[Peetwo]

The Leopard (Carmody) reveals it's spots -

Here's the talk...

Via CASA Briefing:

New instruction on using safety information
Date of Publication: 
Thursday 28th September

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority has taken another important step in implementing its regulatory philosophy and ensuring a 'just culture' approach is taken to safety regulation.

A new instruction from the Director of Aviation Safety to CASA staff sets out limitations on the use of information that may show a contravention of the safety rules.

The instruction clarifies how information can be used when CASA makes decisions about whether enforcement action may need to be taken.

Individuals and organisations found to have violated a provision of the safety rules will be given an opportunity to address and correct safety issues without CASA initiating enforcement action.

Enforcement action will only be taken where there is a deliberate, wilful or reckless breach of the aviation safety rules, where there is a pattern of repeated misconduct or there is a failure to take appropriate corrective or protective action to address identified safety issues.

CEO and Director of Aviation Safety, Shane Carmody, said the new safety information instruction puts into practical effect key elements of CASA's regulatory philosophy.

"It is vital that CASA does not simply talk about taking a 'just culture' approach to regulation but actively implements the principles into our day-to-day operations and decision making," Mr Carmody said.

"Our rational 'just culture' approach means that where honest errors or mistakes are made CASA looks to support the efforts of individuals and organisations to make necessary improvements, correct identified problems and ensure safety risks are effectively managed in the process.

"Individuals and organisations with an understanding and commitment to safety need to take responsibility for addressing safety shortcomings and where they demonstrate the ability and willingness to do this CASA need not take action.

"CASA is encouraging a proactive approach to safety by the aviation community by clearly setting out how we will use safety information and the basis on which we will refrain from taking enforcement action based on that information.

"Of course, if the safety rules are deliberately flouted or action is not taken to address safety issues then CASA must and will take appropriate action.

"I am making it very clear to CASA staff and the aviation community that we will use information in the interests of safety and in a manner consistent with the 'just culture' principles reflected in our regulatory philosophy."

Go to the instruction on the limitations on the use of safety information.

Now let's see the walk...

The following segment from Estimates yesterday is IMHO a real tell on the true nature and intent of DAS Carmody when it comes to his instruction ( i.e. the Leopard's walk), note in particular the final comment from: 

DAS Carmody:"..I will not make a decision till after the ATSB report is finalised.."

Just think about that comment for a second..

Now although the intent by the DAS is to indicate that he will (unlike Malcolm Campbell) be not making any references or revealing any part of the DRAFT report (as per the conditions of section 26 of the TSI Act); he does appear to be indicating that he will be referencing the ATSB Final Report to inform his decision making process on DJ's request for the conditions on his ATPL be dropped...

Does this indicate that the DAS is contemplating breaching the spirit and intent of section 12AA of the TSI Act?

 

12AA  Functions of the ATSB
             (1)  The ATSB’s function is to improve transport safety by means that include the following:
                     (a)  receiving and assessing reports of transport safety matters, reportable matters, and other safety information that is prescribed by the regulations;
                     (b)  independently investigating transport safety matters;
                     ©  identifying factors that:
                              (i)  contribute, or have contributed, to transport safety matters; or
                             (ii)  affect, or might affect, transport safety;
                     (d)  communicating those factors to relevant sectors of the transport industry and the public in any way, including in any one or more of the following ways:
                              (i)  by making safety action statements;
                             (ii)  by making safety recommendations;
                            (iii)  by issuing safety advisory notices;
                     (e)  reporting publicly on those investigations;
                      (f)  conducting public educational programs about matters relating to transport safety;
                     (g)  any other means prescribed by the regulations.
             (2)  The ATSB also has the following functions:

                     (a)  cooperating with:
                              (i)  an agency of the Commonwealth, a State or Territory that has functions or powers relating to transport safety or functions affected by the ATSB’s function of improving transport safety; and
                             (ii)  a person who has, under a law of the Commonwealth, a State or Territory, functions or powers relating to transport safety or functions affected by the ATSB’s function of improving transport safety; and
                            (iii)  a national authority or other body of another country that has functions or powers relating to transport safety or functions affected by the ATSB’s function of improving transport safety;
                     (b)  doing anything incidental to its function of improving transport safety.

             (3)  The following are not functions of the ATSB:
                     (a)  to apportion blame for transport safety matters;
                     (b)  to provide the means to determine the liability of any person in respect of a transport safety matter;
                     ©  to assist in court proceedings between parties (except as provided by this Act, whether expressly or impliedly);
                     (d)  to allow any adverse inference to be drawn from the fact that a person was involved in a transport safety matter.

However, even though blame or liability may be inferred, or an adverse inference may be made, by a person other than the ATSB, this does not prevent the ATSB from carrying out its functions.

             (4)  To avoid doubt, subsection (3) does not prevent the prosecution of any offence under this Act.

Much, much..MTF on this.....P2

[Peetwo]

Carmody - Just Culture, Just’a Smokescreen.
 
The following are some comments/observations I made on a PAIN email chain in relation to the ongoing CASA embuggerance of DJ :

From CASA LSD Officer:

...I refer to  the documents released to you by CASA recently which included a copy of an SFR from March 2012 that was not signed by the delegate. I also refer to our recent telephone conversation where I identified a signed version of the SFR in CASA's records, and that is attached.

I note that even if the delegate had not signed the SFR, the fact of the delegate sending the attached decision letter to you would clearly have signified the delegate accepted the recommendations in the SFR...

ref http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Dominic-James-documents-released-19-Oct-17-Volume-1.pdf

AA refers to the wrong SFR. The one associated with the 27 March 2012 'notice of variation'; 'notice of revocation' letter (references pages 3 to 10 of Vol 1, 19 October 2017 released documents) was signed by Greg Hood (ref pg 7):

The SFR that wasn't signed (or apparently even forwarded to Greg Hood) was dated 18 July 2012 (reference pages 20 to 22). Nor it would seem was it accompanied by a further 'notice of variation' (as I believe is required under the CASA EM) by the original delegate/decision-maker Greg Hood; or someone designated to act on behalf of Greg Hood. However the person who the SFR correspondence was addressed -re: Mark Taylor Manager Permissions Application Centre cc Joe Rule - has seemingly accepted the unsigned - by delegate - SFR as good enough to action placing the ATPL variation condition back on DJ's FCL (reference page 23):

  
Now it could be Mark Taylor has the legal authority to take over the role as the delegate/decision-maker but if that was the case shouldn't he have counter-signed the SFR; and shouldn't Joe Rule as assigned legal counsel, then drafted a further amended 'notice of variation' on the conditions imposed on DJ's ATPL FCL?

Finally if you refer to page 68 of the Vol 1 released documents you will note the ALC (assigned legal counsel) Joe Rule would appear to have directed the 'Permissions application officer' to take down the alert on DJ's FCL:

This would seem to indicate in the mind of the ALC that the CEP of DJ was expired/closed/irrelevant. This assumption would also seem to be indicated by the fact that there was no 'caveats'/ conditions mentioned or referred to in any of the Flight Safety 'command' Falcon 20 type rating (CASA approved) paperwork (reference page 37 onward:

http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Dominic-James-documents-released-19-Oct-17-Volume-2.pdf.

It is also worth noting that had Flight Safety (probably at their amusement) been made aware of the condition on DJ's ATPL licence they more than likely could have arranged for the wx diversion exercise to be demonstrated and recorded in the final type rating test. Because remember that the exercise only has to be observed by a CASA FOI or FTE (ref IV below):

And courtesy of this week's SBG: A Galah event….

...But to put an end to the Carmody/ James argument consider this. At the time James accepted the conditions imposed (on legal advice – not mine) he had little option and it was the only way forward. Since then he has passed, at no less an August institution than Flight Safety a type rating, instrument rating and Command proficiency check. He is now asking, quite reasonably and politely for CASA to accept those qualifications as the evidence they demand of ‘competency’. They flatly refuse. Now they want a ‘CASA’ expert to oversight the same check.

 This is a pure case of embuggerance and a double insult to Flight Safety. The notion that only a CASA nominated inspector may judge the James performance is risible; furthermore if FS say ‘Pass’ and the FOI says ‘Fail’ what then? If and it is a big IF the proposed CASA FOI was a ever a professional pilot with real experience, ever operated as Captain, multi crew, international operations or even as a charter pilot in ‘class’ turbine then maybe he could argue against the FS ‘Pass’. Problem is, the proposed man is not any of these things; is he CEO Carmody

Now I have been reliably informed that the many tell-tale aberrations, errors and deletions etc. in due processes normally required in the administration of a CASA enforcement process (referencing the CASA EM), are not necessarily legally compromised in the DJ case because of the CASA v DJ out of court agreement.

However I would argue that this fact was obviously not conveyed and/or completely ignored by Roger Chambers as he attempted, up to a point, to comply with the normal processes associated with an ongoing CEP i.e. the striking up of a new SFR etc.

The fact that Chambers omitted to CC. to the original delegate/decision-maker Greg Hood could be interpreted as an admission of guilt that the terms of the original CASA v DJ agreement had now been breached without proper consultation with DJ's legal counsel. 

This guilt/admission is perfectly highlighted by the following extract from the 18 July 2012 SFR:

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---

Because Chambers did not recommend (b), IMO from that point on CASA were operating in total 'legal' contradiction of the CASA v DJ out of court agreement. This should have automatically made that 'agreement' and any enforcement actions after the 18 July SFR letter NULL & VOID.

Reference this year's Malcolm Campbell reply email:

UNCLASSIFIED
Dear Mr De Stoop,
 
On 12 September 2017 you wrote to CASA on behalf of Mr Domenic James ARN 519777 requesting relief from the conditions attached to his ATPL as a result of his part in the Westwind accident on 18 November 2009.
 
CASA has considered the request taking into account the adherence to the conditions placed on Mr James’ ATPL and the accompanying safety implications of the request.
 
Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR) 249 prohibits the carriage of passengers on certain flights. A proficiency check as required in the conditions involves practice of emergency procedures so could not be conducted during a charter/aeromedical flight as suggested.
 
As the assessment not only involves a proficiency check but ‘an assessment of the holder’s management of an unplanned weather related diversion designed to assess the holder’s in-flight command decision making’ this will involve a flight of significant duration with a diversion near a critical point in the aircraft’s flight range. It would be impractical and unsafe to conduct this assessment during actual flight so the assessment will need to be conducted in a flight simulator.
 
To reduce the cost impact of this assessment CASA will not charge for the inspector’s time or travel however it would need to be coordinated with sufficient time for this travel to be combined with the inspectors recurrent training program.
 
When you have some proposed dates for the assessment please let me know so we can confirm our availability.
 
Sincerely,
 
 
Malcolm Campbell
 
Certificate Team Manager
Safety Assurance Branch

 

Again, here are the terms of the original agreement:

Therefore  M'Lud, the BRB defence rests and simply calls this a classic case of CASA embuggerance...

Next and in reference to this SBG quote:

...Nope. James is simply the distraction, shifting focus away from the real story. Carmody dare not, indeed cannot undo the arbitrary restrictions placed on James; nor can he shred the evidence trail of some very shaky paper work doings to support the unseemly restoration to service of Pel-Air. Pel-Air remains untouched and unadmonished under the high speed, slippery edicts and decisions made by Chambers, supported by McCormack, approved by Hood, executed by Campbell, Worthington and others. The paper trail and supporting research all point to a major question? What the hell was CASA playing at? One could also ask why? Or; conversely one could speculate why a Virgin and Qantas crew got away with a slightly more dangerous, similar incident at Mildura, Scot free? The really bold questioner may even ask why is Hood running the ATSB?...

Inevitably this will bring PAIN to the next chapter of the PelAir re-cover-up investigation & DJ embuggerance, which I believe will call into question the original 24 December 2009 CAR 265 'NOTICE of SUSPENSION' decision letter to DJ...  

Hint - extract from that letter:

This line IMO is extremely important: "...Auckland reveals that you received a weather forecast for Norfolk Airport at 0904 UTC..." 
   


MTF? - You betcha...P2

Ps TBC on PelAir MKII

[Kharon]

Of devils and details.

P2 – “Inevitably this will bring PAIN to the next chapter of the PelAir re-cover-up investigation & DJ embuggerance, which I believe will call into question the original 24 December 2009 CAR 265 'NOTICE of SUSPENSION' decision letter to DJ...   Hint - extract from that letter:

This line IMO is extremely important: "...Auckland reveals that you received a weather forecast for Norfolk Airport at 0904 UTC..."

Is it fair and reasonable to expect a CASA investigator, CASA manager, CASA decision maker and a CASA legal eagle to be concise in the use of terminology? A ‘weather forecast’ is the thing a TV station put on between advertisements. Not quite the same thing as the detailed weather analysis on which pilots rely, not only for operational ‘safety reasons’ but for ‘legal safety’ – against prosecution, for fuel miscalculations and several other fairly important items. Items such as nominating an Alternate destination; this may seem like a fairly straightforward matter – the weather at destination ‘A’ is lousy so pick an ‘Alternate’ and if a landing at ‘A’ is not possible, then proceed to ‘B’ and land there. Seems simple enough – but it ain’t. (With apologies to the purists).
 
1) Destination airport forecast is below acceptable minima.

a) When the onward or destination airport is not available the aircraft may depart but may not proceed beyond the Point of Safe Return Depressurised (CPD) unless the forecast for an onward airport is acceptable.

b) Acceptable Airport - an airport that has a forecast for weather conditions below the alternate minima, but at or above the landing minima for the duration of the flight being undertaken.

2) Destination airport forecast is below suitable minima.

a) When the onward or destination airport is not available the aircraft may depart but may not proceed beyond the Point of Safe Return Single Engine (CPI) unless the forecast for an onward airport becomes suitable.

b) Suitable Airport - an airport that has a forecast for weather conditions above the alternate minima for the duration of the flight being undertaken.

The use of a ‘general term’ i.e. ‘weather forecast’ is not nearly good enough. I wonder has the ‘second’ Pel-Air report provided an in depth analysis of the legal/technical information conveyed to James (and his FO) or the application of that information to his decision process.

IMO - P7 nailed it – the 0803 from Nadi was pivotal. Auckland wouldn’t think to confirm that the flight had an update issued an hour ago – and so another strand of the safety net was broken. I digress.

Is the use of ‘sloppy’ terminology deliberate or simple ignorant laziness? – Either way, it ain’t right. But then, the cost of this whole farrago would have paid the overtime for the met observer on Norfolk for a lifetime. Why – as a safety matter – can the MO at Norfolk not be on station when a flight is scheduled? A bit of overtime would not break the bank and it would be a definite positive. But hell, that would be proactive safety in action and we can’t have that now, can we children.

Toot – toot..

[Peetwo]

Pelair dots, dashes & the DJ TOE -  (timeline of embuggerance)

Before we start joining the dots and examining the legal premise of the original Greg Hood 24 December 2009 suspension letter to DJ; I'd like to touch on some further observations (OBS) - with  regard to the two SFRs, associated records; and, correspondence Roger Chambers struck up in 2012 as part of a (Coordinated Enforcement Process (CEP) under DJ's enforcement file- (Trim EF10/496).

Note: in the 30 March 2012 'IN CONFIDENCE:LEGAL' correspondence from Chambers, the To & 'CC' addressees:

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---

Now, note the To & CC addressee omissions with the 18 July 2012 'IN CONFIDENCE:LEGAL' correspondence from Chambers to Mark Taylor (2nd email):

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---

Also, note that Chambers had inexplicably struck up another enforcement file for the CEP  ref DJ (EF12/79980) and this was despite the fact that this enforcement action would appear to have been in direct conflict to the 'AAT appeal process agreement' -

Which brings me to yet another ?

 

I am not sure if I can totally explain this Pauline; but, I'll give it a shot...  

It is worth remembering that while Roger Chambers, with DAS McComic's blessing, was desperately trying to prosecute the case of embuggerance of DJ; the ATSB investigation, with many stutters, starts and obvious conflicts of interest; was, finally, reaching the critical Directly  Interested Party (DIP) phase.

This could have been one of the reasons why CASA were seemingly determined to keep DJ from proceeding with his AAT appeal.

It is also interesting to note that the DRAFT Final Report was released to the DIP the day before Hoody's 27 March, 2012 - 'notice'  - correspondence to DJ. Note the TRIM ref No. - (at the top of the page).

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Now fast forward to the 18 July 2012 Chambers email (above) and consider that by this time Hoody had now been privy to the ATSB DRAFT Final Report and probably discovered some pertinent facts like, for example :-

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Extract from CAIR 09/3

---

...the 0803 amended Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) was never actually relayed to the flight crew; or that the 0904 from Auckland...




was not actually a 'weather forecast' but was really an auto METAR/SPECI and not a TAF (forecast) at all...

Could this be the reason why Chambers didn't (a) CC Hoody or; (b) get Hoody to sign off on the 2nd 2012 SFR or; © why Roger strikes up a new EF TRIM file for DJ without all the normal enforcement manual records and paperwork, as demanded and required, when a new CEP has been initiated...

Hmm...I wonder what Hoody's decision would have been then,  if; as the designated CASA delegate/decision-maker in the DJ embuggerance case, he had actually been sent the second 2012 Chambers SFR?

---

---

 
Given the circumstances, at the time, my money is on (b) do nothing...


MTF...P2 .

Choc Frog "K".

[Sandy Reith]

Mr. Carmody quote:-
“Enforcement action will only be taken where there is a deliberate, wilful or reckless breach of the aviation safety rules, where there is a pattern of repeated misconduct or there is a failure to take appropriate corrective or protective action to address identified safety issues.”
Mr. Carmody has a huge problem of credibility.
How to justify the continuing ill treatment of Captain James by CASA?
No one could possibly equate Mr. Carmody’s enforcement criteria with the actions of Captain James during his ill fated flight to Norfolk Island.

[thorn bird]

I agree Sandy.

It fail to understand how this event is in any way different from the Mildura incident.
Both were weather related, not fuel related, nor related to deficiencies in crew management
of the flights.

In both incidents the flights departed legally with all statutory requirements complied with.

In both incidents the crews found themselves in a fuel critical situation because the weather deteriorated while en-route. In both cases the crews were not made aware of the peril they were flying into until their available options had been passed.

Chambers actions against Dom James, as discovered by Peetwo joining the dots in my opinion smacks of malfeasance.

[Kharon]

“A lie that is half-truth is the darkest of all lies.”  (Tennyson).

Ah, but Sandy CEO Carmody’s credibility remains intact you see– this ain’t enforcement (no rules broken). This is a ‘safety related’ matter and the CASA CEO is just showing his great concern for the public safety.

You see, according to CASA ‘officials’, despite having sailed through a raft of exams , type ratings, proficiency checks, including one at Flight Safety for a command rating on a Falcon; CASA are not satisfied that James is competent. Can’t possibly accept FS word for that James passed, nor the word of company Check Training that James is sound – on no. They want to send Inutile Lad, that guru of air operations, along to give James the CASA approved chop ride– the final insult in a long string of injury.  With a bit of luck the chop ride may even put a nail in the check pilots coffin – a sweet bonus right there.

This is a classic Sydney office ploy; lie and cheat their way through a rigged game, this before the ‘whispering’ and subtle threats to operators are made to prevent any chance of employment, even if you manage to get through one of their tricked up ‘check flights’.

No mate, for a start, Carmody ain’t got any credibility to loose. He could clean out the rats nest and make some reparation to those damaged, that would give him a reputation and credibility as a reform DAS; but, so long as he supports this standard embuggerance, states that he intends to infringe the TSI Act and tacitly approves the actions of those actively engaged, he will simply remain another bureaucratic muff; a glove puppet dancing to the ministerial tune. On the plus side – I don’t believe Carmody has the first clue about what really goes on beyond the rarefied atmosphere of his ivory tower; if he does, then he don’t give a monkey’s. We shall see; watch as this story unfolds.

