation of the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS) at aerodromes, including arrangements to prohibit any building developments which could create an obstacle to aircraft operations. 

    
Finally I like to point out the following from pg 6-7 of the 2008 ICAO USOAP report:

3.1.18 With respect to aerodromes, Section 98 of the Act provides for the drafting of regulations related to the “planning, construction, establishment, operation and use of aerodromes, including the licensing of aerodromes” (Section 98(d)) as well as “the prohibition of the construction of buildings, structures or objects, the restriction of the dimensions of buildings, structures or objects, and the removal in whole or in part or the marking or lighting of buildings, structures or objects (including trees or other natural obstacles) that constitute or may constitute obstructions, hazards or potential hazards to aircraft flying in the vicinity of an aerodrome, and such other measures as are necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft using an aerodrome or flying in the vicinity of an aerodrome” (Section 98(g)). Australia has promulgated CASR Part 139 (“Aerodromes”) which requires the certification of aerodromes in Australia and spells out the requirements that apply to operators of certified aerodromes. In addition, CASA is empowered to suspend or cancel an aerodrome certificate under certain conditions. 

A quick reference to what I believe is the latest version of section 98 of the Act under 98(3(d) & (g)) would seem to confirm that the CASA does indeed have authority to rule on building construction in the vicinity of airports: 

(d) the planning, construction, establishment, operation and use of aerodromes, including the licensing of aerodromes;..

..(g) the prohibition of the construction of buildings, structures or objects, the restriction of the dimensions of buildings, structures or objects, and the removal in whole or in part or the marking or lighting of buildings, structures or objects (including trees or other natural obstacles) that constitute or may constitute obstructions, hazards or potential hazards to aircraft flying in the vicinity of an aerodrome, and such other measures as are necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft using an aerodrome or flying in the vicinity of an aerodrome;

Hmm...MTF me thinks?? - P2 

[Kharon]

Can you make change for a nine dollar note?

“Sure” say’s the CASA advisor – “three’s OK?” That children is a short version of what happens when anyone challenges CASA on a point of law. No matter what you offer, there is always a wriggle room and change in the tin. The only real ‘safety’ concern of CASA is that their edicts and their whimsy become part of an unchallengeable, home spun rule set, which always ensures they win -.

Take airports for an example – under the regulations they can approve or disapprove anything that pleases them. Under the section 98 of the Act under 98(3(d) & (g). Despite all protests, they are the only ‘authority’ which matters - push comes to shove. Yet can they deny all responsibility for the Essendon DFO complex – defend their lack of action on safe legal grounds, without Joe Public standing a chance of challenging that decision (or lack thereof) and winning; despite unassailable evidence. Yes, they can and win too. This is a fact of life as we live it. Safe legislative wriggle room for CASA. That ‘safety’ has cost half a billion so far by the way.

Then; there is a push to have the Navigation Act updated and to relieve CASA of some of the massive, unassailable power they have carefully stored over the decades. Great idea, doomed to fail. Even if the ‘new’ Act gets up, there is more than enough wriggle room to actually give CASA even more uncontested power than ever. Ask a Barrister or; better yet, a retired Judge – we did:– and wished we had not.

Then we come to the much advertised ‘disallowance’ of a CASA edict. Been thrown out of court already, before the party even got going. Apart from being a ridiculous rule set it has provided a terrific example of what happens when you try to find your way through the protective systems Sleepy Hollow has installed. However, as a smoke screen; it has been an unmitigated success. Is the general aviation population concerned about the lack of RFF on Essendon? No. The implications of an aircraft smacking into a building and the potential for massive legal conflict? No. The ability of the local services to control a fuel fed fire and evacuate the building within the survivable time frames demanded by law? No. Has anyone yet apart from the ARFF, (aka UFUA) considered the operational and legal ramifications of this event at Essendon? It is a classic example of a cluster of ducks – all heading for the gun lines. It is, from a human survival and legal standpoint a buggers muddle of massive proportions.

And yet, it could have all been avoided had CASA exercised it's god given right and said NO – that building creates a worst case scenario. That would be the end of it – CASA holds all the cards. But there the building sits – with no added safety measures or revamped action plan or even clear lines of authority. A screaming basket case then; as it is now. Yet CASA have even written into ‘their’ law that the building can be torn down – on their say-so; alone.

