[Peetwo]

Update 22/03/17: REX MR corrects the record.

Via rex.com.au: http://www.rex.com.au/MediaAndPressClipp...eList.aspx

21 MARCH 2017

MEDIA RELEASE

FLIGHT ZL768 PROPELLER FOUND

Regional Express (Rex) has been advised today by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) that that the propeller assembly that separated from an aircraft operating Flight ZL768 on Friday 17 March 2017 has been found in the Georges River National Park about 18 km from Sydney Airport by the NSW Police Force Airwing (PolAir). - P2 - maybe this helps Ventus?

Rex’s Chief Operating Officer Neville Howell said, “The propeller will be vital in assisting the ATSB with their investigations. Further technical updates will be provided as appropriate by the ATSB. On behalf of the Board, I wish to place on record our immense gratitude to PolAir for its utmost dedication, perseverance and professionalism in the search for the missing propeller without which the full ATSB investigations may be delayed by many days if not weeks.”

Rex also takes this opportunity to correct certain gross inaccuracies in recent Seven News reports and other media:

- that the aircraft should be diverted to Canberra in accordance with regulations.

As stated in our previous media release and as confirmed by the location of the propeller, the aircraft was some 20 km away from Sydney airport when the engine was shut down and the propeller separated from the aircraft. It would be ludicrous for the pilot to divert the aircraft 250 km to Canberra airport when Sydney airport was just 20 km away. The Company stands behind the decision made by the crew to continue to Sydney airport.

This was the correct and safest decision and in full compliance with both regulatory and company requirements. Further, Sydney airport has a precision landing system, longer runway and more suitable runway orientation to cope with the prevailing strong winds.

- that maintenance checks would have been able to detect the fault in the vulnerable propeller shaft.

It is premature to second guess the outcome of the ATSB investigations but on Rex’s part, it has been fully compliant with the engineering inspections prescribed by General Electric (GE), the manufacturer of the engine assembly.

Finally, Rex wishes to clarify that it did not ground any of its aircraft. Rex has simply taken the precautionary measure to replace the gear boxes and shafts (of the same series as the separated propeller) of 5 aircraft, and this will be carried out over the next 2-3 days. Only minor disruptions are expected and affected passengers will be notified in advance.

Regional Express (Rex) is Australia’s largest independent regional airline operating a fleet of more than 50 Saab 340 aircraft on some 1,500 weekly flights to 58 destinations throughout all states in Australia. In addition to the regional airline Regional Express, the Rex Group comprises wholly owned subsidiaries Pel-Air Aviation (air freight and charter operator), Air Link (Dubbo-based regional airline) and the Australian Airline Pilot Academy.

This was PT 'correcting the record' blog released mid-afternoon yesterday:

REX may be victim of engine defect in lost prop incident

Ben SandilandsMar 20, 2017 61 Comments

[i]A SAAB 340 similar to the REX plane did lose a propeller in similar circumstances 26 years ago..
[/i]

An earlier post on this topic (for which the comments have been preserved) contained some incorrect information published in good faith.

To be blunt, this reporter is unhappy with this situation, particularly given some of the sources.

It has now been established that the flight last Friday from Albury to Sydney was well past Canberra Airport when the pilots shut down the right hand engine and feathered its propeller, shortly before it separated and fell away, fortunately missing any control critical surface of the SAAB 340, which could have caused an crash likely to kill all 16 people on board.

..My apologies to REX and their pilots for doubting the judgments that led to a continuation of the flight when it was incorrectly described as having first encountered engine problems near Canberra.

 
MTF...P2

[MrPeaBody]

Capture.JPG Size: 57.73 KB  Downloads: 9

Screen grab from FR 24; yellow line is the flight path.

[Kharon]

Felix Felicis -Liquid luck.

Looking at the PB screen shot (cheers); then considering the track; then thinking about where that prop could have gone, gives me the shivers. I reckon no one on that flight need bother buying a lottery ticket, there cannot possibly be much more luck allocated.

Been ‘doodling’ the dynamics (aero) of the prop’s fall and predictive flight path; made no sense of it whatsoever, but its an interesting element, particularly from the ‘instant’ of separation – doodles and scribble – far as I got; way too hard for me – not enough data. Speaking of which, the magnitude and duration of the ‘vibration’  data will be interesting when the ATSB (no rush) publishit. The airframe, being built by the same crowd as done the harbour bridge has proven over time to be able to take a huge amount of punishment – in the usual way. But does certification testing cover ‘vibration’ (frequency and resonance) in any great depth – across the entire airframe? (Bugger, more reading).

We must all hope that the ‘legal eagles’ eventually let the crew go home to sit a while and have a couple of cold ones, in the back yard, watching the sunset. Aye, it all makes my poor wooden head ache – maybe I should learn to knit, properly, you know, fluoro yellow cock socks; for winter wear; or, crocheted jock straps with fur lining. Kidding….(P7 – bad influence).

Toot toot.

[MrPeaBody]

An update on where the prop was found. Star marks the area.

Revesby.jpg Size: 131.43 KB  Downloads: 6

It was apparently found just off the Guwark Fire Trail.

Revesby 3.jpg Size: 294.5 KB  Downloads: 6

[ventus45]

Thanks Mr PeeBody, not far from where some friends live a bit north of there in Vega Street.

Interesting, that the starboard prop ended up to port of track. Does the FR24 data give speed and altitude for that point ?

Since PolAir's search was appaerntly so focused, I am wondering how they could have localised it so precisely. Perhaps they had PSR data from the YSSY PSR and cross-plotted it from data from the BoM's Kurnell Doppler site ?

[MrPeaBody]

Closest screen grab I could get with speed and altitude from FR 24.

Capture 2.JPG Size: 73.9 KB  Downloads: 10

My guess is it separated at or just before Fitzpatrick Park.

PB

[Kharon]

‘V’ – “Since PolAir's search was apparently so focused, I am wondering how they could have localised it so precisely. Perhaps they had PSR data from the YSSY PSR and cross-plotted it from data from the BoM's Kurnell Doppler site ?

All of that information I'd reckon plus known speed/distance/track. I do like PB's 'screen grabs', great quality and if there was nothing else to work from they would be a great start - agree with the PB approximate location. Basic math puts it not too far from that, good percentage chance of it not landing in the water and Pol-Air have some pretty sharp eyed crew; well done - again. Choc frogs all around I'd say.

[Peetwo]

REX on a roll with incidents -


Via the Oz today:

Engine fail on another Rex plane

12:00amEMILY RITCHIE

Regional Express has grounded a seventh plane in six days after a flight carrying 23 passengers and three crew made an emergency landing in Dubbo when an engine­ failed.

The aircraft, headed for Sydney, turned back after the pilot was forced to shut down one of its two engines.

It was the second emergency landing by a Rex plane in a week.

Last Friday, a Saab 340 plane lost its right propeller 25km from Sydney airport. The 100kg prop­eller, which sheared off during the flight from Albury to Sydney and travelled 9km, was found in the Georges River National Park and will be inspected by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau.

Following the propeller incid­ent, Rex grounded five similar planes. Rex said yesterday’s incid­ent — involving the same model plane, but one fitted with different components — was unrelated and denied there were systemic problems with its fleet.

“The two events are independ­ent and, in both cases, they do not point to any systemic root causes nor any lapses in maintenance,” a Rex spokeswoman said. “Rex will fully comply with all directions from CASA and ATSB. In the meantime, we need to avoid knee-jerk reactions that do the public more harm than good.”

She said it was impossible to say yet whether the problem was caused by engine failure or the engine ingesting a foreign object.

The plane involved in yesterday’s incident has also been grounded indefinitely, pending an investigation by Rex engin­eers and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.

MTF...P2

[Kharon]

Sods law of the ocean.

A very rare event occurs which hurls an airline into the spotlight, willy-nilly; high drama and media hysterics (even from some who should know better). There was some luck involved, but it was well ‘earned’ luck. The GE engine has performed very, very well and served faithfully for many hundreds thousands of hours, in all manner of conditions. The engineers who maintain and monitor the well being of not only the engines and airframes but the propellers, avionics, and all the many ‘systems’ which keep aircraft safe; they do this very well and it’s not ‘just a job’ to them. The aircrew work hard and train for ‘emergency’ situations, such as the once or twice in a career ‘engine failure’ and know how to manage, flawlessly, an ailing engine, in any weather, day or night. There was very little call on ‘luck’ reserves involved in the eventual safe outcome.