“It is only prudent never to place complete confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived.” (Descatres).

Toot toot.

[Peetwo]

The 0904 from Auckland.

P9: ...The use of a ‘general term’ i.e. ‘weather forecast’ is not nearly good enough. I wonder has the ‘second’ Pel-Air report provided an in depth analysis of the legal/technical information conveyed to James (and his FO) or the application of that information to his decision process.


IMO - P7 nailed it – the 0803 from Nadi was pivotal. Auckland wouldn’t think to confirm that the flight had an update issued an hour ago – and so another strand of the safety net was broken. I digress...

---

P2: ...the 0803 amended Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) was never actually relayed to the flight crew; or that the 0904 from Auckland...




was not actually a 'weather forecast' but was really an auto METAR/SPECI and not a TAF (forecast) at all...

The 'passing strange' omissions in paragraph 6 in Hood's original (

Letter to Mr Dominic John ~ NOTICE OF SUSPENSION OF COMMERCIAL PILOT (AEROPLANE) LICENCE dated 24 December 2009.pdf Size: 561.88 KB  Downloads: 4

) notice of suspension; of the 0803 amended TAF or indeed the 0801 Nadi relayed Norfolk island METAR can partly be explained by the fact that the CASA investigators & FOI's involved were yet to receive the transcript from the Fijian ATC.

This begs the question to how it was possible for the delegate Hood to make a fully informed decision when such critical information, which included a amended TAF that if received by the VH-NGA flightcrew would have automatically placed a legal operational requirement on the conduct of the rest of the flight.

It is also interesting to note that on the 16 December 2009 DJ was informally interviewed (i.e. not recorded) by CASA investigators and in the course of that interview the 0803 amended TAF was never brought up or even acknowledged. So perhaps the omissions were purely a symptom of reckless, cocksure ignorance and/or arrogance...

However the errors and omissions in transcripts, amended TAFs etc in the evidential trail - that left DJ lumbered with a dodgy, ill-informed Hoody decision to suspend DJ's licence - were to continue and be used against DJ all the way through to June 2010. The following are some extracts from the ALC (& apparently acting manager LSD at the time) Joe Rule correspondence in reply to DJ's legal counsel on 11 June 2010:

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Note that again the 0904 from Auckland is errantly referred to by Joe Rule as a 'weather forecast'. Still no mention of the 0803 amended TAF but the Fijian transcript finally arrives and provides another golden opportunity to stick the knife yet again into DJ with the 0801 METAR that was transmitted to VH-NGA. (remember the 0801 contained the errant Nadi transmission of 6000' feet cloud base when it should have been 600') 

However, despite the examination by 'FOI's with many thousands of hours of aeronautical experience', the first CASA published acknowledgement and recognition of the significance of the 0803 Norfolk Island amended TAF did not occur until the CAIR 09/3 was released a month and ten days after the Joe Rule correspondence.

Extracts from page 7 & 8 of CAIR 09/3: 

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Note that Richard (ALIU) White completely glosses over the fact that the 0803 amended TAF was never relayed, by either Auckland or Nadi, to the flightcrew of VH-NGA...

Also note, that despite the assistance of so called technical FOI experts, Richard White was also under the same misconception, as Joe Rule and delegate Hood, that the 0904 from Auckland was a weather forecast (reference page 27 CAIR 09/3):

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Anyway you cut this up and spin it around, it is very hard to come up with how it was remotely possible for all these so called legal, technical and investigative (AAI) experts to miss the errors and omissions of the 0803 from Nadi and the 0904 from Auckland...   

However reckless indifference or plain ineptitude in due process is not a defence against section 24 of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003:

24  Offence to hinder etc. an investigation

             (1)  A person commits an offence if:
                     (a)  the person engages in conduct; and
                     (b)  the person is reckless as to whether the conduct will adversely affect an investigation:
                              (i)  that is being conducted at that time; or
                             (ii)  that could be conducted at a later time into an immediately reportable matter; and
                     ©  the conduct has the result of adversely affecting such an investigation (whether or not the investigation had commenced at the time of the conduct); and
                     (d)  the conduct is not authorised by the Chief Commissioner.

Penalty:  Imprisonment for 12 months.

      
MTF...P2

[Kharon]

Intent and Normalised deviance.

For the legal eagles who operate in the higher atmosphere a single word can form the base for a pivotal part of a case; a word like ‘reckless’ for example. The word, standing alone, can be defined may ways – a simple, quick Google search provides reams of explanation.

Wiki “The precise definition of recklessness has been contested and has evolved. It generally involves a person pursuing a course of action while consciously disregarding that the action gives rise to a substantial and unjustifiable risk”.

You may, if you’ve a mind to, persist with the search and be no better informed from that search than the ‘Wiki’ explanation – which brings ‘mens rea’ and ‘actus rea’ into play and touches on ‘strict liability’. This is the word world the James ‘case’ (Norfolk ditching) has landed in.

The ‘law’ however works both ways – and is applicable in this case to all parties; i.e. ATSB,  CASA, Pel-Air and James. The TSI Act mentions ‘reckless’ in part 24 where conduct likely to adversely affect on investigation etc. is raised. If we take the spotlight off James and his actions and turn it onto the ATSB and CASA to look closely at their actions – in the context of ‘reckless’ and ‘adversely affecting such an investigation’, we see a remarkably different picture emerge from the gloom.

No one in their right mind would mount the prosecution of ATSB and CASA in relation to their actions in this matter; the cost in time alone would be incredible, not to mention the money. The agencies involved know this; and, rightfully, believe they are 'safe': placed above the law by the cost, outside of the law by the time required to get to the first appeal and protected by ‘the government’ which would be harmed if the case against was proven. In short, they are, to all practical intent and purpose, untouchable. Hells bells – even Aleck publicly admits that ’the Act’ is unconstitutional.

But then, in simple terms, what has been done not only to James, but others is wrong. Plain, pure and simple – wrong. We keep screaming for the regulator to be reformed, for there is little which can be done about ‘the law’. The ditching of the Pel-Air West-wind off Norfolk Island could serve the nation very well – if it was managed the right way. The incident provides a perfect ‘snap-shot’ of all that is wrong with the legislation, the way CASA choose to interpret those laws to suit and the way in which the ATSB can be utilised to support the CASA edicts and judgement. A long hard look at the ‘case’ shows James to be more sinned against than sinning; but then so does examination of several other ‘cases’, such as Airtex on a ‘company’ level and Quadrio on a personal level.

In a fair world, these matters examined and compared would shock the nation. A government that was genuinely concerned about the health and well being of an industry would call for an inquiry into the actions of it’s ‘watch dogs’ and take positive action when they discovered that the sheep killers were their very own animals. But why bother when the safety of the travelling public is so well protected by the ‘law’ that no case, no matter how blighted, can ever be brought home to a government agency. Well it should be; those involved in the Pel-Air scandal should be dragged (metaphorically) by the scruff of the neck into a court and prosecuted, we know who they are, so does Carmody. I can’t and he won’t so why have I just wasted ten minutes of my life and of those who may read my twiddles?

Be buggered if I know – but I feel better now for doing it.

Selah,

[thorn bird]

I was trawling through some of the submissions to the Senate Enquiry regarding the Pelair incident. One that stood out in my mind was a submission by Richard Davies. He completed an in depth analysis of the event including fuel plans as well as an examination of Pelairs planning policies and SOP's.

His submission is incredibly detailed and is somewhat large to post here so I have taken the liberty to highlight some of his conclusions, which support the prognosis that by the time the commander of the flight became aware that Met. conditions at Norfolk Island were below an acceptable level, a diversion to Noumea was very problematic and in all likelihood the flight would have ended up ditching in open water before reaching that safe haven. For those interested studying the entire submission a link to the Senate submissions;

https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Bus...2012/index

Opening gambit:

2. I make this submission as an individual who is concerned regarding the standards and practices of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), as exhibited in the matters relating to the accident on 18 November 2009 involving the Westwind II aircraft, registered VH-NGA, operated by Pel-Air Pty Ltd.

3. I became involved in this matter at the request of parties involved or associated with the accident. My subsequent enquiries and analysis indicated deficiencies by both the ATSB and CASA in aspects that I have reviewed.

I think he smelt a rat.

Fuel System and Fuel on Board

8. The ATSB report (page 15), in its section on ‘Fuel System’, discusses the capacity of the aircrafts fuel system. However, it refers to the capacity in units of pounds (lbs) or kilograms (kg). These figures are incorrect in that they represent a weight (of fuel) and not a volumetric capacity of the tanks.


10. The ATSB report frequently refers to a fuel load of 7330 lbs as being the main fuel tanks containing full fuel (pages 3, 16 and 32).
The statement is incorrect for the reasons specified below. I am not aware where the ATSB obtained this figure from, however it is referred to in Pel-Air documentation as being the standard figure for full main tanks.

Already inconsistencies from the ATSB.

15. The aircraft had fuel tank capacities of 1100 USG for the main tanks, and an additional 230 USG for the wingtip tanks. Therefore, if the aircraft was fuelled to the main tanks being full, and an SG of 0.78 applied (as specified by Pel-Air), the aircraft had 7160 lbs of fuel on board preflight, not the reported 7330 lbs.

16. The ATSB Report had a paucity of information regarding their methods of fuel and flight planning calculations.

Scant details included:

“The investigation used a BoM wind/temperature chart to derive the temperature at the cruising altitude as approximating ISA + 10oC.”
and that the calculation included:
“The application of that temperature to the available aircraft performance figures and the PIC-anticipated 50 kts headwind to the relevant cruise speed from the AFM to the distance from Apia to Norfolk Island of 1,450 NM (2,688 km)”
thus deriving:
“resulted in an estimated planned fuel consumption of 5,550 lb (2,517 kg).”