“..(g) the prohibition of the construction of buildings, structures or objects, the restriction of the dimensions of buildings, structures or objects, and the removal in whole or in part or the marking or lighting of buildings, structures or objects (including trees or other natural obstacles) that constitute or may constitute obstructions, hazards or potential hazards to aircraft flying in the vicinity of an aerodrome, and such other measures as are necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft using an aerodrome or flying in the vicinity of an aerodrome; etc.

I’m not even going to run a book on that – daylight robbery don’t come close. We can only hope that Slater & Gordon (USA) division can see the lines of attack as clearly as we can see the evacuation paths. Bring the bulldozers with you boys – I’ll come to cheer. Just start with ICAO and work backwards to see who has the Yea or Nay on whether the DFO was (a) legal (b) safe, © properly prepared for the crash event, (d) who actually approved the building, (e) how was the ARFF prepared to deal with the accident and last; but not least – (f) who authorised the infringement on the mandated runway safety width?

Have fun boys.

Toot – toot.

[Gobbledock]

K, I’m wondering if ‘that man’ Higgins will follow up his MH370 book with perhaps a book on the Essendon debacle? It would have a small audience base but it would be more accurate than anything that the Hooded Canary, CAsA and Infrastructure have put out. And of course nobody listens to us, the IOS.

Sad day when the MSM are more believable than those whom we are meant to be able to trust.

[Kharon]

Too true GD; sad but concise. One of the small matters that I always put aside with a sigh is the Pel-Air inquiry. There was a genuine case which the Government could have used, quietly without terrifying the public, to ring the changes and sort out the mess. The Senate committee tried; they even brought out 30 odd recommendations; then, the good Rev. Forsyth did his bit; another 30 odd recommendations. All up a big pile of evidence which demanded real reform from the Act down to the lowest level of FOI. All neatly swept under the carpet. Now the Essendon DFO provides another opportunity for government to realise that there are major defects within a deeply flawed structure.

Will anything positive come out of this latest event? Not holding my breath – and I don’t reckon Higgens could get it all down in one book – an encyclopaedia perhaps.

Toot – toot.

[thorn bird]

Its been trotted out so many times I'm getting to hate the quote.

"Whats the definition of insanity?

Yet here we are supposedly a sane country throwing enormous volumes of Taxpayer
cash to produce enormous volumes of indecipherable regulations that are supposed
to produce safer outcomes, which they don't. When simply adopting the safest in the
world for basically petty cash will achieve exactly what the "Guvmint" asked for without
buggering a whole industry in the process.

Then we get the CASA FOI union invoking the mystic of safety to protect their rice bowl.

I just don't understand why. Nobody is suggesting that their pay and conditions should be cut.

Maybe if we had sensible english language rules everyone would find it easier to comply, making their job easier.

[Peetwo]

ARFFS and the ICAO lie - 

Ref BITN:

ARFFS Inquiry: Submission update.

The Committee Secretariat - the quiet achievers...

Today's additions:

21 Australian Airline Pilots' Association (AusALPA) (PDF 277 KB) 

...Conclusion

ARFFS provides an essential safety and potentially lifesaving service for the flying public
and the aircrew, which include our members and those of other IFALPA Member
Associations, who operate to/from Australia. AusALPA believes that ARFFS provision
should be established in accordance with the ICAO standards.

The current regulatory framework already means that Australia is not compliant with the
ICAO standard for the establishment of ARFFS and is the least compliant when
compared with Canada, New Zealand, UK and the US. Australia gave an undertaking to
review the MOS 139H after its noncompliance was highlight by the ICAO USOAP 2010
audit. The inference was that Australia would move to a closer compliance (such as
Canada) not adopt proposals that would make it less so.

Furthermore, adopting a risk assessment methodology to a catastrophic, though
fortunately a rare event (at least so far in Australia), is, according to the experts, flawed...

22 Mr Glen Barker (PDF 479 KB) 

23 Mr Karl McDonald (PDF 51 KB) 

24 Mr Kiegan Rice (PDF 53 KB) 

Of the submissions made public today the one I want to focus on is No.24, courtesy of Mr Kiegan Rice, which IMO perfectly highlights the disparity between Australia being an original responsible signatory State of the Chicago (ICAO) Convention and today merely paying lipservice to the ICAO SARPs...   

Senate Inquiry

The provision of rescue, firefighting and emergency response at Australian airports.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to provide a submission into this inquiry. My name
is Kiegan Rice, and I currently hold the rank of Station Officer at Hamilton Island Aviation Rescue Fire
Fighting Service. I have worked at Airservices Australia for 11 years and have also been stationed at
Broome, Melbourne (Tullamarine) and Gladstone. I could talk at length about the history and I feel I
could make reference to all of your requested items, but I would just like to take this opportunity to
pass on my own thoughts regarding Australia’s commitments to the International Civil Aviation
Organisation (ICAO).