Fortune rewarded the hard work and although a propeller abandoned ship, it hurt no one and hit nothing (apart from terra firma); it even managed to be found and the answers to the ‘why’ and ‘how’ will, in time, be determined.

But, Sod’s law still applies: in the spotlight and the first event is followed by two more events; with safe outcomes, in quick succession. They say three times proves the charm; well that’s three now, so it should see the end of the run (fingers crossed). All that’s left to worry about is the possibility of a CASA witch hunt and a desperate need to sheet home ‘blame’ in the name of safety. I say ‘safety’ was served very well and the focus should be prevention not prosecution.

Toot-toot.

[Gobbledock]

Kharon;
"
I say ‘safety’ was served very well and the focus should be prevention not prosecution".

Couldn't agree more. Shit happens. It's REX turn at the present. There doesn't seem to be any specific issues or obvious problems at the surface. The crews appear to have handled themselves professionally and by the book in the recent incidents. Nonetheless, time will tell and all hands will be revealed.

It's pretty standard that when you have a major issue that gains media attention every other thing will be highlighted. For the short-term I pity any REX pilot who breaks wind in the Cabin or any Gingerbeer that headsets a plane while sporting a quick post lunch break piss stain on his shorts, because the Presstitutes and stains like GT will be all over it.

My concern also is that Fort Fumble on behalf of Miniscule NFI 6D may look to use REX as a deflection. It's happened before (not with REX) but other unfortunate souls who have had incidents that have occurred at the wrong time, and then been used as a scapegoat or deflection from other issues which normally involve the Government or it's alphabet soup agencies. Time will tell.

[Kharon]

GD – “[and] then been used as a scapegoat or deflection from other issues which normally involve the Government or it's alphabet soup agencies.

I wish, sincerely, that it were true. I fear it is (IMO) a little more cynical and cold blooded than that. Accidents and incident used to feather the nest, increase the budget and scare the living bejeezuz out of mopes like 6D; who would and will do anything to deflect from his public image and his governments reliance on ‘him’ as a vote winner. Disgust is not an adequate description; but ‘twill suffice, for now.

Toot toot.

[Kharon]

Further update: ATSB presser & prelim report.

Finally via the ATSB website:

Update: Essendon accident
Update of ATSB’s investigation into the collision with retail facility involving B200 King Air VH-ZCR at Essendon Airport, Victoria on 21 February 2017.

The ATSB has today released an update into the tragic accident involving a B200 King Air aircraft that collided with a retail facility at Essendon Airport on 21 February this year. Sadly all four passengers and the pilot died in the accident.

ATSB Chief Commissioner Greg Hood said ATSB investigators have done an extensive amount of work to date.

“Investigators have gathered and assessed a large volume of evidence such as CCTV footage and witness statements. The team has also inspected the engines in close consultation with the manufacturer,” Mr Hood said.

“The aircraft’s fire-damaged CVR was retrieved and transported to the ATSB’s technical facilities in Canberra for examination and download.

“While the CVR was successfully downloaded, no audio from the accident flight was recorded. All the recovered audio was from a previous flight on 3 January 2017. The ATSB is examining the reasons for this.”

Mr Hood said that while the team is diligently assessing the physical and digital evidence, the considerable damage to the aircraft is presenting challenges.

“The extensive damage caused by the collision and post-impact fire has meant investigators are yet to determine a clear picture of the causal factors behind the accident and loss of life,” Mr Hood said.

“I offer my deepest sympathies to the families and loved ones of those on board the aircraft. Every effort is being made to determine the cause of this tragic accident.”

This update does not contain findings. The ATSB will present the findings of its investigation in the final report, due out in around 12 months. Further updates will be provided if significant information comes to hand.

If the ATSB identifies any safety issues during the course of the investigation, it will immediately bring them to the attention of relevant operators and authorities for safety action.

Read the Preliminary report AO-2017-024.
 



Last update 29 March 2017 

---

Preliminary report: 29 March 2017

The occurrence

On 21 February 2017, the pilot of a Beechcraft King Air B200, registered VH-ZCR, was conducting a flight from Essendon Airport, Victoria to King Island, Tasmania. On board were the pilot and four passengers. The weather was fine with a recorded wind speed of 5 kt (9 km/h) from the north‑north‑west and a temperature of 12 °C.

Witnesses familiar with the aircraft type reported that the take-off roll along runway 17[1] was longer than normal. After becoming airborne, the aircraft was observed to yaw[2] left.

The aircraft performed a shallow climbing left turn while maintaining a relatively level pitch[3] and roll[4] attitude. Airservices Australia Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) data[5] indicated the aircraft reached a maximum height of approximately 160 ft above ground level while tracking in an arc to the left of the runway centreline (Figure 1). The aircraft subsequently collided with a building in the Essendon Airport retail precinct.

The pilot and passengers were fatally injured and the aircraft destroyed. Additionally, a number of people on the ground received minor injuries.

Figure 1: Aircraft track from Airservices Australia ADS-B data. All heights above ground level

Source: Google earth, modified by the ATSB

Wreckage and impact information

The aircraft collided with the roof of the building and associated concrete parapet before coming to rest in the building’s rear car park (Figures 2 and 3). Examination of the significantly fire- and impact‑damaged wreckage determined that, at impact the:

• aircraft was configured with 10° of flap
  
• landing gear was in the extended and locked position.
  

Examination of the building roof showed evidence of propeller slash marks and nose and main gear tyre marks (Figure 3). Those marks were consistent with the aircraft having significant left yaw and a slight left roll at initial impact.

Figure 2: Accident site overview

Source: Metropolitan Fire Brigade (Melbourne), modified by the ATSB

On-site examination of the wreckage did not identify any pre-existing faults with the aircraft that could have contributed to the accident.

The left and right engines separated from their mounts during the impact sequence. Both engines had varying degrees of fire and impact damage. The engines were removed from the accident site to a secure facility where they were disassembled and inspected by the ATSB with assistance from the engine manufacturer. That examination found that the cores of both engines were rotating and that there was no evidence of pre-impact failure of either engine’s internal components. However, a number of engine components were retained for further examination and testing.

The propellers separated from the engines during the impact sequence. Both propellers exhibited evidence of rotation and have been retained by the ATSB for detailed examination. The ATSB also retained several airframe components, documents and electronic devices for further examination.

Figure 3: Accident site building roof overview
Source: Metropolitan Fire Brigade (Melbourne), modified by the ATSB

Recorded information

Cockpit voice recorder

A Fairchild model A100S cockpit voice recorder (CVR), part number S100-0080-00 and serial number 01211, was fitted to the aircraft. This model of recorder uses solid-state memory to record cockpit audio and has a recording duration of 30 minutes. CVRs are designed on an ‘endless loop’ principle, where the oldest audio is continuously overwritten by the most recent audio. Apart from pilot speech and radio transmissions, CVRs can record control movements (for example flap and gear levers), switch activations, aural warnings and background sounds such as propeller and engine noise.

The aircraft’s fire‑damaged CVR was recovered from the accident site and transported to the ATSB’s technical facility in Canberra, Australian Capital Territory on 23 February 2017 for examination and download (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Comparison of an undamaged Fairchild model A100S CVR (top) with the CVR from VH-ZCR (bottom)

Source: ATSB

The CVR from VH-ZCR was disassembled and the memory board was removed from inside the crash-protected memory module. The memory board was undamaged (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Memory board (removed from inside the crash-protected module)

Source: ATSB

The CVR was successfully downloaded however, no audio from the accident flight was recorded. All the recovered audio was from a previous flight on 3 January 2017. The ATSB is examining the reasons for the failure of the CVR to operate on the accident flight.

Air traffic control audio

Examination of the recorded air traffic control radio calls for Essendon Tower on 21 February 2017 revealed that, shortly after take-off, the pilot broadcast a MAYDAY call.[6] The pilot repeated the word ‘MAYDAY’ seven times within that transmission. No additional information regarding the nature of the emergency was broadcast.