17. The report does not specify the ATSB’s methodology for calculations. I did obtain a copy of a “Jeppesen FliteMap” calculation, purportedly completed or commissioned by the ATSB for use in the investigation. No weight details are included in the document (eg Takeoff weight). However, for the correlating distance (1449 nm), altitude (FL390) and a 70 knot headwind the calculated fuel used was 5150 lbs.

This is a difference of 400 lbs less despite an extra 20 kts of headwind. The reason for this anomaly could not be identified.

18. The report does not contain details of the calculated fuel remaining at any point enroute. Thus the basis for calculating the viability of diversions whilst enroute cannot be justified.

Some inconsistencies from Pelair;

19. The ‘Pel-Air Operations Manual Part B’ specifies
“16.5.1.1 The following planning data shall be used for Company Westwind operations.”
(my emphasis)
However, in the very next paragraph states:

“16.5.2 Fuel Consumption and Block Speeds

16.5.2.1 The following table is a guide only to planning. Refer to A/C OPS
Planning Manual for precise information.” (my emphasis)
The document then continues with planning information with fuel usage based on hourly time frames, irrespective of the weight of the aircraft. Similarly, a standard figure is used for True Air Speed (TAS), despite this also varying with weight and altitude.

Then CAsA enters the mix;

21. These various statements would appear confusing and contradictory, yet are contained in a manual accepted by CASA that is the primary reference source for the crew.

Dom James was pilloried for not diverting to Noumea when he became aware the Norfolk weather was below minimums, in fact part of Rodger Chambers embuggerance requirements is a check flight in a westward or similar to judge mr James decision making processes and calculation of an inflight diversion. No doubt if he had decided to divert and finished up ditching in open waters short of Noumea, he'd be faced with an inquisition as to why he diverted with insufficient fuel. DAMNED IF HE DID, and DAMNED IF HE DIDNT.

here's the rub from Mr Davies;

Fuel Calculations for Diversion

31. Based on these calculations, the fuel remaining on board at position DOLSI (at time 0839 UTC) was 2282 lbs (assuming the 10 percent Variable Fuel Reserve had been used to this point)
32. The ATSB report identified the “Approximate Last point of safe diversion to Noumea” as being between time 0902 UTC and 0928 UTC
33. At time 0904 UTC the crew received advice of a weather observation (SPECI) issued at 0902 UTC. As identified in the ATSB report, this was the first time the crew assimilated information about the deteriorating weather at YSNF.
34. Time 0904 UTC was 25 minutes after DOLSI, at an average Ground Speed of 352 kts and Fuel Flow of 1326 lb/hr. Therefore, the distance past DOLSI was 146 nm and fuel remaining was 1677 lb (assuming the 10 percent Variable Fuel Reserve had been used to this point)
From a position on track 146 nm past DOLSI to NWWW was 436 nm
Based on a diversion direct to NWWW at that time, at FL390 with a 20 kt headwind component throughout, having used 1409 lbs for the subsequent cruise and descent for the segment (assuming the 10 percent Variable Fuel Reserve has been used), the aircraft would arrive overhead to commence its approach and landing with 269 lbs total at time 1014 UTC
Calculations for this are attached as Annex E.

35. Time 0928 UTC was 49 minutes after DOLSI. Based on the previous figures, the distance past DOLSI was 287 nm and fuel remaining was 1093 lb (assuming the 10 percent Variable Fuel Reserve has been used to this point)
From a position on track 287 nm past DOLSI to NWWW was 410 nm
Based on a diversion direct to NWWW at that time, at FL390 with no wind component throughout, having used 1214 lbs for the subsequent cruise and descent for the segment (assuming the 10 percent Variable Fuel Reserve has been used), the aircraft would not complete its diversion as it would run out of fuel, having a shortfall of 122 lbs

36. By comparison, if the aircraft continued to YSNF (as planned) it would arrive with 709 lbs (Annex D)
37. Based on these calculations, the information contained in the ATSB report is incorrect.

The fateful timeline;

50. The first time the crew became cognizant of a need to consider the option of an alternate aerodrome due to deteriorating weather at YSNF was 0904 UTC; by which time they had passed LPSD for NFFN (time 0845 UTC) (see para 54 and Annex G), and (based on the calculations above) the airport that would result in the greatest amount of fuel being available on arrival was YSNF. (See paras 35 and 36).

269 lb remaining at NWWW (less than FFR), 709 lb remaining at YSNF

The point?

53. At 0904 UTC the latest TAF for YSNF was for conditions below alternate minima, but above landing minima. The latest observation (SPECI 0902 UTC) also identified weather conditions below alternate minima, but above landing minima. As such the crew could have a reasonable expectation of becoming ‘visual’ prior to the completion of an instrument approach and landed.
54. Given that the aircraft was past its ‘last possible diversion’ to arrive with FFR remaining, and at YSNF there were two separate runways, and the expected weather conditions were above landing minima, the crew complied with the Pel-Air procedure (as accepted by CASA).
55. By the time the crew obtained the 0930 SPECI at time 0932 their options were:
Proceed to YSNF to attempt a landing, irrespective of the conditions, or Ditch in open water enroute to NWWW.

Conclusions;

ATSB:

79. As is apparent from the analysis above, the ATSB report contains insufficient factual material to support its analysis and findings. Therefore, the veracity of the ATSB report is questionable.

and CAsA:

83. In the events and conditions associated with this accident it is apparent the risk controls were inadequate and unreliable. This in turn identifies a lack of effective regulatory oversight of the operator by CASA.

[Peetwo]

The 0739 key to the PelAir wx imbroglio -  



Quotes from this week's SBG: Sublime or Ridicules? Your call.

CASA must, by a simple process of elimination, known, full well that the 0803 report was vital. If James had received it – they had him stone cold; gross negligence – and we would have cheered that decision. To continue on regardless of the 0803 was indeed, reckless. But James never, ever got the message. That, standing alone exonerates James completely. From that one omission every possible hole in the cheese lined up. CASA cannot possibly deny knowledge of this fact; and, by extension, neither can Hood. There are so many holes and patches on the legal and procedural case that it cannot hold water.

&..in answer to Ol'Tom's QON:

CHAIR: Of course. I've got to tell you, if your investigator didn't ask it, you want to get him or her down into the car park and get them out of your business as quickly as you can. That would have to be the most fundamental question.

P7 - Didn't James do an interview like that? - No recording made etc...

Indeed it is true that on the 16 December 2009 DJ was 'informally' interviewed by CASA  legal and investigative officers. This interview was described by Hoody in the 24 December 'NOTICE of SUSPENSION' letter as - "discussions with CASA officers". The reason given for making these so called 'discussions' informal (not recorded) was that if made 'formal' (recorded) it may one day be used in a court of law.

Q1/ Was this the first indication that CASA were attempting to prosecute a case that was factually deficient in 'damning evidence' (reference SBG quote above); therefore potentially contestable in either a true court of law or the AAAT? 

Q2/ Could this also be an indication that due to the ToR for 'parallel investigations'...

---

Reference 2010 MOU Part 4 (PDF pg 28), from CASA AAI submission - Attachment 5(PDF 6032KB) 

---

...that the CASA investigative/ops officers were privy to the full weather records that the ATSB had obtained, including the 0803 AMD TAF?

Q3/ If so, I wonder if at that stage the ATSB and CASA were aware that the flightcrew of VH-NGA never received the 0803 AMD TAF? 

Q4/ Could this also be why, sometime after the 8 December 2009, it was decided that CASA wouldn't contribute funds to recover the CVR/FDR?

---

---

Of course this is probably more likely to be typical incompetence by CASA and their so called 'experts' involved in the DJ embuggerance were blissfully unaware of the significance of the 0803 AMD TAF?

However eventually (by July 2010) the penny obviously dropped as the MALIU Richard White referred several times to the 0803 and it's significance in his CAIR 09/3 cover-up report...

This brings me to another omission of fact. Apparently on top of the non-relayed 0803 TAF there was a significant SPECI METAR that was also not passed on by Nadi to the flightcrew.

Extract (PG 60) from original ATSB VH-NGA Final Report:

...The cloud base continued to descend (Figure 8), and at 0739, the automatic weather station (AWS) issued an extra report beyond its normal half-hourly reports. The extra report was issued as the weather conditions had deteriorated to the extent that the reported aerodrome weather report had changed from requiring the issue of a METAR to that of a SPECI (special), because overcast cloud had been observed 1,100 ft above the ARP, which was less than the highest alternate minima. The wind direction had not changed.

---

The 0739 SPECI: SPECI YSNF 180739Z AUTO 29010KT 9999 OVC011 21/19 Q1012 RMK RF00.0/000.0

---

 The 0739 was significant because that was the wx report that triggered the BOM officer to issue the 0803 AMD TAF: Ref pg 61 VH-NGA FR

...In the light of this unforecast change in the weather conditions, an amended TAF was issued at 0803, valid from 0800. The amended TAF forecast Broken cloud at 1,000 ft above the ARP, and that the wind direction was not forecast to change from a westerly direction until 1500, with the passing of the cold front. This amended TAF forecast that the weather conditions would be less than the alternate minima, but not less than the landing minima at the ETA of VH-NGA at Norfolk Island...

  
Note that despite the rapid deterioration in wx conditions, as reported in the 0830 SPECI (see above), neither Nadi nor Auckland attempted to contact VH-NGA with the details from this SPECI weather report...

---

Reference transcripts via Bryan Aherne Senate AAI submission - Attachment 9(PDF 265KB)

---

 
Even more disturbing was that the 0830 SPECI did not prompt the BOM forecasting officer to issue a further amended TAF to reflect that there was now BKN cloud being reported below the aerodrome landing minima. Hopefully the new (500+ page) Final Report will be able to proactively explain how this BOM aberration occurred? My best guess would be that the BOM officer was fooled by the temporary lull in deteriorating SPECI wx as reported in the 0856 SPECI and 0900 METAR. 
       