A decision on adherence

More than likely it was a very cold Chicago day in December 1944 when 52 countries from
around the world penned their signatures on a document that would cement their commitments to
civil aviation worldwide. Arthur was there for the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and
he confirmed Australia’s commitment to work with the world to develop a general consensus and
implement international standards and recommended practices on civil aviation.

Change of commitment?

A lot of time has gone past between Chicago and now, although reading though pages of
legislation one would believe Australia’s commitment is still as solid as 1944. The Airservices Act 1995
(1) is very specific. “Airservices Australia must perform its functions in a manner consistent with
Australia’s obligations under the Chicago Convention”. The Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (2) oozes
the intent for that cold Chicago gathering. “As a signatory to the Chicago Convention, Australia is
obliged to require, as part of its domestic law, that certain classes of airport provide rescue and
firefighting services of an adequate standard.” The very first thing you read in subpart 139.H.

The commitment stops

From the regulations we drop down to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) developed
Manual of Standards Part 139H (MOS139H). Chapter 1: “Where there is a difference between a
standard prescribed in SARPs and a standard prescribed in the Manual of Standards (MOS), the MOS
standard prevails”. It’s been 14 years since the MOS139H has been updated. It has been under a post
implementation review since October 2007 and remains so. 44 million domestic passengers were
carried on 529,970 trips in Australian in 2005. An additional 20 million domestic passengers on
150,000 flights are now being flown throughout Australia with no changes to those standards. In that
time ICAO Annex 14 Volume 1 has been updated 11 times, the largest ever civil aircraft graces the
Australian skies, Australian airports have grown to bursting point requiring additional runways and
terminal extensions. The regulator currently doesn’t seem to be assisting Australia in its convention
commitments, but I can’t find how that inhibits Airservices Australia from carrying out their functions
under the Airservices Act 1995. My personal opinion is that decision makers within the ARFFS believe
that ICAO SARPS is split between the standards: certain standards that must be adhered to, and
recommended practices which are nice to adhere to. After years of research I am still not convinced.
Australian civil aviation strives for world best practice - shouldn’t we be aiming to adhere to all
recommended practices?

A finger is pointed

Under another of Australia’s ICAO commitments Airservices Australia publish within the
Aeronautical Information Package (AIP) Australia’s differences from the ICAO Standards,
Recommended Practices and Procedures (3). ARFFS sit under Aerodromes Volume 1 - currently there
are 41 pages of differences in that section. Every time that Australia is unable to meet the ARFFS
requirements of Annex 14 chapter 9, the AIP states that Australian legislation is the cause. Again, just
because the MOS is less protective than the ICAO SARP’s why isn’t Airservices Australia’s commitment
continued under the act?

The fix

Under the senate submission recommendations, the committee requires ideas on how these
issues can be addressed. Again, these are just my own thoughts. CASA needs to finish the review and
update the MOS Part 139H without input from the ARFFS provider. The Minister and the Airservices
Australia board members need to be reminded of their Chicago Convention ARFFS commitments as
per the Airservices Act 1995. ARFFS Regulatory Performance team along with the Operational
Standards team need to be advised the MOS is required to be read in conjunction with ICAO
publications - Annex 14 Chapter 9 and the Airport Services Manual Volume 1 to ensure they meet
their functions as set out in the Airservices Act 1995. I can see a major resistance to meeting
commitments due to financial reasons.

Prepare for the worst, expect the best

ARFFS have over 900 professional men and women willing and able to overcome adversity to
combat an aviation incident like Australia has never seen. When you are walking through our
terminals or rolling down our runways, just know that we will be there to help however and whenever
- we just hope our management support us in our commitment to the Australian travelling public. I
am available at any time to answer any questions the committee has. Thank you again for the
opportunity to express my thoughts.

Kiegan Rice

Reference:
ICAO Annex 14 Chapter 9
ICAO Airport Services Manual Volume 1
1 - Airservices Act 1995
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2016C00769
2 - Civil Aviation Safety Regulations Volume 4 Subpart 139.H
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F...tml/Volume 4# Toc485983220
3 – Manual of Standards Part 139H
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2008C00128
4 - Airservices Australia AIP – Differences from the ICAO Standards, Recommended Practices and
Procedures
http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/aip/...ents/Annex 14 Vol
1.pdf

  Choccy frog is in the mail Kiegan...  


MTF...P2