Further investigation

The investigation is continuing and will include:

• examination of both propellers to determine the blade angles at impact, their pre-impact condition and to assess the impact damage
  
• further examination of a number of retained engine and airframe components
  
• further interviews with a number of witnesses and involved parties
  
• further analysis of numerous witness reports
  
• review of the aircraft’s maintenance and operational records
  
• review of the meteorological conditions at the time
  
• review of the approval process for the building that was struck by the aircraft
  
• analysis of aircraft performance and other operational factors
  
• review of the pilot’s medical and flying history
  
• review of the operating processes and approvals
  
• determining the reasons for the failure of the CVR to record during the accident flight
  
• further analysis of recorded information, including:
  - Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast data
  - dash camera and other video footage provided by witnesses
  - closed-circuit television video footage
  - air traffic control audio recordings.
  

Identification of safety issues

Should any significant safety issues be identified during the course of the investigation, the ATSB will immediately bring those issues to the attention of the relevant authorities or organisations. This will allow those parties to develop safety action to address the safety issues. Details of such safety issues, and any safety action in response, will be published on the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

MTF...P2

[Kharon]

Curiously intriguing.

We are obliged to accept the ‘tracking’ data as accurate; the yellow line. There are a couple of points of interest – not evidence or even testable, but before the time line starts @ 0858:43 (assumed rotation point) the aircraft appears to be to left of the runway centre line. By 0858:46 past the intersection, track diverges further from the centreline. Note the ‘scalloped’ shape of the tracking; at the next ‘peg’ in the track line, there appears to be a correction to the right, which decays by 0858:47 ; then another apparent ‘correction’ to the right at the ‘peg’ between :47 and :49. It probably ain’t significant and there is no guarantee of ‘precision’ in the tracking depicted, but it raises some interesting possibilities as does the ‘track’. Hypothesis beckons and I am tempted; I shall you tell you a tale instead. Once upon a time, not too many moons ago; I was doing a check ride with a ‘young fellah’, nice day all relaxed as I flew regularly with him; so briefing over breakfast – and off we went. Simulated the engine failure at a sensible height and almost went back to sleep until the aircraft started following an almost identical track to the one depicted today in the ATSB puff piece. Little corrections followed by deviation from heading; a failed check right there, but as we were in no danger whatsoever, I let the young spark run on for while: long story short we described a perfect half a figure of eight to arrive on a right base for the runway we’d departed from – a left circuit to a right base. “Very artistic sunshine; but we need to talk – taking over”.

Remember, we worked together, often as an operational crew which involves a certain amount of socialising etc. But there is a limit; so my very first question was the only one I wanted answered – “why were your feet not on the rudders?” I had to know. His next words said it all for me; “That’s how we do it in the sim”. Enough said. Retraining was swift, ruthless and highly effective. ‘The point’ they shout, ‘get to the bloody point’. Well, for my sins I was forced to endure a session in the same sim; the ‘instructor’ demonstrated an EFATO; it went like this – and I solemnly swear the following is true. “Failure #1” ‘Bang’ - full travel rudder swiftly applied: “whizzz” the trim wheel spins rapidly to full correction. ‘Plonk’ the ‘live’ foot is neatly tucked in behind the ‘dead’ foot, under the seat and there it stayed as with finger tip control the aircraft was brought to an almost stop, almost on the runway. ”Piece of cake” was the declaration as the ‘instructor’ swaggered back to the control panel.

The ‘flight path’ depicted bothers me as does the speed schedule; when I am certain of the Mark and model of both airframe and power units, I will examine the matter closely. There is probably not too much difference between the -41 and -42 ‘critical’ speeds, but I need to be certain. The reason being that after the ‘Mt Hotham’ debacle, there was period of ‘CASA’ inspired ‘checking and training’. I need to know if this was done ‘for real’ or at a simulator facility; if so which one? No doubt I’ll have the answers soon. Then we shall see.

More questions than answers at the moment; like was there a gear box failure? Over speed governor failure? Rudder boost failure? But no matter, we do know the engines were just fine, turning and burning. So WTD happened then?  Was one of the props feathered? Was the fuel condition lever at ICO? Where was the gear handle? Where were the power levers? -

“Assisting the ATSB in its investigation are US regulatory bodies the National Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Aviation Administration, as well as engine manufacturer Pratt and Whitney Canada.”

Why have the ATSB got the bloody brakes on – yet again? It’s bollocks Hoody, get your finger out and get a wriggle on. FDS:

Toot (slightly exasperated) toot.

[Peetwo]

Update: Latest MSM coverage.

Via PlaneTalking:

No Mayday explanation from cockpit of Essendon crash plane

Ben Sandilands Mar 29, 20179 Comments

[i]The causes of the Essendon disaster remain unresolved and the investigation has no cockpit voice or sound recordings to work on[/i]

Via the Age:

No engine failure on Essendon crash plane before impact: investigators
The Age
 - ‎17 hours ago‎

Via ABC news online:

Essendon DFO plane crash: Transport safety bureau finds no evidence of engine failure.

ABC Online
 - ‎20 hours ago‎

Finally via the Oz... :

No engine fault in Essendon Airport death flight

Images from an ATSB preliminary report into a Beechcraft King air B200 crash last month.
Simone Fox Koob
The Australian
12:00AM March 30, 2017
[img=0x0]http://pixel.tcog.cp1.news.com.au/track/component/author/cbd838094c278f870442ad76e8fc0bae/?esi=true&t_product=the-australian&t_template=s3/austemp-article_common/vertical/author/widget&td_bio=false[/img]
The light plane that crashed ­moments after takeoff from Melbourne’s Essendon Airport last month, killing all five on board, had no pre-flight faults and the ­engines had not failed when the aircraft went down.

Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigators are still trying to determine what happened in the cockpit of the Beechcraft King Air B200 on February 21 after the black box retrieved from the wreckage failed to record any audio from the incident.

Texan retirees Greg De Haven, Russell Munsch, Glenn Garland and John Washburn were on their way to King Island off Tasmania on a golfing “trip of a lifetime” when the plane crashed into a DFO shopping centre and burst into flames. All four passengers and Melbourne pilot Max Quartermain were killed.

The ATSB’s preliminary report into the crash, released yesterday, revealed there were no pre-existing faults with the aircraft that could have contributed to the accident and no evidence of pre-impact failure of either engine’s internal components.

“Witnesses familiar with the aircraft type reported that the takeoff roll along runway 17 was longer than normal. After becoming airborne, the aircraft was ­observed to yaw left. The aircraft performed a shallow climbing left turn,” the report read.

Byron Bailey, a senior captain with Emirates for 15 years and former RAAF fighter pilot, said the preliminary report indicated one of the engines may have started to lose power seconds after takeoff, a problem that can generally be ­corrected easily by pilots.

“There shouldn’t be a problem if a competent pilot is handling it,” he said. “You keep the wings level and keep going straight by pushing the opposite rudder to compensate for the yaw.”

Experts also said it would be harder to determine the cause of the crash without the audio ­recording from the plane, which normally records pilot speech and radio transmissions, control movements, aural warnings and background sounds such as propeller and engine noise.

Doug Drury, from the aviation department of the school of engineering at the University of South Australia, said it was unusual for the cockpit voice recorder to have malfunctioned.

“The cockpit voice recorder is very durable so it’s unusual for something to go wrong ... it would be (the responsibility) of whoever does the high-level maintenance on it ... to do a routine inspection,” he said.

The Australian revealed last month the Beechcraft Super King Air was in excellent condition after it underwent a routine check by service company Interair eight weeks before the crash.

The only audio available to ­investigators from the flight is the recorded air traffic control audio, in which Quartermain broadcasts the word “mayday” seven times.

The ATSB said yesterday further investigation would include a review of the pilot’s medical and flying history and a review of the approval process allowing the DFO to be built near the airport.

Chris Cowan, the chief executive of Essendon Airport, said yesterday the preliminary investig­ation showed “much of the speculation to date has been wrong and has not been appropriate, especially to the victims’ grieving families”.

“Tragically this accident could have happened at any airport in the world,” he said. “It’s a reality of modern society that airports operate in proximity to urban environments.”