However the lull was to be short-lived and ironically what should have been the amended TAF issued at approximately 0830, was to be issued at 09:58 (2 minutes before VH-NGA commenced it's first instrument approach):

...The aerodrome weather reports indicated that the cloud base continued to descend after 0830. At 0925, the AWS issued another report beyond its normal half-hourly reports. The weather conditions had deteriorated to the extent that a safe landing was unlikely to be achieved following an instrument approach because Broken cloud was observed 300 ft above the ARP. The horizontal visibility had deteriorated from over 10 km to 6,000 m in the previous 31 minutes. It also started to rain at around this time.

Due to this further unforecast change in the weather conditions, another amended TAF was issued at 0958, valid from 1000. This TAF forecast the same weather conditions in the amended 0803 TAF; however, it also included a TEMPO, forecasting an intermittent deterioration in the weather conditions for no longer than 60 minutes, with the cloud changing to Broken at 500 ft above the ARP, a horizontal visibility of 4,000 m and associated showers of rain. The TEMPO conditions in this forecast were not worse than the landing minima, but were worse than the alternate minima...

       
Finally I want to focus on how the MALIU Richard White (IMO maliciously) manipulated/glossed over/omitted important factual wx reports and forecasts that led and/or allowed the CASA delegate Greg Hood to administer a ill-informed and ignorant enforcement decision (embuggerance - ).

---

Reference CAIR 09/3 PDF pages 50 to 53, from CASA AAI submission - Attachment 5(PDF 6032KB)

---

---

 
P2 comments/obs:

1) Note how the two critical wx reports - 0739 SPECI and 0830 SPECI - that weren't transmitted or received by the flightcrew of VH-NGA are completely glossed over by Richard White;
2) Note how the only wx forecast (TAFOR) referred to by White is cynically added into the timeline between the 0801 and 0841 Nadi transmissions. White continues to falsely imply that the flightcrew were aware of the operational requirements of the 0803 AMD TAF.
3) Finally note how White completely omits the wx details from the 0630 METAR which was relayed first in the 0801 VH-NGA v Nadi HF radio exchange.



MTF..P2

[Peetwo]

Update to the Carmody embuggerance of DJ -  

This from Fort Fumble this AM:

 

UNCLASSIFIED
Good Morning Dominic,

 This email is in regard to how and when CASA will proceed in the matter of your satisfying the conditions attached to your ATPL so that you are able to exercise the privileges of your ATPL.

 There have been discussions on whether or not CASA should exercise some discretion in the application of the ATPL conditions and, if so, what would a suitable assessment look like. During The Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee, Senate Estimates of 27 October 2017 CASA’s CEO/DAS stated in response to a question from a Senator “…The ATSB report is due to be handed down in three weeks. I’m considering the approach from Mr James, but I will not make a decision until after the ATSB report is finalised. I just want to make that clear”

 In light of that response, as recorded in the Hansard transcript of that committee (refer page 29 of 70), I will not be proceeding in determining how any assessment will be made or when that could occur until after the ATSB report is issued.
 
Regards
 
Fred van der Heide
Region Manager Sydney
Safety Assurance Branch
CASA\Aviation Group
 
p: +61 2 8651 3132  m: +61 408 591 214 
260 Elizabeth St., Sydney NSW 2010
GPO Box 2005, Canberra ACT 2601

UDB!

Put that against my factual review (so far) - above: The 0739 key to the PelAir wx imbroglio . 
  
In particular the obvious sinister manipulation of facts within the CAIR 09/3 (page 7 to 9 CAIR 09/3 extracts above) and remembering that the CAIR 09/3 was originally hidden behind copies of the previous MoUs in the CASA submission (Attachment 5(PDF 6032KB)) to the Senate AAI inquiry. That attachment PDF started at 102 pages but then was amended by some unknown person(s) to now be only 82 pages.

The documents that were deleted off a supposedly Parliamentary protected document, were copies of the 2001 and 2004 CASA v ATSB MoUs. Presumably parties were sensitive to the fact that the ALIU 'parallel investigation' was started by MALIU Richard White (reference 'Synopsis' CAIR 09/3 Attach 5 PDF page 50) the day after the ditching and apparently under the ToR of the yet to be officially promulgated 2010 MoU...

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---

For more on the strange PelAir machinations and aberrations with supposedly Parliamentary protected documents and/or evidence, please refer to historical thread posts: Of parallel investigations, MoUs, MALIUs & Directives & All Pel-Air lines of obfuscation lead to?  

   
MTF...P2

[Kharon]

Wot Fred said:

What, exactly, is Fred trying to say? Does he, himself know?

“There have been discussions on whether or not CASA should exercise some discretion in the application of the ATPL conditions and, if so, what would a suitable assessment look like.”

What it should look like is one of a long list of compensation cheques and apologies; that’s what. Attached to those should be a list of CASA personnel; retiring to spend more time with their families or; helping Her Majesty’s number plate or rock pile stocks grow.

Preceding this course of action a sincere apology and plea for leniency should be delivered to the Senate; along with a solemn promise to never, ever again attempt a snow job of this magnitude.

Carmody could then go on television and offer an apology to the Australian people for the gross waste of time and money squandered on the Pel-Air inquiry – and why.  He could even top that off with an explanation of how almost incredible amounts of money have been wasted on the regulatory reform process to provide one of the most useless rule sets known to the aviation world.

The minister could then step up to deliver a simple two year plan to bring in a rule set from overseas which will solve many of the problems created through gross negligence, blind ignorance, unparalleled arrogance and malicious intent. While he’s ‘on camera’ he could offer a sweetener – to assuage the anger; a judicial inquiry to examine the closure of several business enterprises during the McCormack era.

There you go Fred – one of your small problems solved, a side benefit will be a much clearer understanding of your own crew and what they get up to – not what’s reported – but in real life. There’s a handy yardstick for you – would the real Qantas have had people like this working for the company? You know they wouldn’t.

The above is all whimsy and fantasy – what will happen is subtle pressure will be brought to Dom’s employer – the threat of a Chambers style 'negative audit' (not the Pel-Air version) – where every comma and full stop can be transmogrified into a criminal charge; after ‘key personnel’ are culled by another Campbell/De Marco/ Worthington stitch up. The opening words along the lines of "there's a lot of shit coming down - most of it heading your way" (Worthington paraphrased). Whispers on the wind indicate that the knives are already being sharpened.

There are only a few basic questions which must be answered once the Pel-Air report is released; just a few, probably less than a dozen. But answers to those questions must be publicly provided; if Carmody fails to do that – we will.

The great Joe Louis once said, “He can run, but he can’t hide”. You Sir, are deeply involved, by default, in a very serious bout: the law and logic not boxing gloves the weapons, the Senate committee rooms the arena, not Madison Square garden. But you get the picture.



Toot - toot.

[P7_TOM]

Delivery problems.

Well; one of the problems with ‘bombshells’ is a suitable delivery system. You could, in theory, build one the size of a skyscraper, probably get it to work just fine  - but delivery?

Same – same Pel-Air and the ex Bankstown, now Sydney crew; its all there, enough TNT to blow ‘em all to hell and back – but who is going to deliver ‘the package’? Nick has departed the fix; Fawcett is likely to further his political career as ‘El presidento’ of the Senate and will not upset the military – so that leaves who?

There is only the stalwart front row left standing: props, Barry O’Braces Sullivan and Glen (the rock) Sterle and the hooker Gallacher. Good men and true, all. BUT the abominations of the CASA first XV MUST be examined; in detail. The aberrations of Dolan’s ATSB must be scrutinised. The abuse of the ‘Enforcement manual’ and MoU, and ICAO annexes, and the crimes of the Bankstown FOI division, and the parallel investigation, and the ‘doing’s’ of Chambers: all, require full, detailed, rigorous examination; IF this outrageous aviation administration is ever to be set, properly, to rights.

So? To whom do we turn as the sticking point arrives? Certainly not the current minister; or even his peers. ICAO won’t play, the FAA can’t, the NTSB cannot. The AFP simply will not (without evidence- and even then) . The Brits, the Kiwi’s? No, we are all alone in a sea of trouble – Carmody, FDS: don’t make me spill a fine glass of premium imported ‘real ale’, please. The media – the bloody media could not, not on their best day spot a serious story. The duckin’ opposition dare not speak out – FDS Albo was ‘their’ man: McConvict his appointee; and, who knows what hand he played in John Sharp’s little game.

The gods know, full well that there is nowhere to appeal. Forget the higher courts, the costs alone would make a stone idol weep; that’s before the massive amount of time, huge sums of money and party piece ‘expertise’ are (@$7000 {ish+} a day)  raised. Then there is the appeal process, again and again. Two decades and AUD 20 million would just about cover the cost of CASA accepting that they may – in the fine print – have made a small clerical error: not strict liability – so piss off.

Nope; it’s all down to ‘Do-Nuthin Darren’; Gippslands answer to George Cluny. Well, perhaps we could write him a polite letter, with clear, easy to read instructions on how to tie his boot laces- which he may read – if we keep it down to two sentences, in big letters. Useless - unless this industry, collectively, stands behind an anti embuggerance effort, the game will continue for another three decades.  InShaAllah: I won't care by then.

So W T (the) D & FCOL is going to ensure justice prevails? Carmody? I asked you nicely; before, DO NOT make me spill this ale. Aw. Too late.  

Yes please Son; same again and yes; I will hang on to it this time – I promise.

[Peetwo]

DJ embuggerance update: 14/11/2017

CASA continue to take the Mickey Bliss on CAA & FOI Act -

Kaz Casey - - has picked out a couple of relevant quotes from the IronBar book on legal weasel word confectionary (ie Aviation Law in Australia):

Quoting the 'Aviation Law Guru" Mr Ronald I C Bartsch from his book, Aviation Law in Australia (only Aviation Law book in Oz)...with the forward by no other than Mr Jono Aleck. How very bloody convenient. 