"..Airport land use and air space planning always includes CASA [Civil Aviation Safety Authority] and Air Services approvals, based upon internationally accepted approaches..."  -    Err not according to CASA Acting DAS Comardy & Tiede:

Civil Aviation Safety Authority

[20:18]
 Senator XENOPHON: I have some questions about the tragedy at Essendon Airport and safety zones and I have some questions in relation to CASA and Airservices. Those are the two primary areas I will be traversing—I will be guided by my colleagues there. What role does CASA have, Mr Carmody, in relation to rules as to how close developments can be to airport runways?

Mr Carmody : What would normally occur is that those wishing to develop something on the airport would go to the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development. The department would come to us and, I presume, to a number of others and seek advice on the safety implications for such a development.

 Senator XENOPHON: That is, respectfully, quite a vague answer. If you do a search of academic papers online, there are dozens of papers you can find on calculation of third-party individual risk in determining public safety zones for airports. An annexure gives a description of the calculation method and how you determine that. It is an academic paper that I am referring to. There is another one from 2008 from the 4th International SIIV Congress in Palermo, Italy: Proposal of a methodology for airport public safety zones policy. There is a fair body of information out there in determining the risk, is there not?

Mr Carmody : There is. I was just going through the process of how we provide advice. Mr Tiede, who is the Manager of Air Navigation, Airspace and Aerodromes, can give you the details on how this works.

Mr Tiede : The public safety zone item is a matter of government policy. It relates to protection of third parties, as Senator Xenophon has said. The only public safety zone legislation in Australia exists in Queensland, and we can look at that in detail—perhaps not this evening—if it is helpful. In the case of this accident, a public safety zone protected area would not have played a part in the role of the accident. The aircraft did not enter what we would understand to be a public safety zone area. Traditionally or historically, public safety zones have been quite a sensitive area for government and the NASAG. It has been in discussion in Australia since about 2010, but little headway has been made. I would suggest it is more of a policy matter than a CASA matter.

Senator XENOPHON: You are there to determine the safety of those that use aircraft, and you do not say CASA has a role to say, 'This ought to be an appropriate buffer zone, or an appropriate public safety zone,' so that if a plane does lose engine power it has the maximum chance of landing safely, rather than having a building in the way?

Mr Tiede : That is correct.

 Senator XENOPHON: There are no rules, are there?

Mr Tiede : The state of Queensland has some.

 Senator XENOPHON: What is CASA's role?

Mr Tiede : CASA's role would be to provide regulatory input to the discussions as the policies developed.

 Senator XENOPHON: So you do not have a role to say to local councils or whoever controls the land around the airport, 'We don't think you should have a whopping building within 500 metres of that runway'?Mr Tiede : I think Mr Carmody highlighted that in the case of leased federal airports we are a referral agency to the department. We provide safety advice to the department.

Mr Carmody : And the department considers all the advice it receives, I think, in the development planning process, including ours...

Perhaps discussion on the absolute 'zilch' care factor from CASA and the 'partial' (self-preservation) factor from M&M's department would best be taken to the Airports thread, here is a link & further "K" quote from this AM, for those interested... :

An irritating puzzle.

"There is a possibility that the increase in the dollar trigger may permit larger buildings to be constructed under that trigger which may inadvertently have an effect on aviation safety."

[which] may inadvertently have an effect on aviation safety.

Irritating, I keep going back to that statement; it is so blasé and dismissive. Weasel words. The purpose of it troubling; in the final analysis it is not ‘aviation safety’ which is at risk, but the public. Anything relatively large, travelling at speed, loaded with fuel hitting a building will cause damage, fire and possibly take lives. There is a sensible prohibition against building in the median between motorways; I imagine some smart developer would just love to build a shopping mall and a few blocks of home units between the lanes – life near the fast lane.

 
Finally this, from the "K" post above, could go to further pre-accident organisational issues or contributory factors:

 "..The reason being that after the ‘Mt Hotham’ debacle, there was period of ‘CASA’ inspired ‘checking and training’. I need to know if this was done ‘for real’ or at a simulator facility; if so which one? No doubt I’ll have the answers soon. Then we shall see.."  

Indeed it will be fascinating to see how this investigation develops because (IMO) if anything the initial preliminary findings create more hypothetical questions than answers...

MTF...P2

[Gobbledock]

Questions questions questions

CVR not working? Ok. Simple statement. Reason for it not working? Dunno. Are the ATsB pushing that line further? Any prior maintenance records available on the Box? Would be interesting to know as a contributing factor/potential root cause of the accident may be a catostrophic electrical failure of some sort?

This accident is becoming a little more intriguing. A supposedly capable pilot, serviceable aircraft, no major weather issues, preliminary investigations say the engines were working fine (however that is only the preliminary investigations), a deeper look will be needed. Then we have a large yaw to the left. A couple of things could have caused that. Fuel quality? Weight and balance? Eyewitness statements that she appeared to to use up a slower/longer takeoff roll. Have they used CCTV to time the takeoff roll and analysed that against the aircraft type as well as passenger and fuel weight for that particular flight? Who were the eyewitnesses who provided the takeoff roll statements - Kingair pilots, ground crew or Geoffery Thomas doing some plane spotting? Have the ATsB done fuel dips and finalised that analysis? How was Max's health leading up to and on the day of the accident - head cold, ear ache? Slept well the night before and in fact several days before? Good eyesight with no recent changes to spectacle strength? External pressures - finances good, business strong, family life ok?


My ramblings.

[Kharon]

A ramble; definitely not for the professionals.

To oblige a polite request to ‘simplify’ some technical matters the following ‘potted’ version of ‘why’ there is problem with building in close proximity to runways, this is my humble offering.

Stuck, for moment without serial number specific data; and, hindered by a lack of ‘solid’ exact detail of the ‘failure’ nature (gear box, FCU, etc.) we are only left with the flight path and ‘speed’ schedule to play with; oh and the ducking buildings (‘cept they didn’t oblige).

However in the general way of ‘discussion’ I managed to find my own ‘refamil’ notes, now a decade old; so don’t quote them as specific to ‘the’ aircraft in question’. There are three Be20 Aircraft Flight Manuals (AFM – legal tender) on the shelf here within easy reach of a long arm, so to begin to ‘ballpark’, let us take a peep at the AFM speed schedule. The Be20 offers ‘indicated airspeed’ in knots (KIAS) i.e. what’s on the speedo.

The aircraft minimum control speed air is slated at 86 KIAS. The “V” in the acronyms stands for ‘velocity’. So, Minimum Control Speed Air becomes Vmca. It is a complex notion for the layman to grasp, even many CASA inspectors have a problems grasping the ‘true' meaning of what it is and, importantly, how it is derived by test pilots under certifying test. So, take it that it is a speed below which the aircraft rudder runs out of ‘power’ to prevent the yaw induced when an engine quits.  Think car tyre puncture, which way does the car go – yaw).

Next we find the ubiquitous and infamous “Blue line” speed, the Be20 has this speed settled at 121 KIAS. Known as the Single Engine Best Rate of Climb (SEBROC) noted as Vyse.

On each and every take off in an aircraft ln the Be20 class the aim is to persuade the beast to leave the earth at a speed much better than VMC 86 and to achieve SEBROC as quickly as possible – no brainer – right.  It is an increase in speed of 35 knots (70 KpH).

Which leads us to ‘other’ options; the aircraft has a range of useful ‘speeds’. At the low end, the title Vx or Multi Engine Best Rate of Climb (MEBROC) 100 KIAS is available (most ‘up’ for least ‘forward). Followed by VSSE (Safe Single Engine) offered at 104 KIAS. Nominally the lowest speed at which an engine failure may simulated. The next speed ‘gate’ is 115 KIAS, known as Vxse, titled SEBAC, which is the Single Engine Best Angle of Climb. A handy speed to fly at when there are obstacles to clear and an engine has quit.

Next on the list Vyse at a mighty 121 KIAS is the SEBROC, great speed for going ‘up’ quickly if there are no obstacles ahead – distance 'to' - is not a problem.

Final gateway to nirvana – MEBROC; Multi Engine Best Rate of Climb, Vy 125 kIAS. Well done class. One last number to remember, normal cruise climb (comfortable angle) speed 160 KIAS.

Consider this; let’s call it a safe take off pathway, through ‘gates’; the first speed gate we must attend to is Vmca; pilots usually take a moment just before this speed to have a final look at the engine readouts. It is remarkably easy and very safe to ‘stop’ an aircraft of this ‘class’ in the 80 to 90 knot range if something is amiss; after this it becomes more difficult until it becomes unwise to attempt to stop at a higher speed (conditional). And so Gate 1 slides past all is well, now we need a ‘good’ speed to persuade the beast to leave the runway. Our friend Vx@100 seems to be a fair choice, so up we go, looking to accelerate to the lowest speed which will produce some climb performance; should an engine quit (airborne now runway gone). The easiest and quickest is Vxse 115, through that gate and the aircraft is now moving swiftly, the Vyse gate is behind in a heart beat and ‘cruise climb 160 KIAS is hot on its heels. Start to finish? What, perhaps 60 seconds. Stroll in the park. And so it is; until ‘something’ quits. To keep it simple, lets just lump the ‘quits’ compendium into one bucket and call it an engine failure.

Lets work backwards – say you are at 200 feet, 160 KIAS and climbing at 2000 feet per minute (FpM) and you go One Engine Inoperative (OEI); so what, it is an inconvenience and the paperwork is a nightmare; but you pedal it around and plonk it on the nearest suitable. Drinks all around.

Now, back to 200’. and you go OEI with 130 KIAS on the clock; problem. If you loose 5 knots, which is easy to do, you are back to a critical speed 125, provided you loose no more speed, then a performance climb to a safe height is possible. Should you go OEI at 125 KIAS the next safe speed is 121 for ‘climb performance’; it is terribly easy to loose those precious four or five knots; turbulence can rob you, slow reaction can rob you, incorrect technique can rob you of those precious few knots. But, if you go OEI below a single engine climb performance speed; you have a major problem.

The problem being that you need, indeed must, accelerate the aircraft to at least the lowest ‘climb’ speed. In order to achieve this, climbing must be put aside to avoid a further reduction in speed until the tombstone of Vmca appears on the clock. To accelerate at low level, OEI to a safe climb speed needs two essential elements; the most important of which is no obstacles at a greater height than you are. In short class, you need one essential element or the other to be available, preferably both, if you intend to get to the pub. Speed and height; Height and speed.

The King Air at Essendon had neither and failed to escape the clutches of the DFO.

There are serious questions to be answered related to the speed schedule; the aircraft was airborne with 116 KIAS ; only five knots shy of a performance climb speed and only one knot above the SEBAC speed. Why was there a progressive speed reduction to a terminal velocity of 108 KIAS instead of a level acceleration to a performance speed? Many ask why was the power not hauled off and the aircraft ‘dumped’ on the aerodrome. Sorry, far too many variables to say anything for sure.

To my Be20 qualified colleagues, I make my most sincere apologies for ‘brutalising’ and short hand handing the technicalities. “’twas a necessary evil M’luds”. MTF…..

Toot- toot.

[Kharon]

First coffee and stray thought whimsy.

First coffee with the Essendon flight path graphic; just put it up on screen and let the mind wander, picking up the stray thoughts and tugging at loose ends, cursing the lack of hard data. Nine seconds start to finish. 0858:43 to 0858:52 was all the time granted to ‘sort it’. In my time I have had some ten second experiences which seemed to take for ever to pass; also some ten second periods which flashed by, the adrenalin too slow only kicking afterwards.  The time taken to transit between reaction and positive action is an important element to flight; the time between the Oh crap moment and the nodding of thanks to the gods while the heart races. Then there is the setting of priorities; what to manage first; what can wait. The problem with hypothesis is situational subjectivity. The solution to one ‘situation’ may not work for all. A ‘flame out’ during take off (simple engine failure) is not the same animal as an uncontained fire with shrapnel caused by a failing turbine wheel. But the lessons learnt have created rules, written in blood, sealed by fire. In any event ‘control’ is the key, basic factor. Any pilot worth his salt will tell you the first few seconds of any ‘failure’ event during take off are critical, control of speed and direction vital. The aircraft must have a forward speed which will provide the essential lift; and, directional control to avoid hitting anything which will impede that forward progress.  

Back to the graphic: there are three basic questions which have not, as yet been answered. Those answers could be pivotal to any analysis:-




(i) When did the failure occur? The graphic is of no value here; the flight path @:43 shows a marked deviation from runway direction. One could, quite reasonably expect to see a positive correction to this by the @:46 had the ‘failure’ occurred @43. Using the distance radians provide by MPB, there appears to be 109 meters between abeam the runway and the impact obstacle (the DFO). One fifth of that distance is 22 meters. At the :46 mark, the aircraft has deviated (approximately) that far from the runway without a noticeable correction; why? The speed is good 116 KIAS is a workable number; flatten the climb a little, correct the tracking pick up another five or six knots and there is a fighting chance of survival. I’d bet 98% of pilots would have had the basic ‘corrections’ made by :46 clearly visible by :47. No matter what was occurring ‘under the bonnet’. Speed and direction, looking for height, routine, 101 stuff taught from the first time a multi engine aircraft is strapped on. It is almost an ‘instinct’ to remain within the confines of the runway, a matter of pride and long habit. So the continued deviation becomes important.

(ii) Why was the speed allowed to decay from a healthy 116 KIAS to a danger zone 108KIAS?  In combination with the deviation it speaks of a lack of control. Even a small heading correction would have seen the aircraft clear, by a whisker, the DFO; a little nose down would have brought the speed back to the 116, even 110 would have been fine to be going on with. Does this come down to a pilot with a heart attack (or similar). Could it be a combination – a freak – simultaneous engine failure and pilot failure. Figure the odds of that happening for a choc frog.

(iii) Flap was deployed and anecdotally at least the aircraft seemed ‘lazy’ , took a little while longer than ‘usual’ to reach rotation. Contradictions by the shed load. Firstly, we need to know that flap was deployed and whether the flap was retracted; it seems the undercarriage was not. The flight manual calls for Gear up, then flap. Flap is used to shorten the ground run, but there is a potential performance penalty airborne. So why use it at Essendon, a more than adequate runway length, then the long ground roll? Was there an incipient failure early in the piece ignored or not spotted; or, was the flap inadvertently extended beyond the setting used for take off? Been done before and it would go a long way to explaining some of the anomalies. Asymmetric flap another potential killer on the long list.

Aye well, only first coffee thoughts based on fresh air and a poor graphic. But for the budding multi engine pilot it is, without peer, a classic training picture. It should be made poster size and sent to every flying school in the land; for it illustrates the importance of getting the basics ‘spot on’.

Yes, yes, I know where my knitting is; I shall retrieve it directly.

Toot -toot.

P7 edit; my bold, my two bob bet.

[Kharon]

And so it begins:-

A while back I mentioned the complex, powerful ‘obligations’ placed on the registered owner of an aircraft and the registered ‘operator’. Curious, I kept a weather eye on ‘proceedings’. Looks like the trail to the AATA is running hot with our old mate Egon Fice as umpire for CASA v Owner/Operator word fest. The transcript and decision provide a classic example of the complexities of aviation law, the contradictions and the CASA use of the that situation.

The nailing down of the ‘legal’ operator and registered owner becomes important when the blame game begins, as it must when insurance, coroner, operator, owner and CASA meet to determine who did what, to whom and how much it’s all going to cost. Reading through the Fice ruling one gets the feeling that there is much more to follow and this is only the opening gambit.  

1. On 16 March 2017 Australian Corporate Jet Centres Pty Ltd (ACJC) lodged an application with the Tribunal seeking review of a decision made by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) on 16 February 2017 which it claimed it received on 22 February 2017. CASA’s decision was to amend the Australian Civil Aircraft Register (the Register) to show that ACJC was the Registered Operator of a Raytheon Aircraft Company B 200 (King Air) aircraft registration VH-ZCR. That aircraft was destroyed in an accident at Essendon airport on 21 February 2017 at about 9 a.m.

2. In its application, ACJC claimed that it had no involvement in the operation of the flight on 21 February 2017. The charter was not booked through ACJC; it was not conducted under ACJC’s Air Operator Certificate (AOC); and ACJC did not provide the flight crew or prepare the aircraft for flight. Furthermore, ACJC claimed that at no stage prior to the accident did CASA advise ACJC that it was considering reversing a prior refusal to register ACJC as the Registered Operator.