"The purpose of introducing these statutes relating to administrative bodies was to make the government more responsible to the people they were elected to serve. The underlying philosophy being that if decision-makers are held more accountable for their decisions then the "quality" of the overall decision-maker process should improve. To this end the enactments appear to have been a success." - I would suggest if you were in Dom's shoes, "accountability" and "quality" would come a distant 2nd last and last on descriptors for the nearly 8 yr embuggerance inflicted upon him by the CASA Sydney basin regional office - P2

I know, I know, he is talking out of his arse & teaching this shite in University. Might go to his next lecture, take a seat while he is wobbling his big head in front of his law students & ask a few questions, nice & LOUD.

Then regarding the FOI process, he states..

"The FOI Act 1982 creates a legally enforceable right of public access to documents in the possession of Commonwealth Ministers and authorities....Although there are some 18 grounds for exemption from release, the FOI Act is biased in favour of release. The intent of the Act is that, even if there is an applicable exemption, there should be release if at all possible unless to do so would create an unreasonable diversion of the resources of the agency to which the request has been made. There are specific provisions that prevent the disclosure of information relating to aviation accidents and incidents within the aviation regulations."

....Yeeeeah right.

Their job at the FOI department is too, well, um, process FOI's. Included in their budgets...

This statement...

"..there should be release if at all possible unless to do so would create an unreasonable diversion of the resources of the agency to which the request has been made.."

...has been in goodwill and somewhat informally embraced by the CASA FOI Officer David Gobbitt in his response to the DJ request's for information (reference: Carmody - Just Culture, Just’a Smokescreen.).

However as of 5 days ago DG has suddenly gone all formal on DJ's latest request for further information: Letter to Dominic James - sent 9-Nov-17-4

---

WOW! 390 documents and 11,000 pages for an enforcement file that I thought had been closed ever since DJ received the dodgy and ill-informed Hood 'notice of suspension' 24 December 2009 decision letter (note the EF No. at the top of the page): http://www.auntypru.com/forum/attachment.php?aid=377

It was my understanding that everything that followed (up till today) on the DJ embuggerance was then filed under CASA file ref: EF10/496...

---

E.g.

---

Q/ Regardless of the nearly 8 year embuggerance of DJ, it beggars belief that there is 390 documents and 11,000 pages on one file, for what is essentially a minor pilot CEP (co-ordinated enforcement process). One wonders how much time, money and human resources would be expended on an enforcement action against a large major airline? - UDB!
Hansard quote:

Senator XENOPHON: It is a sensitive issue. The standard form recommendation, as I understand it, is a document relating to adding references to a flight crew licence condition. Is that right?

Mr Carmody : In reality it's a recommendation that might have many functions. It's a way of combining information to a decision-maker like me, a recommendation for us to take a particular course of action. So it might not be licensing; it could be anything.

Senator XENOPHON: Sure, but the normal course is that for the document to be a valid document, it ought to be a signed document—is that right?

Mr Carmody : Yes, that would be reasonable.

     
Q/ Coming back to the Gobbitt decision letter, one wonders why he didn't at least release the SFR, that is legally required to be forwarded to and signed by a CASA delegate assigned with the carriage of making an individual enforcement decision, that should have accompanied the Greg Hood original (24 December 2009) decision to suspend the DJ FCL?
 
MTF? - Definitely...P2

[Kharon]

Over it? Ab-so-bloody-lutely.

________________________________________
P2 - Q/ Regardless of the nearly 8 year embuggerance of DJ, it beggars belief that there is 390 documents and 11,000 pages on one file, for what is essentially a minor pilot CEP (co-ordinated enforcement process). One wonders how much time, money and human resources would be expended on an enforcement action against a large major airline? – UDB!

----------------------------------------------------------

Oh, I don’t’ think it’s UDB: in fact, I can believe its quite a lightweight count – considering. I mean there are some 700 odd ‘Worthington’ emails floating about; if you multiply that by even 3 recipients, then add their replies – you come up with a colossal amount of time (money) spent achieving – what, precisely? It is typical CASA haystack – the needle is there, one just has to find it – if one wishes to ‘prick’ the bubble.

The Pel-Air ditching imbroglio has been perpetrated at a monumental cost. CASA refused the paltry AUD$ 50, 000 to retrieve the CVR. That is the first clue. ATSB could have requested and would have received the funding from government – without hesitation. What was the final cost of the retrieval? Nah, all up without hesitation the government threw almost the national debt at MH 370 – and never blinked at the grotesque sums expended. A measly 50 grand would just about cover two couples attending a PM meet and greet dinner; or, one of Greg Russell’s week end retreats for his hard working ASA buddies.

0739 and 0803 should be the James pick of lottery numbers. Must be. I want to know why this veritable shit-storm of paper was made for what was a simple matter. Had James received those amended forecasts and continued – I would be leading the torch and pitchfork brigade. CASA cannot prove he received them. CASA have, in collusion with the ATSB, continued through various methods to ‘gloss over’ or; to put it more bluntly – deceive  everyone concerned that James continued on, in blind arrogance, in the face of weather forecast which would have demanded a ‘diversion’.

HE NEVER RECEIVED THOSE FORECASTS.

And so; to why?

Rumour has it there are only nine more sleeps until the ‘Invisible Manning’ releases ‘his’ report. No one is particularly interested in a rehash of the ‘hash’. “The pilot buggered it up” Blah, blah, blah. (retch).

But he didn’t; did he. What we have is a three year delay to cover over something ugly, something contemptuous, something so disgusting it almost beggars the imagination.

Hood knows his; McCormack knows this; Manning knows this: Chambers orchestrated it and he knows this; his acolytes Campbell, De Marco and Worthington know this: for fact. Hells' bells, even the bloody pixies at the bottom of the garden know this. Yet the haystack grows, as time flows by; fact merges with fiction, the pay cheques roll in; and, all is well in Sleepy Hollow.

Ten more sleeps boys; try to enjoy ‘em.

Toot – toot.

Addendum: - A little light reading - light? Because 22 pages are missing. Start about p70. CAIR 09/3.

[Peetwo]

CASA take on metadata access & continued non-compliance of FOI Act -  

Kaz Casey - - has picked out a couple of relevant quotes from the IronBar book on legal weasel word confectionary (ie Aviation Law in Australia):

Quoting the 'Aviation Law Guru" Mr Ronald I C Bartsch from his book, Aviation Law in Australia (only Aviation Law book in Oz)...with the forward by no other than Mr Jono Aleck. How very bloody convenient. 

"The purpose of introducing these statutes relating to administrative bodies was to make the government more responsible to the people they were elected to serve. The underlying philosophy being that if decision-makers are held more accountable for their decisions then the "quality" of the overall decision-maker process should improve. To this end the enactments appear to have been a success." - I would suggest if you were in Dom's shoes, "accountability" and "quality" would come a distant 2nd last and last on descriptors for the nearly 8 yr embuggerance inflicted upon him by the CASA Sydney basin regional office - P2

I know, I know, he is talking out of his arse & teaching this shite in University. Might go to his next lecture, take a seat while he is wobbling his big head in front of his law students & ask a few questions, nice & LOUD.

Then regarding the FOI process, he states..

"The FOI Act 1982 creates a legally enforceable right of public access to documents in the possession of Commonwealth Ministers and authorities....Although there are some 18 grounds for exemption from release, the FOI Act is biased in favour of release. The intent of the Act is that, even if there is an applicable exemption, there should be release if at all possible unless to do so would create an unreasonable diversion of the resources of the agency to which the request has been made. There are specific provisions that prevent the disclosure of information relating to aviation accidents and incidents within the aviation regulations."

....Yeeeeah right.

Their job at the FOI department is too, well, um, process FOI's. Included in their budgets...

This statement...

"..there should be release if at all possible unless to do so would create an unreasonable diversion of the resources of the agency to which the request has been made.."

...has been in goodwill and somewhat informally embraced by the CASA FOI Officer David Gobbitt in his response to the DJ request's for information (reference: Carmody - Just Culture, Just’a Smokescreen.).

However as of 5 days ago DG has suddenly gone all formal on DJ's latest request for further information: Letter to Dominic James - sent 9-Nov-17-4
 

To continue on the subject of CASA and FOI requests - I note the following Richard Smith   'partially accepted' CASA FOI correspondence, with associated released document links, as published off the Right-to-know website:

From: Richard Smith

March 19, 2017

Dear Civil Aviation Safety Authority,

In 2015 the Commonwealth Attorney-General, under Freedom of Information, released a list of Government Agencies, Departments and Authorities that had applied for ongoing access to Telecommunication Data (phonecalls and internet browsing metadata) of Australians.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority was present in the two lists released under the FOI release, having applied for access to both historical Telecommunications Data and ongoing Telecommunications Data of Australians.

I therefore request the following Government Information:

a) Documents relating to the CASA's consideration and decision to apply for ongoing access to Telecommunications Data as per the TELECOMMUNICATIONS (INTERCEPTION AND ACCESS) ACT 1979;
b) The date of each Application made by CASA for access to Telecommunications Data under the TELECOMMUNICATIONS (INTERCEPTION AND ACCESS) ACT 1979;
c) Documents relating to how CASA deals with the privacy of data obtained through access to ongoing access to Telecommunications Data as per TELECOMMUNICATIONS (INTERCEPTION AND ACCESS) ACT 1979, including how the data received is obtained, assessed, stored and ultimately destroyed;
d) The number of documents containing data obtained by CASA through its ongoing access to Telecommunication Data; and
e) The number of documents containing data obtained by CASA through its ongoing access to Telecommunication Data that CASA has determined are not likely to be required for a permitted purpose and therefore has destroyed, for the period of time from since the commencement of ongoing access to the data was granted until 17th March 2017.

To assist you with your processing of your response, I am interested primarily in the following points, which I consider to be of significant public interest:

1) why the CASA thinks that it requires ongoing access to the Telecommunications Data of Australians, considering there appears to be very few legitimate reasons for ongoing access to phonecalls and internet browsing details of Australians in relation to CASA's role in regulating aviation safety; and

2) the scale of Telecommunications Data of Australians being obtained, handled, stored and ultimately destroyed by CASA.