3. There being a question about the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to review either the decision made by CASA on 16 February 2017 or earlier decisions made by CASA following the lodgement of a Notice of Appointment/Cancellation of Registered Operator by the then current Registration Holder, BB1544 Pty Ltd, I need to briefly set out the events leading to that decision.

Students of matters aeronautical will appreciate the positioning and pre game manoeuvring as the denizens of Sleepy Hollow begin preparations for the match. But, selecting the pre game sacrifice always comes first. However:-

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – JURISDICTION – application for review of decision to amend Australian Civil Aircraft Register to show that applicant was Registered Operator of aircraft – applicant concedes that there is no jurisdiction to review decision as expressed in application for review – application for review of earlier refusal to register applicant as Registered Operator raised at jurisdiction hearing – whether a ‘reviewable decision’ within the definition in the Civil Aviation Act – refusal to amend Register cannot be regarded as refusal to grant or issue certificate – refusal to process application and amend Register does not constitute a variation of an authorisation – matter dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Toot toot. (Find a cuppa and a quiet corner, messy, but worth it).

PS. Just noted the inimitable 'Short-Field'  trading on the UP boards is also 'on the ball'. Choc Frog.

PPS. As requested – and to save repeating myself, links : One - Two - Three try to expand on the CASA position as explained to the Senate RRAT committee at the last estimates hearing. Only IMO of course; but FWIW,…….

[Peetwo]

CASA non-liability rule 101: Always blame the 'other guy' -    

Reference:

And so it begins:-

A while back I mentioned the complex, powerful ‘obligations’ placed on the registered owner of an aircraft and the registered ‘operator’. Curious, I kept a weather eye on ‘proceedings’. Looks like the trail to the AATA is running hot with our old mate Egon Fice as umpire for CASA v Owner/Operator word fest. The transcript and decision provide a classic example of the complexities of aviation law, the contradictions and the CASA use of the that situation.

The nailing down of the ‘legal’ operator and registered owner becomes important when the blame game begins, as it must when insurance, coroner, operator, owner and CASA meet to determine who did what, to whom and how much it’s all going to cost. Reading through the Fice ruling one gets the feeling that there is much more to follow and this is only the opening gambit.  

1. On 16 March 2017 Australian Corporate Jet Centres Pty Ltd (ACJC) lodged an application with the Tribunal seeking review of a decision made by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) on 16 February 2017 which it claimed it received on 22 February 2017. CASA’s decision was to amend the Australian Civil Aircraft Register (the Register) to show that ACJC was the Registered Operator of a Raytheon Aircraft Company B 200 (King Air) aircraft registration VH-ZCR. That aircraft was destroyed in an accident at Essendon airport on 21 February 2017 at about 9 a.m.

2. In its application, ACJC claimed that it had no involvement in the operation of the flight on 21 February 2017. The charter was not booked through ACJC; it was not conducted under ACJC’s Air Operator Certificate (AOC); and ACJC did not provide the flight crew or prepare the aircraft for flight. Furthermore, ACJC claimed that at no stage prior to the accident did CASA advise ACJC that it was considering reversing a prior refusal to register ACJC as the Registered Operator.

3. There being a question about the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to review either the decision made by CASA on 16 February 2017 or earlier decisions made by CASA following the lodgement of a Notice of Appointment/Cancellation of Registered Operator by the then current Registration Holder, BB1544 Pty Ltd, I need to briefly set out the events leading to that decision.

Students of matters aeronautical will appreciate the positioning and pre game manoeuvring as the denizens of Sleepy Hollow begin preparations for the match. But, selecting the pre game sacrifice always comes first. However:-

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – JURISDICTION – application for review of decision to amend Australian Civil Aircraft Register to show that applicant was Registered Operator of aircraft – applicant concedes that there is no jurisdiction to review decision as expressed in application for review – application for review of earlier refusal to register applicant as Registered Operator raised at jurisdiction hearing – whether a ‘reviewable decision’ within the definition in the Civil Aviation Act – refusal to amend Register cannot be regarded as refusal to grant or issue certificate – refusal to process application and amend Register does not constitute a variation of an authorisation – matter dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Toot toot. (Find a cuppa and a quiet corner, messy, but worth it).

PS. Just noted the inimitable 'Short-Field'  trading on the UP boards is also 'on the ball'. Choc Frog.

PPS. As requested – and to save repeating myself, links : One - Two - Three try to expand on the CASA position as explained to the Senate RRAT committee at the last estimates hearing. Only IMO of course; but FWIW,…….

Australian Corporate Jet Centres Pty Ltd and  Civil Aviation Safety Authority  [2017] AATA 403 (31 March 2017):

EVENTS LEADING TO THE REQUEST TO CHANGE THE REGISTERED OPERATOR

4. I had in evidence a statement made on 27 March 2017 by Mr Jurgen Schob, the Registrar employed by CASA responsible for the Register. Attached to that statement were documents which support what Mr Schob claimed were the relevant dates and events.

5. On 15 December 2016 CASA received a Form 032 (Notice of Appointment/Cancellation of Registered Operator) for aircraft VH-ZCR by email from the Registration Holder, BB 1544 Pty Ltd, stating that the appointment of MyJet Aviation Pty Ltd, the then Registered Operator, was cancelled with effect from 6 December 2016. That form also indicated that the Registration Holder (Mr Chris Richards) was cancelling the appointment of the current Registered Operator effective from 15 December 2016. The second part of that form, which deals with the appointment of a Registered Operator, was completed and signed by Mr Sam Iliades who described himself as the CEO of ACJC. The application was to appoint ACJC as the Registered Operator of VH-ZCR. The appointment application was also signed by Mr Richards in his capacity as the then Registration Holder. It is also dated 15 December 2016. The final page of Form 032 deals with Application Fees. The fee in this case amounted to $65 and Mr Richards provided credit card details to affect that payment.

6. In an email dated 16 December 2016 sent to MyJet Charter, Mr Shay Bonfini, a Client Service Centre Officer with CASA referred to the appointment/cancellation of the Registered Operator for aircraft VH-ZCR stating that the credit card payment was unable to be processed due to an error, said to be ‘Card expired’. Mr Bonfini attached a new payment page (page 6 of 6 on Form 032) requesting correct credit card details and that the person dealing with the email attach a scanned copy of the payment page when completed along with the correct details. Mr Bonfini also stated that the email was required by no later than mid-day on 20 December 2016, otherwise:

If I haven’t received the payment page or still can’t process the payment by noon Tuesday, 20th of December 2016, your application will not be accepted and will be returned to you.

7.In his statement Mr Schob said that CASA attempted to contact BB 1544 Pty Ltd on a landline and mobile number in an attempt to contact Mr Richards. Those attempts were not successful.

8.When no response was received from BB 1544 Pty Ltd, on 21 December 2016 Mr Bonfini sent another email to MyJet Charter attaching a refusal letter regarding the appointment or cancellation of the Registered Operator for aircraft VH-ZCR. This letter was not sent to ACJC.

9.Relevantly, that letter referred to Form 032 and stated:

...The notification has been assessed against the requirements, within the limitations of the documentation submitted. This assessment has found that the notification failed to meet the regulatory requirements and notification has been refused. Details of the problems can be found below.

Please note that you will need to lodge a new notification and included new payment before this matter can be considered further. CASA is required to recover costs for providing regulatory services and the fees charged are for processing and consideration of the notification, not for a successful outcome.
Problems with notification

•Payment has not been received.

On 16 December 2016 you were sent an email requesting that an amended payment page be submitted by 12pm 20th of December 2016.
Unfortunately CASA did not receive an amended payment page within the given timeframe, as a result your application has been closed and the assessment has not been conducted.

Please re-submit the application in full and include a new payment page.

10.Mr Iliades sent an email to CASA, Aircraft Registration, on 30 January 2017 seeking an update on the status of the registered operator for B200 VH-ZCR to Australian Corporate Jet Centres. That email was copied to a Mr Andrew Gibb. 

10.
11.CASA (Mr Karl Kumar) responded to Mr Iliades in an email dated 30 January 2017 stating:

I didn’t get what you meant by the below email. Have you put in an application for change of operator?

12.Mr Iliades responded on the same day confirming that he had, referring to ACJC. That statement was of course incorrect, the application form having been lodged by the Registration Holder. Mr Kumar responded to that email again on 30 January 2017 stating:

The only application I see was in December 2016, which was unsuccessful and sent back. The attached letter was emailed to ‘marty@myjetcharter.com.au’ on 21/12/2016.
13.On 31 January 2017 Mr Iliades sent an email to Aircraft Registration, stating the following:

Please see the attached application for change of operator for VH-ZCR as well as response from aircraft registrations, it looks like you have lost it somewhere in your system. Can we now please expedite this application.

14. That email also referred to the Notice of Appointment/Cancellation of Registered Operator which was emailed to CASA on 15 December 2016 asking whether anything needed to be changed. It also stated that a confirmation email from CASA regarding that application had been received. That confirmation letter had in fact been sent to Ms Clare Banfield of MyJet Aviation Pty Ltd. On 6 February 2017 CASA received the correct credit card details over the telephone from Ms Banfield and processed the application form.

15. On 16 February 2017 CASA amended the Register recording that ACJC was now the Registered Operator of aircraft VH-ZCR. On that day, CASA also sent letters to BB 1544 Pty Ltd and ACJC informing both the Registration Holder and the new Registered Operator that the Register had been amended in accordance with their request. That letter reminded the new Registered Operator, ACJC, of its obligations regarding the display of nationality and registration marks and aircraft registration and identification plates. It also stated:

The registered operator is responsible for the airworthiness and maintenance control of the aircraft. Essentially, this means that the registered operator is required to:

•Ensure that the aircraft is maintained in an airworthy and serviceable condition so that when it is operated, it is done safely. These responsibilities include making sure all the equipment needed for the flight is serviceable, that the aircraft has been inspected by the correct people and that the required maintenance has been completed and signed for.

•Have the aircraft maintained in accordance with a set of procedures and requirements commonly referred to as the Aircraft Maintenance Program (AMP) and to keep records of the work associated with these procedures and requirements. In addition, the registered operator should review the AMP regularly to make sure it is still effective for the aircraft and reflects any changes that have been made to the aircraft, the way the aircraft is operated or even where the aircraft is located. The registered operator can perform these functions or contract someone else to do so on their behalf.

16.On 20 February 2017 Mr Iliades sent an email to CASA, Aircraft Registration in which he stated:

Can you please tell me the status of the registered operator application for
VH-ZCR. I understand the wrong expiry date was provided which was rectified over the phone but I have [not] heard of anything since??

17.CASA responded by email on 21 February 2017 at 12:01 stating:

Your application was actioned on 16/02/2017. It should be on its way in the mail.

18.By that time of course, VH-ZCR had been destroyed in an accident at around 9 a.m. Mr Iliades sent a responding email at 1:27 PM to CASA stating:

Unfortunately this aircraft was destroyed in an accident today which you may have seen in the media, the plane was flown by Max Quatermaine [sic] under his AOC – Corporate and Leisure Travel and had nothing to do with our company. Sad news all round but we won’t be requiring the certificate.

FDS -
MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

CASA non-liability rule 101: Always blame the 'other guy' -    

Reference:

And so it begins:-

A while back I mentioned the complex, powerful ‘obligations’ placed on the registered owner of an aircraft and the registered ‘operator’. Curious, I kept a weather eye on ‘proceedings’. Looks like the trail to the AATA is running hot with our old mate Egon Fice as umpire for CASA v Owner/Operator word fest. The transcript and decision provide a classic example of the complexities of aviation law, the contradictions and the CASA use of the that situation.

The nailing down of the ‘legal’ operator and registered owner becomes important when the blame game begins, as it must when insurance, coroner, operator, owner and CASA meet to determine who did what, to whom and how much it’s all going to cost. Reading through the Fice ruling one gets the feeling that there is much more to follow and this is only the opening gambit.  

1. On 16 March 2017 Australian Corporate Jet Centres Pty Ltd (ACJC) lodged an application with the Tribunal seeking review of a decision made by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) on 16 February 2017 which it claimed it received on 22 February 2017. CASA’s decision was to amend the Australian Civil Aircraft Register (the Register) to show that ACJC was the Registered Operator of a Raytheon Aircraft Company B 200 (King Air) aircraft registration VH-ZCR. That aircraft was destroyed in an accident at Essendon airport on 21 February 2017 at about 9 a.m.

2. In its application, ACJC claimed that it had no involvement in the operation of the flight on 21 February 2017. The charter was not booked through ACJC; it was not conducted under ACJC’s Air Operator Certificate (AOC); and ACJC did not provide the flight crew or prepare the aircraft for flight. Furthermore, ACJC claimed that at no stage prior to the accident did CASA advise ACJC that it was considering reversing a prior refusal to register ACJC as the Registered Operator.

3. There being a question about the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to review either the decision made by CASA on 16 February 2017 or earlier decisions made by CASA following the lodgement of a Notice of Appointment/Cancellation of Registered Operator by the then current Registration Holder, BB1544 Pty Ltd, I need to briefly set out the events leading to that decision.

Students of matters aeronautical will appreciate the positioning and pre game manoeuvring as the denizens of Sleepy Hollow begin preparations for the match. But, selecting the pre game sacrifice always comes first. However:-

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – JURISDICTION – application for review of decision to amend Australian Civil Aircraft Register to show that applicant was Registered Operator of aircraft – applicant concedes that there is no jurisdiction to review decision as expressed in application for review – application for review of earlier refusal to register applicant as Registered Operator raised at jurisdiction hearing – whether a ‘reviewable decision’ within the definition in the Civil Aviation Act – refusal to amend Register cannot be regarded as refusal to grant or issue certificate – refusal to process application and amend Register does not constitute a variation of an authorisation – matter dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Toot toot. (Find a cuppa and a quiet corner, messy, but worth it).

PS. Just noted the inimitable 'Short-Field'  trading on the UP boards is also 'on the ball'. Choc Frog.

PPS. As requested – and to save repeating myself, links : One - Two - Three try to expand on the CASA position as explained to the Senate RRAT committee at the last estimates hearing. Only IMO of course; but FWIW,…….

Australian Corporate Jet Centres Pty Ltd and  Civil Aviation Safety Authority  [2017] AATA 403 (31 March 2017):

EVENTS LEADING TO THE REQUEST TO CHANGE THE REGISTERED OPERATOR

4. I had in evidence a statement made on 27 March 2017 by Mr Jurgen Schob, the Registrar employed by CASA responsible for the Register. Attached to that statement were documents which support what Mr Schob claimed were the relevant dates and events.

5. On 15 December 2016 CASA received a Form 032 (Notice of Appointment/Cancellation of Registered Operator) for aircraft VH-ZCR by email from the Registration Holder, BB 1544 Pty Ltd, stating that the appointment of MyJet Aviation Pty Ltd, the then Registered Operator, was cancelled with effect from 6 December 2016. That form also indicated that the Registration Holder (Mr Chris Richards) was cancelling the appointment of the current Registered Operator effective from 15 December 2016. The second part of that form, which deals with the appointment of a Registered Operator, was completed and signed by Mr Sam Iliades who described himself as the CEO of ACJC. The application was to appoint ACJC as the Registered Operator of VH-ZCR. The appointment application was also signed by Mr Richards in his capacity as the then Registration Holder. It is also dated 15 December 2016. The final page of Form 032 deals with Application Fees. The fee in this case amounted to $65 and Mr Richards provided credit card details to affect that payment.

6. In an email dated 16 December 2016 sent to MyJet Charter, Mr Shay Bonfini, a Client Service Centre Officer with CASA referred to the appointment/cancellation of the Registered Operator for aircraft VH-ZCR stating that the credit card payment was unable to be processed due to an error, said to be ‘Card expired’. Mr Bonfini attached a new payment page (page 6 of 6 on Form 032) requesting correct credit card details and that the person dealing with the email attach a scanned copy of the payment page when completed along with the correct details. Mr Bonfini also stated that the email was required by no later than mid-day on 20 December 2016, otherwise:

If I haven’t received the payment page or still can’t process the payment by noon Tuesday, 20th of December 2016, your application will not be accepted and will be returned to you.

7.In his statement Mr Schob said that CASA attempted to contact BB 1544 Pty Ltd on a landline and mobile number in an attempt to contact Mr Richards. Those attempts were not successful.