If this can be answered as informal request, please do so.
Otherwise, please proceed with this as a formal request under the Freedom of Information principles & framework, i.e. the Freedom of Information Act 1982 & other associated guidelines and regulations.

Yours faithfully,

Richard Smith

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From: Anastasi, Adam
Civil Aviation Safety Authority

March 22, 2017

UNCLASSIFIED

Richard

Your email appears to assume the CASA has ongoing access to telecommunications data. I advise that CASA is no longer an enforcement agency under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, by virtue of amendments to that Act by the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015 (the Data Retention Act). Therefore, since 2015, CASA has not accessed telecommunications data for the purposes of its investigation because it has been unable to.

In light of that, please advise if you maintain your request for access.

Adam Anastasi Manager
Legal Advisory, Drafting and Procurement Section Legal Affairs, Regulatory Policy and International Strategy Branch Civil Aviation Safety Authority
p: 02 6217 1040

GPO Box 2005 CANBERRA ACT 2606
www.casa.gov.au

P2 comment - Do you get the impression that the CASA LSD were none too happy about losing their right to accessing metadata...  

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From: Richard Smith

March 22, 2017

Dear Adam,

Thank you for your replying to my request for Government Information of 19 March 2017.

May I take it that your response is a definitive official confirmation that since the commencement of the Data Retention Act, CASA has not reapplied for access to, nor received access to, Telecommunications Data of Australians?

If I assume the answer to my question above is in the affirmative, I consider the impact on my request for Government Information to be that it now covers a finite period of time where CASA accessed Telecommunications Data of Australians.

The narrowing down of the timeframe to a finite period does not materially invalidate nor change my requests for information, and I will address each one (a through e) in turn below.

My request part "a)"

"a) Documents relating to the CASA's consideration and decision to apply for ongoing access to Telecommunications Data as per the TELECOMMUNICATIONS (INTERCEPTION AND ACCESS) ACT 1979;"

goes to CASA's decision making in considering the benefits of accessing Telecommunications Data of Australians and when the decision was ultimately made to apply for access to Telecommunications Data. I am sure that a Commonwealth agency wouldn't commence the application process under a legislative regime without consulting the Minister and without having the decision minuted in an executive meeting. This request for Government Information still stands.

My request part "b)"

"b) The date of each Application made by CASA for access to Telecommunications Data under the TELECOMMUNICATIONS (INTERCEPTION AND ACCESS) ACT 1979;"
is not limited to the situation at the present time. Since CASA had access to Telecommunications Data prior to the commencement of the Data Retention Act, this request needs no further elaboration. This request for Government Information still stands.

My request part "c)"

"c) Documents relating to how CASA deals with the privacy of data obtained through access to ongoing access to Telecommunications Data as per TELECOMMUNICATIONS (INTERCEPTION AND ACCESS) ACT 1979, including how the data received is obtained, assessed, stored and ultimately destroyed;"

goes to the privacy controls that CASA maintained and operated under for the period that it had access to Telecommunications Data. This request for Government Information still stands.

My request part "d)":

"d) The number of documents containing data obtained by CASA through its ongoing access to Telecommunication Data;"

should now be a trivial matter of summing the number of documents that CASA obtained, considering that the period of time that CASA, having not reapplied for access, is now a finite period. This request for Government Information still stands.

My request part "e)":

e) The number of documents containing data obtained by CASA through its ongoing access to Telecommunication Data that CASA has determined are not likely to be required for a permitted purpose and therefore has destroyed, for the period of time from since the commencement of ongoing access to the data was granted until 17th March 2017
goes to the ultimate destruction of any documents obtained or produced during the finite period that CASA had access to Telecommunications Data. This request for Government Information still stands.

I trust that this clarifies the extent of my request, under FOI, for Government Information.

Yours sincerely,

Richard Smith

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: Anastasi, Adam
Civil Aviation Safety Authority

March 22, 2017

UNCLASSIFIED

Thanks. Yes, my email is confirmation that since the 2015 amendments, CASA
has not obtained access to data under the Act, because it was unable to.
 
As noted, from 2015, CASA could not obtain access to data. It could if,
under section 176A of the Data Retention Act, the Attorney-General
declared CASA to be an enforcement agency. I read item (a) of your request
to be seeking access to documents whereby CASA considered, and sought,
such a declaration. Please advise if that is not the  case.
 
In relation to items (b), (d) and (e), what timeframe are you seeking the
information for.
 
Adam

  
P2 comment - this is where this FOI request begins to get interesting...  

Adam,

Thank you for your quick reply.

In regards to the two queries in your reply of 22 March 2017, I address them below.

1. "I read item (a) of your request to be seeking access to documents whereby CASA considered, and sought, such a declaration. Please advise if that is not the case."
My request in item a) i.e.

"a) Documents relating to the CASA's consideration and decision to apply for ongoing access to Telecommunications Data as per the TELECOMMUNICATIONS (INTERCEPTION AND ACCESS) ACT 1979";

is in regards to information allowing the public to see the decision making & associated justifications at the first point in time when CASA decided to access the phone records and internet browsing data of Australians.

I would imagine that this is in the form of a discussion paper or meeting minutes and subsequent request letter to the Attorney-Generals Department and would have been sometime during the 9 year period between 2006 to 2015.

2. "In relation to items (b), (d) and (e), what timeframe are you seeking the information for"

In regards to your query regarding requested timeframes for items b), d) and e), my current request in item b) applies to the entire time from when CASA began to obtain Telecommunication Data to when it ceased to collect Telecommunication Data.

Following on from that, it is inferred in my request items d) and e) that the period of concern is also the entire time from when CASA began to obtain Telecommunication Data to when it ceased to collect Telecommunication Data.

However, in considering the balance between the public's right to see the complete picture of data being collected and the practicality of searching records further back in time, I would not object to my request being narrowed to encompass only the period commencing 12:00am 1st January 2009 to the date of commencement of the Data Retention Act when CASA ceased to be an enforcement agency.

Yours sincerely,

Richard Smith

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From: Gobbitt, David
Civil Aviation Safety Authority

March 23, 2017

UNCLASSIFIED

Good morning Richard,

Thanks again for your enquiry.

I note your previous emails with Adam Anastasi, and in relation to your request for information, I provide the information below.

Firstly, I am unable to provide information for the time period 2009-10 and 2010-11, as the records are not readily available. To retrieve the requested information would entail checking every investigation conducted by CASA over a 2 year period to see whether a request was made for telecommunications data.

In relation to item (a), please see attached letter from CASA to the Attorney-General's Department dated 4 June 2015, seeking ongoing access to telecommunications data.
In relation to item (b), CASA made 0 requests for data in 2011-12, 4 requests in 2012-13, 0 requests in 2013-14, and 11 requests in 2014-15. No requests were made after the 2014-2015 year. I have attached documentation above regarding this, with the exception of 2012-13.

In relation to item ©, CASA uses restricted access technology to ensure that only authorised persons within CASAs investigations team have access to telecommunications data captured under the TIA Act. Only the relevant investigator and the head of CASA's Investigations team have access to the data collected in this manner. CASA complies with the Archives Act 1983 in its handling, storage and disposal of information.

In relation to item (e), as advised above, CASA complies with the Archives Act 1983 in the manner in which it handles the collection, storage and disposal of documents.

I'm unable to respond to item (d) as this would require a search of every investigation file. However, I am informed that, in general, the requests made in the past were phone call data and usually the data provided comprised 2-3 pages for each request.

Thanks again.

Regards

David Gobbitt A/g Freedom of Information Coordinator Legal Advisory, Drafting and Procurement Section Legal Affairs, Regulatory Policy and International Strategy Branch Civil Aviation Safety Authority
p: 02 6217 1281
GPO Box 2005 CANBERRA ACT 2606
www.casa.gov.au

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David,

Thank you for your quick reply.

I did not receive the attachment in relation to item (a). Could you please resend it.
I would also like to thank you for framing your answers in the spirit of the information I was after.

I will consider your response and revert to you shortly.

Regards,

Richard Smith

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From: Gobbitt, David
Civil Aviation Safety Authority

March 23, 2017

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201506041539.pdf
333K Download View as HTML

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UNCLASSIFIED

Hi Richard,

Apologies - please see attached as intended.

Regards

David Gobbitt A/g Freedom of Information Coordinator Legal Advisory, Drafting and Procurement Section Legal Affairs, Regulatory Policy and International Strategy Branch Civil Aviation Safety Authority
p: 02 6217 1281
GPO Box 2005 CANBERRA ACT 2606
www.casa.gov.au

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David,

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

I have considered your response, and believe you have substantially answered the spirit of my request for Government Information.

As to the remainder of the items that you were unable to retrieve, I am satisfied that the effort required to go through historic incident investigations is excessive, compared to the incremental benefit it would add to the information that you have released.

I therefore consider this request for FOI closed.

Thanks,

Richard Smith

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From: Gobbitt, David
Civil Aviation Safety Authority

March 23, 2017

UNCLASSIFIED

Hi Richard,

Thank you for your reply, glad the information provided was helpful.

Regards

David Gobbitt A/g Freedom of Information Coordinator Legal Advisory, Drafting and Procurement Section Legal Affairs, Regulatory Policy and International Strategy Branch Civil Aviation Safety Authority
p: 02 6217 1281
GPO Box 2005 CANBERRA ACT 2606
www.casa.gov.au

 
This whole FOI request and correspondence exchange particularly perked my interest because I had been kept in the loop on a similar (ongoing) request for information on CASA's previous ability to access telecommunications data.

This request for information from CASA LSD came from Karen Casey as a DIP to the PelAir cover-up. Here was Dr Aleck's initial lengthy response to KC's request:

UNCLASSIFIED
Dear Ms Casey
 
When we spoke on the telephone on 3 August 2017, you raised concerns with me about advice you had received from your telephone service provider that electronic intercepts of data related to your use of your telephone occurred in the early months of 2015.  You said your provider advised you that they were not authorised to tell you by whom, or on whose behalf, those intercepts were made.  In your view, however, you said you believed it was, and could only have been, CASA that was responsible for this.
 
You told me you had recently sought to contact CASA’s then General Counsel, Adam Anastasi, about this, because it was your understanding that Mr Anastasi alone was in a position to authorise such action, on CASA’s behalf, at the time.  I said that may have been the case, but I that I would seek further information about the matter from Mr Anastasi in relation to this matter.
 
I reiterate, I was not, and am not, aware of any such action on CASA’s behalf to obtain access to your telecommunications records having occurred at any time, but that I would undertake to pursue your allegations.  As I advised when we spoke again on 29 August, I have now done so and provide you here with information about the results of my inquiries.
 
During the time with which you are concerned (‘early 2015’), CASA had conferred on the then Manager Investigations the authority to seek telecommunications data in accordance with the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (the TIA Act).  On 19 June 21015, that authority was delegated by the Director of Aviation Safety, as an authorised officer under the TIA Act, to CASA’s General Counsel and Executive Manager of what was then the Legal Services Division.
 
Under the TIA Act, authorised officers of enforcement agencies were able to ‘authorise’ the release of telecommunications data to their agency where it is relevant to their investigative functions.  In effect, the exercise of this power operates as a request for telecommunications data from a telecommunications carrier such as Telstra or Optus.
 
CASA is no longer an enforcement agency under the TIA Act, by virtue of amendments to that Act by the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015 (the Data Retention Act). Therefore, CASA is no longer entitled to use the processes under the TIA Act to access telecommunications data for the purposes of its investigations.
 
CASA has never had the power to intercept telecommunications.  Chapter 4 of the TIA Act governed access to telecommunications data. Enforcement agencies, such as CASA, could request access to ‘existing’ telecommunications data. ‘Existing’ telecommunications data is that data which exists as at the time on which the request is made. Meanwhile, criminal law enforcement agencies (which did not include CASA) could also request access to ‘prospective’ telecommunications data. ‘Prospective’ telecommunications data is that data that may be generated by the use of a telecommunications service, with a timeframe set from the data of the  agency’s request to a specified date in the future (to a general maximum of 45 days).
 
‘Existing’ data can be accessed for enforcement of the criminal law / administering a law imposing a pecuniary penalty / protection of the public revenue as similarly noted above, while ‘prospective’ data can only be accessed for the investigation of offences punishable by imprisonment by at least 3 years, or for ‘serious offences’ (which are extensively defined in section 5D of the TIA Act).
 
While rarely used at the time, enforcement agencies were previously able to apply to issuing authorities such as judges, magistrates and Administrative Appeals Tribunal members for Chapter 3 stored communication warrants. Such a warrant would enable the enforcement agency to obtain access to stored communications of a telecommunications service. Stored communications are defined in the TIA Act to be communications that had completed its passage over the telecommunications network and were stored on a telecommunications carrier’s equipment. This potentially included such matters as SMSs, voicemail message and stored emails.
 
Mr Anastasi has assured me that at no time did he authorise the disclosure of information, prospective or existing, under the TIA Act as it related to you, or to anyone else associated with the Pel-Air accident.  He is unaware of any action by the then Manager Investigations authorising such a disclosure, during the time that person held the relevant authority.  I have attached for your information a copy of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 Annual Report for 2014-2015, which contains tables summarising applications for access warrants.  As you can see, there is no record of any applications having been made by or on behalf of CASA during the period with which you are concerned.
 
As I said when we spoke, I am unaware of any action by the then Director of Aviation Safety unilaterally exercising his authority under the TIA Act to obtain telecommunications data relating to you or anyone else associated with the Pel-Air accident.  We have queried the Director’s office, and I am advised that no such action appears to have been taken.
 
Would you like your query to be dealt with under the Freedom of Information Act?
 
If I understand your concerns correctly, I expect my assurances—based on the advice with which I’ve been provided—may not be as compelling as you might wish.  In the event, if you would like me to do so, I am happy to treat your query as a request under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (FOI Act) for access to documents relating to any alleged exercise of authority, by or on behalf of CASA, to obtain access to your personal telecommunications (or records of those communications), during the period 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015.  On this basis, more formal inquiries could be made of the relevant areas within CASA to identify any records of the kind that would necessarily exist if action of the kind you have suggested occurred.
 
If you would like me to instigate action under the FOI Act on your behalf—along the lines described immediately above or otherwise—please let me know as soon as possible and I will initiate that action.  In the meantime, please don’t hesitate to contact me if you have any further questions in relation to this matter.
 
Yours sincerely
 
Dr Jonathan Aleck
General Manager
Legal Affairs, Regulatory Policy & International Strategy (LARPIS)
Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA)
p +61 (0)2 6217 1600 | m +61 (0)407 018 818 | jonathan.aleck@casa.gov.au
16 Furzer Street, Philip ACT 2606
GPO Box 2005, Canberra ACT 2601, AUSTRALIA
www.casa.gov.au

          
Under different circumstances if I were KC I would feel extremely honoured and think I had obviously struck a nerve, if I was to receive such a lengthy response from Dr A.

However having read the collective CASA LSD response to the Richard (Dick??) Smith FOI request I am beginning to think there is more to this than meets the eye...  

Meanwhile taking a visit to the CASA FOI disclosure log webpage, I note that even Richard (Dick) Smith's insightful FOI request and associated correspondence is not considered worthy  of a mention by the Fort Fumble legal weasel services division...        

CASA's Freedom of Information Disclosure Log

Last entry - 9 September 2016 F16/4491 Seeking access to risk assessments for the changes to CASR Part 101 to determine any possible risk or hazard it would present to current aviation activities and the general public.

Last updated:  22 August 2017

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

Gobbitt invokes LPP on DJ FOI - WTD?

As a bit of an update on the ongoing Carmody embuggerance of DJ, CASA FOI Officer David Gobbitt has made it interesting by invoking the section 42 (Legal Professional Privilege) FOI exemption on what appears to be a two and a half page LSD correspondence to a CASA Officer?

Extracts from DJ FOI decision:  

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After 8 years and based on what is appearing to be an illegally 'black letter law' sanctioned decision to suspend the DJ FCL (by former CASA delegate Hoody on the 24 December 2009), one has to question what legal advice the CASA ALC (assigned legal counsel) would be giving to a CASA officer?
Maybe it has something to do with this: References - CASA continue to take the Mickey Bliss on CAA & FOI Act  & The 0803 lost in White rabbit obfuscation

Q/ Coming back to the Gobbitt decision letter, one wonders why he didn't at least release the SFR, that is legally required to be forwarded to and signed by a CASA delegate assigned with the carriage of making an individual enforcement decision, that should have accompanied the Greg Hood original (24 December 2009) decision to suspend the DJ FCL?

---

Note that this investigative summary and update was completed before the Hood 24 December 2009 suspension decision notice. Therefore we can only presume that Hoody was not privy to this additional information, otherwise it would have been included in the notice correspondence and by rights DJ would have had his licence cancelled rather than suspended.

This non-inclusion of this critical factual information and the fact that it wasn't a featured question in the 16 December DJ Q&A, would suggest to me that White, Chambers, Campbell and Co. were either totally inept; or already fully cognisant of the fact that the flightcrew of VH-NGA never received either the 0803 AMD TAF or the 0739 SPECI ...

MTF? - Definitely...P2  

[thorn bird]

P2 Gobbitt's refusal to provide documents based on "legal" precedents suggests to me that something very dodgy was going on. With that in mind a court case may be the only way to get at the truth, unless the good senators can prise it out of CAsA's hands. If CAsA is such a model litigant and follower of just culture surely being transparent with the person who's life and career being destroyed by their minions would be a no brainer. Who's going to protect him from the incompetent, inept, malicious, corrupt assholes. They've already with held information, not only from the pilot, but also the ATsB. Rotten at the head and rotten at the tail.

Quote from Lead Ballon on UP:

A trap was set for the PIC by the system in which he was variously allowed, encouraged and forced to operate. The ‘tripwire’ on the fateful flight was the incomplete and erroneous weather information about YSNF that misled the PIC.

The PIC’s primary sin was that he did not have ESP.

The controversy around the classification and standards applicable to this kind of operation are merely a manifestation of the broader classification of operation dog’s breakfast that will never be cleaned up by CASA.

[Kharon]

Credulity – Slightly stretched? - Just a bit.

P2 - "Q/ Coming back to the Gobbitt decision letter, one wonders why he didn't at least release the SFR, that is legally required to be forwarded to and signed by a CASA delegate assigned with the carriage of making an individual enforcement decision, that should have accompanied the Greg Hood original (24 December 2009) decision to suspend the DJ FCL?"

You could expect a fair percentage of pony-pooh to be contained in almost any ‘correspondence’ from CASA; they can’t seem to break wind without transmogrifying it into fully legally prescribed act of nature, with definitions, references and two paragraphs of wriggle room. It is simply the tiresome, self important, defensive nature of the beast; but…One has to draw the line somewhere and this current happy horse shit about ‘unsigned’ documents being ‘legal tender’ is way, way over the top. There is a clearly defined process and sound legal reasons for a document to be ‘signed’ (and dated). Simply stating that the ‘intent’ justifies an ‘unsigned’ howler turning up by pigeon post is bollocks.

Try to cash an unsigned cheque; or, just for fun don’t sign any flight associated ‘paper work’ like the MR. Can you imagine turning up in court and saying to the judge – “Well M’lud, my intention was to accept the legal responsibility as the Captain; surely that should satisfy the requirements”. “Furthermore, under legal professional privilege, I refuse to show the court any document, not fully redacted, which may indicate that I acted illegally – I do have the right to remain silent: thank you." You then sit down with a self satisfied, smug expression which lasts for the whole five seconds it takes the Judge to find the key to your cell, throw it away and call for the men in white jackets to come and take you away.

Toot toot.