8.When no response was received from BB 1544 Pty Ltd, on 21 December 2016 Mr Bonfini sent another email to MyJet Charter attaching a refusal letter regarding the appointment or cancellation of the Registered Operator for aircraft VH-ZCR. This letter was not sent to ACJC.

9.Relevantly, that letter referred to Form 032 and stated:

...The notification has been assessed against the requirements, within the limitations of the documentation submitted. This assessment has found that the notification failed to meet the regulatory requirements and notification has been refused. Details of the problems can be found below.

Please note that you will need to lodge a new notification and included new payment before this matter can be considered further. CASA is required to recover costs for providing regulatory services and the fees charged are for processing and consideration of the notification, not for a successful outcome.
Problems with notification

•Payment has not been received.

On 16 December 2016 you were sent an email requesting that an amended payment page be submitted by 12pm 20th of December 2016.
Unfortunately CASA did not receive an amended payment page within the given timeframe, as a result your application has been closed and the assessment has not been conducted.

Please re-submit the application in full and include a new payment page.

10.Mr Iliades sent an email to CASA, Aircraft Registration, on 30 January 2017 seeking an update on the status of the registered operator for B200 VH-ZCR to Australian Corporate Jet Centres. That email was copied to a Mr Andrew Gibb. 

10.
11.CASA (Mr Karl Kumar) responded to Mr Iliades in an email dated 30 January 2017 stating:

I didn’t get what you meant by the below email. Have you put in an application for change of operator?

12.Mr Iliades responded on the same day confirming that he had, referring to ACJC. That statement was of course incorrect, the application form having been lodged by the Registration Holder. Mr Kumar responded to that email again on 30 January 2017 stating:

The only application I see was in December 2016, which was unsuccessful and sent back. The attached letter was emailed to ‘marty@myjetcharter.com.au’ on 21/12/2016.
13.On 31 January 2017 Mr Iliades sent an email to Aircraft Registration, stating the following:

Please see the attached application for change of operator for VH-ZCR as well as response from aircraft registrations, it looks like you have lost it somewhere in your system. Can we now please expedite this application.

14. That email also referred to the Notice of Appointment/Cancellation of Registered Operator which was emailed to CASA on 15 December 2016 asking whether anything needed to be changed. It also stated that a confirmation email from CASA regarding that application had been received. That confirmation letter had in fact been sent to Ms Clare Banfield of MyJet Aviation Pty Ltd. On 6 February 2017 CASA received the correct credit card details over the telephone from Ms Banfield and processed the application form.

15. On 16 February 2017 CASA amended the Register recording that ACJC was now the Registered Operator of aircraft VH-ZCR. On that day, CASA also sent letters to BB 1544 Pty Ltd and ACJC informing both the Registration Holder and the new Registered Operator that the Register had been amended in accordance with their request. That letter reminded the new Registered Operator, ACJC, of its obligations regarding the display of nationality and registration marks and aircraft registration and identification plates. It also stated:

The registered operator is responsible for the airworthiness and maintenance control of the aircraft. Essentially, this means that the registered operator is required to:

•Ensure that the aircraft is maintained in an airworthy and serviceable condition so that when it is operated, it is done safely. These responsibilities include making sure all the equipment needed for the flight is serviceable, that the aircraft has been inspected by the correct people and that the required maintenance has been completed and signed for.

•Have the aircraft maintained in accordance with a set of procedures and requirements commonly referred to as the Aircraft Maintenance Program (AMP) and to keep records of the work associated with these procedures and requirements. In addition, the registered operator should review the AMP regularly to make sure it is still effective for the aircraft and reflects any changes that have been made to the aircraft, the way the aircraft is operated or even where the aircraft is located. The registered operator can perform these functions or contract someone else to do so on their behalf.

16.On 20 February 2017 Mr Iliades sent an email to CASA, Aircraft Registration in which he stated:

Can you please tell me the status of the registered operator application for
VH-ZCR. I understand the wrong expiry date was provided which was rectified over the phone but I have [not] heard of anything since??

17.CASA responded by email on 21 February 2017 at 12:01 stating:

Your application was actioned on 16/02/2017. It should be on its way in the mail.

18.By that time of course, VH-ZCR had been destroyed in an accident at around 9 a.m. Mr Iliades sent a responding email at 1:27 PM to CASA stating:

Unfortunately this aircraft was destroyed in an accident today which you may have seen in the media, the plane was flown by Max Quatermaine [sic] under his AOC – Corporate and Leisure Travel and had nothing to do with our company. Sad news all round but we won’t be requiring the certificate.

Update - Via 'The Age' tonight  

Company told hours after Essendon DFO crash that plane was in its name

• Tom Cowie
  
• Liam Mannix
  

The aviation company potentially facing a multimillion-dollar lawsuit over the Essendon DFO disaster was told three hours after the crash that the plane involved had been registered in its name.

As the wreckage smouldered at 12.01pm on February 21, and it was confirmed that five lives had been lost, Australian Corporate Jet Centres received an email from the aviation authority confirming it was the plane's registered operator.

The company's CEO replied at 1.27pm: "Unfortunately this aircraft was destroyed in an accident today which you may have seen in the media, the plane was flown by Max Quatermaine [sic] under his AOC – Corporate and Leisure Travel and had nothing to do with our company. Sad news all round but we won't be requiring the certificate."

With the threat of lawsuits and insurance payouts mounting over Victoria's worst aviation disaster in 30 years, the Essendon-based company has sought to have its registration overturned.

Firefighters at the scene of the plane crash at the Essendon DFO.  Photo: Jason South  

Australian Corporate Jet Centres claims it was not responsible for the plane due to an administrative bungle over a $65 application fee in December.

Civil Aviation Safety Authority records show Australian Corporate Jet Centres became the registered operator of VH-ZCR on February 16, just five days before it went down.

Emails published in a finding by the Commonwealth's Administrative Appeals Tribunal show the company did not find out its application to transfer registration had been approved until midday on February 21 – three hours after the crash at 8.58am.

"Your application was actioned ... it should be on its way in the mail," CASA wrote in the email sent at 12.01pm.

The devastation caused by the crash. Photo: Seven News  

With the media spotlight intensifying and emergency services still on the scene, the company's CEO, Sam Iliades, replied to CASA telling it that the plane had gone down. The plane was being flown by pilot Max Quartermain under his air operator certificate, he wrote.

The company continues to maintain that position: "It was not our air operator's certificate, not our client, not our revenue, not our pilot," Australian Corporate Jet Centres said in a statement on Monday.

Smoke rises from the scene. Photo: Nine News  

Fairfax Media understands just who was legally responsible for the flight is still being investigated.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau has been sifting through the wreckage of the plane, trying to piece together what caused it to go down shortly after take-off.


 Photo: ATSB
 
A recent preliminary report found that both engines and propellers appeared to be in working order at the time of the flight and that there was no evidence of mechanical failure.

Australian Corporate Jet Centres recently applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to have the CASA registration decision overturned but the matter was dismissed due to a lack of jurisdiction.

The matter was taken to the tribunal after the company originally had its application to become the plane's operator cancelled in late December because incorrect credit card details were used to pay the $65 application fee.

According to emails published in the tribunal finding, the company was not informed its application had been cancelled.

On January 30 the company emailed the regulator to find out what the delay was, only to be told the transfer had not gone through.

A new application was submitted and approved just over two weeks later.

CASA updated its register on February 16, sending out a letter to Australian Corporate Jet Centres and the previous registered operator, MyJet Aviation, informing them of the change.

The letter also contained a reminder of the operator's obligations.

These included the display of nationality and registration marks, as well as responsibility for airworthiness and maintenance. 

When the letter hadn't arrived by February 20, Mr Iliades sent another email asking CASA about the "status of the registered operator application".

The response came a day later, when the plane had already crashed.

Any lawsuit could run into tens of millions of dollars, with the family of the passengers plus the hundreds of people who witnessed the crash all having a potential claim. At least three law firms have been retained, Fairfax understands.

"[The case] could generate a very large lawsuit for the entity that is found to be responsible under the law of negligence for the air crash by a court," Shine Lawyers aviation department manager Thomas Janson said.

Negligence is yet to be proved in the case, as investigators continue to work through the plane's wreckage. But if it could be proved, hundreds of bystanders who saw the flight go down might be able to claim for nervous shock, Mr Janson said.

MTF...P2